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THE

ROMAN HISTORY,

FROM THE

BUILDING OF ROME

TO THE

RUIN OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

ILLUSTRATED WITH MAPS.

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BY

N. HOOKE, ESQ.

A NEW EDITION, IN ELEVEN VOLUMES.

VOL. IV.

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1818.

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TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

HUGH, EARL OF MARCHMONT.

MY LORD,

PERMIT me to lay hold of this fair occasion, publicly to congratulate your lordship upon that true glory, the consenting praise of the honest and the wise, which you have so early acquired. "When men have performed any virtuous actions, or such as sit easy upon their memories, it is a reasonable pleasure" (says a philosophical writer,* who speaks contemptuously enough of renown after death) "to have the testimony of the world added to that of their own consciences, that they have done well." My Lord, you have not only this pleasure, but another, no less reasonable, and more exquisite, attending a character like yours, the being able to do much good to others. To those whom you distinguish by particular marks of your good opinion you give reputation; and I have happily experienced, that reputation, so derived, is not mere air and fruitless. Through that warmth of good

* Mr. Wollaston.

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will which your Lordship, on all occasions, expresses for me, I have profited, greatly profited, by your glory. You, my Lord, can be no stranger to this truth; yet I trust you will forgive me, if, to draw still more advantage from your fame, I here take the liberty to tell your Lordship in print, for the information of others, what you knew before: as a player, when alone on the stage, speaks aloud to himself, that he may be heard by those who fill the theatre, I would, by this dedication of my book to your Lordship, publish, as far as by such means I can, that you, my Lord, are my patron and my friend; and that I am, with the greatest respect, esteem, and gratitude,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's

Most faithful, and

Most humble Servant,

N. HOOKE.

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BOOK IV.

From the Beginning of the FIRST PUNIC WAR, *in the Year of Rome* 489, *to the End of the* SECOND, *in* 552.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAP. I.

THE OCCASION OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.

CERTAIN Italian soldiers, called Mamertines, who had been mercenaries in the service of Agathocles, king of Sicily, and had, after his death, treacherously seized upon Messina, being reduced to extremities by the arms of Hiero, king of Syracuse, one part of them puts the citadel into the hands of the Carthaginians, and the other sends ambassadors to the Romans, offering them the possession of the city, and imploring their protection. The people of Rome order the consul, Appius Claudius, to go with an army to the relief of the Mamertines, who, in the meantime, rid themselves of the Carthaginians that had been admitted into the citadel.

HIERO, K. of Syracuse.

Y. R. 489.

CHAP. II.

FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD YEARS OF THE WAR.

The Carthaginians, in conjunction with Hiero, king of Syracuse, who had entered into a league with them, besiege Messina. Appius Claudius lands in Sicily, defeats the allies, and forces them to raise the siege. The next

490. year, Hiero, for a hundred talents of silver, purchases a
491. peace with Rome, and the year following assists the Romans in taking Agrigentum from the Carthaginians.

CHAP. III.

THE FOURTH AND FIFTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

492. In the consulship of L. Valerius and T. Otacilius, Rome fits out a fleet of a hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes, in order to dispute with the Carthaginians the do-
493. minion of the sea. One of the consuls of the next year, Cornelius Asina, falls into the enemy's hands, together with seventeen of his galleys; but the other consul, C.
DUILIUS. Duilius, gains a memorable victory over the Carthaginian fleet, near Mylæ, chiefly by means of a new-invented engine for grappling and boarding the enemy's ships.

CHAP. IV.

THE SIXTH, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

494. Four thousand Samnites conspire with certain discontented slaves to plunder and burn Rome, but are seasonably discovered and punished. The Romans invade Corsica and Sardinia with success. A quarrel in Sicily between the Roman army and their Sicilian auxiliaries, gives the
495. enemy some advantages in that island. Next year several towns there surrendered to one of the consuls; and the other surprises the enemy's fleet in a port of Sardinia, and takes many of the ships; whereupon the Carthaginian
496. sailors mutiny, and crucify their admiral. The Romans are again conquerors in an engagement at sea near the Tyndaris.

CHAP. V.

THE NINTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

497. To oblige Carthage to recal her armies from Sicily, Rome undertakes to transfer the war into Africa. In this view, both the consuls are sent out with a fleet of 330 ships of war, and an army of near 140,000 men. They gain a complete victory over the enemy's fleet near Ecnomus, and afterwards land in Africa. One of the consuls

returns to Italy with the greater part of the fleet and the army, leaving his colleague Regulus to pursue the war.— The Roman general, after taking several towns, routs the land forces of the Carthaginians near Adis, and then offers peace to the republic, but upon conditions that are rejected with indignation. REGULUS.

CHAP. VI.

The senate of Carthage intrust Xantippus, a Lacedæmonian, with the command of their army. By his excellent conduct he totally defeats the Romans in a pitched battle, and takes Regulus prisoner. XANTIPPUS

CHAP. VII.

FROM THE NINTH TO THE FOURTEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

Rome despatches her new consuls into Africa, with a great fleet, to bring off the remains of Regulus's army, which after the late battle had taken refuge in Clypea.— The consuls gain a victory over the Carthaginian fleet, near the promontory of Mercury; they land at Clypea, and take the legionaries on board; but in their passage home meet with so terrible a storm, that of above four hundred vessels, only fourscore escape destruction. The Romans fit out a new fleet, with which the succeeding consuls pass into Sicily, and there reduce some towns.— Next year, 150 Roman ships perishing by tempest, the republic gives over all thoughts of naval enterprises, and resolves to depend entirely upon her land forces; but those are so much afraid of the Carthaginian elephants, that for two years together they dare not face the enemy in battle, or even appear in the plain field. This terror among the legions, and the advantage which the enemy had of being able, at pleasure, to supply their maritime towns with recruits and provisions, make the Roman senate resolve to try once more the fortune of Rome at sea. In the meantime, the Roman general in Sicily draws the Carthaginians into a snare, routs their whole army, and kills or takes all the elephants. 498. 499. 500. 501, 502. 503.

CHAP. VIII.

Carthage disheartened by her losses sends ambassadors to Rome, and together with them, the captive Regulus, to treat of a peace. Regulus dissuades the senate from hearkening to the overture, and even from consenting to an exchange of prisoners. In performance of his word given he returns to Carthage, and there, soon after, dies.

CHAP. IX.

FROM THE FOURTEENTH TO THE EIGHTEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

The consuls set sail with the fleet for Sicily, and lay
503. siege to Lilybæum. Hamilco, the Carthaginian commander in the city, makes a vigorous defence. In the meantime a squadron of ships from Africa passes through the Roman navy, and lands 10,000 men in the town; which being afterwards straitly shut up, one Hannibal, a Rhodian, undertakes to go thither with a single galley, and bring intelligence to the senate of Carthage of the condition of the besieged; and he succeeds. The garrison in a sally burn all the towers and engines employed against their town; after which, the Romans turn the siege into a block-
504. ade. Next year the consul Claudius Pulcher, attempting to surprise Drepanum, is by the governor of the place defeated at sea, and loses the greatest part of his fleet. The rest of the Roman navy, under the other consul and his quæstors, is, by the Carthaginian admiral, forced upon the south coast of Sicily, where every one of the ships perishing by storm, Rome once more renounces the empire of the seas. Her general in Sicily gets possession of the city of Eryx. The following year produces no remarkable action between the contending parties. The Carthaginian army, for want of pay, mutiny against their general. He is recalled home, and succeeded in the command by Amilcar Barcha, father of the famous Hannibal.

HANNIBAL the Rhodian.

CLAUDIUS PULCHER.

CHAP. X.

FROM THE EIGHTEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR TO THE END OF IT, IN THE TWENTY-THIRD OR TWENTY-FOURTH YEAR AFTER ITS COMMENCEMENT.

Amilcar, after quieting the discontents of the army, and making a successful expedition on the coast of Italy, encamps on a mountain between Panormus and Eryx in Sicily, and there maintains his post against all the efforts of the Romans for almost three years. At length (in 508) he finds means to seize upon the city of Eryx, situated on the side of a high mountain; and though hard pressed by a Roman garrison at the top of the mountain, and a Roman army at the foot of it, yet in two years' time they are not able to dislodge him. The senate of Rome finding it impossible to complete the conquest of Sicily without a naval strength, a considerable fleet is fitted out at the expense of private citizens, the public treasury being exhausted. This new fleet, under the conduct of Lutatius Catulus, obtaining a complete victory over that of the enemy, near the Ægates, the Carthaginians are constrained to yield to the Romans, by a treaty of peace, the whole island of Sicily; which, except the little kingdom of Syracuse, is reduced to the form of a province. At Rome the tribes are augmented to thirty-five, which number they never after exceeded.

AMILCAR BARCHA.

506, 507, 508, 509, 510.

511. LUTATIUS CATULUS.

512. 35 Tribes.

CHAP. XI.

The Falisci, a people of Hetruria, rebel against the Romans, but in a few days are forced to submit. Carthage is reduced to great extremities in a war, which for more than three years is carried on against her, by her foreign mercenaries in conjunction with her African subjects. The conduct of the Romans upon this occasion.

CHAP. XII.

For three years the Romans, having no war to maintain, employ themselves in establishing good order in Italy,

512, 513, 514.

and planting colonies in the neighbourhood of the Gauls and Ligurians. The republic desires to assist Ptolemy king of Egypt against Antiochus of Syria; but the Egyptian civilly declines the offer. At length the Boian Gauls breaking the peace with Rome, and the Ligurians being
515. in motion, the Romans take the field. The consul Valerius is vanquished in a battle with the Boian Gauls. He afterwards defeats them, while his colleague obtains
516. a victory over the Ligurians. Next year the Romans act entirely on the defensive against the Boians; but offensively against the Ligurians, and with success. At Rome
517. the secular games are celebrated. The new consuls march against the Boians and Ligurians, who having called in to their assistance an army of Transalpine Gauls, take umbrage at their numbers, fall upon them, and put them to flight. The conquerors, weakened by their victory, are obliged to make peace with the Romans. The Corsicans in the meantime rebel, with whom Claudius Clycias, being sent against them, enters into a treaty, on terms dishonourable to the republic. She refuses to adhere to the treaty, delivers up Claudius to the resentment of the Corsicans, and then subdues them by force of arms. The Corsicans, in conjunction with Carthage, stir up the Sardinians to revolt. Hereupon Rome threatens the African republic with a war, but is diverted from it by an embassy from Carthage: and Sardinia being easily reduced the next year, the temple of Janus is shut for the
518. first time since the reign of Numa Pompilius. A few months after, the Ligurians, Corsicans, and Sardinians
519. take arms again. The first instance of a divorce at Rome.
520. Marriage settlements introduced. Fabius Maximus the consul subdues the Ligurians; his colleague triumphs for his exploits against the Sardinians. At the motion of Æbutius, a tribune of the people, the judicature of the
Centumvirs centumvirs is erected. The following year Flaminius, another tribune of the people, proposes a law for dividing
521. amongst the poor citizens of Rome some lands lately taken from the Gauls. In obedience to his father he desists from his enterprise; but one of his colleagues carries it on, and succeeds, notwithstanding the opposition of the
522. senate. Sardinia and Corsica, now entirely subdued, are reduced to the form of a Roman province; and the con-

queror of this latter island being refused a triumph, gives the first example of assuming that honour against the will of the senate.

CHAP. XIII.

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR.

The Romans send ambassadors to Teuta, queen of a part 523.
of Illyricum, to complain of the piracies of her subjects. Teuta, offended at the haughty behaviour of one of the ambassadors, causes them all to be murdered in their return home. To revenge this insult, Rome employs both 524.
her consuls, who, assisted by Demetrius of Pharos, successfully begin the war; which is finished in the following year by a treaty of peace, dictated by the republic. 525.
Her acquaintance with the Greeks commences at this time.

CHAP. XIV.

The Gauls on both sides the Po take arms. To oppose 526.
these formidable enemies, the Romans make extraordinary 527.
preparations; and the next year obtain a complete victory over them. Yet the following consuls make no progress in the war. Their successors, though Rome, terrified by
prodigies, had ordered them to return to the city, hazard 529.
a pitched battle, and gain the victory. Claudius Mar- 530.
cellus vanquishes in single combat the general of the Gauls, who, discouraged by his death, are put to flight. 531.
Insubria and Liguria submit, and are made one province, which takes the name of Cisalpine Gaul. Istria on the 532.
Adriatic is subdued by the republic.

CHAP. XV.

THE SECOND ILLYRIAN WAR.

Demetrius of Pharos, whom Rome had appointed guardian to the young Illyrian king, despises her orders, and attacks her allies. The present consuls being obliged to abdicate their office, and the season being too far advanced
for their successors to begin a new war, Æmilius Paulus, 533,

534. and his colleague Livius Salinator, go the next year with an army into Illyricum. Demetrius flies for protection to the court of Philip of Macedon. Livius, on his return to Rome, is condemned by the tribes, for having applied part of the spoil to his own use. Roman colonies are planted at Placentia and Cremona, in the territories of the Gauls.

CHAP. XVI.

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR, OR THE WAR OF HANNIBAL.—ITS CAUSES AND COMMENCEMENT.

The spirit of revenge with which Amilcar left Sicily, and which he communicated to his son Hannibal, is reckoned the first cause of the second Punic war. The unjust seizure of Sardinia by the Romans, the second and principal cause. The successive victories of Amilcar, Asdrubal, and Hannibal in Spain, the third cause.

HANNIBAL. Hannibal attacks the Saguntines, a people in alliance with Rome, and the only Spaniards who, on the south of the Iberus, remained unsubdued to the Carthaginian dominion. He reduces Saguntum, after a siege of eight
535. months. The Romans order Sempronius, one of their consuls, into Africa, and P. Cornelius Scipio, the other consul, into Spaln, and at the same time send an embassy to Carthage, demanding that Hannibal should be delivered up to them, to be punished for his unjust infraction of the peace between the two republics: this being refused, and war denounced on both sides, the Carthaginian general settles the affairs of Spain, leaves his brother Asdrubal to command on the south side of the Iberus, and crosses that river with a great army.

CHAP. XVII.

Hannibal, after subduing all the country between the Iberus and the Pyrenees, passes those mountains with his army, in his way to Italy. He proceeds to the banks of the Rhone without molestation. There the Gauls in vain oppose his passage; nor can the consul Scipio, who, arriving at the mouth of the Rhone, gets notice of the place where Hannibal is, advance expeditiously enough to stop him. Scipio re-embarks his forces, sends the major part of

them forward to Spain, but returns himself to Italy, that he may meet Hannibal at his descent from the Alps. The Carthaginians with great danger and fatigue pass those mountains, lay siege to Turin, and take it. The Romans, astonished at the news of Hannibal's being in Italy, whom they thought to have confined to Spain, despatch orders to the consul Sempronius, now at Lilybæum, to hasten to the defence of his country. Scipio, in the meantime, crosses the Po, and advances to meet the enemy.

CHAP. XVIII.

Battle of the TICIN.

The Roman horse and light-armed infantry under Scipio are defeated at the TICIN by the Carthaginian cavalry. The consul retires to the neighbourhood of Placentia: Hannibal follows him, and offers battle; which the Roman declines. Scipio distrusting the Gauls, some of whom had gone over to the enemy, removes to the high grounds near the Trebia, and there waits the arrival of his colleague.

CHAP. XIX.

The TREBIA.

Sempronius having joined Scipio, and being encouraged by a slight advantage he had gained over a party of the enemy, ventures, notwithstanding the remonstrances of his colleague, to fight a pitched battle with them at the TREBIA. The Roman army is totally defeated, and all the nations of the Gauls declare for Hannibal. The senate make vigorous preparations to support the war. Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius are raised to the consulate, and the affairs of the republic prosper in Spain, under the direction of Cn. Scipio. Hannibal, to gain friends in Italy, dismisses, without ransom, all those of his prisoners who are of the Roman allies. Dreading the levity of the Gauls, he crosses the Apennines, and enters Hetruria through the marshes, where his army suffers extremely, and he himself loses one of his eyes. 536.

CHAP. XX.

THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR.

The Lake THRASYMENUS.

Flaminius, raised to the consulship by the favour of the people, fears lest the augurs should declare his election in-

valid. Neglecting therefore the usual ceremonies of religion, he hastens to Ariminum, where he takes upon him the command of the forces, and from thence, at the head of four legions, marches to Aretium in Hetruria.—Hannibal lays an ambush for him on the banks of the lake Thrasymenus, and routs his whole army. The consul himself is slain in the action; and a few days after, a body of 4000 horse, that had been sent to his assistance, fall into the hands of the enemy. Rome, terrified at these misfortunes, names Q. Fabius Maximus to be pro-dictator, and appoints Minucius Rufus to be his general of the horse. Hannibal, in the meantime, ravages Italy quite to Apulia. Thither Fabius follows him, but keeps on the hills, and declines a general engagement. The Carthaginian, to provoke him to fight, pillages the fine country of Campania. Hannibal, by a stratagem, deceives Fabius, who imagined that the Carthaginian would not be able to get out of Campania, a country surrounded partly by high mountains and partly by the sea. The cautious circumspective conduct of Fabius giving offence at Rome, the *comitia* divide the command of the army between him and his general of the horse. Minucius, now at the head of half the troops, and proud of an advantage he had gained in an encounter with the enemy, descends into the plain, hazards a battle with Hannibal, and is on the point of being totally routed; but Fabius rescues him from danger. The two brothers, Publius and Cneius Scipio, in the meantime, carry on the war with success in Spain, where the hostages, which Carthage had obliged the Spaniards to give her, are betrayed into the hands of the Romans.

CHAP. XXI.

THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR.

537. C. Terentius Varro, by the intrigues of a tribune of the people, is raised to the consulship, and L. Æmilius Paulus is appointed his colleague. Rome, weary of dilatory arts, sends both her consuls, at the head of a mighty army, to dispute once more with Hannibal the superiority in the field. The armies approach each other in a plain country near Cannæ in Apulia. Æmilius, disliking the ground, advises his colleague not to fight; but Varro, on

CANNÆ.

a day when it is his turn to command, gives battle to the enemy, and is totally defeated with the slaughter of almost all his troops. Many of the allies of Rome go over to the conqueror.

CHAP. XXII.

Some young Romans of distinction resolving in despair to forsake Italy, Scipio (afterwards surnamed Africanus) obliges them to take an oath never to abandon the republic. And while the people of Rome are in the utmost consternation and despondency, the senate preserve their courage, and make all possible preparations for the defence of their country. They even solemnly give thanks to Varro, for that he had not despaired of the commonwealth. A dictator is named to govern the state; levies are made with all diligence; the slaves are enlisted for the service; all ranks of men bring their gold and silver into the public treasury, and the silver coin is now first alloyed with copper. In the meantime, by the permission of Hannibal, a deputation from the Roman prisoners in his camp arrives at Rome, and petitions the senate to ransom the captives. The conscript fathers deny the request. Capua, resolving to shake off the Roman yoke, demands of the republic that Rome and Capua should for the future be upon a perfect equality; this proposal being rejected with disdain, the Capuans deliver up their city to Hannibal. The Carthaginian despatches his brother Mago to Carthage, with an account of his success; the senate vote him a supply of men and money, but are very dilatory in sending it. The Roman dictator takes the field with a considerable army, and Hannibal, after making some fruitless attempts upon Naples and Nola, lays siege to Casilinum; the garrison of which place, after a stout defence, at length capitulates. Rome not being in a condition to provide for the fleets and armies in Sicily and Sardinia, her allies in those islands assist her by their contributions. The senate having lost a great number of their members in the war, a dictator is chosen for the sole business of filling the vacant places. He names 177 new senators.

CHAP. XXIII.

FOURTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

538. Sempronius Gracchus and Posthumius Albinus are raised to the consulship. The latter being cut off, together with all his army, by the Gauls, the senate resolve to send no more armies into Gaul. Fabius Cunctator is chosen in the room of the late consul. Hannibal enters into a treaty with king Philip of Macedon, whose ambassadors, in their return home, are taken at sea and carried to Rome. The senate resolve to keep the Macedonian out of Italy, by making war upon him in his own country. The campaign in Italy passes in expeditions of no great importance, and the Romans, though they have many armies in the field, never hazard a general action against Hannibal. Their arms prosper in Sardinia and Spain. In Sicily, king Hiero being dead, his grandson and successor Hieronymus makes an alliance with Carthage, and is soon after assassinated by his own subjects.

FABIUS CUNCTATOR.

PHILIP of Macedon.

CHAP. XXIV.

FIFTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

When the *comitia* at Rome were going to raise T. Otacilius to the consulate, Fabius, the president of the assembly, knowing the insufficiency of the candidate, hinders his election, and is himself chosen together with Claudius Marcellus. The Roman citizens remarkably show their zeal for the republic. The soldiers serve without pay, and fleets are equipped at the expense of private men. Sempronius is said to have defeated an army of Carthaginians under Hanno, and Marcellus to have gained an advantage over Hannibal. Fabius besieges and takes Casilinum, while the prætor Lævinus begins the war in Greece against king Philip.

539. MARCELLUS.

CHAP. XXV.

Hippocrates and Epicydes, two of Hannibal's agents in Sicily, get themselves, by intrigue, chosen prætors of Sy-

racuse; yet the inhabitants of that city enter soon after into a league with Marcellus, then commander of the Roman army in the island. The Hannibalists, going to Leontini, persuade the Leontines to a rupture with the Romans; Marcellus takes the place at the first assault: nevertheless the Hannibalists not only make their escape, but by artifice and singular boldness find means to return to Syracuse, with an army under their command. They are re-elected prætors, and become absolute masters of the city. Marcellus lays close siege to it, but by the wonderful engines of Archimedes is constrained to turn the siege into a blockade. ARCHIMEDES.

CHAP. XXVI.

SIXTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

The following year, the Romans take some towns from the Carthaginians in Italy. Hanno routs a præfect of the allies in Bruttium, and cuts off almost all his army. In Spain the two Scipios make considerable progress. They also engage Syphax, a Numidian king, to commence a war with the Carthaginians in Africa. The latter, in conjunction with Gala, (another Numidian king) fall upon Syphax and defeat him with great slaughter. Marcellus continues the blockade of Syracuse, and with part of his forces reduces several towns, while many others declare for Carthage. 540.

CHAP. XXVII.

SEVENTH AND EIGHTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

Hannibal, by means of intelligence with some of the inhabitants of Tarentum, gets possession of the city. The Roman garrison retires into the citadel. Hanno, whom the Carthaginian general had sent to supply Capua with corn, is defeated by the consul Fulvius. Thurium, and the Metapontines, submit to Hannibal's officers. The consuls proposing to besiege Capua, send for Sempronius Gracchus to assist them. In his way he is betrayed into the hands of the enemy and slain. Hannibal advances to the defence of Capua, and begins a battle with the con- 541.

suls, which an accident puts an end to. The Roman generals decamp in the night; Hannibal follows one of them, but missing him, attacks another commander, Centenius Pænula, and destroys almost his whole army. After this, he falls upon the prætor Fulvius, cuts off 16,000 of his men, and takes his camp. In the meantime the consuls, in conjunction with the forces of Claudius Nero, besiege Capua in form.

During these transactions, Marcellus makes himself master of a part of Syracuse, and encamps within the walls. An army of Carthaginians and Sicilians come to the relief of the Syracusians. A plague makes great havoc in both camps. Hippocrates and all the Carthaginian soldiers are carried off by it; and the Sicilians disband themselves. Epicydes deserts Syracuse, and the inhabitants begin a treaty with Marcellus; during the course of which, a Spanish officer, corrupted by the Roman general, betrays Ortygia to him; whereupon the Syracusians immediately surrender to him Achradina, and he gives both up to be plundered. Archimedes is slain.

SYRACUSE taken.

542. In the consulship of P. Sulpicius Galba and Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, Hannibal marches to the relief of Capua, now greatly distressed for want of provisions. After some vain efforts to draw the Romans to a battle, or break into the town, he suddenly marches away, and appears before the walls of Rome, in hopes the army before Capua, or part of it, would hasten to the defence of the capitol. The consuls issue out of the city to oppose him, but keep to the high grounds. Hannibal marches back towards Capua; but finding that none of the besiegers had stirred, he turns upon the consuls, who were following him, and forces their camp in the night, with great slaughter. Despairing of being able to raise the siege of Capua, he with wonderful rapidity traverses Apulia, Lucania, and Bruttium, in the view of surprising Rhegium, and is very near succeeding in his design. Capua surrenders to the Romans, and is treated with extreme rigour. In Greece, Lævinus draws the Ætolians and several other states into a confederacy against Philip of Macedon.

CHAP. XXVIII.

NINTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

T. Lævinus and Marcellus are promoted to the consulship. The latter is accused by the Syracusians of cruelty and injustice before the senate, who acquit him. The Campanians in vain complain of the rigorous proceedings of Fulvius Flaccus. Salapia in Apulia is betrayed to Marcellus, who takes two more cities in Samnium. Fulvius Centumalus venturing a battle with Hannibal, is totally defeated. The consul Lævinus, in the meantime, finishes the reduction of Sicily. 543.

A Map of ANCIENT GAUL.
BATAVORUM INSULÆ plenior descriptio
Ancient Roman Miles.
British Statute Miles.
Longitude 4 West.
Longitude East 6 from Greenwich.
OCEANUS GALLICUS vel AQUITANICUS
MARE INTERNUM
GERMANIA
ITALIA
HISPANIA
Londinum
London
Lugdunum Lugdunensis
Lutetia Parisiorum
Aurelianum
Mediolanum Aulercorum
Burdigala
Tolosa
Narbo
Massilia
Lugdunum Convenarum
Tarbellicus Sinus
Aquæ Sextiæ
Aquæ Apollinares
Aquæ Mortuæ
Aquæ Tarbellicæ
Aquæ Augustæ
Aquæ Sextiæ
Aquæ Vertiæ

A

DISSERTATION

ON THE

CREDIBILITY

OF THE

HISTORY OF THE FIRST 500 YEARS OF ROME.

THE famous Turenne, (as we learn from the history of his life) when he was about twelve years old, sent a challenge to an officer, who had affronted him by saying, that Quintus Curtius's history of Alexander the Great was a mere romance. I do not wish that our young gentlemen, who have begun to delight themselves in the Roman history, should carry their resentments so far against M. de Beaufort, author of a work, entitled "Dissertation sur l'Incertitude des cinq premiers Siecles de l'Histoire Romaine[1]:" yet I think they may reasonably look upon him as an enemy, who seeks to deprive them of a considerable part of their pleasures; and that they ought to be upon their guard against him. And, for my own part, I cannot readily consent to have my grave remarks upon certain passages of the history reduced to the importance of those, by which some industrious chronologer should fix the precise year when Noah's grand-daughter Cesara fled into Ireland to escape the deluge. For the sake therefore of us Romanists, I once

Ramsay's life of the Viscount de Turenne.

Topog. Hibern. p. 135, 136. apud M. de Pouilli.

[1] A dissertation on the uncertainty of the history of the first five ages of Rome.

proposed to have gone through the whole of M. de B.'s Dissertation, and to have attempted to show the insufficiency of his citations and his reasonings for discrediting the Roman history of the first 500 years, as to the main and fundamentals of it: for much of the embroidery and flourishing may be given up without parting with the groundwork[2]. But the execution of that design would stretch this discourse to too great a length; and I conceive, that to those who have perused M. l'Abbé Sallier's[3] defence

[2] That the Romans had, with the neighbouring states, the successive wars which Livy has recorded; that these wars followed one another in the order given them by Livy, and had the final events which he has mentioned, may surely be admitted by a reader, not over credulous, and who at the same time will, in his own mind, naturally abate somewhat of the complete victories and numerous triumphs, with which Livy has adorned his history, in compliance with the vanity of his countrymen. For, that the Roman vanity has now and then prevailed to the misrepresentation of facts, is too manifest, from several passages in the Latin historian, some regarding the earlier, some the later ages of Rome. The fortunate effect of the unsuccessful enterprise of Mucius against Porsenna's life, and the marvellous exploit of Camillus against the Gauls, when, at the foot of the capitol, they were selling a peace to the Romans, are remarkable instances of the power of this vanity. And that it had its influence in Livy's relations of the war of Hannibal, and the Spanish war, is shown in Book IV. Chap. XVI. to Book V. Chap. XVII.

See Memoires de Litterature, &c. Tom. 8. edit. Amsterd. Pref. p. vii.

[3] It was the controversy [in 1722, 23, 24, 25] between these two very learned and very eloquent gentlemen, members of the Royal French Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres, which gave occasion to M. de Beaufort's "Dissertation sur l'Incertitude des cinq premiers Siecles de l'Histoire Romaine." Not content with the efforts made by M. de Pouilli, who, he thinks, has treated a little too

of the history against the attacks of M. de Pouilli, any further defence is unnecessary. However, as the discourses of that able champion of our cause have, I think, neither been printed apart from the other pieces in the "Memoires de Litterature," nor translated into English, and therefore may not have fallen into the hands of many persons, who may have met with M. de B.'s Dissertation, which is translated, I shall just mention some particulars, in which I apprehend the chief strength of M. l'Abbé Sallier's arguments to be couched; and then make some brief remarks on M. de B.'s principal positions in his attempt to refute those arguments.

1. It is beyond all belief, that Varro[4], the

superficially a matter which deserved to be examined to the bottom, he, without neglecting M. de Pouilli's arguments, endeavours to supply his deficiencies, and to prove, even to demonstration, the uncertainty, &c. [Je crois avoir *demontré*, d'une maniere tres claire, l'incertitude qui regne sur *le tems lequel a precedé la prise de Rome* par les Gaulois, et la destruction de ses monumens, qui en fut une suite naturelle. Il est vrai, que cela ne prouve rien à l'egard du *siecle suivant, sur lequel j'ai cru pouvoir etendre cette incertitude*, à cause de la confusion, que regne encore par rapport à divers evenemens.] In 1738, M. de Beaufort gave the first edition of his Dissertation; an English translation of which was published in 1740. His second edition of it, revised, corrected, and considerably augmented, bears date 1750. It is to the pages of the latter the references are made.

M. l'Abbé Sallier 1st and 3d Disc.

N. B. M. de Beaufort gives up one argument, in which M. de Pouilli expatiates, drawn from the work called, "The Parallels of Plutarch," a work of which M. l'Abbé Sallier has totally destroyed the credit.

[4] Of Varro, Cicero thus writes:

"Nos in nostra urbe peregrinantes errantesque tanquam

most learned Roman, of the most learned age of Rome, should employ his studies and his labours upon the antiquities of his country, in order to dispel the obscurity cast upon the history of the earliest ages, unless there were means of attaining to certainty, or a high degree of probability, with regard to many things that passed in those ages.

2. It is no less incredible, that Cicero should[5]

hospites, tui libri quasi domum deduxerunt, ut possemus aliquando qui, et ubi essemus agnoscere; tu ætatem patriæ, tu descriptiones temporum, sedem locorum, tu sacrorum jura, tu domesticam, tu bellicam disciplinam, tu omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum nomina, genera, officia, causas aperuisti." Acad. 1. c. 3.

[5] "Cicero," says Dr. Middleton, "was meditating a general history of Rome, to which he was frequently urged by his friends, as the only man capable of adding that glory to his country, of excelling the Greeks in a species of writing, which, of all others, was at that time the least cultivated by the Romans. But he never found leisure to execute so great a task; yet has sketched out a plan of it, which, short as it is, seems to be the best, that can be formed, for the design of a perfect history.

"He declares it to be the first and fundamental law of history, that it should neither dare to say any thing that was false, nor fear to say any thing that was true, nor give any just suspicion either of favour or disaffection: that in the relation of things, the writer should observe the order of time, and add also the description of places: that in all great and memorable transactions, he should first explain the councils, then the acts, lastly the events: that in the councils, he should interpose his own judgment on the merit of them: in the acts, should relate not only what was done, but how it was done: in the events, should show, what share, chance, or rashness, or prudence had in them: that in regard to persons, he should describe, not only their particular actions, but the lives and characters of all those who bear an eminent part in the story. That he should illustrate the whole

design, and Livy undertake[6], a history of the earliest ages of Rome, if they had no authentic records, no solid materials for their groundwork; and this in an age, of which Cicero says[7] that it was too knowing, too much enlightened to be imposed upon by fictions, and persuaded to believe absurdities.

3. Cicero, in six books which he wrote concerning the commonwealth, gave a particular and circumstantial account[8] of the customs and maxims of ancient Rome, *a primo urbis ortu*, its domestic and military discipline.

4. We have the express testimony of Cicero for the existence, in his time, of the PONTIFICAL ANNALS[9], which were begun almost as

in a clear, easy, natural style; flowing with a perpetual smoothness and equability; free from the affectation of points and sentences, or the roughness of judicial pleadings. De Orator. 2. 15. Middleton's life of Cicero. Vol. II. p. 528.

[6] "Res immensi operis, ut quæ supra septingentesimum annum repetatur," &c. Liv. Pref.

[7] "Ut jam doctis hominibus, ac temporibus ipsis eruditis ad fingendum vix quicquam esset loci. Antiquitas enim recipit fabulas, fictas etiam nonnunquam incondite; hæc ætas autem jam exculta præsertim et erudita omne quod fieri non potest respuit." Frag. lib. 3. de repub.

[8] "Nec enim hic locus est ut de moribus, institutisque majorum, et disciplina ac temperatione civitatis loquamur: aliis hæc locis accuratè satis dicta sunt, maximèque in his sex libris quos de republica scripsimus." Lib. 4. Tusc. c. 1.

[9] "Erat* enim historia nihil aliud nisi annalium confectio. Cujus rei memoriæque publicæ retinendæ causa, ab initio rerum, Romanarum usque ad Publium Mucium pontificem maximum, res omnes singulorum annorum litteris mandabat p. maximus, referebatque in album, et proponebat tabulam domi ut esset potestas populo cognoscendi,

* Lib. 2. de Orat. 12.

early as the birth of the state, and continued to the time of P. Mucius, the high priest, who lived in the seventh century of Rome. Varro, in his books concerning the Latin tongue, gives us many fragments of these annals.

L. 12. Ep. 25. ad Cornif. L. 11. Ep. 25 ad Brut.

5. Since it was the custom in the latter times of the republic to record the acts of the senate and of the magistrates, it is probable that the same custom was observed in the former. And it seems unquestionable from a passage [10] in Suetonius [Vit. Vesp. 8.] not only that the

iique etiam nunc annales maximi nominantur. Hanc similitudinem scribendi multi secuti sunt qui sine ullis ornamentis monumenta solum temporum hominum locorum, gestarumque rerum reliquerunt. Itaque qualis apud Græcos, Pherecydes, Hellanicus, Acusilaus fuit, aliique permulti; talis noster Cato, et Pictor, et Piso, qui neque tenent, quibus rebus ornatur oratio (modo enim huc ista sunt importata) et dum intelligatur, quid dicant, unam dicendi laudem putant esse, brevitatem.

De leg. Lib. 1. c. 2.

"Abest enim historia litteris nostris, ut et ipse intelligo, et ex te persæpe audio. Potes autem tu profectò satisfacere in ea, quippè cum sit opus, ut tibi quidem videri solet, unum hoc oratorium maximè. Quamobrem aggredere, quæsumus, et sume ad hanc rem tempus, quæ est a nostris hominibus adhuc aut ignorata, aut relicta. Nam post *annalis pontificum maximorum, quibus nihil potest esse* jucundius:* sit aut ad Fabium, aut ad eum, qui tibi semper in ore est, Catonem, aut ad Pisonem, aut ad Fannium, aut ad Vennonium venias: quamquam ex his alius alio plus habet virium, tamen quid tam exile, quam isti omnes.

* Doubtless jejunius. See Taylor's Elem. of Civ. Law, p. 79.

"Unde autem facilius quam *ex annalium monumentis* aut res bellica, aut omnes republicæ disciplina cognoscitur? Unde ad agendum aut dicendum copia depromi major gravissimorum exemplorum, quasi *incorruptorum testimoniorum* potest?" Frag. Cic. in Hortens.

[10] Speaking of Vespasian's restoring the capitol, which had been demolished in the Vitellian sedition: "Ipse

acts of the senate, and of the people, in the earliest ages, used to be recorded; but that many of those records were preserved from the flames, when the Gauls burnt the city.

6. Dionysius speaks of the memorials[11], commentaries, or tables of the censors, preserved in families which had been honoured with the censorship, pieces which he consulted, and in which he found that a poll of the people had been taken two years before the burning of Rome, in the consulship of Valerius and Manlius.

7. Censorinus, in his book *de die natali*, insinuates, that the memorials of the duumvirs and decemvirs were ancient monuments that used to be consulted, long after the first ages of Rome. c. 17.

8. Livy frequently cites the linen books; which seem to have been of great use for discovering the succession of the consuls and other magistrates. Libri Lintei.

9. It appears from the historians, that many treaties with foreign states were preserved from the flames which consumed the city.

10. The laws of the twelve tables were unquestionably preserved, and these would give

[Vespasianus] ærearum tabularum tria millia, quæ simul conflagraverant, restituenda suscepit, undique investigatis exemplaribus, instrumentum imperii pulcherimum ac vetustissimum confecit; quo continebantur *penè ab exordio urbis senatus consulta, plebiscita* de societate, et fœdere, ac privilegio cuicunque concessis."

[11] Δηλοῦται δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ τῶν καλουμένων τιμητικῶν ὑπομνημάτων, &c. D. Hal. p. 59. Edit. Oxon.

a thorough insight into the constitution of the state.

Liv. Lib. 1. Macr. Lib. 3. c. 9. Aul Gell. L. 16. c. 4.

11. In Livy, Macrobius, and A. Gellius, we have the ancient invariable forms that were used by the Roman heralds, when employed to demand satisfaction for an injury done to the state; declare war; invite the gods to forsake a city besieged; and, before a battle, load with curses the army of the enemy.

12. The rituals and calendars were of use to history. The very name of a festival is often a brief relation of the fact which gave occasion to its institution.

13. Ancient pillars, statues, and inscriptions[12], immortalized the memory of several great men of the early times, and bore testimony to their exploits.

Therefore, though Livy complains of the scarcity of men of letters in the early times [*raræ per ea tempora litteræ*] and of the loss of a great part, or the greater part[13], of the pontifical annals, and other historical monuments, both public and private, in the burning of Rome by the Gauls, yet there remained good memorials and original pieces sufficient

[12] "Suorum vero clypeos in sacro vel publico, privatim dicare primus instituit (ut reperio) Appius Claudius, qui consul cum Servilio fuit anno urbis 259, posuit enim in Bellonæ æde majores suos; placuitque in excelso spectari et titulos honorum legi.—Quales clypeos nemo non gaudens, favensque aspicit." Pliny, L. 35. c. 3.

[13] "Quæ in commentariis pontificum, aliisque publicis, privatisque erant monumentis incensâ urbe pleraque interiere." L. 6. c. 1.

for composing a credible history[14] of the earliest ages of Rome.

14. Tradition alone was sufficient whereon to found a reasonable and full belief of many facts in the Roman story; such, for example, as the shameful defeat of the Romans near the Caudine Forks; and the seditions and secessions of the plebeians on occasion of the cruelties exercised by the rich towards the poor. [This is a concession made by M. de Pouilli.]

15. The fables which are found interspersed in the writings of the Roman historians ought not to ruin the credit of the history of the first ages of Rome, as to the essentials of it; though the historians should seem to have adopted those fables for facts. Livy[15] warns us not to be over credulous with regard to several old stories of the marvellous kind, and Cicero ridicules them.

16. And Atticus[16] had successfully labour- L. 2. de Divin. et L. 1. de leg.

[14] "Quæ ab conditâ urbe ad captam eandem urbem Romani sub regibus primum, consulibus deinde ac dictatoribus, decemvirisque ac tribunis consularibus gessere foris bella, domi seditiones, quinque libris exposui." L. 6. c. 1.

[15] "——Omnes expers curæ, quæ scribentis animum, etsi *non flectere à vero,* sollicitum tamen efficere possit. Quæ ante conditam, condendamve urbem, *poeticis* magis *decora fabulis,* quam incorruptis rerum gestarum monumentis traduntur, *ea nec affirmare nec refellere* in animo est." Liv. in Præf.

Speaking of the Curtian Lake, and how it came to be so called: "Cura non deesset, si qui ad verum via inquirentem ferret; nunc fama rerum standum est, ubi certam derogat vetustas fidem." Liv. Lib. 7. c. 6.

[16] "Laborem nobis Attici nostri levavit labor; sic familiarum originem subtexuit, ut ex eo clarorum virorum propagines possimus cognoscere." Cic. in Orat. et Corn. Nep. in Attic.

ed to rectify the mistakes in some family memoirs, concerning the succession of the magistrates, and the origins of families, mistakes occasioned by ignorance or vanity; and he could have had no success in such an attempt, had he been destitute of all sure guides to the truth.

If any reader desires to see these, and several other particulars, relating to the same subject, learnedly and ingeniously discussed, I shall refer him to the discourses at large of M. l'Abbé Sallier in the "Memoires de Litterature."

Before I take notice of M. de Beaufort's positions, I must frankly confess that I am not well qualified to dispute against his opinion, concerning the Roman history; because I cannot, by his Dissertation, discover with certainty what his opinion is.

I know not whether, in his judgment, we may reasonably reject the whole[17] history of

[17] "Attendu le peu de soin qu'on a eu de transmettre à la posterité la memoire des evenemens, dans le tems, qu'ils arrivoient, nous sommes fondés, en voiant une histoire suivie de quatre siecles, de *rejetter* le tout, ou du moins *la plus grande parte comme forgée à plaisir.*

"Ce n'est pas que je veuille *revoquer en doute* generalement tous les evenemens de ce siecle [le cinquieme] pour quelques traits fabuleux dont ils se trouvent accompagnés, ou parce qu'il y en a plusieurs qui sont manifestement faux. Mon intention est seulement de faire voir, que *divers faits* des plus marqués, et des plus importans, *se trouvant faux,* et le fruit de la vaine gloire des Romains, *les autres doivent nous etre suspects.* J'en tire encore de nouveaux motifs de douter de *l'Histoire des siecles precedens, laquelle,* à plus forte raison, *doit paroitre fabuleuse et forgée apres coup.*" P. 359.

"Ces caracteres de fausseté suffiroient à bien des gens

the first 500 years of Rome as groundless and fabulous.

Or should reject only almost all.

Or may stop when we have rejected the greater part.

Or, rejecting some passages of the history as utterly false, should call in question, doubt of, suspect all the rest: [le revoquer en question, en douter, le tenir pour suspect.]

This last, from a great number of passages[18] in his Dissertation, one would imagine to be his real opinion. And yet now and then he seems to slide into belief, and even into certainty, without being aware of it. He has great faith in what Polybius relates of the Romans in the early times of the republic; and admits, as indubitable, several facts, for which the other historians are his only vouchers. Thus, for example,

pour leur faire *rejetter cette Histoire*, sans plus d'examen; mais je ne veux pas me prevaloir de cet avantage. Ce n'est que sur l'autorité des ecrivains les plus celebres, et les plus accredités, que je veux m'appuier pour *en douter*. Et, afin qu'on ne m'accuse pas d'en douter trop legerement, je me retranche à ne trouver cette histoire *obscure* et *incertaine*, que parce qu'ils la trouvent telle eux memes." P. 10.

[18] "De là je conclus—que nous sommes fondes à *tenir pour fort suspect* TOUT *ce qu'on nous raconte des quatre ou cinq premier siecles de Rome.*

"La seconde partie sera destinée à l'examen de certain faits des plus marqué, et qui figurent le plus dans l'Histoire Romaine: l'incertitude ou la fausseté desquels, étant bien prouvée, donnera une nouvelle force aux raisons que l'on a de *revoquer en doute* TOUTE *cette Histoire*,—je me flatte, que ceux qui se dépouilleront de leurs préjugés con-

Dissert. p. 299. "It is certain [19] that Servius [Tullius] augmented the number of the "tribes."

p. 329. "Certain it is, that from this time Porsena did not treat the Romans as enemies, but as old allies or as good subjects."

See p. 33. And M. de B.'s arguments for disbelieving some facts in the Roman story, or doubting of them, are frequently drawn from the certainty of others, particularly of the treaties.

Dissert. part 2. ch. 10. I cannot but take notice, that with regard to the story of king Brennus the Gaul, M. de B. seems not to doubt of these facts. 1. That the Gauls totally routed the Roman army in the field. 2. That they presently after possessed themselves of Rome. 3. That they burnt the city. 4. That the old historical records and monuments were most of them consumed in the flames. 5. That the capitol was saved. 6. That several ancient monuments being there deposited, were preserved with it. 7. That the Gauls sold a peace to the Romans, and departed without loss. Here are then, in

viendront qu'il n'y *a rien de plus incertain que* TOUT *ce corps d'Histoire des prémiers siecles de Rome.*" P. 11, 12.

"Il faut absolument, qu'on en vienne à dire, que ces traités sont supposés, ce qu'on ne peut faire sans de fortes raisons (et je ne vois pas qu'on ait aucune pour douter de leur autenticité) ou que l'on convienne de bonne foi, que TOUT ce qu'on nous debite dans l'Histoire Romaine n'est qu'incertitude, et *qu'on n'y peut compter sur rien.*" P. 43.

[19] "Il est *sur* que Servius en augmenta le nombre [des tribus.]

"Ce qu'il y a de *sur*, c'est que, dès lors, Porsena n'en usa plus avec les Romains, comme avec des ennemis, et qu'au contraire il les traita en anciens alliés, ou en bons sujets."

the history of this one affair, seven important facts which M. de B. seems fully to believe. And what is it he objects to? Why, to Livy's relation of Camillus's wonderful arrival, in the critical moment, to save the Romans from the disgrace of living on the foot of a ransomed people; and his destroying the whole army of the Gauls. But this relation, romantic in the air of it, and discovered by Polybius's account to be a mere fiction of Roman vanity, can never be thought a good reason for questioning the truth of every thing that Livy has related of the earliest ages of Rome; and much less for regarding the whole Roman history of the first 500 years, as fabulous or uncertain. For when M. de B. speaks of the uncertainty of the Roman history, I suppose he means, or ought to mean, the uncertainty of the best and least exceptionable accounts of the Roman affairs, that can be collected from the several ancient writers who have treated the subject. We shall presently see, that one of M. de B.'s reasons for his incredulity is, that the Roman historians (the earliest of whom lived in the sixth century from the building of Rome) wanted means to know the truth. Yet he gives credit to Polybius's relation of the wars between the Romans and Gauls, from the time of Brennus to that of Pyrrhus: and if he thinks it reasonable to believe Polybius on this part of the Roman history, he must allow that there were means of coming at the truth of it, whether Livy, and the prior historians whom he followed, made use of them or not.

But whatever be the real opinion of M. de B. concerning the Roman history of the first 500 years, he has advanced (if I mistake him not) the following propositions.

Diser. p. 6. I. "THE ROMANS were an obscure people, confined, during four centuries, to a little corner of Italy; and the continual exercise of arms and husbandry (the only sciences they professed) hindered them from having the thought[20] of transmitting the memory of events to posterity."

p. 15. II. "AND, if they had thought of perpetuating the memory of what passed among them, they were universally so illiterate, that nobody was capable of writing history, or transmitting the events to posterity by sure and exact memorials[21]." Personne n'etoit capable, &c.

[20] "—*l'empecha de songer á transmettre á la posterité des evenemens*, qui dans le fond, ne sont devenus interessans, que par le haut degré de gloire, auquel ses descendans se sont elevés par leurs conquêtes."

* p. 16. [21] M. de B.* cites a passage from Livy, (B. vii. c. 3.) to prove that even in the end of the 4th century, WRITING was very little in use. "Raræ per ea tempora litteræ, *on faisoit peu d'usage de l'ecriture*, dit Tite Live en parlant *de la fin du quatrieme siecle*." M. de B. adds: "Indeed they must have been very little solicitous in those times to preserve the memory of events, since, instead of all other annals, they were content with driving a nail every year into the wall of the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus; and this was the sole expedient they could have for fixing the chronology, [c'etoit là toute la ressource qu'on pouvoit avoir pour fixer la chronologie] as the same historian informs us in the same place."

He proceeds: "had this been practised from the foundation of Rome, it might have been of great use for settling the true era of the city. But the practice could not com-

III. "THE PONTIFICAL ANNALS, or historical part of the pontifical books, and the other mo- p. 10. 56.

mence before the temple was dedicated, which was not till after the expulsion of Tarquin; and it had suffered a long interruption. It was renewed in the end of the fourth century of Rome, not because they found it mentioned in any record or ritual, (for they made so little use of letters, that they had neither books nor records) but on account of a tradition almost forgotten, *ex seniorum memoriâ repetitum.*" [It was recalled to mind by some old men, &c.]

As great use is made of the passage in Livy, referred to by M. de B. for proving the extremely illiterate state of the Romans, during many years after the commencement of the republic, I shall here transcribe the passage at length. The historian is speaking of the year 392 (or, according to the capitoline marbles, 390) when Rome was grievously afflicted with the plague.

"Cn. Genucio, L. Æmilio Mamercino, secundum consulibus, quum piaculorum magis conquisitio animos quam corpora morbi afficerent, repetitum ex seniorum memoria dicitur, pestilentiam quondam clavo ab dictatore fixo sedatam. Ea religione adductus senatus, dictatorem clavi figendi causa dicijussit. Dictus L. Manlius Imperiosus, L. Pinarium magistratum equitum dixit. LEX vetusta est priscis litteris, verbisque scripta, ut qui prætor maximus sit, idibus Septembribus clavum pangat. Fixus [most of the manuscripts have fixa*] fuit dextro lateri ædis Jovis optimi maximi, ea ex parte qua Minervæ templum est. Eum clavum, quia raræ per ea tempora litteræ erant, notam numeri annorum fuisse ferunt: eoque Minervæ templo dicatam legem, quia numerus Minervæ inventum sit. Volsiniis quoque clavos indices numeri annorum, fixos in templo Nortiæ Etruscæ Deæ, comparere, diligens talium monimentorum auctor Cincius affirmat. M. Horatius CONSUL, EX LEGE templum Jovis optimi maximi dedicavit, anno post reges exactos: à CONSULIBUS postea ad DICTATORES quia majus imperium erat, solenne clavi figendi translatum est. Intermisso deinde more, digna etiam per se visa est res, propter quam dictator crearetur." Liv. B. vii. c. 3.

* Crevier.

Now I conceive that M. de B. has, through inattention,

numents, public and private, which could have given some certainty to history, were all

made no less than four mistakes in his comment upon this passage.

For, I. First of all, Livy does not speak of THE END OF THE FOURTH CENTURY, when he says, some report, that the nail was to mark the number of years, because letters were rare in THOSE DAYS, *per eâ tempora;* but of the time, when the practice of driving a nail in the wall of the temple of Jupiter COMMENCED, in pursuance of a law directing that it should be done annually on the IDES OF SEPTEMBER, by the chief prætor, [i. e. by the chief magistrate. The CONSULS were, at first, styled PRÆTORS.] That this practice commenced long before the end of the fourth century is evident, from the instance then called to mind by the old men, of a dictator's doing it, and from the words *intermisso deinde more.* And it seems highly probable from Livy's words, that the LAW was made, and the PRACTICE commenced in the first year of the republic, and that HORATIUS, when he dedicated the temple, struck the first nail into the wall; and that it was a part of the ceremony, at a dedication, and performed in conformity to the law above mentioned. "There is an old LAW, (says Livy) written in antique characters, and antique words, importing, that the chief prætor should, on the ides of September, drive the nail, *clavum pangat.* The nail [or the law] was fixed on the right side of the temple of Jupiter, in that part where the fane of Minerva is." What follows is all parenthesis, till he thus goes on: "The CONSUL Marcus Horatius, ACCORDING TO THE LAW, dedicated the temple of Jupiter, the year after the expulsion of the kings: AFTERWARDS, the fixing of the nail was transferred from the CONSULS to the DICTATORS, because these were magistrates of greater power and dignity" [agreeably to the spirit of the law, expressed in these words, *Qui prætor maximus sit.*] Whoever attends to Livy's words must surely see, that, when he says, the CONSUL Horatius dedicated the temple EX LEGE, he refers to the law, where it was enjoined, that the chief magistrate should drive a nail annually on the ides of September; and means to tell us, that this CONSUL drove the first nail pursuant to that law, when he dedicated the

destroyed[22] by the flames which consumed the city, after the Gauls had taken it in 363.]"

temple; (which DEDICATION was on the ides of September, as Plutarch informs us.) If Livy did not mean to say that HORATIUS drove the nail, when he dedicated the temple, what connexion between the former and latter part of this period? The "CONSUL Horatius dedicated the temple the year after the regifuge; AFTERWARDS, the fixing the nail was transferred from the CONSULS to the DICTATORS."

II. THERE is not one word in the passage referred to importing that the Romans had no annals except nails. And the written law itself is a proof, that the nails were not used because nobody could write, or because these nails were the only expedient they could have to fix the chronology. And, for the same reason, they, of whom Livy says *ferunt*, cannot be supposed to have meant, that the nails were used, because nobody could mark the years by words or figures, but because the generality of people could not read what some could write; as was the case in these countries not many hundred years ago. And the interruption of the practice of driving nails [*intermisso deinde more*] if it proves any thing, proves only, that the common people were become less illiterate, and that the nails were not wanted to instruct them in chronology.

III. IT appears from the passage referred to, that, in the end of the fourth century, the Romans had a monument or record mentioning the custom of driving a nail, &c. They had a written law enjoining it; *lex vetusta est priscis litteris verbisque scripta, ut qui prætor maximus sit, idibus Septembribus clavum pangat*: in conformity to which law the act of fixing the nail had been transferred from the consuls to the dictators. And this shows, that both the law and the practice were anterior to the institution of dictators.

IV. The thing said to be remembered by the old men was not the custom of driving a nail into the wall of the temple, but a particular instance of the plague's being stopped by a dictator's driving a nail, &c. *repetitum ex seniorum memoria dicitur pestilentiam quondam clavo ab dictatore fixo sedatam.*

[22] "C'est de ces ecrivains, que j'apprens, que TOUS les

How to reconcile this third assertion with the second, or with the latter part of the first, seems somewhat difficult; nor seems it very easy to reconcile it with the following enumeration of the ancient monuments which M. de B. supposes to have escaped the flames:

p. 13. "SOME LAWS of the KINGS.

p. 32. "ALL the LAWS of the twelve tables by which might be known the constitution of the ancient government.

p. 46, 47. "SOME of the PONTIFFS BOOKS, which discovered the origin of several religious customs, or ceremonies. (Under the name of pontiffs books, M. de B. comprehends all the books in general, which treated of the religious ceremonies and traditions of the Romans, as the books of the augurs and haruspices, the verses or hymns of the Salii, the Saturnian verses, and a great number of books of that kind.)

monumens publics, qui auroient pû donner quelque certitude à l'histoire, *perirent par le feu*, lorsque les Gaulois eurent pris Rome." P. 10.

"Il est sur que la partie historique des livres des pontifes, ou leurs *annales*, perirent dans la destruction de Rome par les Gaulois. Tite Live est si exprés là dessus, qu'il nous ote tout sujet d'en douter,—lorsque se plaignant de la peine qu'il a eue parceque TOUS les memoires, conservez dans les archives, *qui etoient entres les mains des particuliers*, ou *qui faisoient partie des livres des pontifes*, avoient été enveloppés dans la ruine de la ville. *Et quod etiamsi quæ in commentariis pontificum, aliisque publicis privatisque erant monumentis, incensâ urbe* PLERÆQUE interiere." P. 56.

N. B. In this place, *pleræque* with M. de B. imports *tous;* in p. 5, 18. *presque tout:* in p. 20, 27. *la plus part:* in p. 19. *grande partie.*

"SOME of the books[23] which contained the musters and polls taken of the Roman citizens, which books might be of use to history. p. 103.

"A considerable number of the treaties which Rome had made with the neighbouring states. Il est à presumer qu'ils sauverent un assez bon nombre de ces derniers [les traités] parce qu'ils etoient gardez dans le temple de Jupiter au capitole, qui demeura à l'abri de la fureur des Gaulois. And treaties of peace are the most authentic materials for history. Les traités de paix sont les materiaux les plus authentiques pour l'histoire, et on ne peut former aucun doute raisonable sur des faits appuiés de pareilles preuves." p. 42. p. 33.

IV. "THERE was, at Rome, no book, no writing prior to Pyrrhus's coming into Italy; no[24] piece that could be of use to history, anterior to the end of the fifth century." p. 145. p. 70.

[23] "Quoique les anciens historiens omettent quelques *lustres*, et quelque fois les noms des censures, ainsi que le nombre des citoiens, qui s'etoit trouvé dans chaque denombrement, *je serois assez porté à croire, sur ce qui nous reste de ces revues generales des citoiens de Rome, que c'etoit un des monumens le mieux conservé, et que les historiens avoient le moins negligé de consulter*. Ce que Denis d'Halicarnasse en cite remonte jusqu' au premier cens sous Servius Tullius. On seroit un peu mieux fondé, si on nous alléguoit de pareilles pieces en faveur de l'Histoire Romaine. Car, si ce que les historiens nous disent des differens cens, où denombremens, qui se sont fait à Rome, est fondé sur le temoignage de ces monumens, qui ce gardoient dans les archives, *on ne peut disconvenir*, qu'ils n'aient echapé aux flammes, du moins en partie, et *qu'ils n'aient été de quelque usage pour l'histoire*." P. 102, 103.

[24] "J'ai deja prouvé que ces annales des pontifes n'existoient point: et je prouverai bientôt, *qu'il n'y avoit aucune*

How to make this agree with the foregoing enumeration of pieces preserved from the flames, I do not readily perceive.

p. 6, 7. V. "THE LATER historians of Rome did but copy[25] the earlier with regard to the times preceding the earlier."

This seems to be a hasty assertion; since both Livy and Dionysius speak so frequently of the disagreeing accounts given by the authors they cite, with regard to the times anterior to the first historians. And Livy, in his preface, says, that each new writer thinks either to produce something more certain with regard to facts than his predecessors have done, or to excel them in language and style. *Novi semper scriptores, aut in rebus certius aliquid*

piece qui pût servir à l'Histoire laquelle faut anterieure à la fin du cinquieme siecle de Rome." P. 70.

[25] "On reconnoitra facilement que ceux qui ont ecrit l'Histoire Romaine *n'ont fait que se copier les uns les autres* pour ce qui regardoit les tems anterieurs." P. 7.

"Fabius Pictor et ceux qui le suivirent de près avoient ignoré, &c. On *n'avoit fait depuis que les copier* sans autre examen." P. 45.

"Ils ont été plus de cinq siecles sans avoir d'historiens—*les premiers* qu'ils ont eus ont fort mal reüssi destitués comme ils l'etoient de monumens anciens et de memoires surs qui leur pussent servir de guides—*les historiens, qui depuis ont entrepris* de fournir la même carriere, *se sont contentés de s'appuier de l'autorité de leurs predecesseurs et de les donner peur garans des faits qu'ils rapportoient*—ils se sont peu mis en peine *d'examiner à la rigueur la verité des faits.*" P. 6.

N. B. Unless with regard to absurd fictions, it is hard to guess by what test the later historians, if there were no ancient monuments, no authentic memorials, could examine the truth of the facts related by the earlier historians.

allaturos se, aut scribendi arte rudem vetustatem superaturos credunt.

VI. "THOSE records or monuments which escaped the flames (when Rome was burnt by the Gauls) were of little use for composing a history. And the first historians did not rest upon such monuments, but founded themselves WHOLLY upon traditions and vulgar stories, as the most celebrated and most esteemed writers inform us,[26] who nevertheless took all their accounts from those first historians. p. 11.

"What we have of the Roman history [of the first 500 years] was taken out of family memoirs. Destitute of all other monuments, it was to these pieces, that the historians, towards the middle of the sixth century [*i. e.* p. 142, 143, et 435. p. 151.

[26] "Je recherche ce qui a pu échaper à cet incendie—je trouve que ce qui en echapa fut de peu d'utilité pour la composition de l'Histoire. Ce sont eux memes [*les ecrivains les plus celebres et les plus accredités*] qui m'apprennent, que ce n'est point sur de pareils monumens, que *les premiers historiens* se sont appuiés, et que *ceux qui les ont suivi* (en avouant, que ceux qui les avoient precedés dans cette carriere, *ne s'etoient fondés que sur des traditions, et sur des bruits populaires*, que d'ailleurs ils n'avoient aporté ni jugement, ni exactitude, dans la composition de leurs histoires, et dans ce qu'ils disoient des premiers siecles de Rome) *n'ont pas laissé de reconnoitre que c'etoit d'eux qu'ils tiroient* TOUT *ce qu'ils en rapportoient* [i. e. *tout* ce qu'ils rapportoient des premiers siecles de Rome.]" P. 10, 11. "Les historiens, qui ont vecu dans des siecles plus polis, et où l'on n'ignoroit aucune des loix de l'Histoire, n'aiant point eu d'autres sources où puiser que ces mêmes histoires, *qui n'etoient fondées que sur la tradition*, ils n'ont pû donner plus de certitude à ce qu'ils rapportoient des premiers siecles de Rome." P. 204.

p. 152. the first historians] were obliged to have recourse, and from no other sources could they have drawn what they related of those times, which, as they [27] themselves confess, were covered with thick darkness, and of which there was no speaking with any certainty [28]."

To explain, and, as much as possible, reconcile these two paragraphs, we shall have recourse to another passage in the Dissertation.

p. 150. "The most ancient piece known at Rome in Cicero's time [29] was the speech of Appius

[27] By *they themselves*, I presume M. de B. means the later historians; for they are the only writers he cites as complaining of darkness.

[28] "C'est des *memoires des familles*, qu'est tiré ce que nous avons de l'Histoire Romaine." P. 142.

"Destitués de tous autres monumens, ce fut à ces pieces [memoires des familles] que les historiens, vers le milieu du sixieme siecle, furent obligez d'avoir recours." P. 435.

"Dans quelle source ont-ils puisé ce qu'ils ont dit sur des tems, que selon eux-memes couvroient d'epaisses tenebres, et dont on ne pouvoient parler avec aucune certitude? *Ce n'a pû être* que dans ces *traditiones des familles* puisqu'il n'y avoit point d'autre monument auquel ils pussent avoir recours." P. 152.

[29] I am not aware that M. de B. has any support for this, but a mistake of his own (through inattention) in interpreting a passage of Cicero's Brutus [c. 16.] *Nec veró habeo quenquam antiquiorem* cujus quidem scripta proferenda putem, *nisi Appii Cæci oratio hæc ipsa de Pyrrho, et nonnullæ mortuorum laudationes, forté delectant: et Hercule, hæ quidem extant.* Cicero is discoursing not of authors in general, nor of historians, but of orators, and the last he mentions is Cato the Censor: and he adds, that, "he is acquainted with none more ancient, whose writings he thinks worth speaking of; unless the oration of Appius Claudius concerning Pyrrhus, and some funeral orations may happen to please. Of these there are indeed enough."

Claudius, the blind, pronounced in the senate to dissuade them from accepting the terms of peace proposed by Pyrrhus in 474. Indeed there were beside that some funeral orations, but tradition must have supplied the rest: so that the truth of the history of the first five centuries had no other support but these two witnesses, funeral orations and tradition."

"Perhaps to these we may add, some songs or hymns, composed in honour of the heroes and illustrious men,—pieces not proper to instruct us in the truth of facts."

THE CASE then was this; there were no written family-traditions nor any other [historical] writings, aucun livre, aucun ecrit, before the year 474. Between this time and the year 550 (when Fabius Pictor became an historian) funeral orations were written. And

Had Cicero been speaking of Roman historians, or authors, in general, he certainly would not have said, that he knew none more ancient than Cato, that were worth mentioning; because Fabius and Cincius, and several other historians, much esteemed, were prior to Cato. Yet on the authority of this passage M. de B. (p. 145.) writes thus, "On ne pourra pas douter de la verité de ce que j'avance, des que j'aurai fait voir, qu'on n'avoit à Rome aucun livre, *aucun ecrit*, qui fût *anterieur à la venuë de Pyrrhus en Italie*, evenement, qui ne se place que vers la fin du cinquieme siecle de Rome. Pour *des* HISTORIENS, on sait qu'ils ne parurent que dans le siecle suivant. Ciceron, *parlant de ce qu'on avoit de plus ancien de son tems*, dit que Caton, qui etoit mort il n'y avoit pas plus d'un siecle, etoit consideré comme *un auteur* fort ancien, *eum nos perveterem habemus*. Certes ajoute t-il, je n'en connois point de plus ancien dont *je puisse vous citer les ecrits*, à moins que l'on ne trouve du gout à la harangue d'Appius Claudius sur Pyrrhus, et à quelques oraisons funebres."

from these written orations, and from oral tradition, the first historians compiled their works.

p. 150. But then we are aground again, by reason of an unlucky passage, cited by M. de B. from Dionysius, who tells us, that Fabius [whom all the following historians are said to have copied] compiled his history of the first 500 years from tradition, from hearsay, wholly from hearsay; "on voit que ce qu'il en disoit n'etoit appuié que sur ce qu'il en avoit oui dire: ἐξ ὧν ἤκεσε,"

p. 164. D. H. Lib. 7. p. 475. Fabius then did not make use of the funeral orations, nor of any written family traditions, (family-memoirs:) neither were these, according to M. de B. formed upon hearsay. The matter of them was invented by the vanity of private men. And not only the matter of them was invented, but a greater number of the pieces themselves

p. 154. were forgeries[30]; *i. e.* they were not contemporary with the authors to whom they were ascribed, but forged after their time. And if Fabius took his historical accounts from forged funeral orations, these forgeries must have been almost all made in his own time, and all in the space of 76 years; supposing it true, that there were no writings of earlier date than the year 474. And then we shall be at a loss to guess how it was possible to impose these forgeries upon Fabius for genuine pieces.

[30] "L'on peut assûrer sans temerité que l'Histoire Romaine, pour la plus grande partie, à été forgée sur ces *traditions des familles*, et sur des *oraisons funebres*, qui *pour la pluspart* n'etoient que des *pieces supposées, que des faussaires avoient forgées* pour favoriser les pretensions que quelque familles formoient à une genealogie illustre."

But is it not strange that M. de B. who, by admitting that the public monuments and private memorials of the Romans were burnt by the Gauls, admits that the Romans had both ability and disposition to write before that time, should yet suppose, that they had neither the one nor the other, for above 100 years after that time?

And there is another difficulty arising from another passage cited by M. de B. from Dionysius [Lib. 1. p. 59.] who there says, that the earliest Roman historians took all their accounts of the birth of Romulus, and the building of Rome, from the antique narratives in the SACRED BOOKS, ἐν ἱεραῖς δέλτοις. p. 162.

And what makes these difficulties the greater is, that M. de B. is of opinion, we [31] ought to give full credit to Dionysius in what he says concerning the works and merit of the historians who preceded him.

But, not to dwell any longer on the seem-

[31] "Denis d'Halicarnasse, aiant entrepris l'Histoire des cinq premiers siecles de Rome, doit être consideré comme juge competent de ceux qui l'ont precedé dans la meme carriere." P. 168. "L'on ne risque rien en s'en rapportant à ce qu'il en dit." P. 163.

I cannot possibly be of M. de B.'s opinion in this particular. Dionysius seems, of all writers, to be the man who deserves the least credit when he speaks of the merit of other writers. For (Lib. 1. p. 5) he says of Polybius, "that he wrote little concerning the Romans, and that the little he did write was without any care or accuracy, and wholly founded upon idle reports." Nor could even Thucydides please Dionysius: but, as to what he says by way of censure on Thucydides, Mr. Hobbes remarks, "that there was never written so much absurdity in so few lines."

ing repugnances in the argumentation of our ingenious critic against the credibility of the history of the five first centuries, let us now consider what Livy says concerning his own history of the times anterior to the burning of Rome by the Gauls.

"I have, in five books, set forth what, from the building of the city to its being taken, was done by the Romans, first under the kings, then under the consuls, dictators, decemvirs, and military tribunes, with consular power; the foreign wars and domestic seditions; matters very obscure, by reason of their antiquity (like objects that, at a great distance, are hardly discerned.) For it is only by writings, that the transactions and events of remote times can be clearly and faithfully transmitted; and in those days there were few writers; and the greater part of the commentaries of the high priests, and of the other records, public and private, perished in the burning of Rome[32]. Henceforward matters more clear and certain will be related; the civil affairs and military acts of the Romans, after the rebuilding of their city[33]."

[32] It seems pretty plain from what Livy here says of the destruction of public and private monuments or records, that he knew nothing of the *peu d'usage de l'ecriture*, for which M. de B. contends.

L. 6. Cap. 1. [33] "Quæ ab condita urbe Roma ad captam eandem urbem Romani sub regibus primum, consulibus deinde ac dictatoribus decemvirisque ac tribunis consularibus gessere, foris bella, domi seditiones, quinque libris exposui; res quum vetustate nimia obscuras, veluti quæ magno ex intervallo loci vix cernuntur: tum quod et raræ per eadem

Now what is the obvious sense of this passage?

"The foregoing part of my history (says Livy) is full of obscurity and uncertainty: because the matters there treated of, are of too ancient date to have been transmitted with faithfulness and exactness by oral tradition, and because the contemporary writers were few, and the greater part of their writings perished in the fire that consumed the city. But the transactions and events after that time, are things more clear and certain, *clariora et certiora:*" How so? "Because with respect to these, there are not the same causes of obscurity and uncertainty. The times not being so remote, the traditions concerning them are more to be depended on; contemporary writers were less rare; and there has not been a like destruction of their writings."

This is surely the plain meaning of his words, and it ought to be observed to his credit, that his history of the earliest times is proportioned, for length, to the scarcity of materials he complains of; for notwithstanding his circumstantial, and, perhaps in his own opinion, fabulous account of the rape of the Sabine women, with the consequences of it; and notwithstanding the frequent display of his skill in adorning a

tempora litteræ fuere, una custodia fidelis memoriæ rerum gestarum: et, quod etiam si quæ in commentariis pontificum, aliisque publicis privati que erant monumentis, incensa urbe pleræque interiere. Clariora deinceps certioraque ab secunda origine, velut ab stirpibus lætius, feraciusque renatæ urbis, gesta domi militiæque, exponentur."

story, as in his description of the combat between the Horatii and Curiatii, and in several other instances, his whole history of the seven kings, who are supposed to have reigned 244 years, hardly fills seventy pages in Le Clerk's small edition; and of these, twenty are taken up with the reigns of Servius Tullius, and his successor Tarquin the Proud. Now, the institutions of Servius, which were his most important acts, and were the plan whereon, after the expulsion of Tarquin, the new government was established and maintained, cannot easily be called in question; nor, I believe, will any body question the truth of the most material things related of Tarquin's tyranny, which gave occasion to the revolt from him, and the abolition of kingly government. The obscurity and uncertainty, therefore, of which Livy speaks, must chiefly regard the circumstances with which some facts are accompanied in his relations, and not the principal facts and events contained in the history of the early times.

p. 6. Certainly M. de B. had not duly attended to the accounts given by the ancients, of the regal state of Rome, when he ventured to say, "It is surprising to find a continued history of five centuries, in which there is scarce any void, any year, that is not distinguished by some considerable event:" for very few of the 244 years of the kings are distinguished by any event whatsoever.

It may be further remarked, that Livy's history of the 119 years, from the expulsion of

Tarquin to the burning of Rome by the Gauls, is above four times as long as his history of the 244 years of the kings; and his history of those 119 years is no longer than his history of the 95 years that follow the rebuilding of Rome, and reach to the year 460, with which his tenth book ends. And the next ten books (which are lost) contained but the history of 73 years. Now the reason of these differences in the length of his accounts of the different periods is very obvious, and is contained in the passage above cited.

I proceed now to say something of the value of those materials, which the first Roman historians may reasonably be supposed to have had for composing their histories. Without entering into any discussion of the antiquity or contents of the linen books, the books of the magistrates, the tables and memorials of the censors, the books of the decemvirs and duumvirs, or the inscriptions on pillars, statues or shields, (from all which, it cannot be questioned but many things useful to history might be drawn) I shall confine myself to speak of the other sources of historical matter, that were open to the first historians.

1. The annals or commentaries of the high priest, called the great annals.

That it was the constant custom from the earliest times, for the high priest to record in writing the events of each year, and that ancient annals, composed by the high priest[a],

[a]—Ab initio rerum—Res omnes singulorum annorum mandabat litteris pontifex maximus——ii qui etiam nunc

existed, either entire or in part in Cicero's time, is unquestionable from his express testimony.

And from the complaint which Livy makes of the loss of the greater part of the pontifical annals, anterior to the burning of Rome [*incensa urbe pleræque*[35] *interiere*] it is evident that some pieces of those ANNALS were preserved from that fire. His words import this: and his chief ground for saying that the greater part perished, was doubtless the preservation of the smaller.

L. 6. c. 1.

Rome was burnt by the Gauls about the year 363, *i. e.* about 119 years after the commencement of the republic. The Romans, we are told, were very industrious in collecting what monuments or records had escaped the fire; and it is natural to suppose, that endeavours were used to supply by memory (as far as memory could supply) the defects of what remained of the pontifical annals. "Before the use of letters (says Sir Isaac Newton) the names and actions of men could scarce be remembered above 80 or 100 years after their deaths: and therefore I admit of no chronology of things done in Europe above 80 years before Cadmus brought letters into Europe." It seems here to be admitted by this great man, that the names and actions of men, and even

Short Chron. p. 7.

Annales maximi vocantur, De orat. Lib. 2. c. 12. Servius ad Virg. Æneid. Lib. 1. v. 377. and Vopiscus in Tacito cap. 1. speak to the same effect, as M. de B. observes.

[35] M. L' Abbé Sallier considers Livy's pleræque as a word of exaggeration, to magnify his own labour in compiling a general history of his country.

the chronology of things done 80 years back, might be preserved by memory, and without written records. The defects of the great annals might therefore, with certainty enough, be supplied by the help of memory alone, as to the principal events during the far greater part of the time, between the beginning of the republic and the burning of Rome. And with regard not only to that time, but to the earlier times, is it to be supposed, that those persons who had read the annals before they were in part destroyed, remembered nothing of what they had read?

These annals, thus repaired, would doubtless be very brief and very imperfect, but not useless to history. The great events and the order of them would there be found. And as to the annals, written after the burning of Rome (for the practice was continued) we read of no destruction happening to these, either in whole or in part. It must be granted however, that even these, through some accident or neglect, were not entire and perfect in the days of Livy, or of the prior historians. If there had been no chasms, no interruptions in them, how could the historians have been so much at a loss, as we find they sometimes were, concerning the succession of the magistrates?

But granting the pontifical annals, mentioned by Cicero, to have been very imperfect, and even supposing, that his words, *ab initio rerum*, regard the time when the practice of writing annals began, and not the epoch whence the relations, contained in those which he had

read, commenced; yet (as I said before) certain it is from his testimony, that ancient records, called the annals of the high priests, or the great annals, did exist in his time: and therefore the silence of Livy and Dionysius, if they are silent, (as M. de B. imagines) concerning these annals, will not prove what M. de B. would infer from it, the non-existence of them in their time. If they did not then exist, they must have been lost in the few years between the time when Cicero wrote, and the time when Livy and Dionysius composed their histories; and of this there is no where any hint. Livy would doubtless have complained of such a loss, had it really happened, since he complains of the earlier loss suffered by the burning of Rome. And for these several considerations it is reasonable to believe, that the old annals, of which Livy frequently speaks, and the ἱεραὶ Δέλτοι, mentioned by Dionysius as historical monuments, were the great annals described by Cicero: and I think it may be reasonably asked, How could Cicero well know (and he speaks with confidence) that the custom of writing annals commenced *ab initio rerum*, but from the actual existence, in his time, of fragments of annals, written in the earliest times, or from their being cited by the first historians as existing in their time?

To PROVE the non-existence of any annals, or parts of annals, written before the burning of Rome, M. de B. makes great use of the authority of one CLODIUS cited by Plutarch, and represents this Clodius as speaking thus: "ALL the ANCIENT MONUMENTS were burnt when the

In Numa. Dissert. p. 20.

Gauls sacked Rome, and those which the Romans now have are forgeries."

M. de B. goes on: "And Plutarch himself, or whoever was the author of the treatise OF THE FORTUNE OF THE ROMANS*, after speaking of some marvellous events of those early times, —adds, To what purpose should we dwell upon times which have nothing clear, nothing certain, since, as Livy assures us, the Roman history was corrupted, and its monuments destroyed?"

* De Fortuna Romanorum. p. 21.

Then immediately, (taking for granted, that Plutarch was the author of that treatise) he adds, "What Plutarch says, upon the testimonies of Clodius and Livy, of the destruction of those monuments, gets an additional force in the mouth of so grave an author as he. For since he does not contradict them, he supports what they say by his suffrage. The testimony of these authors is very express," &c.

Again: "Livy, Clodius, and Plutarch, depose that the monuments, by which the truth of the Roman history might have been ascertained, and which alone could give it the requisite certainty, were destroyed in the sacking of Rome." p. 26.

And again: "It is certain, that the historical part of the books of the pontiffs, or their ANNALS, if they ever existed,[36] perished in the p. 56.

[36] "If they ever existed." Had Livy used these words in this place, he would have spoken like a certain gentleman, who, in giving a bad character of a person deceased, after many severe accusations, went on thus: "And he was a very cruel father to most of his children——if he had any."

destruction of Rome by the Gauls. Livy is so express upon this, that he leaves us no room to doubt of it."—For he says, "that ALL the memorials (kept in the archives) that were in private hands, or that made part of the books of the pontiffs, were involved in the ruin of the city." But where does Livy say this? Why, [in B. 6. c. 1.] where he tells us, that a great part, or the greater part, of what was contained in the high priests' commentaries, and in other public and private monuments, perished in the burning of Rome: *Et quod etiam si quæ in commentariis pontificum, aliisque publicis privatisque erant monumentis incensâ urbe pleræque interiere.*

Now as to CLODIUS, Plutarch writes thus: "Though the pedigrees of Numa's family, from its beginning to this day, be set forth in very nice order, there is much dispute concerning the time when he lived. One Clodius, in a

That Livy did not intend to express a doubt whether any pontifical annals existed before the burning of Rome, is pretty evident from a passage (in his 4th book, c. 3.) cited by M. de B.

The historian is writing of the year 310, and he puts these words into the mouth of a tribune: "If we are not admitted to the Fasti, nor to the COMMENTARIES of the high priests, are we therefore ignorant of those things which are known even by all strangers? That the consuls succeeded in the place of the kings, and have no rights or prerogatives which the kings had not before?" Si non ad Fastos, non ad COMMENTARIOS PONTIFICUM admittimur: ne ea quidem simus, quæ omnes peregrini etiam sciunt; consules in locum regum successisse: nec aut juris, aut majestatis quicquam habere, quod non in regibus ante fuerit?

work entitled ἔλεγχος χρόνων, asserts that the ancient writings of that sort [τὰς ἀρχαίας ΕΚΕΙΝΑΣ ἀναγραφὰς] were lost when the Gauls destroyed Rome, and that those which now appear were framed by flatterers to please the vanity of some private families, who would needs be thought descended from the most illustrious origins, to which they had in truth no relation." We see, that Clodius speaks only of genealogical tables, and not of any other historical monuments. Had he asserted that ALL the ancient monuments or records were lost, he would have asserted what was not true, by the concession of M. de B., who allows, that many treaties of peace, the laws of the twelve tables, and several other pieces of antiquity, escaped the flames.

M. l'Abbé Sallier thinks, that Plutarch was not the author of the treatise *de Fortuna Romanorum;* and indeed, if he were, he must, how grave soever, have been a very idle man, and condemned by himself in the above-cited passage from that treatise, to spend his time in writing the lives of Romulus, Numa, Poplicola, and Camillus, without any materials, but what he believed to be forgeries and romance.

But can it be imagined, that either he or Livy, or Dionysius, believed nothing of what they have written of the first ages of Rome, or that they looked upon all as uncertain? Though Livy, in some instances, doubts, yet he often says, "it is evident," "it is certain," *constat, certam est*; and, in his preface, he warns us, with regard to what he is going to

write, to distinguish between the stories adorned with fiction, and the traditions supported by authentic monuments.

And it was very singular, and not a little marvellous, if, when Rome was burnt by the Gauls, the fire did so piously distinguish between sacred writings and profane. It spared that part of the pontiffs BOOKS which regarded public worship, and likewise the treaties of peace and the laws of the twelve tables, treaties and laws being *religiones* *, religious matters, deemed so on account of the religious ceremonies performed at their making; but it destroyed entirely the historical part of the pontifical books, their annals: it spared no writing that was wholly profane, nothing historical, if not somehow under the protection of religion.

* Livy, l. 6. c. 1.

II. THE first Roman historians had, among the materials for their works, not only some parts of the high priests' annals, written before the burning of Rome, but some parts of OTHER public historical monuments or memorials, preserved from that fire. *Quæ in commentariis pontificum* ALIIS *que publicis monumentis erant* PLERÆQUE *interiere:* the greater part, not all, perished.

What those OTHER public monuments were, I will not pretend to say. Perhaps they were the linen books, the books of the magistrates, the memorials or tables of the censors, and some other ancient pieces referred to by the historians.

p. 98. M. de B. observes, that Livy, who cites the

linen books pretty often, from Licinius Macer, during the space of about ten years, does not cite them for any thing after that time, or before it. Now supposing this to be a proof that the linen books, which Licinius had consulted, contained nothing but what related to those ten years; yet, as those years were prior to the burning of Rome, we may reasonably believe, that the books in question were part of an old public record, a fragment preserved from that fire. And we may reasonably think the same of those parts of the books of the magistrates, and of the censors' books, which are cited in attestation of matters anterior to the destruction of Rome by the Gauls. The very imperfection of these pieces carries with it some proof of their antiquity, and of the mischief they had suffered.

III. Original records of many treaties which the Romans had made with the neighbouring nations, before the burning of the city. And these must have been of excellent use to the first historians, both for facts and dates, in their accounts of the early times. And as to the treaties, after the rebuilding of Rome, there is no question of their preservation.

IV. The acts of the senate and of the *comitia*, and the laws of the twelve tables, which fully laying open the constitution of the state, the customs and manners of the Romans, the rights of the people, and the powers of the magistrates, were a sure guide to the historians in many particulars of their accounts.

V. Whatever could be ascertained by an-

cient annals or records, preserved in the other cities of Italy, that were fallen under the power of the Romans, when Fabius and his successors undertook to write history. Why should we suppose, that these were totally neglected by the first historians? That the neighbouring nations had books and records is evident from Liv. l. 10. c. 38, where we find, that, in the year 459 of Rome, the Samnites had[37] recourse to their linen books, for direction in forming that legion which they called *legio linteata*.

That treaty with Porsenna, (mentioned by Pliny) of which M. de B. takes advantage to discredit the Roman history, was doubtless found at Clusium, or some other city of Hetruria, not at Rome.

Livy, in citing the prior historians, does not always tell us from whence they took their matter, yet often enough to make us know, that they cited authorities for what they delivered. And it is evident, that they had recourse to the archives of the conquered cities. From the passage in Livy, (L. 7. c. 3.) before referred to, we learn that Cincius having examined into the antiquities of Volsinii, a town in Hetruria, had found it to have been formerly

[37] M. l'Abbé Sallier, in his first discourse, makes this observation; and he adds, "Les nations voisins pouvoient donc offrir des monumens aux recherches des historiens. On pourroit rapporter bien d'autre preuves, que les peuples voisins des Romains n'etoient pas sans monumens et sans histoires. Varron, cité par Censorin et Festus, en plusieurs endroits, fourniroit de bons temoignage pour ce que je dis icy."

a custom there to mark the number of the years by nails fixed in a temple dedicated to Nortia, an Hetruscan goddess; and that Cincius was a diligent inquirer into such antiquities, *diligens talium monumentorum auctor Cincius.*

VI. FAMILY MEMORIALS, and FUNERAL ORATIONS.

M. de B. cites[33] the authorities of Cicero and Pliny, to prove that it was the general custom at Rome for each noble family to preserve memorials, recording the services which the members of it had done the state in the discharge of those offices, with which they had been entrusted. "If these memorials," says M. de B. "had been faithfully written, they would have been of infinite use to history. Should we admit that all the other monuments were lost, we must likewise admit, that the loss might have been supplied by these memorials. They were so many histories of the lives of particular men, and contained the principal affairs of the state, in the conduct of which those men had had a share. But unhappily, in the composition of these histories, much less regard was had to truth than to heightening the lustre of families. There were so many falsifications, the truth of facts was so frequently corrupted in these memorials, that no use could be made of them without great precaution." p. 104, et seq.

To PROVE the unfaithfulness of the family memorials, M. de B. insists chiefly on a passage in Cicero, and another in Livy, charging some p. 107, 108.

[33] Cic. in Brut. c. 16. Plin. l. 35. c. 2.

funeral orations with containing false facts invented to gratify the vanity of private families. From which it would seem, that he considers the family memorials as consisting wholly of funeral orations. Yet as he ranges certain records of the censors, (called by Dionysius τιμητικὰ ὑπομνήματα) among the family memorials, and is inclined to think that the linen books ought to be placed there too, he manifestly admits, that funeral orations were not the whole of the family memorials.

p. 105, 100.

Now if the practice of writing family memorials began early, and these pieces were preserved, and transmitted from generation to generation, they must have been of excellent use to the first Roman historians: for how much soever those pieces might abound in panegyrical exaggeration and false colourings, they would furnish good evidence of the truth of those facts, in which they agreed, and with which the several writers of those pieces were contemporary.

But as it does not appear at what time the custom of writing family memorials began, I shall here leave this matter, and consider what is said of funeral orations.

Dionysius, speaking of the funeral oration which Poplicola pronounced on his deceased colleague Brutus, tells us, it is uncertain whether Poplicola introduced this custom among the Romans, or found it already established by the kings. Be that as it will, there is no doubt of its being the constant practice, from the beginning of the republic, to honour the memory

of great men by funeral panegyrics. And, as these were premeditated speeches, and as the glory of the orator was no less concerned in the composition, than the glory of the deceased, it is highly reasonable to believe that the orator wrote down what he purposed to say, and by revising and correcting his speech, put it into the best form he could before he delivered it. I say, it is natural to suppose, that this method was for the most part, if not universally, observed by the speakers of funeral orations. Nor can any thing be more probable, than that the families, concerned in these orations, would be very desirous to preserve them.

And indeed there seems to be sufficient ground to conjecture, that from these funeral orations were taken, into the history of the earliest times of the republic, many particulars, not to be learned from tradition, or the high priests' annals, or any other public memorials. But then, for an authentic account of what passed among the Romans, I would ask, What better materials could an historian have to work upon, than a series of such orations? For though in a funeral panegyric the orator may well enough be supposed to overrate the private virtues of the deceased, disguise or refine the motives of his actions, ascribe to his remote ancestors exploits which they had not performed, nay, give him noble ancestors from whom he was not really descended: yet, as to the high offices which the person himself had filled, and the public acts he had done in those

offices, whether civil or military, we can hardly imagine the orator would attempt to impose upon an audience, who, having been eye-witnesses of the truth, were not capable of being deceived: for the sphere of action, in which the Romans moved during more than 200 years after the erection of the commonwealth, was so very narrow, that nothing considerable, of a public concern, could pass either in peace or in war, but what must be known to almost every individual of the state. The Roman citizens were all soldiers, all went to the war in their turns, and they could not, therefore, be imposed upon with regard to the success of the enterprises formed by their generals: and the same soldier-citizens were parties in all the civil commotions and struggles, and had a share in establishing those useful laws and regulations, which their magistrates had the merit of contriving and proposing. So that a series of funeral orations on the great men of Rome would contain most authentic memorials of all the principal transactions and events both at home and abroad. It was the business of the historian, who employed these materials for his work, to separate the solid from the light and unsure; and certainly no task could be more easy.

It does not seem probable, that, during the regal state, funeral panegyrics were in use, unless we may suppose that this honour was done to the kings, upon their demise, who, while Rome was governed by kings, had the glory of all victories in war, and all prudent institutions

in peace. But certain it is, that the practice prevailed from the very commencement of the republic. And though much the greater number of these funeral orations were unquestionably lost, when Fabius, about 300 years after the expulsion of Tarquin, undertook a general history of Rome, yet, that many of them were preserved, and especially of those posterior to the rebuilding of the city, there seems no reason to doubt. What could Livy mean by the *privata monumenta*, of which, he says, the greater part was destroyed by the Gauls, but these funeral orations and other family memorials? For he speaks of them as pieces that would have been useful towards a general and clear history of those times. And indeed we cannot imagine, that private families, in the earliest times of the republic, were chargeable with that vanity, which Cicero[39] and Livy complain of, as the source of many inventions in funeral panegyrics of the later ages. Till some

[39] "Nec verò habeo quemquam antiquiorem [Catone censore] cujus quidem scripta proferenda putem, nisi quem Appii Cæci oratio hæc ipsa de Pyrrho, et nonnullæ mortuorum laudationes fortè delectant: et Hercules, hæ quidem extant. Ipsæ enim familiæ sua quasi ornamenta, et monumenta servabant, et ad usum, siquis ejusdem generis occidisset, et ad memoriam laudum domesticarum, et ad illustrandum nobilitatem suam. Quamquam his laudationibus historia rerum nostrarum est facta mendosior. Multa enim scripta sunt in eis, quæ facta non sunt, falsi triumphi, plures consulatus, genera etiam falsa, et ad plebem transitiones, cùm homines humiliores in alienum ejusdem nominis infunderentur genus: ut si ego me à M. Tullio esse dicerem, qui patricius cum Servio Sulpicio consule, anno decimo post reges exactos fuit." Cic. in Brut. c. 16.

families could with truth boast of their antiquity, and the long glories of a line of ancestors from whom they were descended, there was no temptation, no opportunity for vain men falsely to claim that kind of nobility, and invent pedigrees to do themselves honour. And should we suppose that at the renovation of the state, upon the departure of the Gauls, (*i. e.* about 119 years after the birth of the commonwealth) the loss of many monuments, public and private, might give both temptation and opportunity for fiction in some degree, yet this could reach to nothing very considerable; and it is hardly credible that the orator at a funeral would, to raise the glory of the deceased and his family, hazard invented facts, which derogated from the glory of other families, and could be contradicted by the memory of persons living. And when in latter times (the brevity and imperfection of the pontifical annals and the other public monuments, and the loss of many private ones, through the extinction or decay of families, giving large scope to inventive vanity) consulships and triumphs were falsely ascribed, in funeral orations, to the remote ancestors of those whose obsequies were then solemnized; still the accounts, given in those orations, of what they themselves had performed in the high offices they had filled, would be materials which an historian might confidently and safely employ.

Livy's complaint sufficiently proves, that he thought the first historians had made use of funeral orations in compiling their histories, and

that some of those writers had very injudiciously adopted what they found delivered in such orations, concerning the remote ancestors of the persons in whose honour they were spoken. But neither he nor Cicero charges those orations with containing false accounts of facts contemporary with the orators, nor do they speak of those pieces as forgeries. I am not aware of any the least ground M. de B. has for thinking, that the funeral orations of which Livy and Cicero complain, were *pieces supposées que des faussaires avoient forgées.*

It is in writing of the year 432 of the city (*i. e.* the 188th of the republic) that Livy is at a loss to know, whether the dictator Cornelius, or the consuls of the year, conducted the war against the Samnites, and had a triumph for the success. The authors he consulted differed on this point, all agreeing however in Cornelius being then dictator: they had therefore some unquestionable authority for this particular. Their differences, in relation to the persons who obtained the victory and triumph, he imputes to the differing accounts in funeral orations and inscriptions on images, made long after the time, and by which he supposes the disagreeing historians to have been respectively guided. "It is my opinion," says he, "that the truth of history has been corrupted by funeral orations, and lying inscriptions on images, each family, by plausible fictions, assuming to itself the honour of great exploits. Hence, (that is, from this arrogant vanity) it has doubt-

less happened, that the actions of particular men are confounded, (those of one man ascribed to another) and the public monuments are likewise in confusion (disagree, contradict one another.) Nor is there any contemporary writer (contemporary with the dictator and consuls of the year 432) extant, by whose authority the truth of the matter in question can be sufficiently ascertained."

What Livy means by public monuments in this place, I will not pretend to say; probably they were the inscriptions on statues, erected in the later times, in temples and other public places, which inscriptions, contradicting one another, had occasioned a disagreement among the historians, who employed them in their own compositions. That he does not speak of the high priests' annals, as confounded or made inconsistent, is evident from Cicero's account of those pieces. The high priest's business was not to record the transactions that passed two or three hundred years before, but the transactions of the present, or immediately preceding year. No funeral orations nor inscriptions on images, made in after times, could confound those annals. Contradict them they might, but not make them inconsistent with themselves.

The same may be said of any other monuments, contemporary with the facts recorded in them; no posterior orations nor inscriptions could throw them into confusion.

It must indeed be admitted, upon the cre-

dit of Livy's[40] words, that, in his time, no authentic record of any sort, contemporary with the magistrates he is writing of, was extant, by which the particular point in question could be cleared up: for otherwise the differences among the prior historians would not have perplexed him. But he does not say, that Rome had no writers so early as the year 432, or that no writing of so early date was extant in his time. His words rather import the contrary, that there were writers in those days, and that some of their writings were extant, but none whereby the matter in doubt could with sufficient certainty be determined. *Nec quisquam æqualis temporibus illis scriptor* EXSTAT, *quo satis certo auctore stetur.*

DEMONSTRATION, or satisfactory proof, is not aimed at, by any thing or by all that is said above in favour of the Roman history of the five first centuries; but only probability. The sum is this. It seems from many passages in Cicero, Livy, and other ancient writers, that the first Roman historians had a great variety of ancient and genuine pieces for the foundation of their histories; "The High Priests' Annals;" "The Acts of the Senate, and of the Comitia;" "Records of the Succession of the Magistrates;" "The Censors' Books;"

[40] "Vitiatam memoriam funebribus laudibus reor, falsisque imaginum titulis, dum familia ad se quæque famam rerum gestarum, honorumque fallente mendacio trahunt. Inde certè et singulorum gesta, et publica monumenta rerum confusa. Nec quisquam æqualis temporibus illis scriptor exstat, quo satis certo auctore stetur." Lib. 8. c. 40.

"Treaties of Peace and Alliance;" "Family Memorials and Funeral Orations."

Of no one sort of these pieces was there an uninterrupted series, but only parts and fragments. The whole stock of materials was insufficient for a continued thread of history; and accordingly the history is broken and imperfect; there are many chasms in it; some things are delivered as uncertain, some as fabulous; and many things in it are fabulous or uncertain, which are not delivered as such. Fabius Pictor and his nearest followers adopted traditional stories which pleased the national vanity, and of which those historians had no desire to destroy the belief, even when they could have done it by the means of authentic monuments; and in many instances they were destitute of those means. The circumstantial accounts of the exploits of particular men, I conjecture to have been taken from family memorials and funeral orations; because I cannot conceive from what other source the historians could have them. For the great annals, according to the description of them by Cicero, must have been too brief, to descend often to circumstances of actions; and tradition (as M. de Pouilly observes) never informs us of circumstances any more than of dates. When fiction or uncertainty is apparent in the accounts given us of the heroic deeds of this or that great man, I apprehend, that those accounts were taken from family memorials and funeral orations, of low date, when, the power of the Romans growing considerable, and their va-

nity keeping pace with it, genealogies became a matter of great moment to private families.

But as to the most memorable of the national affairs, the civil contests and the important changes produced by those contests in the constitution of the government, the foreign wars in which the Romans engaged, and the final success of their struggles with each of the neighbouring states, the truth of these events might be assured by tradition alone; and the very dates of most of them would be ascertained by the LAWS and the TREATIES that were carefully preserved; the laws consequent to the commotions, and the treaties consequent to the wars. And we may well presume, that the memory of much more than these principal events was transmitted by the high priests' annals and the other public monuments, contemporary with the facts they recorded. Family memorials and funeral orations, composed in the earliest times of the republic, would be excellent materials for an historian; and even those of later date, where truth was mingled with fiction, would be good authority with regard not only to contemporary facts, but to facts much earlier than those pieces, if many of those pieces agreed in the same accounts.

M. de. B. begins the second part of his Dissertation with these words: "I have given the reasons which make me call in question the history of the first five centuries of Rome. They are founded on the want of contemporary monuments and historians. So that the first his-

torians which Rome produced could have nothing whereon to ground their relations but tradition, which is apt to corrupt very much the truth of facts[41]."

Now, granting that the very short account of the 244 years of the kings, contained in Livy's first book, was chiefly taken from tradition, yet surely it is quite incredible that such a variety of matter, so many particulars (with that degree of order which they have) as fill the nine preserved books of Livy that follow the first, and filled seven[42] books more that are lost, could all be collected from tradition alone. Tradition is not so copious and methodical. The earlier historians, therefore, from whom Livy drew the matter of his history of Rome, from the expulsion of Tarquin to the end of the 5th century, must have had written records and memorials of some sort to work upon; and from these they must have taken the greater part of what they related; unless we will suppose that their histories were romances of their own invention, which is not very probable; there being no indication whatsoever of those writers being great wits. It is probable, that after Fabius Pictor and some others had composed general histories of their country, most

[41] "J'ai rapporté les raisons qui me font revoquer en doute l'histoire des cinq premiers siecles de Rome. Elles sont fondées sur la disette de monumens, et d'historiens contemporains; de sorte que les premiers historiens ne purent fonder leurs relations, que sur la tradition, sujette à alterer beaucoup la verité des faits." P. 205.

[42] Livy's 17th book ended with the year 495.

of the private memorials, which had served them in many particulars, for guides and vouchers, were neglected and lost; as was the fate of Fabius, and all the historians prior to Livy, after he had published a better written and more entertaining history, comprehending the substance of all that they had collected.

M. de B. in the second part of his Dissertation, produces from the Roman story, several facts, which he calls principal events, and which, from the disagreement among the ancients, in their accounts of them, he considers as wholly uncertain; and from the uncertainty of these principal events he infers the uncertainty of all the rest. I shall not enter into a particular consideration of the facts referred to; because, first of all, some of them are spoken of by the ancients as uncertain; and nobody pretend the certainty where they disclaim it. In the next place, because I conceive that very few of the facts mentioned have a title to be called principal events; and lastly because, if disagreement in some things, among historians who write of the same people and times, be a sufficient ground for refusing credit to every thing they relate, there is no history which may not with good reason be utterly rejected; and I am not concerned in the defence of history in general.

But, in the first part of the Dissertation, there is one particular, which being strenuously insisted upon by the ingenious author, and seeming very much to his purpose of discrediting the accounts given us by Livy and Diony-

sius, of the early times of the republic, ought not to be passed over unconsidered: I mean THE TREATY which Polybius says was concluded between the Romans and Carthaginians in the first year after the expulsion of Tarquin; Lucius Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius being consuls. The reader may find this piece in the 7th Chap. of B. 3. of this history. If the treaty be genuine, and there be no mistake in the date which Polybius assigns to it, it stands in opposition to many things related by the two other historians.

Dissert. p. 35.

I. IT APPEARS by this treaty (says M. de. B.) "That Brutus and Horatius were colleagues in the consulship; which, according to Livy and Dionysius, and all the Roman Fasti, they were not:" and he adds, "that every thing the historians tell us of the events of this year, being partly founded on the names of the consuls, nothing of the whole is, in his opinion, much worthy of credit[43]."

He observes, "that Mr. Dodwell, (*de cyclis* Rom. Diss. x. p. 104.) and Rycquius (*de capitol.* Rom. c. 11.) choose rather to accuse Polybius of falsifying this treaty, than admit the uncertainty which it throws upon ancient history; and that Perizonius* has endeavoured to reconcile Polybius with the Roman Fasti, by conjecturing, that Polybius found only the name of Horatius in the original of the treaty,

* Dissert. vii. N. 8.

[43] "Je crois qu'il faut avouer de bonne foi, que tout ce que les historiens nous disent des evenemens de cette année, etant en partie fondé sur les noms de consuls, est peu digne de creance."

and added, of his own head, the name of Brutus, the better to denote the true date of this piece; and, as the name of Horatius alone had been put on the temple of the capitol, so that name alone had been put to this treaty. This conjecture [says M. de B.] I would let pass, if it removed the other difficulties raised by the piece in question, and reconciled it with the accounts given by the other historians; yet I think Polybius too well versed in the Roman history to have given Horatius a colleague who never was his colleague; and too exact and scrupulous to have added any thing of his own to an original piece."

That it is not probable, Polybius would falsify a treaty, add any thing of his own to an original piece, I readily grant; and that Perizonius's conjecture, if admitted, would leave the main difficulties in their full force. But I should be curious to know, what Roman history that was which M. de B. supposes Polybius so well versed in, and in which he supposes him to have found, that Brutus and Horatius were colleagues in the consulship. If, in the days of Polybius, there were authentic annals existing, which recorded the transactions of the earliest times of the *republic, M. de B.'s main position in his Dissertation is overthrown. If he supposes that Polybius's sole authority for joining Brutus and Horatius in the consulship (contrary to the report of the older historians and annalists, whom Livy and Dionysius are said to have copied) was the piece in question, I would ask, how it appears that the names

of Brutus and Horatius were certainly at the head or tail of that ancient monument? It is plain they were not in the body of it. When Livy and Dionysius contradict Polybius upon any particular historical fact, I believe there are very few readers who will not be inclined to side with the last, provided there be no reason not to do so, but barely his being contradicted upon that fact, by those two historians. But this is not the present case. The fact reported by him is highly improbable; and it is inconsistent with a series of not improbable facts, reported by them; facts, in regard to which we cannot conceive any temptation they had to invent, conceal, or disguise: and, in what Polybius himself says, there seems to be good ground for suspecting that he was deceived in relation to the piece in question. He introduces his translation of it with these words:

L. 3. c. 22. "The first treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians was made in the consulship of Lucius Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, the first consuls after the regifuge, by whom also was consecrated the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, 28 years before the passing of Xerxes into Greece. Below, you will find the words of the treaty interpreted in the best manner I was able to do it. For the ancient Latin is so different from that now in use, that the most skilful are frequently at a loss, even after close application, to explain it."——And (in c. 26.) after giving us two subsequent treaties, he says, "It is no wonder that Philinus knew nothing of these [all the 3] treaties, (though engraven

on brass, and preserved in the temple of Jupiter, under the custody of the ædiles,) for even in my time the oldest men, both Romans and Carthaginians, those who were thought the best acquainted with public affairs, were ignorant of these treaties."

NOW, granting that some consuls' names were really found at the beginning or end of the old record in question, yet nobody will suppose that the consuls were there described in the manner Polybius describes them. The description is all his own. And (by the way) when he says, that the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus was consecrated by Brutus and Horatius; who can prefer his authority, in this particular, to that of Livy, or of the most ancient Latin historians, whom doubtless Livy followed herein; and to the very inscription itself on the temple, where Horatius was named as the only consecrator? What motive can we imagine the Roman historians to have had for denying Brutus a share in that honour, if he had any title to it? Besides, it seems pretty evident from many passages in Livy, that it was not the custom, in the dedication of any temple, for more than one person to perform that ceremony.

L. 2. c. 8.
L. 4. c. 29.
L. 9. c. 46.

FURTHER; not only the description of the consuls, but their very NAMES, as Polybius gives them, cannot well be supposed to have been annexed to this record, Lucius Junius with his surname Brutus, and Marcus Horatius without his surname Pulvillus. If the names were entire and legible, we must believe that the historian

has either omitted or added something. And supposing, that to this record were found, both entire and legible, the names of some consuls; yet why is it so difficult to believe, that Polybius may have been deceived, concerning those names, by the persons to whom he applied himself, for assistance in his attempt to explain a record in old Latin? For it is not to be supposed that he, a stranger, would undertake without assistance to translate a piece so difficult to be translated, even by the most skilful of the natives. He may have given us a false account of the date of this treaty, without being guilty of forgery.

And why may we not suppose, that time had effaced some parts of the consuls' names, and that the defects were supplied by conjecture? The Roman vanity might have a share too in the conjecture; it might prompt the assistants of our historian to fill up[44] the chasms in such a manner as to form an evidence, that

[44] Suppose the treaty in question to have been made so late as 304, the first year after the decemvirate, when Lucius Valerius Potitus and Marcus Horatius Barbatus were consuls. The matter of the treaty will, in this case, suit better with the times, according to the accounts of them by Livy and Dionysius. (For Ardea was then in alliance with Rome, and Antium was a Roman colony.) Imagine the names of the consuls to have been partly effaced, and that there remained of them, (supposing the cognomens to have been originally inserted) only Lucius—ius—tus, Marcus Horatius. Who will not see, that the Roman vanity of those, whom Polybius employed for his decypherers, might tempt them to supply the chasms with Jun—Bru—? But I am inclined to think that the piece in question was of much later date than the year 304.

the Roman state was considerable enough in the first year of the republic, to have a treaty with the Carthaginians.

But perhaps there is some reason to doubt, whether any date or consuls' names were really found at the beginning or end of this old record. For it is remarkable, that Polybius, who gives us at large two subsequent treaties engraven like the first, on brass, and kept with it under the custody of the ædiles, neither mentions the names of the consuls under whose administration they were made, nor assigns any certain date to either of them. Of the former of the two, he says only, that it was made after the first; and of the latter he says only, that it was made about the time of Pyrrhus's coming into Italy: and for this it does not appear that he had any voucher, but the matter of the treaty itself, where Pyrrhus is mentioned. If he had found dates and consuls' names to these brazen records, it is wonderful that so exact an historian should omit them; and especially when he is employing these records as evidence against Philinus's accounts, and the evidence has no real weight for want of those dates. Seeing then there is so much reason to believe that the records of the two later treaties wanted dates, we may well suspect that the oldest had the like defect; and that the date given to it was by mere conjecture.

II. M. de B.'s second discovery in this important piece of antiquity is, "That so early as the first year of the republic, the Romans

Dissert. p. 37.

practised navigation and piracy; of which things (he adds) there is little said in their history, which represents their marine, till the first Punic war, as consisting only of some merchant ships, and as not brought to any perfection but on occasion of that war, as Polybius himself remarks."

L. 1. c. 20. I must here confess, that I cannot discern, in the treaty, one word importing that the Romans, at the time of its being concluded, practised piracy, or had any ships of war, Perhaps M. de B. collects this piracy from Polybius's comment on the treaty, who says, "That the Carthaginians would not suffer the Romans to sail to the south of the Fair Promontory with long ships, μακραῖς ναυσι;" which are commonly understood to be ships of war. But his comment here does not well accord with what he himself asserts, when he writes of the first Ibid. Punic war: for he there tells us, "That the Romans, to that time, had never thought of the sea—and were so far from having decked ships, that they had not so much as one long ship, or even a lembus." In this particular the historian is undoubtedly mistaken; and I mention it, not only to show its repugnance to his comment on the treaty in question, but to show likewise that Polybius is not always to be followed with a blind deference; and that we ought, in reading him, to observe the rule which he recommends to those who read the L. 3. historian Fabius, "not to regard so much the great name of the person who writes, as the matter he delivers," and to consider whether

this be probable, have the appearance of truth, and be consistent with what is unquestionably true[45].

[45] Polybius (L. 3. c. 26.) quarrels with Philinus, not for being ignorant of the three treaties before mentioned, as he supposes he was, but for asserting things contrary to the tenor of them. Now it does not appear, from any proof Polybius gives, either that Philinus was ignorant of these treaties, or that he asserted any thing contrary to them. Philinus affirmed (in speaking of the grounds of the first Punic war) that in some treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians, it had been covenanted, that the former should not invade any part of Sicily, nor the latter any part of Italy. But this assertion does not contradict what is contained in the other treaties. To show a contradiction, Polybius should have given us the dates of all the three treaties he has mentioned, and likewise the date which Philinus assigned to the treaty mentioned by him; and this Polybius has not done. The treaty to which Philinus referred, might have been made after the time of Pyrrhus's coming into Italy: And Philinus might know there was such a treaty, though Polybius could find no record of it; which is the second bad reason he gives for denying the fact. What Philinus reported is so far from being manifestly false, that it is highly probable. For if the Romans, before they had subdued all Latium, or had even alliances with all the Latine states, thought it necessary to bind the Carthaginians by treaty not to attempt conquests in any part of Latium, it was natural, that when they came to have the same sort of interest in protecting all Italy from the Carthaginians, which they had before in protecting Latium only, they should exclude the Carthaginians from every part of Italy; and doubtless, in that case, the Carthaginians would exclude the Romans for the like reasons, from every part of Sicily.

[N. B. In p. 37. of this fourth volume of this history, where the question, Whether the first war undertaken by the Romans against the Carthaginians was justifiable, is discussed, the reasoning is partly founded on the supposition, that the report of Polybius is true; and that no treaty

But further, this treaty, according to M. de B. informs us,

Dissert. p. 37.

III. That so early as the first year of the republic, "The Romans were masters of all the sea-coast as far as to Tarracina, and even of the cities of Antium and Ardea; a point wherein it manifestly stands in opposition to Livy* and Dionysius†. For these authors tell us, that Antium was the capital of the Volsci, and that the Romans did not take it till 40 years after, in the consulship of T. Quinctius and Q. Servilius. The city of Ardea‡, according to the same historians, was besieged by Tarquin the Proud, at the time when the Roman people shook off the yoke of his domination. The Ardeates, after that, having the same interests with the Romans, made a fifteen years truce with them. After which time Ardea continued in alliance with Rome to the year 310, when, on account of some particular discontents, they confederated with the Volsci; but in the following year the old alliance was renewed.

* Lib. 2. in fine.
† Lib. ix. p. 615.
‡ D. Hal. Lib. 4. p. 277. Liv. Lib. 1. c. 57.

had been concluded between the two states, whereby the Romans were barred from meddling in the affairs of Sicily.]

It is sometimes urged against the authority of Livy and Dionysius, with regard to certain important facts related by them, that Polybius is silent concerning those facts, though he wrote of the same times and on the same subject which they treat. But I shall here observe once for all, that this his silence will never alone be a sufficient reason for rejecting the accounts of the other historians. For Polybius, though he speaks three times of the taking of Rome by the Gauls, does not once mention their burning it; and yet this is an important fact, of which I believe nobody questions the truth.

"This city therefore (adds M. de B.) was, according to those historians, independent, and only in alliance with the Romans; whereas the treaty, given at large by Polybius, imports, that this city, and likewise Antium, Laurentum, Circeii, Tarracina were SUBJECT to them; and expressly distinguishes these cities from the cities IN ALLIANCE with Rome. Hence it appears, that the two historians give us a false notion of the Roman state in the beginning of the republic; for they represent its domination as extending little further than the proper territory of Rome; whereas by this treaty we see, that it extended over several cities, and over all the sea-coast as far as Tarracina."

WHENEVER THIS treaty was made (supposing it genuine) it is evident, that the main purpose of the Romans in it, was to exclude the Carthaginians from all Latium, not only those parts of it that were subject to the Romans, or in alliance with them, but those likewise with which they had neither of those connections. And it is not, I think, clear, from the words of the treaty, that all the towns therein mentioned were in absolute subjection to the Romans. It speaks to this effect: "Let[46] the Carthaginians do no hurt to the Ardeates, Antiates, Lauren-

[46] ΚΑΡΧΗΔΟΝΙΟΙ ΔΕ ΜΗ ΑΔΙΚΕΙΤΩΣΑΝ ΔΗΜΟΝ ΑΡΔΕΑΤΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙΑΤΩΝ, ΛΑΥΡΕΝΤΙΝΩΝ, ΚΙΡΚΑΙΑΤΩΝ, ΤΑΡΡΑΚΗΝΙΤΩΝ, ΜΗΔ' ΑΛΛΟΝ ΜΗΔΕΝΑ ΛΑΤΙΝΩΝ, ΟΣΟΙ ΑΝ ΥΠΗΚΟΟΙ ΕΩΣΙΝ, ΔΕ ΤΙΝΕΣ ΜΗ ΩΣΙΝ ΥΠΗΚΟΟΙ, ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΕΩΝ ΑΠΕΧΕΤΩΣΑΝ. ΑΝ ΔΕ ΛΑΒΩΣΙ, ΡΩΜΑΙΟΙΣ ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΤΩΣΑΝ ΑΚΕΡΑΙΟΝ.
Polyb. Lib. iii. c. 22.

tini, Circeienses, Tarracinenses, or any other of the Latines, if they be ὑπηκοοὶ, nay, if any of them be not ὑπηκοοὶ, let not the Carthaginians meddle with their towns. If they take any town of the Latines [whether they be ὑπηκοοὶ or not ὑπηκοοὶ] let them restore it unhurt to the Romans." Here is no distinction made of towns subject and towns in alliance, but of the Latines who were ὑπηκοοὶ, and the Latines who were not ὑπηκοοὶ. What the force of the word ὑπηκοοὶ is, does not fully appear; whether it mean subject in the strict sense, or only dependent allies. I say dependent allies; for these towns might be in alliance with the Romans and yet not independent on them; such being the case of almost all the states of Italy at the commencement of the first Punic war. And what the true import was of the old obsolete Latin word, which Polybius has rendered ὑπηκοοὶ, who can tell? One would suspect, that neither Polybius nor his assistants did very well understand the piece they undertook to explain. For it is a very strange covenant, That in case the Carthaginians seized any town of the Latines, not subject to the Romans, they should restore it to the Romans.

Further; If this brazen monument had for its date, the names of Brutus and Horatius, (consuls in the first year of the republic) and if the words of the treaty import, that the Ardeates were SUBJECT to Rome, and distinguish them from ALLIES, it is contradicted by an original authentic record, which Livy mentions of a treaty of alliance and friendship, made with the Ardeates in the consulships of L. Sempro-

L. 4. c. 7.

nius Atratinus and L. Papirius Mugilanus, (year of Rome 309 or 311.:) which treaty was a renewal of an alliance that had long subsisted between the two states[47].

Again, it is hardly to be imagined that the Romans had subdued the maritime towns of old Latium, as far as to Tarracina, in the remotest extremity of it, without having reduced the intermediate inland towns, and in short, the whole or almost the whole country: Yet this subjection of the Latine nation to Rome, in the first year of the republic, is incompatible with an original brazen monument existing in Livy's time, and recording the treaty of alliance made with the Latines in the second consulship of Cassius, (year of R. 260 or 261.) L. 2. c. 33.

[47] The Ardeates, on occasion of a dispute between them and their neighbours, the Aricini, about a tract of land, were insulted by a decree of the Roman people, to whom the cause had been referred; who, instead of adjudging the land to either of the claimants, took it to themselves. Hereupon the Ardeates broke alliance with the Romans, and soon after, by ambassadors, complained at Rome of the injury which had been done them; but complained in such terms, as showed they were willing to renew alliance and friendship with the Roman state, provided restitution were made of the land in question. The senate gave them a soft answer; and the next year the alliance was renewed by treaty; the record of which treaty Licinius Macer had read. "T. Quinctius Barbatus interrex consules creat, L. Papirium Mugilanum, L. Sempronium Atratinum. His consulibus cum Ardeatibus fœdus renovatum est. *Idque monumenti est,* consules eos illo anno fuisse qui neque in *annalibus priscis,* neque in *libris magistratuum* inveniuntur, credo, quod tribuni militum initio anni fuerunt, eo perinde ac si totum annum in imperio fuerent, suffectis his consulibus, prætermissa nomina consulum horum. Licinius Macer auctor est, et in FOEDERE ARDEATINO et in *linteis libris* ad monetæ inventa."

L. 2. c. 65. And, as to Antium, the capital of the Volsci, though Livy reports, that it was taken (in 284) forty years after the commencement of the republic, yet, by the sequel[48] of his story, it would seem, that the Antiates were not really subdued, not reduced to a state of absolute subjection till the year 415, when the Latines also,

[48] The Latine historian relates, that when after the taking of Antium in 285, by T. Quinctius, the senate had decreed to place a colony there, the persons appointed to settle the
L. 3. c. 1. colony could prevail with but few of the Roman citizens to go thither, so that they were forced to admit of Volsci to complete the necessary number; and he further tells us, that
c. 4. a multitude of the old inhabitants returning soon after to the city, these alienated the minds of the colony from the Ro-
c. 23. mans, and its fidelity could no longer be depended upon. Livy seems not to have known the exact time when the Antiates shook off all dependence upon the republic; but he
L. 4. c. 56. represents them in the year 345 at the head of a confederacy against Rome. In 377, he makes them surrender their
L. 6. c. 33. town and territory to the Romans. Nevertheless, in 407, we find them acting as an independent people; they had rebuilt Satricum, and sent a colony thither: And they by deputies solicit the Latines to take arms against the Romans.
L. 8. c. 12. And in 413, the Antiates make incursions on the lands of Ostia, Ardea, and Solonium; and the Romans gain no ho-
c. 13, 14. nour in the war against them. But in 415, they are totally subdued, together with the Latines, and a new colony is sent to Antium. The Antiates are allowed to enrol themselves in the colony; but they are forbid the sea, and deprived of their long ships, some of which the Romans burn, carrying the beaks of them to Rome, where the suggestum, or pulpit, in the Forum, being adorned with them, acquires thence the name of Rostra. With the rest of the ships, the Romans augment their own navy.

Supposing the first treaty with Carthage to have been made in 244, and the third in the time of Pyrrhus, there will have been, according to Polybius, 231 years between the first and the third.

or at least the much greater part of them were brought into the like subjection. And even then Antium was made a Roman colony, into which the natives were admitted.

It would seem, therefore, that the treaty, given by Polybius, as made with Carthage in 244, was not made till after the year 415, the matter of it perfectly agreeing with the state of things after this year, and not before it.

Livy speaks of a treaty * of alliance and friendship with the Carthaginians in the consulship of Valerius Corvus and Popilius Lænas, year of Rome (according to the Fast. Cap.) 405; and his words seem to import that this was the first treaty concluded between the two republics. "Cum Carthaginiensibus legatis Romæ fœdus ictum, quum amicitiam ac societatem petentes venissent." Liv. lib. 7. c. 27. He speaks of no other till he comes to the year 447, when he says a third treaty was made with Carthage; "Cum Carthaginiensibus eodem anno fœdus tertio renovatum." L. 9. c. 43. So that it would seem from hence, and from the matter of that treaty, which Polybius calls the first, that it was really the second, and made between the years 405 and 447, and after the reduction of Latium in 415. According to the Epitome of Livy, the treaty concluded in the time of Pyrrhus †, which is Polybius's third treaty, was the fourth treaty made with the Carthaginians. "Iterum adversus Pyrrhum dubio eventu pugnatum est. Cum Carthaginiensibus quarto fœdus renovatum est."

* Oros. L. 3. c. 7. calls this treaty, Primum illud ictum cum Carth. fœdus.

L. 9. c. 43.

† Y. of R. 475. Epit. L. 13.

Granting then, that by the words of this old

brazen record, the towns there mentioned were absolutely SUBJECT to the Romans; what is the conclusion we should naturally draw from it? Not that Livy and Dionysius have given us a false account of the Roman state in the first year of the republic, but that the PIECE in question was not genuine, or that the names of Brutus and Horatius were not annexed to it. For,

What could tempt Livy, a Roman, or Dionysius, an extravagant flatterer of the Romans, wilfully to disguise the extent of the Roman domination at the commencement of the republic? I say wilfully to disguise; for is it possible to believe that either the Romans or the Latines were ignorant of the time when the latter became subjects of the former? And M. de B. seems not to have duly reflected, when he says[49], "It is sufficiently apparent that Livy and Dionysius knew nothing of the treaty mentioned by Polybius." They could not but meet with this piece in Polybius's work, which they appear to be very well acquainted with, and of which Livy makes great use in compiling his own. And is it not evident, therefore, from their showing no regard to what Polybius says of this old brazen monument, either that they looked upon it as not authentic, or knew that he had been deceived concerning the date of it? It is remarkable, that

[49] "Il paroit meme assez, qu'ils n'en ont eu nulle connoissance." *Dissert.* p. 34. "Si Tite Live avoit eu connoissance de cette piece, &c. S'il avoit consulté ce monument," &c. P. 39.

Livy, who informs us, that some authors, differing from the rest, make Horatius the immediate successor of Brutus, has not thought it worth while to observe, that Polybius makes them colleagues in the consulship. L. 2. c. 8.

Add to this, the great improbability that, during the unsettled and precarious state of things at Rome, in the first year after the expulsion of Tarquin, the Carthaginians should enter into any treaty with the Romans; and the yet greater improbability, that they should conclude a treaty with them in terms which suppose them in a settled state, and in a condition to maintain the stipulations therein expressed.

Perhaps we should have found the matter cleared up, and Polybius's mistake animadverted upon by Livy or Dionysius, if those parts of their histories, which treated of the first war with the Carthaginians, had been preserved.

I SHALL close these observations with the words of M. de Pouilly, in the beginning of his *Nouveaux Essais de Critique sur la Fidelité de l'Histoire*.

"It very seldom happens that we avoid one faulty extreme without running into another its contrary: this maxim, true in morality, is true in criticism. Are men afraid of giving credit to fables? They sometimes refuse it to the most certain facts; they look upon history as a compound of truths and fictions, so intimately united, that it is impossible to separate them. Had the historian no part in the trans-

actions he relates? They suspect him of being ill informed.—Had he a part in those transactions? They accuse him of prejudice and prepossession.—On the other hand, there are those who, fearing lest they should happen to reject true history, give credit to all the fables which have borrowed its name.—Let us avoid these opposite extravagances: let us confess that, in history, falsehood is mingled with truth; but that there are marks by which they may be distinguished. Love of the marvellous, interest, vanity, spirit of party, are so many fountains ever open, from whence fiction spreads itself in ample waves over the annals of all nations. When we are reduced to seek the truth of a fact in historians biassed by passions, if they are of different parties and interests, let us bring their narrations together; and from this collation, we shall strike out the truth, if I may so speak, in spite of them: I say further, that those who are of one and the same party, will commonly deserve some credit in facts of such public notoriety, that they durst not disguise them; or in which they were too little interested to have sufficient temptation to undertake it."

THE

ROMAN HISTORY.

BOOK IV.

From the beginning of the FIRST PUNIC WAR, *in the year of* RYme 489, *to the end of the* SECOND *in* 552.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the close of the preceding volume of this history, we left the Romans complete conquerors and quiet possessors of all ancient Italy, that is, of all the country between the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, from the remotest border of Hetruria to the Ionian sea. The far greater part of this dominion, though their state [by the usual reckonings] was now 488 years old, had been of late acquisition: for, whatever advantage they might have over their neighbours, in the admirable construction of their legion[1], the discipline of war, or any other

[1] Vegetius thinks that the form of the legion was not the product of mere human reason, but that the Romans were led to it by a kind of instinct from heaven; "Non tantum humano consilio, sed etiam divinitatis instinctu, legiones Romanis arbitror constitutas." De Re Milit. l. 2. c. 21.

respects, they could make but little progress in conquest during the space of above four centuries from the building of their city. Rome, while under the government of kings, was in the weakness of infancy; and if, with Florus, we consider her as advanced to sprightly youth, (the second stage of life) when she became a republic, yet her natural strength was impaired, and her growth long checked, by the disease of civil discord, a mischief wholly proceeding from the want of that essential of a free state, a just equality among its members.

By the revolution which expelled Tarquin the Proud, the commons of Rome were delivered from a tyrant, but not from tyranny. A short suspension there was indeed of the weight of oppression. This was owing to the honest zeal of that excellent patriot, Valerius Poplicola, and to the temporising lenity and moderation of the senate, while their fears of Tarquin's return were alive and strong. In so perilous a season, the indulgent fathers had the goodness to decree, "That the poorer sort, by only educating their children, paid sufficient tribute to the state, and ought not to be loaded with any other tax." But it was not long before the plebeians felt themselves in the chains of servitude; Livy makes the death of Tarquin, which happened in the fourteenth year after his banishment, to be the precise period when they began[2] to be oppressed by the nobles. The

Livy, B. 2. c. 9.

[2] "Insignis hic annus est nuncio Tarquinii mortis.—— Eo nuncio erecti patres, erecta plebes. Sed patribus nimis

commons then became sensible, that by dethroning their king, they had only cast off the domination of one tyrant to become slaves to many, an assembly of tyrants, whose yoke was no less heavy and insupportable. The Valerian law *, to permit appeals from the sentence of the magistrates to the people assembled, was not sufficient to protect the plebeians from injustice and cruelty. They found it necessary to provide themselves living protectors against the tyranny of the great, and therefore extorted from the senate a consent to the establishment of the tribunitian power. Another rampart against the overflowings of ambition they raised to themselves by instituting the *comitia tributa*, and by the practice of bringing into judgment, before those assemblies, the most exalted of the nobles, upon accusations of treason against the people. By the publication of the laws of the twelve tables, some check was given to the abuse of that prerogative, which the patricians tenaciously kept, of being the sole judges in civil causes: and we find that on several other occasions, the commons, urged by oppression to fury, exerted their natural strength in such a manner as seemed to proclaim them the sovereign masters in Rome.—But those acts of power were only transient flashes, the lightnings of a civil tempest; and, notwithstanding all the advances hitherto made towards liberty and equality, the

* Passed in the Y. of R. 244.

Y. of R. 260.

Y. of R. 262.

Y. of R. 302.

luxuriosa ea fuit lætitia; plebi, cui ad eam diem summa ope inservitum erat, injuriæ à primoribus fieri cœpere."—B. 2. c. 21.

patricians were the permanent, established lords of the commonwealth: all the great offices, civil, military, and sacerdotal, were confined to their body; the public treasure at their disposal: they heaped up riches to themselves; and, while the people, through extreme indigence, fell under a necessity of contracting debts to the patrician usurers, the laws gave the creditors power to be cruel to their insolvent debtors: and the consequence of all this was, that multitudes of the plebeians, slavishly dependent by reason of their poverty, durst not concur with the more free, in using even the undisputed rights of the commons. Hence the few instances of plebeians chosen to the military tribuneship, even after they were legally qualified for that station.

See B. 3. c. 4. § 1.

Y. of R. 386.

The commonwealth of Rome was never truly a free state, till after the publication of the Licinian laws, those laws which, in their consequences, made merit alone the ordinary scale whereby to ascend to the highest offices, and which, by admitting the plebeians to a reasonable share of what was purchased with their blood, delivered them from that servile subjection to the wealthy nobles in which their indigence had so long detained them.

From this period, the Roman people, when they made laws, or elected magistrates for the execution of them, were, generally speaking, free from all undue influence; not over-awed, as before, by the rich and the great, nor constrained by any force, but that of reason and natural justice, in the most absolute subjection

to which is the most perfect freedom. No citizen, who had showed superior talents and virtue, stood excluded, on account of the low degree of his birth, from the dignities of the state: the emulation among the individuals was to surpass each other in deserving honours.

Indeed the haughty patricians, as, when vanquished by the plebeians, they had given ground with an angry reluctance, and retired fighting, so they afterwards, from time to time, showed a strong disposition to renew the war, in order to regain their unrighteous sovereignty: but their efforts were faint and ineffectual; and at length acquiescing in what they could not undo, there ensued domestic peace and union, and an established liberty.

Union at home gave new strength to the state; and liberty seems to have inspired the people with a more elevated courage, a more unwearied fortitude, than they had hitherto shown in their war abroad. By a series of victories, they, in the space of about 70 years, (reckoning from the battle against the Latines in 413) enlarged their narrow dominion, of a few leagues about the city, to the utmost extent of Italy. And, though destitute of naval strength and naval skill, their next enterprise, as we shall presently find, will be against a rival republic, beyond the continent; a republic that, with greater riches and more ample territories than theirs, had possession of the absolute dominion of the sea. The boldness

of the undertaking, and the amazing constancy with which they supported it, in spite of the most terrible adversities, are not to be paralleled in the history of any other nation: but the Roman legions were, at this time, legions of free citizens, whose predominant passion was glory, and who placed the highest glory in facing every danger, and surmounting every difficulty, to preserve their liberty, and extend their empire.

CHAP. I.

The occasion and commencement of the first Punic or Carthaginian War.

THE prophetic exclamation of king Pyrrhus*, as he sailed from Sicily, is now going to be accomplished, and that island to be the theatre of a bloody war between Rome and Carthage. The Epirot, when he beheld these powerful and ambitious republics making swift advances in conquest, and by every step approaching nearer to each other, could have no difficulty to foresee that they would soon become enemies; and, as he might with reason believe that the Romans would finish the reduction of Italy before the Carthaginians could totally subdue Sicily, the conjecture was natural, that this country would be the seat of the war between them. He himself had gone thither, on the invitation of the people of Syracuse, to guard them against the Carthaginian en-

* See B. 3. c. 28. § 3.

croachments; and he was, doubtless, persuaded, that, in a short time, they would find themselves under a necessity of suing to the Romans for the like succour. The occasion however of the first rupture, between Rome and Carthage, was not any distress of the Syracusians; it was an event singular and unexpected; and as it has left ground for a dispute, whether the first Punic or Carthaginian war was justly undertaken by the Romans, it may be proper, for the reader's satisfaction, to state the case as fully as possible; and, in order thereto, we must recal some passages of the former part of this history *.

A considerable body of soldiers, Campanians by birth, and called Mamertines, had been mercenaries to Agathocles king of Syracuse; upon whose death finding themselves no longer welcome there, they marched away with all their effects to Messina. Admitted here, and kindly entertained as friends, they treacherously massacred one part of the citizens, expelled the rest, and seized, for their own use, upon the lands, houses, and even wives of those unfortunate men.

Some time after this, when Pyrrhus was just landed in Italy, the inhabitants of Rhegium, that their city might neither fall into the hands of the Epirot, nor become a prey to the Carthaginians, who were masters of the sea, and whose fleets appeared frequently off the coast, requested of the Roman senate to furnish them with a garrison. A legion of 4000 Romans,

* See B. 3. c. 26. § 1. and c. 29. § 5. Strab. l. 6. p. 268. Polyb. l. 1. c. 7. Diod. Sic. in Eclog. p. 866.

raised in Campania, was, under the command of Decius Jubellius, appointed to that service. At first, they demeaned themselves suitably to the intention of those who employed them: but at length, tempted by the wealth of the place, emboldened by the example of the Mamertines, and strengthened by their aid, they acted the same perfidious and cruel part towards the Rhegians, which the other had acted towards the people of Messina.

As these cities are parted only by that narrow sea (now called the Faro) which separates Italy from Sicily, it was easy for the two bands of robbers mutually to assist each other in the defence of their usurpations; for which purpose they entered into a strict confederacy.

The Romans, though they found their honour greatly stained by the outrageous wickedness of the garrison with which they had furnished their good allies, were then too much engaged in affairs more urgent to take immediate revenge on the offenders: nor in truth did they turn their thoughts that way till four years after Pyrrhus had left Italy, and the old enemies of Rome were all subdued. Then they marched an army to Rhegium, and besieged it; in which enterprise Hiero of Syracuse lent his aid. The traitors, hopeless of pardon, defended themselves with an obstinate resolution, yet the town was at length carried by assault: all those who escaped the sword of the assailants, being led in chains to Rome, were, by a decree of the senate, first beaten

with rods, and then beheaded: and the Rhegians were restored to their former liberty and estates.

About six years after this execution of justice, the fame of which had sounded honourably through all quarters of Italy, came messengers to Rome from the Mamertines in Sicily, imploring help against the Syracusians, under whose power they were ready to fall, and who, they feared, would inflict on them the like punishment for the like crimes: a most impudent request from the thieves of Messina, to ask protection of the very judges who had condemned to death their fellow-thieves of Rhegium! Nevertheless, from a view of their present situation, we shall perhaps be induced to conclude, that the Mamertines took this step in consequence of sober reflection, and were not without a reasonable hope of assistance from Rome.

These usurpers of Messina, so long as they could get succours from their friends at Rhegium, had not only lived fearless of any danger, but had often been aggressors on their neighbours the Carthaginians and Syracusians, putting many towns and villages under contribution. The posture of their affairs received a mighty change by the destruction of their Italian allies: of whose wonted aid being deprived, they were overthrown in battle by the Syracusians under the conduct of Hiero[1], præ-

Polyb. l. 1. c. 8 and 9.

[1] Hiero, on his return to Syracuse, was elected king. He was the son of Hierocles, and by him descended from Gelo, who had formerly reigned in Syracuse; but his mother was

tor of that state, and their army almost totally cut off. Humbled and reduced by so terrible

a slave. He distinguished himself early from those of his own years by his expertness in military exercises, and his courage in battle. He gained the esteem of Pyrrhus, and was honoured with several rewards from his hand. Extremely handsome, of great bodily strength, smooth and engaging in his address, equitable in business, and gentle in command, he seemed to want nothing kingly but a kingdom. "Pulchritudo ei corporis insignis, vires quoque in homine admirabiles fuere; in alloquio blandus, in negotio justus, in imperio moderatus; prorsus ut nihil ei regium deesse, præter regnum videretur." Justin. B. 23. chap. 4.

Polyb. l. 1. c. 8.

He was chosen prætor by the soldiers on occasion of a quarrel between them and the citizens; nevertheless, the latter, on account of the great gentleness and humanity with which he proceeded on his first accession to power, confirmed him in that office. He aspired however to something yet higher, as was easily discerned by the quick-sighted from the very beginning of his administration. For Hiero knowing that the citizens, whenever the troops with their leaders went into the field, were apt to fall into factions and seditions, and that Leptines, a man in high repute for his probity, had the greatest sway with the people, he made an alliance with him, by taking his daughter to wife, proposing by this means to secure to himself the fidelity of the Syracusians at home, during his expeditions with the army abroad. As to the soldiery, the veteran mercenaries having lost their discipline, and being on all occasions prompt to mutiny and to raise new commotions, he took the following method to get rid of them. Under colour of a design to extirpate the usurpers of Messina, he marched his forces that way, and, when he came up with the enemy, so ordered his battle, as to keep the Syracusians, both horse and foot, from engaging, while he exposed the mercenaries to the entire shock of the Mamertines. The mercenaries were all cut off; and while the enemy were busied in the slaughter, he withdrew his own people in safety to Syracuse. After his having formed an army to his own mind, he marched once

a blow, they thought themselves no longer in a condition to defend Messina, and, being divided in opinion about what measures to take, one party had recourse to the Carthaginians, made a league with them, and put the citadel into their hands; the other sent ambassadors, with an offer of the city, to the Romans, whose protection they implored, and with whom they pleaded the relation between them, as men of the same country and original.

Polyb. l. 1. c. 10.

The Romans, having so severely punished the treachery and cruelty of their own citizens, were very sensible how much their honour might suffer, should they protect villains notoriously guilty of the same crimes; and, when, on the other hand, they considered that the Carthaginians[2] had not only subdued a very

c. 11.

more against the Mamertines, and gave them that total overthrow which is mentioned in the text.

Mr. Rollin, who is a divine, cannot approve of this method which Hiero took to rid himself of the foreign mercenaries, though he grants, that he had no other way to secure himself from them. Chevalier Folard, who is a soldier, seems to applaud Hiero for the action, and says, that it ought to have served for a lesson to the Roman emperors, how to guard themselves against the prætorian cohorts, when they became licentious.

[2] In the following account of the rise and progress of the Carthaginian power, great use is made of Mr. Rollin's collections in his Hist. Ancienne.

Justin. B. 18. c. 4, 5, 6. App. de Bell. Pun. p. 1. Strab. B. 17. p. 832. Vell. Paterc. B. 1. c. 6. Joseph. contr. Ap. B. 1.

The Carthaginians were originally a colony from Tyre, (in Phœnicia, a country on the east coast of the Mediterranean) the most renowned city in the world for commerce, and which had long before sent into Africa a colony that built Utica. The foundation of Carthage is ascribed to Elissa, a Tyrian princess, better known by the name of Dido. Her great grandfather, Ithobal king of

long and rich tract of country in Africa, and some part of Spain, but were masters of Sar-

Tyre, is thought to be the same with Ethbaal the father of Jezebel, wife of Ahab. Dido married her near relation Acerbas, (called otherwise Sicharbas and Sichæus) a man immensely rich. Her brother Pygmalion, king of Tyre, put Acerbas to death, that he might seize his great riches but she disappointed the cruel avarice of the tyrant, by conveying them secretly out of his dominions. She put to sea with a considerable number of friends and dependents, and, after stopping awhile at Cyprus, pursued her voyage, and at length landed on the African coast, between Utica and Tunis. Here she is said to have bought of the natives a piece of ground, as much as she could compass with an ox's hide, (cut into thongs) and on this spot to have built Byrsa, afterwards the citadel of Carthage. Many of the Africans in the neighbourhood, invited by the prospect of gain, repaired to these strangers to traffic with them, and, in a short time, took up their habitation among them; so that the whole had now something of the appearance of a petty state.

Dido, soon after, by encouragement not only from the people of Utica, (who looked upon the Tyrians as their countrymen) but from the Africans also, built a city adjoining to Byrsa, and called it Carthada, a name that in the Phœnician tongue signifies New City. The Romans called it Carthago, the Greeks Carchedon. It was to pay an annual tribute to the Africans for the ground on which it stood.

[It is impossible to fix the time of the foundation of Carthage, chronologers, both ancient and modern, differing widely on the subject. Appian and others place it before the fall of Troy; others many years later.

Solinus reckons 737 years from the first year of Carthage to its total destruction, which, if placed in the 607th of Rome, Carthage, according to him, was built before Rome 130 years.

According to Sir Isaac Newton, Carthage was founded by Dido 883 years before the beginning of the Christian era. This computation will fall in with that of Solinus, as to the age of Carthage, but not as to the juniority of

dinia, and the adjacent isles on the coast of Italy, and had even extended their dominion

Rome; which Sir Isaac supposes to be younger than her rival by 256 years.]

The new city grew in a short time into a flourishing condition; Iarbas, a neighbouring prince, demanded Dido in marriage, threatening the Carthaginians with war in case of refusal. Dido, to avoid this marriage, without drawing a calamity upon her people, put an end to her own life with a poniard. She was afterwards worshipped as a goddess so long as Carthage subsisted.

THE FIRST WAR* waged by the Carthaginians in Africa seems to have been on account of the annual tribute they had bound themselves to pay to the Africans for the ground on which their city stood. In this war their arms prospered under the conduct of one Malchus.

But Mago, who succeeded Malchus, is considered, by Justin, as the first builder of the Carthaginian empire, because it was he that introduced an exact discipline among the troops. After his death his two sons Hasdrubal and Hamilcar had the command of the army. These brothers left each three sons, who shared among them the chief authority in Carthage. They made war against the Moors and Numidians with success, and obliged the Africans to relinquish all claim to the tribute; which they had demanded sword in hand.

[Six commanders out of one and the same family, and who governed all affairs both at home and abroad, seemed dangerous to a free state. It was a jealousy of the exorbitant power of this family of Mago, which induced the Carthaginians to elect a hundred judges out of the senators, to whom the generals were to give an account of their conduct after their return from the war.]

When the Carthaginians had made considerable conquests in Africa, there arose a war† between them and the people of Cyrene (a powerful city standing to the east of the greater Syrtis) concerning the limits of their respective jurisdictions. After many bloody conflicts by land and sea, it was agreed (as the story is told) that two

* Justin, B. 18. c. 7. B. 19. c. 1.

† Sallust, de Bell. Jugurth. Val. Maxim. B. 5. c. 6.

far in Sicily, these things gave them very uneasy apprehensions. For they plainly foresaw, men should set out from each of the two cities at the same instant, and that the place of their meeting should be the boundary to the two states. The men from Carthage (who were brothers of the name of Philænus) either made more expedition than those from Cyrene, or, as Valerius Maximus relates, began their course before the appointed time. Be that as it will, the Cyrenians complained of deceit, and refused to stand to the agreement, unless the two brothers (in proof of their innocence) would consent to be buried alive in the place of meeting. The Philæni, readily acquiescing in the proposal, were buried quick in that spot; and the Carthaginians erected there two altars to their memory. The place from that time was called "The Altars of the Philæni," [*aræ Philænorum*] and was ever after the eastern boundary of the Carthaginian empire, which in time comprehended the whole extent of the northern coast of Africa, from those altars to the pillars of Hercules.

History does not inform us at what times the Carthaginians first carried their arms into SICILY, SARDINIA, or SPAIN.

SPAIN had sufficient allurements to draw the Carthaginians thither. It abounded with mines of gold and silver; enchanting baits to their avarice, and it was peopled by a martial race of men, who (if once reduced to be subjects of Carthage) would furnish her with brave troops for the conquest of other nations, and free her, in part, from the necessity of employing foreign mercenaries in her wars. For the genius of the Carthaginians being more turned to commerce than war, they had constantly recourse (at least in the latter ages of their state) to that dangerous expedient of hiring strangers to fight their battles.

The occasion* of the first descent made by the Carthaginians on Spain, was to defend the inhabitants of Gades (a colony from Tyre, and more ancient than those of Carthage and Utica) against the Spaniards.

Encouraged by success in this enterprise, they became aggressors, and made conquests in Spain. It is plain

* Justin, B. 44. c. 5. Diod. B. 5. p. 300.

that unless they interposed to prevent it, Messina would soon fall into the hands of those

however, by what Polybius and Livy tell us of the wars of Amilcar Barcas, Asdrubal, and Hannibal, that, till the times of these generals, (that is, till after the end of the first Punic war) the Carthaginians did not penetrate far into that country.

[*Some account of Spain will be given in a more proper place, when the Romans carry their arms thither.*]

Sicily, the largest island in the Mediterranean, was anciently called Trinacria and Triquetra, on account of its triangular form. Diod. Sic. L. 5.

The eastern side, which faces the Ionian or Grecian sea, extends from Cape Pachinum * to Pelorus †. The chief cities on this coast were Syracuse, Tauromenium, and Messina.

* Passaro.
† Capo di Faro.

On the northern coast, looking towards Italy, and reaching from Cape Pelorus to Cape Lilybæum, the most noted cities were Mylæ, Hymera, Panormus, Eryx, Drepanum, Lilybæum.

The south-west side, opposite to Africa, extends from Cape Lilybæum to Pachinum. Its principal cities were Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Camarina. The passage from Lilybæum to the promontory of Mercury, in Africa, is about 187 miles.

About the year ant. Chr. 480, the Carthaginians, in consequence of a league made with Xerxes, king of Persia, raised an army of more than 300,000 men, and equipped a fleet of 200 ships of war, and 3000 transports, in order to attack and expel all the Greeks who were settled in Sicily and Italy, while Xerxes himself was to invade Greece. Diod. Sic. B. 11. p. 1, 2.

This mighty army, which landed at Panormus, and under the command of a general named Hamilcar, laid siege to Hymera, was, before that place, totally routed and destroyed by Gelo, governor of Syracuse; and this on the very day of the famous action of Thermopylæ, when Leonidas fell with his 300 Spartans in defending that pass against the numberless forces of Xerxes.

After ‡ the memorable defeat of the Athenians under Nicias at Syracuse, the people of Segesta, (a city not far ‡ B. J. C. 413. Diod. Sic. B. 13. p. 159.

formidable neighbours; who would then be able speedily to invade Syracuse, and all the

from Eryx) who had declared in favour of the Athenians against the Syracusians, fearing the resentment of the latter, and being attacked by the inhabitants of Selinus, implored the aid of the Carthaginian republic, under whose protection they put themselves and their city. The Carthaginians, allured by the prospect of possessing a place very convenient for them, promised succour to the people of Segesta.

The conduct of this war was given to Hannibal, grandson to Hamilcar, who had been killed before Hymera. At the head of a great army he besieged Selinus, and took it by assault. He treated cruelly all whom he found in the place, but suffered those who had fled to return and possess the city, paying a tribute to the Carthaginians. He afterwards took Hymera by assault, and, to revenge the death of his grandfather, not only razed the city, but caused 3000 prisoners to be murdered on the very spot where Hamilcar had been slain.

Hannibal, after these expeditions, returned to Carthage; but his successes having rekindled the ambition of the Carthaginians to get possession of all Sicily, they, with this view, three years after his return, appointed him a second time to be their general, and allotted him an army of 120,000 (some say 300,000) men. On his pleading his great age, to excuse himself from commanding in this enterprise, they gave him, for his lieutenant, Imilco, son of Hanno, of the same family.

The Syracusians and their allies prepared themselves to give the enemy a warm reception.

Hannibal opened the campaign with the siege of Agrigentum. Imagining that it was impregnable except on one side, he employed his whole force on that one side. He three up banks and terraces as high as the walls, and made use of the rubbish and ruins of the tombs which he had found standing round the city, and which he had demolished for that purpose. The plague soon after infecting the army, swept away a great number of the soldiers, and the general himself. The Carthaginians interpreted this disaster as a punishment inflicted by the gods for the

other parts of the island, not yet in their obedience. They considered likewise, that the injuries done to the dead, whose ghosts they fancied they saw stalking before them in the night. They forbore therefore to demolish any more tombs, and endeavoured to appease the gods: a child was sacrificed to Saturn, and many victims thrown into the sea in honour of Neptune.

The besieged, after eight months, were so pressed by famine, that they resolved to abandon the place in the night. Men, women, and children, all but the aged and sick, retired to Gela, the nearest city to them.

Imilco entered Agrigentum, and massacred all who were found in it. The plunder of the place was immensely rich. It had contained 200,000 inhabitants, and had never before been besieged, nor consequently plundered. An infinite number of pictures, vases, and statues of an exquisite taste, were found in it, and among other curiosities the famous Bull of Phalaris, which was sent to Carthage.

Imilco having quartered his troops during the winter in Agrigentum, and totally ruined it, laid siege to Gela in the beginning of the spring. He took this place notwithstanding the succours brought to it by Dionysius the tyrant, who had seized the government of Syracuse. A treaty, which the Carthaginians afterwards made with Dionysius, put an end to the war. The conditions of this treaty were, that Carthage should remain mistress of her ancient colonies, and of the territories of the Sicanians; that the people of Selinus, Agrigentum, and Hymera, should be subject to her; that those of Gela and Camarina should inhabit their own dismantled cities, but be tributary to Carthage; that the Leontines, Messinians, and all the other Sicilians, should enjoy their own laws and liberties, except the Syracusians, who were to continue subject to Dionysius.

These articles being ratified, the Carthaginians returned home, having lost one half of their army by the plague, which raging afterwards in Africa, multitudes perished both of the people of Carthage, and of their confederates.

Dionysius had concluded the late peace with the Carthaginians in no other view, but to get time to establish his new authority, and make the necessary preparations for a vigorous war against them. These things being ac-

Carthaginians, when once in possession of Messina, might make use of it almost as a bridge

complished, he called the Syracusians together, and represented to them the dangerous ambition of Carthage, which, he said, aimed at nothing less than the subduing of all Sicily, an enterprise which only the havoc made in Africa by the plague did at present suspend; and he exhorted them to seize the favourable opportunity they had of being the aggressors.

The tyrant was no less odious than his tyranny to the people of Syracuse; nevertheless, the implacable hatred they bore to the Carthaginians made them receive his harangue with applause. Dionysius, hereupon, without any previous complaint of treaties violated, or so much as a declaration of war, gave up to the fury of the populace the persons and possessions of the Carthaginian merchants, who in great numbers were then residing in Syracuse, and were there trading securely on the faith of treaties. These unhappy men were not only plundered of all their effects, but made to undergo the utmost ignominy and cruelties that could be devised, under pretence of retaliation for what the Carthaginians had formerly done to the people of Sicily: and this example of perfidy and inhumanity was followed in many parts of the island. The tyrant, after this strange beginning of hostilities, sent deputies to Carthage, to demand the restoration of all the Sicilian cities to their laws and liberties; and to declare that, in case of refusal, all the Carthaginians found in those cities should be treated as enemies.

Dionysius opened the campaign with the siege of Motya, the chief magazine of the Carthaginians in Sicily; and, notwithstanding all that Imilco could do to succour it, carried the place by assault. He put all the inhabitants to the sword, except those who took refuge in the temples; he plundered the town, and then leaving a strong garrison in it, under a trusty governor, returned to Syracuse.

Diod. Sic. B. 14. Justin, B. 19. c. 2, 3.

The following year, Imilco came back to Sicily with a most formidable army. He landed at Panormus, recovered Motya by force of arms, and took several other cities. Animated by these successes, he marched his forces towards

to pass into Italy, the conquest of which had been long their ambition. All this was well

Syracuse with intention to besiege it, ordering his fleet, under the conduct of Mago, to sail thither. Mago, with two hundred ships of war, that were adorned with the enemy's spoils, was quickly seen entering the great port as in triumph, and followed by 500 barks. The Carthaginian land forces, consisting, according to some authors, of 300,000 foot and 3000 horse, appeared at the same time on the other side of the city, and both together threw the Syracusians into the utmost consternation. Imilco for thirty days successively employed his troops in laying waste the neighbouring country. He afterwards possessed himself of the suburb called Acradina, and pillaged the temples of Ceres and Proserpine, beating down the tombs that stood round the city, to fortify his camp with the materials. But now, when master of almost all the cities in the island, he expected to complete the conquest of it by the speedy reduction of Syracuse, a dreadful plague, which with incredible swiftness and destruction spread itself among his troops, put an end at once to all his pleasing hopes, and made the splendour of his anticipated triumph vanish in a moment.

Dionysius did not neglect so favourable an opportunity to attack the enemy. The Carthaginian ships were almost all either taken or burnt. The land forces made but a feeble resistance; but night coming on, Imilco during that short suspension of hostilities, sent to Dionysius for permission to carry back to Carthage the small remainder of his troops, offering him 300 talents, which was all the money he had left. This permission could not be obtained but for the Carthaginians only, with whom he stole away in the night, leaving the Africans to the discretion of the enemy. However, to show that what he had done, was purely to preserve those few of his countrymen whom the plague had spared, and not from a cowardly care of his own life, he on his arrival at Carthage retired immediately to his house, shut the doors against the citizens, and even his own children, and killed himself.

A misfortune far greater than what the Carthaginians

weighed by the Romans; and yet, as Polybius reports, the conscript fathers could not be

had just suffered in Sicily now threatened them at home; for the Africans, resenting highly that their countrymen had been left behind in that island, to be slaughtered by the Syracusians, flew to arms in the utmost fury, seized upon Tunes, and, their numbers increasing to more than 200,000 men, marched directly to invest Carthage. Happily for the republic, this numerous army had no leader, no discipline, no provisions, no engines of war. Disputes and jealousies quickly broke the lawless rabble into factions, and famine soon after entirely dispersed it.

Carthage, not yet despairing of the entire conquest of Sicily, made a new effort in that view. A general named Mago had the conduct of the enterprise. He lost 15,000 men and his own life in a battle against Dionysius; and those of the Carthaginian army, who escaped the slaughter, were constrained to sue for peace. Dionysius insisted on their evacuating Sicily and defraying all the expenses of the war.

The Carthaginians pretended to accept the peace on these terms; but representing that it was not in their power to deliver up the cities they possessed in Sicily without the express orders of their republic, they obtained a truce, which was to last till the return of an express sent to Carthage. During this interval they chose the son of Mago to be their general. This new commander, though very young, yet by his great ability and conduct so improved the short time he had to manage, that at the return of the express, he was in a condition to take the field, and give the enemy battle. He gained a victory over the Syracusians, so considerable, as to produce an honourable peace for the Carthaginians. By the conditions of the treaty, they not only kept all their possessions, but acquired some additional places, and had also a thousand talents from Dionysius.

Diod. Sic. B. 15.

After the death of this the elder Dionysius, and in the time of the younger (his son and successor) Carthage took part in the troubles wherein Syracuse was involved, endeavouring to make advantage of them for establishing there her own domination. Timoleon from Corinth res-

Plut. in Timol. about the Y. ant. Chr. 346.

brought to determine for succouring Messina; because they judged, that the benefit which

cued the Syracusians from this danger, and reduced the Carthaginians to sue for peace, which was settled on the following terms: The river Halycus (or Lycus) near Agrigentum was to be the boundary of the Carthaginian territory in Sicily; all natives of the cities subject to the Carthaginians were to be allowed to withdraw, if they pleased, to Syracuse with their effects; and lastly, the Carthaginians were not to assist, or to have any correspondence with the several tyrants who at this time pretended to the lordship of that city.

It was probably about the same time that Hanno, one of the most considerable citizens of Carthage, formed the design (but without success) of making himself tyrant of his country, by poisoning the whole senate at a banquet. His stratagem being discovered, he was put to death by torture; and his children, and all his relations, were at the same time cut off without mercy, though they had no share in his guilt. Justin, B. 21. c. 4.

Some years after this, the Carthaginians were terribly alarmed for their possessions in Sicily, by the growing power of the formidable Agathocles. This man, who is said to have been the son of a potter, owed the wonderful rise of his fortune in a great measure to the beauty of his person, his distinguished courage, and his enterprising genius; but chiefly to his consummate wickedness, the arts of treachery, and the practice of the most unbounded cruelties. He was now absolute lord of Syracuse. Not content with this elevation, he aspired to be king of all Sicily, and had made so swift a progress in subduing the island, that Carthage was obliged, in self-defence, to despatch a very numerous army thither, to put a stop to his conquests. Hamilcar commanded it; he gave the tyrant a total overthrow near the Hymera, pursued him even to Syracuse, and closely besieged him in that capital of his dominion. About the Y. ant. Ch. 317. Justin, B. 22. Dio. Sic. B. 19. c. 1. Polyb. B. 15. p. 1003.

The cruelties of Agathocles had made him universally detested by the Sicilians; he was now therefore deserted by all his allies, and he knew at the same time that his own forces were too weak to preserve the place. In these

they should draw from it would not be greater than the reproach they should suffer for so in-

distressful circumstances he formed an enterprise worthy of the most accomplished hero. To make a descent upon Africa, invade the dominion of his victorious enemies, and transfer the war to the very seat of their empire. His great foresight and judgment to discern that this design was practicable, and also the courage and prudence he displayed in the execution of it, are much admired by the historians, but cannot be enlarged upon here. Let it suffice to mention, that leaving under the command of his brother, Antander, a sufficient number of his troops to defend the city for some time, he put to sea with the remainder, without letting any body know his design, or what course he intended to steer: but, before his departure, to encourage the Syracusians to behave themselves with constancy during his absence, he assured them, that the siege would be but of short duration, and that he had found an infallible way to victory.

The forces which Agathocles took with him in this expedition amounted to about 14,000 men. Having landed these troops safely in Africa, he immediately called them together, opened to them his design, with the motives of it, and made them understand, that the only way to deliver their own country from its present distress, was to carry the war into that of their enemies. He represented to them, that the citizens of Carthage were a luxurious and effeminate people, utterly unable to cope with the Syracusians, inured to the toils of war; that the unexampled boldness of his enterprise would alone disconcert and terrify them; that they were wholly unprepared to repel an enemy at their gates; that the Africans, always hating the Carthaginians, would infallibly join him upon the first notice of his landing; and in a word, he promised them the whole wealth of Carthage as the certain reward of their courage in the present expedition. The soldiers received his harangue with applause and acclamations, and fancied themselves already in possession of that rich city. Taking advantage of their present sanguine temper, and the high hopes he had inspired them with, he then persuaded them to burn all their ships

consistent a conduct. But the people having been greatly impoverished by the late wars, and

in honour to Ceres and Proserpine, pretending, that in the passage to Africa he had secretly made a vow so to do, if those deities would grant him a prosperous voyage. When by thus destroying his fleet he had brought his soldiers under a necessity of placing all their confidence in their courage, he led them on to action.

Two considerable cities he successively attacked and carried by assault in a short time; the latter was Tunes, not many miles from Carthage. The Carthaginians, terribly alarmed at the swift progress of this unexpected invader, hastily armed their citizens to the number of above 40,000, and sent them out under the command of Hanno and Bomilcar, men who had been long at variance about family interests. A pitched battle quickly ensued; Hanno was slain in it, the Carthaginians routed, and their camp taken. It is said, that Bomilcar might have restored the battle after the death of Hanno, if for private reasons of self-interest he had not chose rather to quit the field to Agathocles. After this victory many fortified places surrendered to the conqueror, and great numbers of the Africans revolted to him.

It was at this time that an embassy came to Carthage from the Tyrians, to implore succour against Alexander the Great, who besieged their city; a request which the Carthaginians, how willing soever, could by no means comply with, in the present melancholy situation of their affairs. Dio. Sic. B. 17. Q. Curt. B. 4.

The unhappy condition to which the Carthaginians were reduced, they ascribed to the anger of the gods, provoked at some neglect of duty. It had been a custom from the very infancy of Carthage, and was become a part of their religion, to send annually to Tyre (the mother city) the tenth, or what was so called, of the public revenue, as an offering to Hercules, the patron and protector of both Tyre and Carthage. But from the time that this revenue grew considerable, the whole tenth was not fairly remitted: remorse seized the Carthaginians; and, to expiate their guilt, they now sent to Tyre presents of a prodigious value. Dio. Sic. B. 20.

it being represented to them by those who were to command the army, in case of an ex-

Another custom had prevailed at Carthage, of a most barbarous and bloody superstition, that of sacrificing great numbers of children to Saturn. Anciently those children were chosen out of the best families; of late the children of slaves and beggars had been substituted in the room of the nobly born: a fraudful impiety, for the expiation of which, two hundred children of the first rank were now thrown into the fire, an offering to the god: and, as Diodorus Siculus reports, three hundred of the citizens voluntarily sacrificed themselves on this occasion to pacify the same deity.

After these expiations, expresses were despatched to Hamilcar in Sicily, with the news of what misfortunes had befallen the republic in Africa, and to urge him to send speedy succours to Carthage. Hamilcar commanded the deputies not once to mention the victory of Agathocles, but on the contrary to report, that his forces had been all cut off, and his whole fleet taken by the Carthaginians.—The senate of Carthage had sent to Hamilcar by the messengers all the beaks of Agathocles's ships which had been burnt, that by showing them he might the more easily gain credit to this report. The stratagem had like to have proved successful. Hamilcar summoned the besieged to surrender, and showed the beaks. The ruin of Agathocles being generally believed in Syracuse, the majority of the citizens, and Antander himself, were disposed to capitulate. But Eurymnon, an Ætolian, whom Agathocles had left behind him to counsel his brother, by much persuasion prevailed with them to hold out till they had certain intelligence of the truth. A galley of thirty oars arrived soon after in the port, and brought the news of Agathocles's victory, which at once restored life and resolution to the inhabitants. Hamilcar made a last effort to carry the city by assault, but without success. He then raised the siege, and sent 5000 men to the relief of his distressed country. Returning afterwards in hopes to surprise the city in the night, his design was discovered, his army defeated, and he himself taken prisoner. The Syracusians cut off his head, and sent it into Africa, a welcome present to Agathocles.

pedition into Sicily, how profitable it would be, not only to the public in general, but to each

The confusion into which all these disasters threw the Carthaginians, encouraged Bomilcar their general to attempt the execution of a design he had long harboured in his breast; it was to make himself monarch of the Carthaginian state. He had gained over some of the citizens to his interest, and had secured a body of the foreign mercenaries to assist him. The conspiracy nevertheless proved abortive; he was overpowered, and being made prisoner, was crucified for his rebellion.

While Bomilcar was pursuing his wicked design against the liberties of his country, Agathocles was busy in a treachery of another kind. He had won over to his cause Ophellas, king of Cyrene, by pretending that he would leave him the empire of Africa, and that he had no view in his present expedition, but to draw the Carthaginians out of Sicily. Ophellas brought a considerable army to the assistance of the Syracusians. Agathocles, to get the absolute command of these troops, slew their leader by surprise, after which, by fair words, and large promises, he engaged the Cyrenians to follow him.

His affairs being now in a flourishing condition, he thought it proper to leave them a while under the conduct of his son Archagathus, and return into Sicily, to take some care of his interests at home. His renown, and the report of his victories, flew before him. On the news of his arrival in Sicily, many towns revolted to him; but it was not long before ill news recalled him into Africa.—His absence had entirely changed the face of things in that country, and all his arts and endeavours proved ineffectual to restore them to their former condition. His army had been defeated, his strong holds had surrendered to the enemy, and his troops were mutinous for want of pay. He attacked the Carthaginians after his landing, but was repulsed and routed; he lost 3000 men in the action. After this defeat, and another disaster, by which he lost 4000 of his men, the Africans of his army all deserted him. Not thinking himself therefore in a condition to maintain the war any longer, he resolved to leave Africa; and not having ships sufficient to transport his

man in particular, they passed a decree in favour of the enterprise; and Appius Claudius*,

* His colleague was Fulv. Flaccus.

troops into Sicily, he would have stole away with only a few of his friends, and his younger son Heraclides; for he feared lest his eldest son Archagathus, being a daring man, and having been too familiar with his stepmother, would attempt something against his life. Archagathus discovered his design, caused him to be arrested and put in chains. A sudden panic soon after seized the army, believing that the enemy was just ready to fall upon them. The guard who had the king in custody, being in the same consternation with the rest, and in their fright coming out with their prisoner bound, the soldiers were so moved at this sight, that they all cried out, "Unloose him, let him go." Agathocles was no sooner freed from his chains, but, consulting only his own safety, he got on board a small vessel, and set sail for Sicily, leaving his two sons to the fury of the enraged soldiers, who slew them both upon the first discovery of his departure. The Syracusian troops, though thus forsaken by their leader, made an honourable treaty for themselves with the Carthaginians, with whom also Agathocles, after his return into Sicily, concluded a peace upon equal terms, notwithstanding his late disasters and disgrace.

After the death of Agathocles, and when Syracuse was again involved in civil war, the Carthaginians renewed their attempt once more to subdue the whole island of Sicily. They possessed themselves of many cities belonging to the Syracusians, and invested Syracuse itself. This common danger obliged the contending parties in the city to unite, and call in king Pyrrhus to their aid. Pyrrhus, by repeated victories over the Carthaginians, deprived them in a short time of all their possessions in Sicily, except the city of Lilybæum only. By his own misconduct he afterwards lost all the fruit of his successes, being abandoned by his Sicilian allies, and obliged to quit the island to preserve himself and his Epirots from total destruction. The Carthaginians, who before his departure had brought a mighty army into Sicily, not only recovered all their ancient possessions, but endeavoured to enlarge their dominion by new conquests. Hiero being chosen to the go-

one of the consuls, was ordered to conduct an army into Sicily to the relief of Messina.

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vernment of Syracuse, opposed the progress of their arms, till the affair of MESSINA united the two powers in one enterprise, drew the Romans into Sicily, and gave commencement to the first PUNIC WAR.

The Form of the CARTHAGINIAN GOVERNMENT.

The government of Carthage, like that of Rome, was composed of three different authorities, which balanced each other; the authority of the two supreme magistrates, called suffetes, (from the Phœnician word *sophetim*, which signifies *judges*) that of the senate, and that of the assembly of the people. To these was afterwards added the council of the hundred.

The SUFFETES.

The suffetes were annual magistrates, and their authority much the same with that of the consuls at Rome. By the ancient writers they are frequently styled kings, dictators, consuls. History does not inform us of the manner of their election. Their office was to convene the senate, to preside there, propose the matters for debate, and collect the voices. They also sat as chief justices in private causes of importance. Nor was their authority confined to civil affairs, they sometimes commanded the armies.

The SENATE.

The number of which the senate of Carthage consisted is not known; it must certainly have been very considerable, seeing a hundred persons were selected from it to form a separate council. In the senate all public affairs were debated, the letters from generals read, the complaints from the provinces heard, ambassadors admitted to audience, peace and war determined. When the senators were unanimous, there lay no appeal from their decision; but whenever they were divided in opinion, the affair devolved to the people; a regulation which seems well contrived to prevent divisions, and a factious opposition to reasonable counsels; for it was not to be supposed that any member of an assembly, which had the preroga-

Appius, to learn the posture of the enemy, and the true state of things in that place, is reported[3] to have ventured over thither in a fish-

tive of judging decisively in affairs, would willingly suffer them to be carried before another tribunal.

The People.

Arist. B. 2. de Rep. c. 11.

It appears from Aristotle's eulogium on the government of Carthage, that, so low as to his time, the people spontaneously left the chief administration of public affairs to the senate. And Polybius remarks, that while the senate governed, the Carthaginians were successful in all their enterprises. But at length riches and extensive conquests made the people insolent; and then forgetting that they owed their prosperity to the wise conduct of that venerable body, they not only interfered in the government of the state, but arrogated to themselves almost the whole power. From that period the public affairs were transacted wholly by cabals and factions; and Polybius assigns this as one of the chief causes of their ruin.

The Tribunal of the Hundred.

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This council was composed of 104 persons, though for brevity sake they are called the hundred, and was instituted to be a check upon the Carthaginian generals, who had used before to exercise an absolute and uncontrollable power when at the head of armies in the field; they now became accountable to these judges for their actions, on their return from the campaign.

Of these 104 judges, five had a particular jurisdiction superior to that of the rest, and were like the council of ten in the Venetian senate. A vacancy in their body could be filled by none but themselves. They had also the power of choosing those who composed the council of the hundred.

[3] "Primò ad explorandos hostes fretum piscatoria navi trajecit [Appius Claudius Caudex] et cum duce Carthaginiensium egit, ut præsidium arce deduceret. Rhegium regressus," &c. *Aurel. Vict.* c. 37.

That the consul in person went over privately to Messina, seems to be supported by the words of Polybius, who

ing-boat, and to have so happily conducted himself there, as by some means to make the

speaks of the Mamertines sending for Appius, and surrendering their city to him, as of a transaction previous to the passage of the Roman army to Messina. But, according to this author, they had either by art or force rid themselves of the Carthaginian officer before they called over Appius. Polyb. l. 1. c. 11.

If we may believe Zonaras, the person who went over privately to Messina, to learn the state of affairs in that city, was not Appius Claudius the consul, but one Claudius, a legionary tribune, whom the consul despatched on that commission.

Zonaras differs in some particulars from Polybius concerning the origin of the first Punic war, and has many circumstances which are not mentioned by any writer but himself. He tells us, that the two republics were mutually jealous of each other; each thought its own safety depended on subduing its rival. This was the true cause of the war. Thus far he agrees with other writers. But he adds, that the Romans assigned, for their motive to the war, some assistance which the Carthaginians had formerly given the Tarentines against Rome. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, alleged as their ground of quarrel, that the Romans had made a friendship with Hiero, when he was at war with Carthage.

As to the affair of Messina, his relation is in substance as follows: The Mamertines, being besieged by king Hiero, ask succour from the Romans. The Romans, knowing that if this request should be refused, they would give themselves to the Carthaginians, who might then be able to pass into Italy, readily promise to send the succour desired. This promise, however, not being speedily performed, and the Mamertines being straitly pressed by the enemy, they apply for aid to the Carthaginians, who thereupon make peace with Hiero, both for themselves and for the Mamertines, as the most effectual means to hinder the Romans from coming into Sicily: and, under a leader named Hanno, they take upon them the guard of the city and of the straits. In the meanwhile, Claudius, a legionary tribune, whom the consul

Carthaginian officer and his soldiers evacuate the citadel; after which the consul returned

had sent before him with a few ships, comes to Rhegium; but finding that the enemy has a much stronger fleet at sea, and therefore not daring to attempt the passage with his ships, he steals over privately in a small boat to Messina, and has a conference with the Mamertines; but, through the opposition of the Carthaginians, is obliged to return without effecting any thing. Afterwards, when he hears that the Mamertines are in some commotion (for though they would not consent to be subject to Rome, they were weary of the Carthaginians), he goes over again, and promises that the Romans, if admitted into the place, shall return home as soon as they have restored Messina to a state of security. He then bids the Carthaginians quit the place, or give a good reason for staying. The Mamertines are silent through fear; the Carthaginians make him no answer, because they hold the city by force and despise him.—The silence of both, cries Claudius, shows that the Carthaginians act unjustly, and that the Mamertines desire liberty; for if these cared for the Carthaginians, they would promise to stand by them. The Mamertines applaud his words. He then returns to Rhegium, and endeavours to pass from hence to Messina with his fleet. In this attempt he loses some of his ships by stormy weather, others are taken by the Carthaginians, so that he is forced to return once more to Rhegium. The Carthaginian admiral coming on the coast of Italy, offers to restore the ships he had taken, but at the same time declares, that the straits belong to the Carthaginians, and that he will not suffer the Romans even to wash their hands in them. Claudius hearing this, rejects the offer with indignation, repairs his fleet, and seizing a favourable opportunity, passes safely with his troops to Messina. Hanno was now retired into the citadel; he had quitted the city through a distrust of the inhabitants. Claudius persuades the Mamertines to invite Hanno to an amicable conference. The Carthaginian, though with great reluctance, comes to the assembly, lest the Mamertines, who already complained of his injustice, should begin hostilities against him. After much altercation between him

to Italy to prepare for the embarkation of his troops.

and Claudius, he is seized by a Roman officer, and carried to prison, the Mamertines approving of the action. Thus Hanno is reduced to the necessity of entirely abandoning Messina. The Carthaginians punish him for his ill conduct, and send a herald to signify to the Romans to quit Messina and all Sicily by a certain day; which demand not being complied with, they in the first fury of their resentment murder all the Italian mercenaries in their service; and then, assisted by king Hiero, lay siege to Messina.

Such is the account given us by Zonaras, of what passed in relation to Messina before the consul went thither. But I do not find the least mention of the voyages or management of the tribune Claudius in any other author. Only that the Romans sent some troops to Messina, as Zonaras relates, before Appius went thither with the main army, is supported by a fragment of Diodorus Siculus, who speaks of an agreement between Hiero and the Carthaginians to make war upon the Romans, unless they would immediately withdraw all their forces out of Sicily; and this is previous to the arrival of the consul with the legions.

CHAP. II.

FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD YEARS OF THE WAR.

The consul Appius Claudius Caudex transports an army into Sicily to the relief of Messina, besieged by the Carthaginians and Syracusians. He forces them to raise the siege. His successors make peace and an alliance with Hiero, king of Syracuse. The next year's consuls, assisted by Hiero, take Agrigentum from the Carthaginians.

THE people of Carthage, upon the news of their officer's having quitted the citadel of Messina, were so highly offended that they condemned him to be crucified, as both a trai- Polyb. B. 1. c. 11.

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tor and a coward. They ordered, at the same time, a fleet and a land-army to besiege the place. Hiero, the new king of Syracuse, having now a fair prospect of exterminating the usurpers of Messina, entered into a league with the Carthaginians, and joined his forces to theirs: so that the Mamertines were entirely closed up within their city, the Carthaginians lying with a navy at sea, and with an army on one side of the place, while the Syracusians lay before it on the other.

In this their great danger came Appius Claudius the Roman consul to Rhegium with an army appointed for their relief: but how to pass from thence to Messina was a difficulty that seemed insurmountable. Not that he wanted transports; for he had borrowed from the Tarentines, Neapolitans, and other neighbours, a sufficient number of triremes and boats of fifty oars, wherein to waft over his men: but the Carthaginian fleet was in the way, and was by much superior in strength to that of the consul. He was obliged therefore to have recourse to stratagem. He pretended to give the enterprise entirely over as a thing impracticable, and, the better to deceive the enemy, steered his course towards Rome. This motion made the Carthaginians watch the straits less narrowly; and then the consul tacking about on a sudden, and being favoured by a dark night, passed to Messina without opposition[1].

Frontin. de Strat. B. 1. c. 4.

[1] Polybius, (from whom this account of the origin of the first Punic war is chiefly taken) though he does not

His arrival, however, did not discourage the besiegers; for they far exceeded him in num-

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B. 5. c. 1. § 3.

directly charge the Romans with injustice in their beginning this war, yet declares (L. 1. c. 10.) that it would be difficult to justify them. Sir Walter Raleigh is clearly of opinion, that the Romans in this enterprise were unjust. His words are these: "Now in this place I hold it seasonable to consider of those grounds whereupon the Romans entered into this [the first Punic war;] not how profitable they were, nor how agreeable to rules of honesty (for questionless the enterprise was much to their benefit, though as much to their shame) but how allowable in strict terms of lawfulness, whereupon they built all their allegations in maintenance thereof. That the Mamertines did yield themselves, and all that they had, into the Romans' hands (as the Campanes, distressed by the Samnites, had done) I cannot find; neither can I find how the messengers of those folk, whereof one part had already admitted the Carthaginians, could be enabled to make any such surrendry in the public name of all.

"If therefore the Mamertines, by no lawful surrendry of themselves and their possessions, were become subject to Rome, by what better title could the Romans assist the Mamertines against their most ancient friends the Carthaginians, than they might have aided the Campanes against the Samnites, without the same condition? which was (as they themselves confessed) by none at all. But let it be supposed, that some point serving to clear this doubt is lost in all histories; doubtless it is, that no company of pirates, thieves, outlaws, murderers, or such other malefactors, can by any good success of their villany, obtain the privilege of civil societies, to make league or truce, yea, to require fair war, but are by all means, as most pernicious vermine, to be rooted out of the world. I will not take upon me to maintain that opinion of some civilians, that a prince is not bound to hold his faith with one of these; it were a position of ill consequence. This I hold, that no one prince or state can give protection to such as these, as long as any other is using the sword of vengeance against them, without becoming accessary to their crimes, wherefore we may esteem this action of the Romans so far

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ber of men, and the whole island was ready to relieve them in their wants; and they were

from being justifiable by any pretence of confederacy made with them, as that contrariwise, by admitting this nest of murderers and thieves into their protection, they justly deserved to be warred upon themselves by the people of Sicily, yea although Messina had been taken, and the Mamertines all slain, ere any news of the confederacy had been brought unto the besiegers."

To this reasoning of our learned countryman I take leave to answer:

WHETHER the messengers who went to Rome from Messina from one part only of the Mamertines, could be enabled to treat in the name of all, or whether the Mamertines made such an absolute surrendry of their possessions to the Romans, as the people of Capua had formerly done, seems not material to the present purpose. Neither the Romans nor the Carthaginians could acquire any right to Messina in virtue of any such surrendry, whether made by a part or by the whole body of the Mamertines, these having themselves no right to the town, if they are to be considered as a nest of pirates, murderers, and outlaws, which is the light in which Sir Walter considers them.

In the next place, though it be granted, that no one prince or state can give protection to pirates, thieves, and murderers, as long as any other is using the sword of vengeance against them, without becoming accessary to their crimes; I say, though this be granted, it will not affect the present question. For that the Romans did not grant their protection to the Mamertines, in the circumstance above described, is evident from what our author himself relates. He tells us, that the Carthaginians (and they were the principals in the present war, Hiero was only an auxiliary) upon the news of their officer's being driven out of the citadel of Messina, sent a fleet and an army to besiege the place, as a town that had rebelled, having once been theirs. These preparations were to punish rebellious subjects, not to punish the Mamertines as pirates and murderers, not for the injuries they had done to the lawful proprietors of Messina. It would indeed have been shameless

strong enough at sea to hinder any supplies from getting into the town. All this Appius

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in the Carthaginians to pretend the latter after they had made a league with the usurpers, treated them as a civil society, and consented to protect them against king Hiero.

From the whole then it would seem, that our author has not assigned sufficient reasons for passing so rigorous a sentence of condemnation against the Romans.

B. 1. c. 1. § 3.

Chevalier Folard, who in his comment upon Polybius entirely differs in opinion from Sir Walter, makes very short work with the present question.

A necessary war (says he) is always just. A war, without which the rights and liberties of a people must be greatly endangered, is a necessary war: this was the case of the Romans at the present juncture; and he cannot therefore believe that the senate of Rome were really so scrupulous as Polybius represents them to be, about accepting the offer made them by the Mamertines.

Nay the chevalier declares, that not only the consideration of a present danger to our liberties, but even the prospect of a distant one, an allowable motive to begin a precautionary war; and that the too great power of any prince will justify the neighbouring powers in making war upon him; because liberty is a thing, which by both divine and human laws we are allowed to have so tender a concern for, that the apprehension of being deprived of it justifies whatever we do for its preservation.

As I shall not contend with the force of this argument, so neither can I think it necessary to have recourse to it to justify the Romans in the present war.

If the Mamertines are to be considered as a civil society, the Romans acted nothing contrary to justice in making an alliance with them, or in succouring them when in that alliance. Rome (if we may believe Polybius) had made no treaty with the Carthaginians, or with Hiero, whereby she was bound not to concern herself in the affairs of Sicily. Polyb. B. 3. c. 26.

If the Mamertines are not to be considered as a civil society, but as a gang of robbers and pirates, Messina would then belong to the first civil society that should get pos-

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Polyb. B. 1. c. 11. Diod. Sic. in Eclog. p. 874.

well understood; and therefore apprehending both danger and dishonour in the enterprise, he despatched ambassadors to the Carthaginians and Hiero, to treat of an accommodation, and obtain peace for the Mamertines. The answer[2] from king Hiero was, that the Mamertines for their cruelty and wickedness in getting the possession of Messina, and for divers other barbarities committed in Sicily, were most justly besieged; and that it did not become the Romans, so famed for their justice and faithfulness, to protect such bloody villains, who had contemptuously broken all the ties of faith and truth among men: that if the Romans began a war in defence of such wicked invaders, it would be evident to all the world,

session of it; and the Romans having acquired the right of first possession, the Carthaginians must be considered as the aggressors; for I presume, that the latter cannot be deemed to have acquired the right of first possession even of the citadel, by the bare admission of their officer with a few men into it, since they did not enter the citadel as taking possession of it for themselves, but to guard it for the usurpers against king Hiero.

As to the conduct of the Romans in protecting the Mamertines, who had been guilty of the same crimes for which the senate had punished the Campanian legion, it must undoubtedly at first, as Polybius observes, have a strange appearance; but certainly, when by sparing the most notorious offenders a national good is to be obtained, much greater than could accrue from punishing such offenders, there is no doubt but the arm of vengeance may wisely and lawfully be staid. And this appears plainly to have been the motive on which the Romans acted in the case now before us, even according to Polybius's relation of the matter.

[2] According to Diodorus Siculus, the consul's embassy was sent from Rhegium before he passed the straits.

that succour to the distressed was but a pretence to cloke their covetousness, when in truth their aim was to gain Sicily.

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Polyb. B. 1. c. 11.

The consul finding his negotiation fruitless, and that he was under a necessity of fighting, took at length the bold resolution to sally out into the field, and make the enemies know, that his coming to Messina was to drive them from the town, and not to be by them besieged within it.

In executing this determination it was very advantageous for him, that the confederate armies lay encamped in such a manner, as not to be well able to assist one another in distress. Appius sallied out first against Hiero, and drawing up the legions in order, presented him battle. This brave prince (says a learned writer, well skilled in military affairs) must certainly have wanted good advice on the present occasion; otherwise he would not have hazarded all his power against an enemy, of whom he had made no trial, when it had been easy for him, and as much as was requisite, to defend his own camp. With great readiness and gallantry he accepted the challenge, and met the enemy; but after a long and bloody conflict, the Syracusians were defeated, and driven to save themselves within their intrenchments. The Romans returned triumphantly with the spoils of the dead into Messina.

Sir W. Raleigh.

The king, by this disaster, learned a point of wisdom very useful both to him and his kingdom during the remainder of his life. Had

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Messina been taken by the Carthaginians, Syracuse itself must have sought help from Rome against those friends whom it now so diligently assisted. Hiero had (in respect of those two mighty states) but a small stock, which it behoved him to manage frugally; such another loss would have almost ruined him. He therefore quietly broke up his camp in the night, and retired home; intending to leave those to try the fortune of the war, who had hopes to be gainers by the event of it[3].

Polyb. B. 1. c. 11.

c. 12. Appius, receiving intelligence of the king's retreat, and finding the courage of his men greatly raised by their success in the late action, resolved to attack the Carthaginians without loss of time. Having caused the soldiers to take their repast at a very early hour, he sallied out by break of day, surprised the enemy, and routed them with great slaughter; those who escaped flying for refuge to the neighbouring towns. The Romans, after this action, made inroads upon the country as far as to the territory of the Syracusians, and at length sat down before Syracuse. It does not appear, however, that the consul made any progress in the siege: remitting the conduct

[3] Diod. Siculus writes, that when the consul landed at Messina, Hiero, suspecting that the Carthaginians had made way for him, fled himself to Syracuse.

Florus says, that Hiero confessed he was conquered before he saw the enemy.

Zonaras, B. 8. makes Appius to land with his forces, not at Messina, but some place near it, and to attack the Syracusians before he entered that town.

of this enterprise to his successors, he returned to Rome[4].

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Polyb. B. 1. c. 16.

II. The Romans being animated by the victories of Appius to pursue the war with

[4] According to Eutropius, B. 2. and Silius Italicus, B. 6. Appius Claudius had a triumph for his victories; but the Capitoline Marbles say nothing of it.

He acquired his surname of Caudex, if we may believe Seneca (de Brev. Vit.) from his having transported the Roman army from Italy to Sicily in small boats, which the ancients called caudices.

Mr. Vertot, perhaps on no other authority, says, that this general was the first who by the means of some rafts transported troops into Sicily, which got him the surname of Caudex, as having found the art of fastening planks together, so as to make transports of them.

Chevalier Folard rallies the abbot on this passage of his history, and wants to know his voucher. Doubtless the chevalier has good reason to dispute the fact. It would have been madness for the consul to have attempted to waft an army cross those straits on such transports; neither had he any occasion to have recourse to that dangerous expedient, all the ships in the ports of Italy being at his disposal; and Polybius expressly tells us, that Appius embarked his men on vessels of fifty oars, and on triremes borrowed of the Tarentines, Locrians, &c. This relation of Polybius is decisive also against Seneca.

The chevalier will have it, that Appius's surname of Caudex was on account of a dull, stupid air, the word codex signifying a blockhead.

Father Catrou, in the large Roman history, speaking of Appius's surname, keeps clear of Mr. Vertot's rafts and Seneca's little boats; but then he wants a reason for Claudius's surname of Caudex. He says, that when Appius undertook to cross the straits with his fleet, he went himself on board a sorry galley, hastily and clumsily built (une mauvaise galere tumultuairement construite et sans art.) This enterprise happily executed, the Romans thought it so fine an exploit, that they gave the consul the surname of Caudex, which word, adds the father, sig-

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189th Consulship.

more than ordinary vigour, it was decreed, that the consuls for the new year, Manius Valerius and Manius Otacilius, should both go into Sicily, and should take with them four legions, each consisting of 4000 foot and 300 horse. Upon the arrival of these forces in Sicily, most of the towns‖ and castles, that had submitted to the Carthaginians and Syracusians, gave themselves up to the Romans; insomuch that the king of Syracuse found it high time for him to endeavour after a peace with an enemy so formidable, and that came now to besiege him in his capital. He perceived, says Polybius, that the designs and hopes of the Romans were better founded than those of the Carthaginians, and in conclusion therefore sent ambassadors to the consuls to treat of peace and an alliance with Rome. Valerius and Otacilius readily embraced the overture, and the more readily, on account of the difficulties they were under with regard to their convoys. The Roman troops had the

‖ Diod. Siculus (p. 875.) makes the number to be 67.

nified then un mauvais batteau fait de planches mal arrangées et précipitemment réünies.

But what reason in the world can be imagined why Appius should make choice of such a transport, wherein to convey his own person to Sicily, when he might have chosen the best triremis in the fleet? I cannot find, that the reverend father has any authority for this fact.

If Appius did really acquire the surname in question from the bad built and fashion of any vessel in which he crossed the straits, I should conjecture it was from that fisher boat (which might be a caudex) wherein, as Aurelius Victor reports, he courageously ventured over to Messina, to learn the state of things there before he transported his army thither.

last year been driven to great straits, and there was good reason to apprehend lest the Carthaginians, who were masters of the sea, should be able totally to debar them of all supplies of provision. The consuls nevertheless made the king purchase the alliance which he sought with a hundred talents of silver.

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189th Consulship.

Diodorus Siculus reports, that Hannibal, the Carthaginian general, was by this time come with a fleet to Xiphonia (not far from Syracuse) to the assistance of the king, but that hearing of what was done, he instantly retired [5].

In Eclog. p. 875.

[5] We find by the Capitoline Marbles, that a dictator was created this year at Rome to drive the nail, probably on account of some prodigies, or to stop the plague: from the same Marbles we learn also, that Valerius at his return to Rome was decreed a triumph, and that he acquired the surname of Messala; which Seneca § and Macrobius ‡ tell us was given him for the conquest of Messina, (then called Massana.) It is hard to reconcile this with Polybius's account, unless we suppose that the enemy got possession of that place after the return of Appius Claudius into Italy. The Jesuits believe rather, that Valerius performed some notable exploit in the defence of Messina, while Otacilius was otherwise employed; and that this occasioned the distinction with which he was afterwards honoured above his colleague. Pliny authorizes this conjecture, when he tells us, (B. 35. c. 4.) that Valerius brought with him from Sicily a picture representing the battle wherein he had vanquished Hiero and the Carthaginians before Messina. He fixed it up in the old palace of king Tullus Hostilius, where the senate used to assemble.

§ De Brev. Vit.
‡ Saturn. B. 1.

The same author reports also, (B. 7. c. ult.) that Valerius brought with him from Sicily another novelty, an horizontal sundial, and that he placed it on a pedestal in the *comitium* near the *rostra*.

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189th Consulship.

Hiero, after this treaty, continued ever a firm and useful friend to the Romans; and being a prince who not only made the prosperity of his subjects his chief aim, but always pursued that aim by measures honest and noble, he enjoyed a long and happy reign, dear to his people, beloved of his allies, and universally esteemed by all the Greek nations.

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190th Consulship.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 17.

III. The treaty with the Syracusian king being ratified by an ordinance of the Roman people, it was now thought adviseable to abate of the number of troops in the service, and to send into Sicily, under the command of the new consuls (L. Posthumius Megellus and Q. Mamilius Vitulus) only two legions; which, through Hiero's friendship, they trusted, would live in plenty of all things necessary.

As for the people of Carthage, when they learned that Hiero of a friend was become an enemy, and when they considered that the Romans were now superior to them in strength, they turned their thoughts to provide a force that might be sufficient to preserve those acquisitions which they still possessed in the island. To this end they hired a great number of troops in Gaul and in Liguria, but principally in Spain; and having resolved to make Agrigentum † (a strong place distant about eighteen furlongs from the sea, on the south coast of Sicily,) the rendezvous of their armies, and their chief magazine, they transported the mercenaries to that city.

† Called also Agragas, now Gergenti.

The consuls Posthumius and Mamilius were now arrived in Sicily with the legions, and

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having got intelligence of the designs of the Carthaginians, and of the preparations they were making in Agrigentum, came to a resolution to march directly with their forces towards that place, and invest it. They pitched their camp about a mile from the town, and totally blocked it up.

It happening to be the time of harvest, the Roman soldiers, who foresaw that the siege would be a long one, dispersed themselves abroad to forage; and this they did in so unguarded a manner, that it tempted the besieged one day to sally out upon them. The Carthaginians not only fell upon the reapers in the fields, but made a furious attack upon the Roman advanced guards, not without hopes to force the very camp. And here (says Polybius) the Romans, as on many other occasions, owed their preservation to that discipline in which they excelled all nations; for being accustomed to see those punished with death who deserted their post, or fled in battle, they diligently rallied, and bravely sustained the shock of the enemy, though superior in number. And though many of the Romans fell, the loss was much greater on the enemy's side, who being at length surrounded when they had almost forced the Roman entrenchment, were with great slaughter driven back to their works. After this action the Romans became more wary in their foraging, and the Carthaginians less forward to make sallies. The consuls, however, the better to secure themselves, cut a deep trench between the walls of the city and

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190th Consulship.

their camp, and another on the side towards the country, to prevent any surprise that way; which double fortification also hindered the besieged from receiving any supplies whatsoever. At the same time provisions and all necessaries were brought to the besiegers by their Sicilian allies to Erbesus; and from that town, which lay not far from their camp, their convoys passed without impediment.

Diod. Sic. in Eclog. p. 875. Polyb. B. 1. c. 18.

Affairs continued five months in this posture, neither party gaining upon the other any considerable advantage, their engagements being for the most part only in slight skirmishes. The besiegers received daily reinforcements from the Sicilians, and in all amounted to above 100,000 men. In the meantime the city, being stuffed with a garrison of 50,000 soldiers, began to be much straitened for provisions: Hannibal, who commanded there in chief, despatched frequent advices to Carthage, representing the extremities to which they were reduced, and demanding speedy succour. The Carthaginians, therefore, embarking on board their fleet what soldiers and elephants they could readily muster, sent them into Sicily to Hanno, their other general in that country. Hanno having assembled all his forces at Heraclea, a maritime town a little to the west of Agrigentum, marched directly to Erbesus, where he had a secret correspondence, and which was put into his hands by treachery. By this loss the Romans not only were deprived of their wonted supplies, but became themselves almost as closely besieged by

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190th Consulship.

Hanno, as Agrigentum was by their troops; and they must unavoidably have quitted their enterprise, if king Hiero had not relieved them in their distress. He found means to convey provisions to their camp, though not in great quantity, nor sufficient to prevent those distempers among the soldiers, which are the usual consequences of scarcity.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 19.

Hanno having intelligence of the bad condition of the Roman army, that the soldiers were enfeebled by want, and their number diminished by diseases, believed he might now be able to cope with them. He marched with fifty elephants, and all the rest of his forces, from Heraclea (whither he had returned after the affair of Erbesus) sending his Numidian horse before, with orders to approach to the enemy's camp, and endeavour to draw the Roman cavalry to a battle, in which they were to retreat till they joined the main body. The Numidians punctually performed their instructions. They marched up to the entrenchment of the enemy, and being attacked by the Roman horse, retired before them till they joined Hanno with the army, which almost encompassing the Romans, slew many of them, and drove the rest back to their camp. After this exploit, the Carthaginians made no other attempt for two months, but lay strongly encamped on an eminence about ten furlongs from the Romans, waiting for some opportunity to fight with advantage.

In the meantime, Agrigentum was reduced

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to the utmost extremity by famine. Hannibal gave notice to Hanno, as well by signals from the town as by frequent expresses, that the garrison were no longer able to sustain the wants they laboured under, and that many of the soldiers were compelled by hunger to desert. This brought Hanno to resolve upon a decisive action, to which the Romans were no less disposed, on account of their inconvenient situation. The two armies therefore drawing out, came to an engagement on the ground between their camps. The success was long doubtful; but Hanno's elephants being at length disordered by his own vanguard, which the Romans had broken and put to flight, those unruly beasts threw his whole army into confusion. The Carthaginians suffered a great slaughter; some few got into Heraclea; but the Romans took most of the elephants, and all the enemy's baggage.

And now Hannibal turned all his thoughts to make his escape from Agrigentum, which he despaired of holding any longer; and perceiving that the Romans after their victory, wearied with labour and grown secure by their good fortune, kept negligent watch, he rushed out of the place at midnight with all his foreign troops, and filling the Roman trenches with fagots, passed over their works unhurt and unperceived. The Romans saw not their error till the morning, when they contented themselves with a short pursuit, and presently returned to take possession of the town; which

they entered without resistance, unmercifully despoiling the inhabitants both of their riches and of their liberty.

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CHAP. III.

THE FOURTH AND FIFTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

The Romans, to accomplish their designs upon Sicily, find it necessary to provide themselves with a naval force. They build a considerable fleet, and by the help of a new-invented engine for grappling and boarding the enemy's ships, gain a memorable victory over the Carthaginians at sea near Milæ (now Milazzo).

GREAT joy there was at Rome on the news of the taking of Agrigentum, and every body's courage and hopes were raised. They now thought it not enough to have rescued Messina, and enriched themselves by the war; they proposed nothing less than the entire expulsion of the Carthaginians out of Sicily; nay, and this was to be done the very next year by L. Valerius and T. Otacilius, their newly elected consuls. However, they soon became sensible, that the task was too difficult to be accomplished in so short a time. For though a great number of the inland towns of Sicily had, after the reduction of Agrigentum, readily submitted to the Romans, who were evidently superior to their enemies by land; yet many places situate on the coast had revolted from them, through fear of the Carthaginian strength by sea. And indeed this advantage on the side of Carthage, made the success of the war

Polyb. B. 1. c. 20.

Year of ROME CCCCXCII Bef. J. C. Two hundred sixty. 191st Consulship.

Year of ROME CCCCXCII Bef. J. C. Two hundred sixty.

191st Consulship.

still doubtful; which being well considered by the Romans, as also that the coast of Italy lay exposed to the depredations of the Carthaginians, who made frequent descents upon it, whilst Africa felt none of the calamities of war, they at length resolved to apply themselves diligently to maritime affairs, and even, at their first essay, to make provision for such a fleet as should be able to contend with the naval power of Carthage.

Polybius, in speaking on this subject, cannot forbear to express his admiration of the magnanimity of the Romans, so void of fear in enterprises of the greatest hazard and moment; and it is in truth an astonishing instance of the resolute bravery of this people, that being hitherto extremely ignorant in all the arts relating to navigation, they should now at once determine upon a naval battle with the Carthaginians, who had held uncontested, from time immemorial, the dominion of the sea.

The same author tells us, that the Romans were not at this time masters of one single galley[1], no not even of a bark; and were so little

[1] Doubtless Polybius goes too far, when he affirms that the Romans had no ships before the first Punic war; the ancient treaties between Rome and Carthage, which he himself presents us with, evince the contrary: nay, it appears by the former part of this history, that they had ten ships of war at the time of the rupture with the Tarentines. And as to what he says of the loss the Romans would have been at to build a fleet, if they had not seized a Carthaginian vessel which chanced to be stranded, his meaning, to be consistent with himself, must be, either that without this accident they would have had no good

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191st Consulship.

skilled in ship-building, that if fortune had not favoured them, it would have been almost impossible for them to put their design in execution. A Carthaginian galley, cruizing on the coast of Italy, and venturing too near the shore, happened to be stranded; the Romans seized her before the crew could get her off, and, by the model of this galley, their first fleet, which consisted of 100 quinqueremes and 20 triremes, was built[2].

Polyb. B. 1. c. 21.

While these vessels were upon the stocks, the men appointed to be the rowers were taught the use of the oar in the following manner:—Seats were raised on the sea-shore, in the same fashion and order as they were to be in the

model whereby to build any ship of war, or would have had no model at all of a quinqueremis. For he tells us in the very same part of his history, that some of the vessels in which they transported their troops the first time to Messina, were triremes (and these were ships of war) borrowed from their neighbours, the Tarentines, &c.

[2] Of the ancient ships of war, the most considerable were the *naves longæ* (long ships or galleys) so named from their form which was the most convenient to wield round or cut their way; whereas the ships of burden were generally built rounder and more hollow, that they might be more easy to load, and might hold the more goods. The most remarkable of the *naves longæ* were the trimeris, the quadriremis, and the quinqueremis, exceeding one another by one bank of oars, which banks were raised sloping one above another. Some indeed fancy a different original of these names, as that in the triremes for example, either there were three banks one after the other on a level, or that three rowers tugged all together at one oar; but this is contrary not only to the authority of the classics, but to the figures of the triremes, still appearing in ancient monuments. Kennet's Antiq. part 2. b. 4. c. 20.

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191st Consulship.

galleys, and the mariners being placed thereon, an officer, who stood in the midst of them, instructed them, by signs with his hand, how at once and all together to dip their oars, and in like manner to recover them out of the water. They afterwards spent some time in practising upon the water what they had been learning at land, adventuring first along the coast of Italy.

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192d Consulship.

Before the finishing of this naval armament[3], the consular fasces were transferred to Cn. Cornelius Asina and C. Duilius. It fell to Cornelius to be the Roman admiral. Leaving orders with the pilots to make the best of their way to the Straits so soon as all the new vessels should be equipped, he with only 17 of them repaired to Messina, to give directions for the reception and security of the main fleet. He had not been long there, when, deceived by some false intelligence, he thought he had a fair occasion of surprising Lipara[4]. Thither he went with his squadron, and drew up under the walls of the town. Hannibal, who commanded at sea for the Carthaginians, and was now at Panormus, having notice of this design, immediately despatched away twenty galleys, under the command of one Boodes, a senator, who arriving in the night, blocked up Cornelius

[3] According to Florus, B. 2. and Orosius, B. 4. c. 7. the Romans were but sixty days in building and equipping their fleet, reckoning from the time that the necessary timber was prepared.

[4] A town in a small island of the same name, not far from Sicily, to the north.

in the harbour. As soon as day appeared, the Roman mariners, in their first fright, to save themselves, got with all diligence ashore. The consul in this distress, seeing no remedy, yielded himself prisoner; and the Carthaginians possessing themselves of the 17 vessels, and the principal Roman officers, made the best of their way back to Hannibal.

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192d Consulship.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 21.

Such is Polybius's account of this affair; but according to Livy's Epitome, B. 17. Cornelius was made prisoner by treachery, being decoyed from his ship by the pretence of a parley, to which the Carthaginian commander invited him in order to a peace.

Not long after this adventure of Cornelius, Hannibal himself was very near falling into a like disaster by an equal indiscretion. For having received advice that the Roman fleet was at sea, and coasting along Italy, he would needs be himself a witness of the number and posture of the enemy; and to that end went in search of them with only fifty of his galleys. The Romans happened to be nearer than he was aware of, and just as he doubled a promontory on the Italian coast, surprised him with their whole fleet in order of battle. In this encounter, he lost the greater part of his squadron, and escaped narrowly himself, when every body despaired of his safety.

The Romans continued their course towards Messina, pursuant to the instructions they had formerly received from Cornelius, of whose defeat and captivity having got advice, they immediately sent the news of it to Duilius, (who

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192d Consulship.

then had the command of the land forces in the island) and while they waited the coming of the consul, they prepared for a new engagement with the enemy, whose fleet they heard was not far off. And considering that their own ships were heavy and slow, not having been built with great art, they turned their thoughts to contrive some new invention which might compensate for this disadvantage; and then was devised that famous machine which they afterwards called the corvus*.

* The crow.

The learned cannot agree concerning the exact form of this engine. Polybius's description of it has not been found sufficient to make it clearly understood. It appears to have been a kind of drawbridge, so framed on the prow of the vessels, that being let fall upon an enemy's ship, it served both to grapple her and to render the boarding her more easy.

Duilius, upon the first notice of what had happened to his colleague, remitting the conduct of the land army to his tribunes, hastened to the fleet, where hearing, on his arrival, that the enemy were cruizing on the coast near Mylæ, which was not far from Messina, he made the best of his way with all his galleys to encounter them. Their fleet consisted of 130 ships, and was commanded by the same Hannibal who had escaped with his army by night from Agrigentum. His own vessel was a septiremis, or galley of seven banks of oars, belonging formerly to Pyrrhus king of Epirus.

Polyb. B. 1. c, 23.

The Carthaginians greatly rejoiced when they descried the Romans, whom they held in

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192d Consulship.

such extreme contempt, that they advanced with their prows directly upon them, careless of any order of battle, and dreaming of nothing but certain victory. But when they drew near they became much astonished at the sight of the engines before mentioned, having never seen the like before, and not being able to conjecture the design of them. However, they staid not long in suspense, nor did the novelty of what they beheld lessen their presumption. The headmost of their vessels made a furious attack upon the Romans, who grappling with them by means of their engines, entered them at once, fighting upon deck hand to hand with their enemies, as upon firm ground. And now neither the lightness of the Carthaginian galleys, nor the skill of their mariners, availed any thing; all was carried by the advantage of weapon and superiority of valour, and both these were on the side of the Romans. The Carthaginians lost in this first encounter thirty of their vessels, of which Hannibal's galley was one, he himself escaping in a small boat, when he was by all given for lost. At length the rest of the fleet came up; but having perceived the terrible effect of the new engines in the defeat of their first squadron, they used all their endeavours to avoid them, nimbly rowing round the Roman galleys, to find an opportunity of attacking them with safety; but when they observed, that which way soever they approached, those machines were traversed and opposed to them, they were at length compelled to yield

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192d Consulship.

Val. Max. B. 7. c. 3. in Extern.

the honour of the day to the Romans, retiring with the loss of fifty more of their ships.

Hannibal, with the remainder of his fleet, stood away for Afric; but fearing lest crucifixion should be his fate, he sent before him one of his friends, a man well chosen for the commission, who being introduced into the senate, "Your admiral," said he, "desires to know your opinion, whether, in case the Romans appear at sea with a numerous fleet, he should give them battle?" "Doubtless he ought to fight," they all cried out unanimously. The messenger then added, "He has fought, and is vanquished." And thus Hannibal escaped the danger that hung over him; for they were no longer free to condemn an action which they had already approved.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 24.

As for Duilius, the courage of whose men was greatly raised by their late surprising victory, he landed his forces on the island, and marched to the relief of Segesta, which the enemy at that time closely besieged. He not only forced them to raise the siege of this place, but took from them Macella by assault. After these exploits, leaving the land army behind him, he returned to Rome, to receive the recompense due to his valour and conduct. A victory at sea so unexpected, so complete, and so important, made all former victories at land to be in a manner forgot. The conqueror, beside the usual honour of the triumph, which was decreed him, was suffered to assume a new one of his own invention. During the rest of

Cic. in Cat. maj. Florus, B. 2.

his life, whenever he had supped abroad in the city, he caused himself to be attended home with flambeaux and music. Medals were struck by the Romans to perpetuate the memory of his exploit; and to the same end they erected in the Forum a rostral pillar of white marble *. This pillar was in the last century accidentally dug up out of the ground, in that part of Rome which was formerly the Roman Forum. There are yet the figures of six rostra, or prows of Roman galleys, sticking to it, and a long but imperfect inscription on the pedestal.

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192d Consulship.

* Columna Rostrata.

CHAP. IV

THE SIXTH, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

The Romans invade Corsica and Sardinia with success, reduce some places in Sicily, and come to an engagement at sea with the Carthaginians near Tyndaris.

THE consuls for the following year were L. Cornelius Scipio and C. Aquilius Florus. While the former employed himself on the coast in getting the fleet ready for new enterprises, the latter was detained at Rome on occasion of a conspiracy then on foot to plunder and burn the city. Four thousand Samnites being appointed, contrary to their inclination, to serve as rowers in the galleys, had united with three thousand discontented slaves in this design; but a certain commander of auxiliaries, whom they had chosen to be their leader, and who

Year of ROME CCCCXCIV. Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-eight.

193d Consulship.

Orosius, B. 4. c. 7. Zon. B. 8.

Year of ROME CCCCXCIV. Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-eight.

193d Consulship.

seemed at first to go heartily into their measures, had no sooner learned their whole secret, than he discovered it to the senate, who took effectual care to avert the mischief and punish the offenders.

Before this domestic disturbance was quite over, Cornelius weighed anchor and put to sea. Ambitious of signalizing himself by some exploit yet unattempted, he made a descent first upon Corsica and then upon Sardinia, and in a short time made considerable progress in the conquest of those islands, the possession of which was of great importance to the Romans, who now aspired to the empire of the seas.

Aquilius went late into Sicily. The affairs of the Romans had suffered much in that island since the departure of Duilius. For a dispute had arisen between the Roman and Sicilian troops about the post of honour; which dispute was carried so far as to produce a separation. Hamilcar (the Carthaginian general by land) who was then at Panormus, having intelligence of this division, surprised the Sicilians as they were about to encamp between Paropus and Thermas, and slew four thousand of them. He had also taken Enna and Camarina, and had fortified Drepanum.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 24.

Aquilius staid in the island all the winter in quality of proconsul, and by his able conduct brought affairs into a better posture.

In the meantime his colleague held the *comitia* for the new elections, where A. Atilius Calatinus and C. Sulpicius Paterculus were chosen consuls. The command of the land army

Year of ROME CCCCXCV Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-seven.

194th Consulship.

fell to the former, the fleet to the latter. Soon after the arrival of Calatinus in Sicily, Misistratum, which the proconsul, Aquilius, had reduced to the last extremity, surrendered to him. From thence he marched towards Camarina; but in his way, not taking sufficient precaution, he brought his army into a valley, where he was shut in, and surrounded by the Carthaginians, under the command of Hamilcar. In this desperate situation, Calpurnius Flamma[1], a legionary tribune, undertook, with the consul's consent, an action of bravery much extolled by the historians. With three hundred chosen men, he, to make a diversion, seized an eminence, where he knew the Carthaginians would soon attack him, and from whence he could have little hope to escape.—He promised himself, that by this motion he should give the enemy so much employment, that they would not be able to obstruct the consul's march. The stratagem succeeded. The Carthaginians, in their attempt to dislodge him, met with so obstinate a resistance, that they were forced to bring almost the whole body of their army to the charge; and in the meantime, the consul with his legions got safely through the pass with little opposition. Of the three hundred Romans, Calpurnius was the only person that escaped: he was found miserably wounded, but still breathing, under a heap of dead bodies, and his wounds being

Zon. B. 8. Orosius, Florus, Aurel. Victor, c. 39. Livy, Epit. B. 17. Livy, B. 22. c. 60.

[1] He is called by some writers Cæditius, by others Laberius.

Year of ROME CCCCXCV Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-seven.

194th Consulship.

Pliny, B. 22. c. 6. and Diod. in Eclog. p. 876.

carefully dressed, he recovered. A crown of cramen was the reward of his exploit.

Calatinus, after this escape, continued his march towards Camarina, and by the help of engines, sent him by king Hiero, made himself master of it. Enna betrayed her garrison, and opened her gates to him. He took Sittanum by assault; and then many other towns surrendered without standing a siege, and, among the rest, Erbesus in the country of the Agrigentines. Flushed with this success, he undertook the siege of Lipara, expecting for the future to meet with no resistance wherever he appeared: but Hamilcar having got notice of his design, had stolen with some troops into the place; and when the Romans, who saw none but citizens upon the ramparts, confidently began to scale the walls, they were on a sudden surprised by a sally of the Carthaginians, and shamefully repulsed with considerable loss. And thus Calatinus finished his campaign, which by the mixture of good and bad success, gained him but little honour.

Zon. B. 8.

As for the other consul, Sulpicius, he had conducted the fleet like an able commander. He had not only assisted his colleague in the reduction of the maritime towns of Sicily, but had much advanced the conquest of Sardinia and Corsica. However, this did not satisfy his passion for glory; he burnt with a desire of distinguishing himself by a naval victory; and because no Carthaginian fleet appeared at sea, he spread a report that he intended to go and burn the ships of the African republic in their

harbours. This news alarmed the Carthaginians, and they trusted Hannibal once more with the command of a considerable fleet. He found Sulpicius with his not far from the coast of Africa. But when both sides were preparing for an engagement, a storm separated them, and drove the ships of both fleets into the ports of Sardinia. After this, Sulpicius surprised the Carthaginian admiral in a harbour of that island, and took many of his galleys; which misfortune begetting a mutiny in the remainder of his fleet, the mariners seized on his person, and crucified him.

Year of ROME CCCCXCV Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-seven.

194th Consulship.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 24.

The year following, when C. Attilius Regulus and Cn. Cornelius Blasio were consuls, the former being with the fleet at Tyndaris, descried the Carthaginian fleet standing along the coast in a confused and careless manner, whereupon he hastened with a squadron of ten galleys to give them chase, directing at the same time the rest of the ships to follow him. The Carthaginians observing that the detached squadron was advanced a good distance from the enemy's main fleet, tacked about on a sudden, and surrounding the ten ships, quickly sunk them all, except the admiral's galley, which escaped only by her lightness and the force of her oars. But the rest of the Roman fleet coming up soon after in order of battle, amply revenged this disgrace; for the Carthaginians were forced to fly to the island of Lipara, with the loss of eighteen of their vessels, of which eight were sunk and the other ten taken.

Year of ROME CCCCXCVI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-six.

195th Consulship.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 25.

c. 25

Year of ROME CCCCXCVI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-six.

195th Consulship.

Little was performed this year by land, the armies engaging in no action of importance, and the contending powers being chiefly solicitous about the increase of their naval strength, which for good reason, as we shall presently see, was by each side deemed to be more than ever its principal affair.

CHAP. V.

THE NINTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

The Romans, under the conduct of Marcus Attilius Regulus and L. Manlius defeat the Carthaginians in the memorable sea-fight of Ecnomus; after which they make a descent upon Africa. Carthage, though reduced to great extremity, rejects the hard conditions of peace proposed by Regulus.

Year of ROME CCCCXCVII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-five.

196th Consulship.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 26.

THE struggle between the rival republics for the dominion of Sicily had now lasted eight years, and Carthage had already lost the greater part of her acquisitions in that island, when the Romans, to make her relinquish the rest, undertook to transfer the war into Africa.—They imagined that they should hereby reduce the Carthaginians to the necessity of calling home all their forces for the defence of their own country. The naval preparations of the Romans the last year had been wholly in view to the execution of this design; and the fleet which they now put to sea, under the command of their new consuls, Marcus Attilius Regulus * and L. Manlius, was suitable to the importance of the enterprise; for it consisted of no less than 330 ships of war.

* 2d time.

Year of ROME CCCCXCVII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-five.

196th Consulship.

On the other hand, the Carthaginians, who well knew how easy it was for an enemy, who had once got footing in their country, to subdue the inhabitants on the coast, and to march even to the walls of Carthage, had determined to exert their utmost strength in opposing the intended descent. Fully bent upon a sea engagement, they had equipped a fleet that was still more numerous than that of the Romans. They arrived at Lilybæum with 350 galleys. From this place they went afterwards to Heraclea Minoa, where they staid at anchor, waiting the motions of the enemy.

The Roman fleet had touched at Messina, and had thence steered its course along the coast of Sicily that lay to the right, and having doubled the promontory of Pachinum, was come to Ecnomus, where their land forces then were. From these the consuls selected the ablest of the soldiers for the present service, providing all things necessary either for a battle with the enemy by sea, if it should be offered, or to make an irruption into Africa, if their voyage thither should not be obstructed. Each galley in the Roman fleet had 300 rowers and 120 soldiers, so that the whole army amounted to near 140,000 men. As the Carthaginians exceeded their enemies in number of ships, so was their army proportionably greater, consisting of above 150,000 mariners and soldiers.—And now, says Polybius, who could behold, or but barely hear of such fleets and armies, and of the hazard to which these contending states were exposed, without being astonished at the

Year of ROME CCCCXCVII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-five.

196th Consulship.

mightiness of their power, and without taking part in the danger with which they threatened each other?

Ecnomus was not far from Heraclea; the two parties were obstinately determined, the one to invade, the other to defend; it was easy therefore to foresee they would soon come to a battle.

The Romans considering the advantage which the Carthaginians had over them in the lightness and ready working of their galleys, took especial care to draw up their fleet, that it should be difficult to break its order. They divided their ships into four squadrons, to three of which they gave the names of the first, the second, and the third fleet; and these, in three lines, composed the form of a wedge or triangle, pointing towards the enemy.

The first fleet to the right, and the second to the left, (keeping the prows of their vessels turned outwards) made the sides of the triangle; and at the head of these two lines, that is, at the point where they met, were the consuls Regulus and Manlius, in two galleys abreast of each other. The third fleet made the base of the triangle, and towed the vessels of burden, which carried the horses and baggage.

In the rear of all was the fourth division, which they called the triarians, a term taken from the land forces. This squadron was drawn up in a line parallel to the base of the triangle, but was stretched so far in length, that its two extremities extended a good way beyond those of the base.

Year of ROME CCCCXCVII. Bef. J.C. Two hundred fifty-five.

196th Consulship.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 27.

The several divisions of the Roman fleet being thus disposed, the whole, says Polybius, was fit for action, and very difficult to be broken.

The Carthaginian fleet was commanded by Hanno, who had succeeded so ill during the siege of Agrigentum, and by Hamilcar, who had fought near Tyndaris. These admirals observing how the Roman galleys were drawn up, and rightly conjecturing the intention of such a disposition, turned their thoughts to disappoint it, by the order in which they should dispose their own vessels, and by stratagem.—Having divided their whole fleet into four squadrons, they drew three of them up in one long line frontways, their prows pointing directly on the enemy. Hanno was with the squadron which formed the right of this line, and which stretched a great way out into the sea. He had with him all the best rowing galleys, such as were proper to attack and retreat, and could row round the Romans at pleasure. Hamilcar was with the squadron in the left of the line. The third squadron, which made the centre, was designedly drawn up very thin, that the Romans might be tempted to begin the attack there, in which case this squadron had orders to retreat, thereby to engage the Roman galleys, which made the two sides of their triangle, in a pursuit, which would separate them from the base.

The fourth division of the Carthaginian fleet, in form of a tenail, kept close under the shore which lay to the left of their long line of battle.

The stratagem above mentioned, and which

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Polybius imputes to Hamilcar, succeeded. The Romans began their attack on the Carthaginians in the middle of their line. The galleys that were attacked, pretended to fly through fear, and the assailants, that is to say, the first and second fleets of the Romans, pursuing them warmly, disjoined themselves from their third fleet (which towed the baggage) and from the triarians in the rear of all.

When the Carthaginians judged that the first and second fleets of the Romans were sufficiently distanced from the rest, the signal was given from Hamilcar's galley; whereupon those that were chased by the Romans immediately tacked, and made head against the pursuers, Hamilcar with his squadron charging them at the same time. And now the battle grew warm; for though the Carthaginians had the advantage in the lightness and ready working of their vessels, yet the Romans lost not their assurance of success in the end; they found themselves better men when they came to the sword's point, and they had great trust in their engines, with which they grappled and boarded the enemy; besides, the soldiers were animated by the presence of their generals, in whose eye they fought, and who themselves engaged in equal hazard with the rest.

Polyb. B. I. c. 28.

During this conflict, Hanno, who commanded the squadron which had formed the right of the Carthaginian line, bearing down upon the Roman triarians, attacked them vigorously, and succeeded so well, as to reduce them to very great extremities.

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196th Consulship.

At the same time the fourth squadron of the Carthaginians, which in form of a tenail had been posted close under the shore, ranged themselves into a front, and advanced against that squadron of the Romans which they called their third fleet, and which had made the base of their triangle. This fleet was therefore obliged to cast off the vessels they had in tow, which having done, they received the Carthaginians, and fought them with great bravery. So that now might be seen three naval battles at one and the same instant.

The fortune of the day was for some time doubtful, and would at length have infallibly declared for the Carthaginians, if Hamilcar's courage had been equal to his skill in stratagem, and if, with his two squadrons of the left and the centre, he had only maintained the fight against the first and second fleets of the Romans, so as to hinder them from going to the assistance of their other fleets; but he, after some loss, shamefully fled out of the battle.—And now, while Manlius employed himself in towing away such ships as had been taken, Regulus, who perceived the great danger the triarians were in from Hanno's attack, advanced with all diligence to their relief, taking with him those ships of his colleague's squadron, which had not suffered any thing in the engagement with Hamilcar. The triarians hereupon, though now almost quite vanquished, recovered heart, and renewed the battle with alacrity. Hanno seeing himself thus assaulted contrary to all expectation, both in front and

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rear, betook himself to his oars, and made off to sea, yielding the day to the Romans.

About the same time, Manlius coming up, and joining Regulus, they both hastened to the succour of their third fleet, which had been forced under the shore by the fourth squadron of the enemy, and was in a manner besieged there. This third fleet would have been in great danger of destruction, before the consuls could have come to its rescue, if the Carthaginians had had the courage to push their advantage; but their dread of being grappled by the corvi, and of coming to a close fight with the Romans, was so great, that they contented themselves with driving their enemies against the shore, and there keeping them beset. And now they were themselves entirely surrounded by the Romans, who took fifty of their ships with all their equipage. Such was the event of this last combat in particular. The Romans, every where victors, took in all sixty-four of the Carthaginian galleys, and sunk thirty. Of their own fleet they lost but twenty-four galleys, and these perished against the shore, not one was taken.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 29.

The consuls, after this victory, returned into the ports of Sicily to take in provisions and fresh troops, and prepare anew for a descent upon Africa.

Whilst they were thus employed, Hanno made no scruple to go in person to amuse them by conferences about peace, which Hamilcar had refused to do, for fear he should be treated as the Carthaginians had treated Cornelius

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196th Consulship.

Asina five years before. Hanno's confidence was founded upon a different judgment of the temper of the Romans; and experience on the present occasion showed that he judged rightly. For when a certain legionary tribune cried out, "That he ought to be detained prisoner, by way of reprisal, for the treachery practised towards Cornelius," both the consuls immediately ordered him silence; and then turning to Hanno, "The faith of Rome secures thee from that fear." The Carthaginian was dismissed in safety, but his proposals were rejected, and the consuls pursued their enterprise.

Polyb. B. I. c. 29.

The Romans had a fortunate voyage, and landed in the neighbourhood of Clypea, near the promontory of Mercury. Having made themselves masters of that town, they would not advance any further till they had received fresh instructions from Rome: for such was the dependence of the consuls upon the senate at this time, that they did little more than execute the orders of the fathers; most of whom being experienced soldiers, and having commanded armies, were very capable of directing the conduct of their generals. The consuls however did not continue in a perfect inaction; they fortified Clypea after the Roman manner, and detached parties to ravage the rich territory all around, and plunder the fine houses of the Carthaginian nobles. These detachments, meeting no opposition, brought away an immense booty, besides 20,000 prisoners, who were made slaves.

When the consuls' messenger came back

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196th Consulship.

from Rome, he brought orders for Manlius to return to Italy with the fleet, and for Regulus to continue in Africa with a sufficient number of troops to carry on the war. The people of Rome depended greatly on the courage and abilities of Regulus, and the city was in universal joy upon the publishing of this regulation. But when the news of it came to Regulus, he was much afflicted. His pretext was, the bad condition of his little farm of seven acres of land. He represented to the senate, that upon the death of the husbandman, to whom he had committed the care of his farm, the management of it had fallen to a day-labourer, who had since stolen his instruments of husbandry, and carried off all his stock; so that his presence was necessary at home to provide for the subsistence of his wife and children. Upon this the senate gave orders that his losses should be repaired, his farm taken care of, and his family maintained at the public expense; but he himself was directed to stay in Africa. Manlius, leaving behind him forty ships, 15,000 foot, and 500 horse, returned to Italy with the rest of the army, and with all the prisoners which had been taken upon the continent of Africa.

Val. Max. B. 6. c. 6.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 29.

Regulus made incursions into the country, and pushed on his conquests with prodigious rapidity[1]. All the towns in his way that were

Flor. B. 2. Zon. B. 8.

[1] Regulus, in the progress of his conquests, encamping on the banks of the Bagrada, a river that discharged itself into the sea, not far from Carthage, is said by many authors to have met there with a monstrous serpent, of 120

unfortified, he took by assault, and those that were fortified, by siege; and now at length he sat down before Adis, a city of great importance, and pressed the siege of it with vigour.

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196th Consulship.

Hitherto the Carthaginians had brought no army into the field to oppose his progress.—Upon the first notice of their terrible defeat at sea, apprehending a sudden invasion from the Romans, they had despatched away some troops to keep guard upon the coast; but this care was over, as soon as they learned that the Romans were landed. They proceeded therefore with all possible application to reinforce their army with new levies, and make due provision both for strengthening the city, and securing the country. They named two generals to command their forces, Bostar, and Asdrubal the son of Hanno; they afterwards sent orders to Hamilcar, who was then at Heraclea, to return home with all expedition. Hamilcar brought with him to Carthage 5000 foot and 500 horse, and being there named third general of the republic, and having consulted with Asdrubal, it

Polyb. B. 1. c. 30.

feet long, which much infested his army, seizing his men, and swallowing them whole when they went to draw water. The skin of this animal was so tough, and its scales so thick, as to be impenetrable by the Roman weapons, insomuch that they were forced to employ their battering engines, called *ballistæ*, to destroy it. And even when they had killed it, the stench of its carcass infected the air and the water to such a degree, that the Romans were forced to decamp. Many other extraordinary things are related by the historians of this serpent, which was probably nothing more than an overgrown crocodile, a creature common in Africa, but to which the Romans were at this time strangers. *Catrou.*

Val. Max. B. 1. A. Gell. B. 6. Plin. B. 8.

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was determined no longer to endure that the Romans should make such spoil upon the country, and to hasten to the relief of Adis. They advanced with their army, and encamped upon an eminence, which, though it overlooked the Roman camp, was a very incommodious situation; for as their greatest strength lay in their horse and elephants, to abandon the plain country and post themselves in high and steep places, where neither elephants nor horse could be of any use to them, was in effect to point out to their enemies the method to destroy them. Regulus, who saw their mistake, gave them no time to rectify it. At break of day he marched against the enemy, his troops ascending the hill on both sides. The mercenaries of the Carthaginians behaved themselves gallantly on this occasion, and repulsed the first legion of the Romans which charged them in front; but being presently after attacked in the rear by the soldiers who had got up the hill on the other side, they could no longer maintain the fight. The whole army disbanded itself, and in the utmost confusion fled out of the camp. The elephants and the horse, which had been wholly useless during the action, gained the champaign country and escaped. The Romans having pursued the foot for some space, returned and pillaged the camp; after which they proceeded to make incursions as before, spoiling the country, and taking towns without opposition. Among others, they seized upon Tunes, and there they pitched their camp within the walls of it; this being of all places

the most commodious for distressing Carthage itself, and the country about it.

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196th Consulship.

The Carthaginians, who had so unfortunately managed their affairs both by sea and land, not so much through the cowardice of their armies, as the insufficiency of their chiefs, began now to despair. For over and above the calamities that have been related, the Numidians, their implacable enemies, taking advantage of the present troubles, had entered their provinces with fire and sword, and compelled the inhabitants to fly for refuge to the capital, whither they brought both fear and famine, a mighty multitude of all sorts flocking at once thither.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 31.

It is not surprising therefore, if in such extremity the Carthaginians were overjoyed to receive a message from the Roman general, exhorting them to think of an accommodation. What moved Regulus to make this step was the apprehension lest a successor, who was expected from Rome, should deprive him of the glory of putting an end to the war. The senate of Carthage with great readiness despatched away some of their principal citizens to confer with him: but these were so far from yielding to his proposals, that they could not with patience even hear them mentioned. For Regulus would have had them esteem it as a singular grace and benefit, that he granted them peace upon any terms whatsoever; and those he demanded were so infamous for the Carthaginians, that in their imagination no-

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196th Consulship.

thing worse could befal them, should they be entirely conquered. The deputies therefore returned to Carthage, not only without having consented to any thing, but full of indignation at the intolerable insolence of the Roman.—The senate likewise, when the report was made to them of what had passed at the conference, showed so much courage and greatness of mind, that though they were almost at the brink of despair, they determined rather to abide any adversity which their worst fortune could bring upon them, than stain the nobility of their name and actions by so shameful a treaty.

CHAP. VI.

Xantippus, a commander of Greek mercenaries in the service of Carthage, by his excellent advice and conduct, gives a wonderful turn to affairs in Africa. The Roman army is totally defeated, and Regulus taken prisoner.

Polyb. B. I. c. 32.

IN the height of this distress, to which the victories and obdurate pride of Regulus had reduced the Carthaginians, there fortunately arrived at Carthage a body of recruits which they had hired in Greece. Among these was a certain Lacedæmonian named Xantippus, an officer well skilled in military affairs according to the Spartan discipline. This man having informed himself of the circumstances of the late overthrow, and of the number of horse and elephants which yet remained, concluded

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within himself, and freely said it among his friends, that the Carthaginians had not been vanquished by the enemy, but by the ignorance of their own leaders. This discourse being spread among the people, came at length to the ears of the magistrates, who thereupon commanded him to be brought before the great council. Xantippus offered such strong reasons in support of what he had advanced, that it was impossible to resist the force of them. He showed plainly, that if, instead of encamping upon the high grounds, they would keep in the open champaign country, they might not only banish all fear of the enemy, but even be assured of victory. The whole assembly, the generals not excepted, applauded what he said, and it was unanimously agreed to place him at the head of their troops; the only example of the kind in all history, and a sure proof that the Carthaginians were in the utmost perplexity and consternation.

The soldiers had already begun to conceive a favourable opinion of this stranger, and to hope for some advantage from him; but when, after he had led them without the walls of the city, they saw in what manner he drew them up, and the new exercise he taught them according to his rules, displaying such a skill in the art of war, as they had never seen in any of their former generals, they were quite transported with joy; they pressed earnestly to be led against the enemy, being assured that they could not fail of success under the conduct of Xantippus. The army in a few days began to

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196th Consulship.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 33.

march. It consisted of 12,000 foot, 4000 horse, and about 100 elephants.

The Romans were at first a little struck with the novelty, to see their enemies boldly marching in the open flat country, but having no doubt as to the event, they advanced with all expedition to meet them, and encamped within about 1200 paces of them. Next day, the Carthaginians held a council of war, to determine how they should proceed, while the soldiers, assembling in great numbers, and proclaiming every where the name of Xantippus, demanded with much earnestness to be led against the enemy. The officers observing this forwardness of the army to fight; and being urged by the pressing instances of Xantippus not to let the ardour of the soldiers cool without action, directions were presently given to prepare for battle, and the whole conduct of it was committed to the Spartan, who disposed his troops in the following manner:

He drew up all his elephants in one rank, and behind these, at a reasonable distance, he placed the Carthaginian infantry in one phalanx. The foreign troops were posted, one part of them in the same line with the phalanx, to the right of it; the other part, composed of light-armed soldiers, was placed in the intervals of the squadrons of horse, which made the two wings of the army.

On the part of the Romans, as the chief care of Regulus was to guard against the elephants, he to this end placed in front his velites, or light-armed soldiers, that these with their darts

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or other missive weapons might drive back those huge beasts upon the enemy, or at least hinder them from rushing with their usual violence upon the legions. It was also out of fear of the same animals, that he made his battalions deeper in file than he had been accustomed to do; an excellent precaution, says Polybius, against the shock of the elephants; but then, by narrowing his front, he left himself more exposed to be attacked in flank by the enemy's cavalry, which greatly outnumbered his.

It does not appear of what number of men Regulus's army consisted; but supposing him to have lost none of those which his colleague left him, they amounted but to 15,000 foot and 500 horse.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 34.

The two armies being thus drawn up, and the signal being given by Xantippus, the first onset was made by the elephants, which met with so little resistance from the velites, that they presently broke into the Roman main body, making great destruction amongst the foremost ranks of it. However, the rest of that body stood firm for some time, by reason of its depth. But the Carthaginian horse, having quickly driven those of Regulus out of the field, began now to charge his battalions both in flank and rear, which put them into great distress, for they were forced to face every way, and could neither pass forward, nor yet retire, and had much to do, to make good the ground on which they stood. In the meanwhile such of the Romans as with great difficulty had made their way through the elephants, and had left

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them at their backs, met with the Carthaginian phalanx, which not having yet engaged, and being therefore quite fresh and in good array, obtained an easy victory over a body of men already in disorder, and wearied with wounds and labour. These being entirely cut off, and the phalanx advancing, there was no longer any resource for the Romans. Surrounded on all sides, the greater part of them were crushed to death by the enormous weight of the elephants, or slain in their ranks by the arrows of the horse. Some attempted to escape by flight, but being in an open country, they were easily overtaken by the cavalry, and either cut off, or made prisoners. Five hundred who followed Regulus, fell alive with him into the enemy's hands[1].

Of the whole Roman army, there escaped only 2000 men, who had been posted in the left point of their main body, and who, in the beginning of the action, to avoid the shock of the elephants, had wheeled round them, and charged the mercenaries that were to the right of the enemy's phalanx, putting them to flight,

[1] Chevalier Folard is of opinion, that the loss of this battle was wholly owing to the mistake of Regulus, in not leaving (as Scipio did afterwards at the battle of Zama) sufficient spaces between the columns of his main body, for the elephants to pass freely through them. That if, by this precaution, the Roman infantry had shunned the mischiefs, which, for want of it, they suffered from the elephants, they would have had nothing to fear from the Carthaginian horse, which could have made no impression on them, (formed as they were) even after the Roman cavalry were driven out of the field.

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and pursuing them even to their entrenchments. These 2000, as it were by miracle, got safely to Clypea, when the rest were all slain or taken.

On the enemy's side were killed but 800 men, of whom the greater part were of those mercenaries that had been attacked by the 2000 Romans.

The Carthaginians, having spoiled the dead, marched back to their city, leading in triumph the Roman general and the 500 other prisoners.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 35.

Whoever, says Polybius, reflects seriously on this adventure, will gather from it excellent instruction for the conduct of human life. The misfortune of Regulus affords us an admirable lesson of moderation, and teaches us to be always on our guard against the inconstancy of fortune. We see him who but a few days before was so elated by success, so haughty and inexorable, reduced at once to be the scorn of a people whom he had despised and insulted, and to stand in need of that clemency from his enemies, which he had with pitiless pride refused them in their misery. We learn wisdom, says our author, two ways; by our own experience, and by the experience of others. The first is the more convincing, but the other is the easier and safer. And this is the great benefit we reap from the study of history. Without any peril to ourselves, we gather rules of conduct from a view of the miscarriages and misfortunes of other men.

Polybius also observes, that the event which

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196th Consulship.

has been just related, confirms that saying of Euripides, "That one wise head is of more value than a great many hands." For it is manifest in the case now before us, that the counsel and abilities of one single person subdued the Roman legions that were esteemed invincible, restored a sinking and despairing commonwealth, and revived the courage of a spiritless army, grown stupid by their defeats.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 36.

The Carthaginians, whose affairs had prospered to their wish, expressed their joy by solemn thanksgivings to the gods, and by congratulations and mutual good offices to one another. As for Xantippus, who had had so great share in restoring the commonwealth, he shortly after (an admirable example of judgment and wisdom) took his leave and departed from Carthage, well foreseeing that his services, too great for a reward, would draw upon him both envy and calumny, against which a native perhaps might have been able to guard himself by the means of relations and friends, but which would in all probability bring ruin upon a stranger, who had nothing to support him but his merit.

Polybius tells us, that some authors give a different account of Xantippus's departure, and promises to take notice of it in another place: but that part of his history has not been transmitted to us. According to Appian, the Carthaginians, fearing lest the honour of the victory should be ascribed to the Lacedæmonians, feigned a gratification of their general, made him magnificent presents, and ap-

Appian De Bell. Pun. c. 3.

pointed a convoy of their own ships to conduct him to Sparta, but with secret instructions to the commanders of the galleys to throw him and his Lacedæmonians overboard, as soon as they could come into the open sea. Such, says our author, was the end of Xantippus, and such the recompense he received for so noble an exploit. But surely this is a very senseless account, or the Carthaginians must have been a very senseless as well as ungrateful people, first to do public honour to the Spartan, as the known and undoubted author of the victory, and then to imagine they could rob him of that glory, and conceal their obligation to him, by treacherously throwing him into the sea.

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196th Consulship.

CHAP. VII.

FROM THE NINTH TO THE FOURTEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

The Romans, after the misfortune of Regulus, vanquish the Carthaginians in a sea-engagement on the coast of Africa; but withdraw their forces from that country. In their return home they lose their own fleet by tempest. They build a new one, and this is also destroyed by the like misfortune. Hereupon they resolve to think no more of naval enterprises; but after two years, in which their land forces perform nothing of moment, they change that resolution, and, while a third fleet is building, they gain a signal victory at land over the Carthaginians, near Panormus.

THE Romans, having received an account of the miserable condition of their affairs in Africa, applied themselves with all diligence to repair and equip their fleet, in order to

Polyb. B. 1. c. 36.

Year of ROME CCCCXCVII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-five.

196th Consulship.

rescue out of danger the 2000 soldiers, who, after the late battle, had escaped to Clypea. In the meantime the Carthaginians, to reduce those remains of Regulus's army, laid siege to that place, and used their utmost efforts to carry it; but so brave and so obstinate was the resistance they met with, that they were forced at length to abandon the enterprise and retire. And now hearing of the naval preparations of the Romans, for a new expedition to Africa, they fitted out in a short time about 200 galleys, and put to sea to watch the arrival of the enemy.

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197th Consulship.

Early in the summer, the new consuls, Fulvius and Æmilius, with a fleet of 350 sail, appeared off the promontory of Mercury, and there came to an engagement with the Carthaginians, who, not being able to sustain the very first shock, were entirely defeated, and lost 114 of their vessels. The Romans pursued their course, arrived at Clypea, took the garrison on board, and then steered back towards Sicily[1].

[1] There are two parts of the Roman conduct in this war, which Mr. Rollin and Chevalier Folard think very hard to be accounted for.

1. Why did the Romans, after their victory at sea near Ecnomus, and the fortunate descent made in Africa in consequence of that victory, leave so small a number of troops under Regulus to carry on the war in that country? Mr. Rollin says, it was a manifest renouncing of the advantages gained by sea; and the Chevalier declares, that it is enough to distract a commentator, and wonders that Polybius makes no remark on this strange proceeding.

Again, 2. Why did the Romans, just after this new vic-

They had a prosperous voyage till they came near the Sicilian coast, in the territory tory at sea, near the coast of Africa, entirely abandon that country, instead of attempting to complete the conquest of it? Polybius relates this fact also without any remark upon it, to the great amazement of Chevalier Folard.

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197th Consulship.

But as to both these difficulties, may it not be answered, that the only object of the Romans in this war, was the conquest of Sicily? To alarm Carthage, and induce her to withdraw her forces out of that island, are the reasons assigned by Polybius for the descent made by the Romans on Africa. But they were disappointed as to the effect of this measure; for the Carthaginians judging, by the small army left with Regulus, that the enemy, in making their descent, had no further view than to cause a diversion, did not recall their troops out of Sicily; but seeing, as Polybius says, that the war would go on slowly, named two generals, Bostar and Asdrubal, to command the forces they had at home; and when afterwards Hamilcar was sent for from Sicily to join those generals, he brought with him but 5500 men.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 37.

It is plain therefore, from the conduct of both the contending powers, that neither the Romans intended, nor the Carthaginians feared, any serious attempt upon Carthage by Regulus, when he began the war in Africa.

But why did not the Romans resolve to attempt Carthage after the victory at Ecnomus? I answer: because from their knowledge of its great strength, and of the many resources its prodigious wealth furnished, they judged the conquest of it impracticable at this time, and before Sicily was subdued. And that they judged right, one may fairly conclude from Polybius's not reproving their policy, and from the difficulties they afterwards met with in that enterprise, even when masters of Sicily, and of all the islands between Italy and Africa.

But after the total defeat of Regulus's army by means of the elephants, the difficulty of succeeding in an African war was become infinitely great. We find, that the legions were possessed with such a dread of those animals, that for some years they durst not come to a pitched battle with the Carthaginians even in Sicily, where the Romans

Year of ROME cccexcviii. Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-four.

197th Consulship.

of Camarina; but then so terrible a tempest overtook them, as no words are able to describe. Of above 400 vessels, only fourscore escaped destruction: the rest either foundered at sea, or were dashed to pieces against the rocks; so that the whole coast from Camarina to Cape Pachynum was covered with dead bodies and fragments of ships. History affords no example of a more deplorable shipwreck. And this calamity was owing not to fortune, but to the obstinacy of the consuls. For the pilots had often represented to them, that the season was come when it was no longer safe to navigate on that coast of Sicily which looks towards Africa: but they being full of expectation, that the towns situate thereon, terrified

had many advantages which they must have wanted in Africa.

In a word, Sicily was the present object of the Roman ambition, and the only reasonable object it could now have; and we shall see by what follows, that they had need of all their forces for the reduction of this island: so that their leaving Africa after the victory at sea by Fulvius and Æmilius, ought not perhaps to have so greatly astonished the Chevalier Folard.

If we may credit some authors, we have a shorter way of getting rid of the Chevalier's difficulties, which is to deny the facts that give occasion to them. According to these writers, Regulus's army was not so inconsiderable, as from Polybius's account it seems to have been. Appian and Orosius make it 30,000 strong; and Eutropius reckons 47,000 men, of whom 30,000 were slain, and 15,000 taken prisoners in the battle with Xantippus.

And as to the Romans quitting Africa after the victory at sea by Fulvius and Æmilius, the last named author [Eutropius] represents them, not as making this retreat by choice, but as being constrained to it by famine.

by the late victory, would readily submit to them on their first appearance, despised the admonition, to pursue an interest that was by no means worthy of the hazard. But such, as Polybius tells us, was the character of the Romans; impetuous, presumptuous, and obstinate, they would carry every thing by mere violence; they would force all nature to their will: to them nothing was impossible which they could desire; nay, it must of necessity come to pass, if they had once decreed that it should be done. And indeed, adds our author, in their enterprises by land, and where they had to do only with men and the works of men, this inflexible audaciousness of spirit for the most part (not always) carried them through every obstacle to the end proposed; but in their naval expeditions, when they foolishly imagined that the winds and the seas must be complaisant to their wishes and projects, they were sure to be chastised for their overweening presumption: and of this they had frequent experience.

Year of ROME cccccxcviii. Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-four.

197th Consulship.

The Romans, though extremely afflicted, were not discouraged by the ruin of their fleet; they ordered a new one of 220 sail to be speedily built; and, which is almost incredible, this powerful armament was completely equipped in three months' time.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 38.

The consular fasces had been transferred to A. Attilius and Cn. Cornelius Asina (the same Cornelius who was formerly made prisoner at Lipara, and had lived some time in captivity.) These commanders having passed the Straits

Year of ROME ccccxcix. Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-three.

198th Consulship.

Year of ROME cccccxcix. Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-three.

198th Consulship.

Diod. Sic. in Eclog. p. 877.

with the new fleet, and touched at Messina to take with them the eighty vessels which had escaped the late storm, shaped their course for Cephaledium, which was delivered to them by treachery; thence they sailed to Drepanum, and began to besiege it; but upon succours being brought thither by Carthalo the Carthaginian general (who had retaken Agrigentum, and demolished the walls of it) they drew off and sailed to Panormus*, which, according to Polybius, was then the capital city of the Carthaginians in Sicily. The consuls besieged this place, and having carried the outworks by assault, the besieged capitulated, and surrendered the town. The inhabitants of Selinus, Tyndaris, and other places, did the like, having first driven out the Carthaginian garrisons. After these conquests the Romans, leaving a strong body of troops in Panormus, returned to Rome.

* Palermo.

Year of ROME D. Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-two.

199th Consulship.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 39.

Early the next summer the succeeding consuls, Cn. Servilius and C. Sempronius, sailed over to Sicily with all their naval force, and from thence soon after stood for the coast of Africa, where they made several descents, and brought away some booty, but performed nothing of moment. Coming at length near the island of the Lotophagi, (which was called Meninx,) not far from the lesser Syrtis; and, being unacquainted with the coast, they ran upon some banks of sand, and there stuck fast: the sea ebbing left them dry, and they were utterly at a loss what to do, apprehending the destruction of the whole fleet. But the flood return-

Year of ROME D. Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-two.

199th Consulship.

ing some hours after, and they lightening the vessels by throwing their booty overboard, made a shift to get off. Immediately they stood away for Sicily, as if they were flying before an enemy, and, having doubled the cape of Lilybæum, arrived safely in the port of Panormus. But from thence steering their course homewards at a time unskilfully chosen, they lost 150 of their vessels by a storm that overtook them in the passage.

So terrible a destruction of two fleets by tempest totally discouraged the Romans from all naval enterprises. No more than sixty vessels were to be equipped for the future, and these were to be employed only to transport the troops with the baggage and ammunition into Sicily. Their thirst of glory and empire was not abated, but they determined to rely wholly on their land forces for the achievement of the conquest they had in view. This conquest however could not be effected by land armies alone, while the maritime towns in the possession of the Carthaginians were open to receive provisions and recruits by sea, as occasion should require. Nay, ever since the defeat of Regulus by means of the elephants, the Roman soldiers were afraid of coming to any engagement by land, where they should have to do with those huge and furious animals.

The Carthaginians had despatched Asdrubal with 140 elephants to Lilybæum, and had strengthened the army which was there with troops drawn from other places; and they had

Year of ROME D. Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-two.

199th Consulship.

sent after him 200 ships of war. Asdrubal, after his arrival, having first applied himself diligently to discipline his soldiers and elephants, had boldly taken the field with a resolution to offer the enemy battle. But though the armies were on several occasions encamped within five or six furlongs of each other, sometimes in the territory of Selinus, sometimes about Lilybæum, the Romans for the space of two years together had not once the resolution to come to an engagement with the enemy; nor durst they descend into the champaign country. So that during the consulship of C. Aurelius[2] and P. Servilius, and that of L. Cæcilius Metellus and C. Furius, no progress was made in their affairs, except the taking of two towns, which they could besiege, still keeping themselves posted in high and inaccessible places. This terror among the legions made the senate of Rome at length change their measures, and resolve to try their fortune once more at sea. And accordingly, after the election of C. Atilius* and L. Manlius† to the consulate, they ordered the building of fifty new vessels, and that suitable levies should be made of men fit for that service.

Year of ROME DI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred fifty-one.

200th Consulship.

Year of ROME DII.

Year of ROME DIII.

In the meantime Asdrubal having observed the dread that possessed the Roman army, whenever he presented them battle; and having intelligence that Furius was returned to Rome with one half of the army, and that Cæ-

* A second time.
† A second time.
Polyb B. 1. c. 40.

[2] In this consulate Tib. Coruncanius was chosen pontifex maximus, the first instance of a plebeian raised to that high station.

Year of ROME DIII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred forty-nine.

202d Consulship.

cilius with the other was at Panormus to protect his allies while they gathered in their harvest, he marched from Lilybæum, and came with all his forces to the borders of the territory of Panormus, hoping to provoke Cæcilius to fight. But the Roman, who well understood his own business, kept close within the town, and pretending fear, suffered the Carthaginians to advance and pillage the country without opposition, till with all their elephants they had passed a river which ran within a mile of the place. He then sent out some light-armed troops, to skirmish and draw the enemy further on, supporting his first detachment by others, as occasion required, till by this management he had brought the whole Carthaginian army as near the town as he wished them to be. At a proper distance from the walls he had caused a trench to be cut, which the elephants could by no means pass; and he had given his dartmen orders, in case those animals advanced against them, to retire by slow degrees till they came to that trench, into which they were then to leap down, and from thence to gall the elephants with their darts as much as possibly they could. He ordered the town's people, at the same time, to furnish themselves with great quantities of darts, and post themselves at the foot of the walls. Cæcilius himself, with the main body of his forces, remained in readiness at a certain gate of the town, which was opposite to the left wing of the enemy. When the battle grew warm, the leaders of the elephants, being desirous to have the

Year of ROME DIII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred forty-nine.

202d Consulship.

chief honour of the victory, advanced in order upon the Romans, whom, retiring before them, they pursued to the very brink of the trench above-mentioned. There they were at a stand, and the elephants being terribly galled with the darts, both of those who leaped into the trench, and of those who were on the other side of it, began presently to grow unruly, and turning back furiously upon their own infantry, utterly disordered them. And now Cæcilius, who saw his advantage, sallied out with all his troops, fresh and in good order, and charging the enemy in flank, easily put them to the rout. The Carthaginians suffered a great slaughter; some of their elephants were killed, and the rest were all taken[3].

Polyb. B. 1. c. 41.

The news of Cæcilius's exploit caused great rejoicings at Rome, not so much on account of the taking the elephants, though that was a very terrible blow to the enemy, as because by the victory obtained against those formidable animals, the courage of the Roman soldiers was entirely restored, and they no longer feared to keep in the open country. It was resolved therefore diligently to pursue the design of sending the new consuls into Sicily with a naval force, and by vigorous efforts, both by land and sea, to put an end, if possible, to this destructive war.

[3] Cæcilius, according to Pliny, B. 8. c. 6. caused the elephants to be transported to Italy, where they were baited to death in the Circus at Rome.

CHAP. VIII.

Regulus is sent to Rome with some ambassadors from Carthage to negotiate a peace. His behaviour on this occasion, and the consequences of it.

Year of ROME DIII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred forty-nine.

202d Consulship.

Appian. in Punic. Bell. c. 3. Livy Epitom. B. 18. Eutrop. B. 2. Cic. de Offic. B. 3. Sil. Ital. B. 6. Val. Max. B. 1. c. 1. et B. 9. c. 2. A. Gell. B. 6. c. 4. Aurel. Vict. c. 40. Zon. B. 8.

THE defeat of Asdrubal[1] before Panormus threw the people of Carthage into discouragement; they began now to think seriously of peace; and believing that if Regulus, a man so much esteemed by his countrymen, engaged in the affair, an accommodation might be easily effected, they sent him to Rome with the ambassadors appointed for this negotiation; having first taken an oath of him to return to Carthage, in case there should neither be peace nor an exchange of prisoners. When, after his landing in Italy, he came to the gates of Rome, he would by no means enter the city, alledging, that he was no longer a Roman citizen, but a slave of a foreign power, and that he did not come to infringe the laws and customs of his native country, which forbad the senate to give audience to strangers within the walls; nor, when his wife Marcia with her children ran to meet him, did he show any signs of joy, but fixed his eyes upon the ground, as one ashamed of his servile condition, and unworthy of their caresses. So extraordinary a behaviour raised the admiration both of the Romans and Carthaginians, and all were impatiently curious to know how he would con-

[1] This general, according to Zonaras, was crucified for his misconduct.

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202d Consulship.

duct himself in the senate. The fathers being at length assembled without the walls, the ambassadors were admitted to an audience, and made their proposals; and then Regulus, whose turn it was to speak next, only added, "Conscript fathers, being a slave to the Carthaginians, I come on the part of my masters to treat with you concerning a peace and an exchange of prisoners." He said no more; and when he had uttered these few words, sought to withdraw and follow the ambassadors, who could not be present at the deliberations. In vain the consuls pressed him to stay, and give his opinion as a senator and consular person; he absolutely refused to take his place among the conscript fathers. However, he obeyed his African masters, who directed him to continue in the assembly. There he remained in a modest silence till the oldest senators had declared their opinions, and then he expressed himself to the following effect: "Romans, I am sensible, that the fatigues and expense of so difficult a war put your virtue to a severe trial; but what great enterprise can ever be achieved without a steady fortitude? I am an eye-witness of the distress of Carthage. It is nothing but the impossibility of maintaining the war that makes the Carthaginians solicit for a peace. You have lost one battle, (it was when I commanded) a misfortune which Metellus has repaired by a notable victory. Except two cities, Sicily is entirely yours: and your new fleet spreads a terror throughout the seas. You govern your allies in tranquillity,

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and they serve you with zeal. Carthage, drained of her wealth, can depend but little on the provinces of her dominion. With how much ease did I bring them into a revolt! Your armies are composed of soldiers of one and the same nation, united by mutual esteem and affection: the troops of Carthage are chiefly made up of strangers who have no tie to her but their pay, and whom the example of Xantippus will deter from engaging in her service. My opinion, therefore, is absolutely against a peace with our enemies; nor do I think it for your interest to make an exchange of prisoners. Among the Carthaginian captives you have thirteen considerable officers, young, and capable of commanding one day the armies of the enemy. As for me, I grow old, and my misfortunes have made me useless, add to this, that the number of Carthaginian captives of an inferior rank infinitely exceeds that of the Roman prisoners, so that the exchange must be to your disadvantage. And after all, what can you expect from soldiers who have been vanquished and reduced to slavery? Will they serve the republic with the courage of men whose reputation is entire and untouched? No, they will rather be like timorous deer that have escaped out of the toils of the hunter, ever ready to fly at the approach of danger."

This discourse filled the senators with admiration and compassion, and though they approved his advice concerning the proposals made by the Carthaginians, yet they knew not

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how to consent to the ruin of a man whose contempt of life made him the more worthy to be preserved. The pontifex maximus being consulted, declared, that his oath having been extorted from him, he might without perjury continue at Rome. They pressed him therefore not to return to Afric; but Regulus was offended with these solicitations. "What! have you then resolved to dishonour me? I am too well acquainted with the inconstancy of the people's favour, to trust them with the care of my reputation. At my first return they are full of good-will, touched with a fresh remembrance of my misfortunes: this fit of joy once over, and I am no longer thought of. Nay, I doubt not but my stay here would be reproached me by those who have seemed the most afflicted for my absence. How often shall I be called slave! May not Rome herself disdain to own me for one of her citizens? I am not ignorant, that death and the extremest tortures are preparing for me; but what are these to the shame of an infamous action, and the wounds of a guilty mind? Slave as I am to Carthage, I have still the spirit of a Roman; I have sworn to return, it is my duty to go; let the gods take care of the rest."

The senate, by the same decree which refused the Carthaginian ambassadors both peace and an exchange of prisoners, left Regulus at liberty to continue at Rome, or return to Carthage, as he should think fit. This was all that Marcia could obtain from the fathers by her tears and solicitations. Regulus, to free

himself from all further importunity of his friends, assured them that before his departure from Afric, the Carthaginians had given him a slow poison, and that he could not long survive the negociation. As soon as it was ended, he quitted his native country, to go and resume his chains at Carthage, with the same serenity as if he had been going to a country seat for his recreation.

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Those authors who have celebrated the heroism of Regulus on this occasion, though they all concur in reporting that he suffered at his return into Africa some cruel death from the revenge of the Carthaginians, yet are by no means agreed concerning the particular kind of torment he was made to undergo.

The most current opinion is, that they cut off or sewed back his eye-lids, and then bringing him out of a dark dungeon, exposed him to the sun at mid-day: that after this they shut him up in a kind of chest or press stuck full, on the inside, with iron spikes, and there left him to die in torment[2].

[2] Although this story of the cruel revenge which the Carthaginians took of Regulus after his return to Carthage be found in many of the best Roman authors, and although it be not expressly contradicted by any ancient writer; yet the reasons that are offered by some moderns against the truth of it may perhaps excuse our incredulity, should we look upon it as a mere fiction.

Palmerius, in a note upon Appian, offers two very weighty arguments for rejecting the account as fabulous.

1. The total silence of Polybius, concerning every thing that happened to Regulus after his defeat and captivity.

How can we account for that author's silence upon matters of so interesting a nature, in his history of the first

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The news of this barbarity no sooner reached Rome, but the senate, by way of retaliation,

Punic war; a history, which in many parts of it, is written rather with prolixity than brevity; I say, how can we account for this, but by supposing that Polybius for good reasons disbelieved the tradition which had been greedily embraced by the Romans concerning Regulus's death, and therefore disdained to record it; and that nevertheless he was unwilling to offend them by contradicting such a favourite story? It was hence, doubtless, that he avoided saying any thing of Regulus's voyage to Rome, his behaviour there, and his return to Carthage; because had he mentioned these without speaking of his death, (the supposed immediate consequence of them) an affected silence in this particular only, would have amounted to a direct condemnation of the prevailing opinion.

2. A fragment preserved by Valesius, of the 24th book of Diodorus Siculus.

This fragment (speaking of Regulus's wife and sons, into whose custody Boscar and Hamilcar, two captive Carthaginian generals, had been given) begins thus:

"But the mother of the young men [the Attilii] grievously laid to heart the death of her husband, and thinking [or imagining] that he had lost his life [δι' ἀμέλειαν] for want of good looking after, stirred up her sons to use the captives cruelly."

Then it relates, that the captives being thrust together into a close place, where they could hardly stir, and being kept from food, Bostar, after five days of extreme misery, expired: that Hamilcar, who yet held out, telling the wife of Regulus how careful he had been of her husband, with tears implored her compassion; but that she, far from being touched with the least sense of humanity, kept him five days after this in the same hole, shut up with the carcass of his companion, giving him only so much sustenance as would serve to prolong his life in misery: that by means of some servants in the house, a report of this horrible cruelty came to the ears of the tribunes of the people: that the magistrates having well assured themselves of the fact, summoned the Attilii, and threatened them with the severest punishments, if for the time to come they did not take al

gave up the chief of the Carthaginian captives to be treated at the discretion of Marcia, (the

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due care of the prisoners; nay, that they were very near pronouncing sentence of death upon the young men, for having brought a dishonour upon the Roman name: that the Attilii, to excuse themselves, laid the blame upon their mother: that they burned the body of Bostar, and sent the ashes to his relations, and for the future cherished Hamilcar, whom they had so barbarously treated.

Palmerius's conjecture from the whole is this:

That Bostar and Hamilcar being taken prisoners, [probably in that sea fight on the coast of Africa, where the Carthaginians lost 114 ships, because no mention is made of them in the war after that time,] the senate, to console the wife and sons of Regulus, put those captive generals into their hands, that they might have the price of his ransom in their possession.

That Regulus died of some distemper in captivity, whereat the wife being extremely vexed, as having lost the pleasing hope of recovering her husband by exchange, treated the captives cruelly; that the magistrates being angry at this conduct, she, to give a colour of justice to her cruelty, told this fable of her husband's perishing by hunger, want of sleep, and other torments, to her neighbours and gossips; that hence the story by degrees spread far, gathering strength as it went, and easily obtained credit through the hatred borne to the Carthaginians.

Palmerius might have added, that as some women have imaginations very creative, and especially where their passions are concerned, they easily believe the real existence of what mere imagination exhibits, the wife of Regulus might possibly have persuaded herself without any ground, that her husband had lost his life through the hardships of his imprisonment. And this is conformable to the fragment of Diodorus, which says, that she thinking that he had lost his life through neglect, stirred up her sons, &c.

3. A third argument against the story of Regulus's death by torture, may be drawn from the disagreement among those who report it, concerning the kind of torture he was made to undergo. Did he perish by being kept from sleep? was he starved to death? was he crucified? or did

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widow of Regulus,) who condemned them to the same kind of death her husband had suffered.

he end his life in a chest or barrel stuck with spikes? All these are reported by different authors. If it were certain that the Carthaginians put him to death by torture, is it not strange that the kind of torture should not be more certainly known? Florus doubts whether he died by the hardships of his imprisonment, or upon a cross.

4. Where there is any good reason to suspect the evidence to a fact, the improbability arising from the situation of things, makes strongly against the belief of such fact. Now it seems highly improbable that the Carthaginians should treat Regulus in the manner pretended, at the very time when two of their generals and many of their inferior officers, as well as multitudes of their common soldiers, were in the hands of the Romans.

5. We may observe, that the senate's giving up the Carthaginian prisoners to be treated at the discretion of Regulus's sons, upon the news of the cruel death he had suffered, a fact reported by A Gellius, and which, if true, would be the strongest argument in favour of the common opinion, is absolutely inconsistent with what Diodorus relates of the anger of the Roman magistrates at the conduct of the Attilii with regard to the captives.

Thus much concerning the credibility of the story of Regulus's sufferings. Before we take leave of him, let us see Sir Walter Raleigh's judgment of that part of his behaviour which is supposed to have drawn upon him the Carthaginian resentment, and brought him to so miserable an end. Sir Walter's words are these:

"The death of Attilius Regulus, the consul, was very memorable. He was sent from Carthage to Rome, about the exchange and ransom of prisoners on both sides, giving his faith to return if the business were not effected. When he came to Rome, and plainly saw that his country should lose by the bargain, so far was he from urging the senate unto compassion of his own misery, that he earnestly persuaded to have the prisoners in Afric left to their ill destinies. This done, he returned to Carthage, where for his pains taken he was rewarded with an horrible death. For

CHAP. IX.

FROM THE FOURTEENTH TO THE EIGHTEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

The Romans, flushed with their late victory at land, imagine, that with the assistance of their new fleet, they shall now be able to take Lilybæum, and thereby put an end to the war in Sicily. After considerable progress made in the siege, they are forced to turn it into a blockade: and, not long after, their whole navy is utterly destroyed. More fortunate by land, they take Eryx from the enemy. Amilcar Barcha is sent from Carthage to command the forces of that republic in Sicily.

Year of ROME DIII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred forty-nine.

202d Consulship.

WHEN the consuls Attilius and Manlius had got all things ready for their expedition into Sicily, they put to sea with a fleet of 200 sail, and arrived on the coast of Lilybæum, in the

Polyb. B. 1. c. 41.

this his constancy and faith all writers highly extol him. But the Carthaginians seem to have judged him an obstinate and malicious enemy, that neither in his prosperity would hearken to reason, nor yet in his calamity would have the natural care to preserve himself and others, by yielding to such an office of humanity as is common in all wars (not grounded upon deadly hatred) only in regard of some small advantage. Whatsoever the Carthaginians thought of him, sure it is, that his faithful observance of his word given, cannot be too much commended. But that grave speech which he made in the senate against the exchange of prisoners, appears, in all reason, to have proceeded from a vain-glorious forwardness, rather than from any necessity of state. For the exchange was made soon after his death; wherein the Romans had the worst bargain, by so much as Regulus himself was worth. As for the authority of all historians, that magnify him in this point, we are to consider that they lived under the Roman empire: Philinus, the Carthaginian, perhaps did censure it otherwise."

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202d Consulship.

neighbourhood of which place their land forces were already assembled.

It was the strongest, and except Drepanum (about 15 miles from it northward) the only city of importance, which the Carthaginians possessed in the island; and the Romans had therefore resolved to besiege it, as knowing that, could they make this conquest, it would be easy for them afterwards to transport the war into Africa.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 42. Diod. Sic. in Eclog. p. 879. Zon. B. 8.

Lilybæum stood almost at the extremity of the cape of the same name, and was surrounded by a strong wall, and a deep ditch filled with water from the sea. The Romans sat down before it, and having fortified themselves by an entrenchment which ran from sea to sea, made their first approaches against some towers of defence. These they soon beat to the ground; after which they filled up the town ditch, and by their battering engines, and by mining, so weakened the wall in many parts of it, that the besieged began to be extremely terrified; although the garrison, without reckoning the inhabitants, consisted of more than 10,000 men. Himilco, who commanded in the place, performed the part of a gallant and able officer. He repaired the breaches, made countermines, and was in a manner every where present, watching an opportunity to set fire to the enemy's wooden towers, and engines of battery; and, in this view, making frequent sallies by night and by day with a boldness little short of temerity; on which occasions the slaughter

was sometimes not less than what commonly happens in ranged battles in the field.

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In the meanwhile, though they were ignorant at Carthage of what passed at Lilybæum, yet concluding that the garrison must be sorely distressed, they despatched an officer named Hannibal, with 10,000 men on board a fleet of 50 galleys to their relief. Hannibal being arrived at the island of Ægusa, lying a little off of Lilybæum, waited there for a favourable and brisk gale, which no sooner presented, but crowding all his sails, he came to the entrance of the port, having ranged his soldiers in a fighting posture on the decks of the vessels.—The Romans, whose ships were stationed on each side of the mouth of the haven, partly through surprise, and partly through fear of being forced by the wind into the port with the enemy, made no motion to attack them, but contented themselves to look on and wonder at their hardy attempt. Thus Hannibal, without any opposition, made his way into the haven, where he landed his men, to the great joy of the besieged, who were yet more pleased with the consternation in which they beheld their enemies, than with the succour they themselves received.

c. 45.

Himilco observing the alacrity and good dispositions, both of the inhabitants, whose courage was raised by the reinforcement, and of the new comers, who had yet suffered nothing of the hardships incident to a town besieged, resolved now to make a general sally, and attempt what he had long meditated, the burn-

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ing of the enemy's towers and engines. The conflict on this occasion was extremely bloody, all the forces on both sides being engaged in it, and fighting with the utmost obstinacy and emulation. In conclusion, the Romans happily preserved their works; for at the very instant when they were beginning to despair of it, Himilco seeing great numbers of his men slain, and his purpose not effected, sounded a retreat, and put an end to the fight.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 46.

After this action, Hannibal sailing away in the night, went with his fleet to Drepanum, there to consult with Adherbal, who was his intimate friend, and who commanded in that place for the Carthaginians.

But now the Romans kept Lilybæum so straitly shut up, and watched the entrance of the haven so narrowly, that nobody durst make an attempt to come out of it. In the meanwhile they were very impatient at Carthage to have some account of the condition of the besieged; and at length a certain Rhodian, named Hannibal, a man of distinction, undertook to satisfy their desire. Having prepared a light galley expressly for this enterprise, he put to sea from Carthage, (or perhaps from Drepanum) and got under covert of one of those islands lying off of Lilybæum. Early the next morning, with a fair and fresh gale, passing in view of the enemy, who could not thrust from the shores on either side time enough to stop him, he got by ten o'clock into the port. The Romans doubted not but this bold adventurer would soon attempt to return. The consul,

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therefore, to keep a better guard, posted at the entrance of the port ten of his nimblest vessels, (on each side five) which with their oars, displayed like wings, kept themselves ready to fly upon the expected prey. The Rhodian nevertheless in broad day-light made his passage safely through these guards, and not only so, but when he was got out to sea, turned about, and lying upon his oars, with an insulting mockery, challenged any one of them to come and fight him. In this manner he passed and repassed several times, bringing orders and carrying intelligence, to the great encouragement of the besieged, and the amazement of the Romans at so successful a temerity. But the boldness of the Rhodian was founded on his perfect knowledge of the channel, and how to keep clear of the rocks and sand-banks on each side. His success so often repeated, encouraged others, who had the same skill, to follow his example: which the Romans finding to be of very ill consequence, they undertook to choak up entirely the mouth of the haven. For this purpose, they filled a great number of round ships (or ships of burden) with huge stones, and sunk them in the channel; but the force of the stream carried the most of these away. However, they grounded so many of them in the best of the entrance, as at last it made a manifest rising and heap, like a ragged island, in the passage. A certain Carthaginian galley coming out of the port in the night, and not suspecting any such impediment, ran herself aground upon it, and so fell into the enemy's

Polyb. B. 1. c. 47.

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hands. The Romans immediately manned her with chosen soldiers and their best rowers, and then placed her on the watch to catch the Rhodian. He had happily got into the port by night, and was returning in open day, when he found himself chased by a galley that gained upon him. He soon perceived what she was by her form and her swiftness, and as he was not able to run from her, he had no way left but to turn about and fight with her. This he resolutely did, but she being too well manned for him, he was presently taken; after which, no more attempts were made to go in or out of the port of Lilybæum.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 48.

The besieged however were not so disheartened by this disadvantage, as to remit any thing of their attention to a vigorous defence; and though they had lost all hope of destroying the works erected against their fortification, they continued indefatigable in repairing the breaches made in it. And now a favourable accident, when they least expected such good fortune, delivered them at once from the fear of those wooden towers which overtopped their walls, and of all the battering engines of the besiegers. So violent a tempest arose on a sudden, as made the galleries of the Romans totter, and threw some of their towers to the ground. This was thought by some Greek soldiers in the service of Carthage an opportunity which ought not to be neglected, to attempt once more the burning of the enemy's works of battery. Having communicated the project to their commanding officer (who both ap-

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proved it, and prepared every thing necessary for its execution) out they rushed, and set fire to the works in three places. The flames spread themselves with great swiftness, by reason of the violence of the wind and the dryness of the timber, the works having been long erected. The Romans, all in confusion and surprise, knew not which way to turn themselves; for they were blinded by the smoke and the sparks of fire which the wind drove in their faces, so that many of them were slain before they could approach the places where help was wanted. On the other hand, the wind favouring the Carthaginians, not only they could see clearly, and so take their aim, but whatever they threw either against the enemy, or against their batteries, was carried with the greater violence to the mark, while the darts of the Romans could take no effect. In a word, the fire became irresistible, and spreading every way, it consumed to ashes all the Roman works, and even melted the brazen heads of their battering rams.

The besiegers by this blow were totally discouraged from the thoughts of renewing their attacks. They turned therefore the siege into a blockade, encompassing the place with a rampart and a ditch, and patiently hoping to obtain by some happy turn of fortune, or by starving the enemy, what they now despaired of carrying by assault.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 49.

But when the news came to Rome that great numbers both of the sea and land forces had been lost in fighting to defend the works, and

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in the other service of the siege, the people were only the more animated by it to pursue the enterprise with vigour, insomuch that 10,000 of them voluntarily offered themselves to go and serve before Lilybæum. Upon the arrival of these troops at the camp, Claudius Pulcher, who was then in the consulate, (with L. Junius Pullus) and had the command of the forces in Sicily, having called his officers together, proposed to them instantly to embark and sail with all the fleet to Depranum. To engage their approbation of this project, he represented to them that Adherbal, the governor of that place, had not a sufficient strength to resist them; that he knew nothing of the reinforcement they had received, and would never imagine they could be masters of a naval army, after the losses they had sustained in the siege. The design being generally approved, the seamen, both old and new comers, were ordered forthwith to embark, together with the bravest soldiers of the legions, who readily offered themselves for this expedition, not doubting but they should enrich themselves with the plunder of Drepanum.

For this place then the fleet, consisting of 124 galleys, set sail about midnight; and at break of day the headmost of the vessels were descried from the town. Adherbal was at first struck with the unexpected appearance of the enemy, but soon recovering himself, he determined to run any hazard rather than endure a siege, with which he plainly saw that he was threatened. Instantly he called

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together upon the sea shore all his seamen and soldiers, both those that were on board his galleys and those that were in the town, and set before them in few words how easily they might be victors in a naval battle, if they would but resolve to behave themselves with courage; and on the other hand, what dreadful calamities (the consequences of a siege) they must unavoidably undergo, if on the present occasion they let themselves be intimidated by the apprehension of danger. The army unanimously declared their readiness to follow him whithersoever he should please to conduct them. Hereupon he instantly ordered them all on board, and embarking himself, directed them to keep their eyes on his galley, (which should lead the van) and to do as she did. Then putting to sea he brought his fleet out of the port, and hid them behind some rocks which lay on the side of the haven opposite to that by which the Romans were going to enter.

The headmost of the Roman vessels were already entered into the port, other galleys were entering, and others were not far off, when Adherbal, quitting his concealment, appeared on a sudden with his fleet out at sea, and in a posture to give battle. At this sight Claudius, extremely surprised and disappointed, made a sign to his foremost galleys to tack and stand back again; but when those that had entered the port, or were in the haven's mouth, began to hasten back, they encountered with others that were yet standing in, so that falling foul of one another, many of the ships received

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great damage, and were in danger of perishing. At length in such manner as they could, they drew out; and as fast as they got clear and obtained room, put themselves in order of battle along the shore, with their prows pointing towards the enemy. Claudius, who had been in the rear of all his fleet, now placed himself in the left of his line. He had it once in his power (as some report) to sheer off, but was obstinately bent to try an engagement; insomuch that when the sacred chickens were consulted, and refused their meat, he threw them cage and all into the sea; "If they won't eat," said he, "let them drink," not reflecting that such a contempt of religion might discourage those who were witnesses of it.

Cic. B. 2. de Nat. Deor. Val. Max. B. 1. c. 4. Polyb. B. 1. c. 50.

In the meanwhile, Adherbal, having with five great vessels passed the left wing of the Romans, turned the prow of his own galley upon the enemy, making a signal for the rest of his fleet, which followed on the same line, to do the like. And now the whole Carthaginian fleet being drawn up in front, advanced against the Romans, who, as was before said, were drawn up along the shore, a situation than which none could be more dangerous. As soon as the two fleets were near each other, the flags of defiance were hoisted by the two admirals, and the battle began. At first the conflict was equal on both sides, each fleet having on board the hardiest men they could pick out of their land forces. But victory by degrees began to declare for the Carthaginians, who indeed had many advantages above the Romans,

c. 51.

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by the lightness of their vessels, the expertness of their rowers, and especially by the wise precaution they had taken to have sea room, wherein to work their vessels as occasion required; for at any time when they were pressed by the enemy, they could at pleasure retire, spread themselves, or draw close together, in which movements the lightness of their galleys greatly availed. Moreover, when any of the Roman galleys (heavily built and unskilfully managed) chased any of theirs, and thereby separated themselves from their own fleet, those who were chased could tack upon the pursuers, and intercept them, or, rowing round them, come upon their flank with the prows, and sink them. All these benefits were wanting to the Romans; but their greatest evil was their situation; because when any of their vessels were hard pressed, they could by no means retire for the shore; they must either run aground upon the flats, or bulge against the rocks.

The consul at length observing the distress of his fleet, that some were split upon the rocks and others stranded, stood away to the left, and with only thirty vessels that were the nearest to him, escaped out of the battle. The rest, to the number of ninety-three, fell into the enemy's hands, together with all the men, except a few soldiers who had got ashore, after their vessels were run aground or broken to pieces. Eight thousand of the Romans are said to have been slain, and 20,000 taken prisoners. Orosius, B. 4. c. 10.

This was a glorious action for Adherbal, to Polyb. B. 1. c. 52.

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whom the Carthaginians did very great honour, ascribing the success to his sole virtue and bravery; while, on the other hand, Claudius was recalled to Rome, where he was reproached with his shameful defeat, and with the loss his country had sustained, as entirely owing to his folly and temerity. Nevertheless, when he was ordered to name a dictator, he, to insult the senate, nominated to that supreme dignity one Claudius Glycia, a mean fellow, who had been his viator or tipstaff: but this mock dictator[1] did not hold the place; M. Attilius Calatinus was substituted in his room. After which the consul (now deposed) was brought to a formal trial for his misconduct, and was loaded with a rigorous sentence.

Suet. Life of Tib. Fast. Cap.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 52.

As for the other consul, Junius Pullus, he had been despatched over to Sicily, with order to supply the camp before Lilybæum with provisions and all necessary stores; for the safe convoy of which, he had a squadron of 60 galleys. Being arrived at Messina, he there augmented his fleet with what ships had been sent thither from Lilybæum, and from other places in the island, and then set sail for Syracuse; his whole fleet now consisting of 120 ships of war, and 800 storeships. From Syracuse he despatched his quæstors with one half of his vessels of burden, and some of his galleys, that they might without delay furnish the camp with necessaries, while he himself staid at this port,

[1] According to Liv. Epit. he was suffered afterwards to wear the prætexta at the public shows.

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203d Consulship. Polyb. B. 1. c. 53.

waiting the arrival of that part of his fleet which had not been able to keep him company, and was not yet come up, as also to receive the corn which the islanders in the alliance of Rome had provided for him.

About this time, Adherbal, studious to make the best advantage of his victory, and having sent away to Carthage the ships and the prisoners taken in the battle, delivered 30 of his galleys to Carthalo, who had already under his own command 70, with which he was lately arrived, and sent him to try what mischief might be done to the Roman fleet in the harbour of Lilybæum. Carthalo suddenly entered the mouth of the haven, and finding the Romans more attentive to the keeping in of the besieged than to the defence of their fleet, without difficulty seized and towed away some of the galleys, and set fire to others. The Roman camp took the alarm, and the soldiers hastened to the rescue: but Himilco, governor of the town, sallying out at the same time, and putting the Romans in great distress, gave Carthalo leisure to go through with his enterprise. After this exploit, the Carthaginian ran all along the south coast of Sicily, with a view to obstruct, what in him lay, the succours that were coming to the Roman army. And receiving advice by his scouts, that a great fleet of all sorts of vessels was approaching, and was not far off, he advanced with much joy to encounter them; for both he and his men were full of courage by reason of their late victories. The fleet which had been descried was that

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under the conduct of the Roman quæstors; who, when they got notice that the Carthaginians were at hand, not conceiving themselves of sufficient strength to hazard an engagement, presently made for the coast, and drew up their vessels under covert of a poor town belonging to their party. Here was indeed no safe harbour, yet they found some sort of shelter in certain coves and small retreats among the rocks; and the town having furnished them with engines for casting stones and shooting arrows, they waited here, in a posture of defence, the attack of the enemy. But Carthalo knowing that they could not long ride under those rocks, but would be forced by any great change of wind either to put out into the deep or to abandon their ships in order to save the men, he, after he had taken some few of their vessels, would not pursue the assault any further, but retired into the mouth of a neighbouring river, and there lay waiting for an opportunity to seize the rest, without hazard to himself.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 54.

In the meanwhile the consul Junius having despatched those affairs which had detained him at Syracuse, departed thence, and doubling the cape of Pachynus, shaped his course for Lilybæum, totally ignorant of what had happened to his quæstors. The Carthaginians perceived his approach, and, quitting their station, sailed away to attack him before he could join the other part of his fleet. Junius was yet a great way off when he first descried the enemy; yet finding himself too near to fly, and too weak to fight, he also, like his questors, ran in close

on a part of the coast that was quite harbourless and full of rocks, imagining no danger so great as that of the enemy. Carthalo did not care to attack him in a place where it was difficult to work a ship with safety, he betook himself therefore to a station between the two fleets, and there watched to see which of them would first stir, resolving to assault that which should first dare to put out to sea. Thus all the three fleets were on the south coast of Sicily, between the cape of Pachynus and Lilybæum, a tract exceedingly dangerous when the wind stormed at south. The Carthaginians, who knew the times of tempest and their signs, and who now perhaps observed some swelling billow, or some other such-like indication of an approaching storm, immediately weighed anchor, and made all haste to double the cape of Pachynus, thereby to cover themselves from the rage they feared. This, though with great difficulty, they effected, and secured their ships.

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203d Consulship.

But the Romans, who knew better how to fight than how to navigate, remaining exposed on that rocky coast, were so terribly assaulted by a boisterous south wind, that not a single ship of either fleet escaped being dashed to pieces.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 55.

In this manner was Rome once more deprived of all her naval force; and, thus deprived, she renounced once more the empire of the seas.

Notwithstanding all these disasters, the Romans were still superior to their enemies by land, and though driven to hard shifts for pro-

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203d Consulship.

visions, they continued the blockade of Lilybæum, firmly fixed to abide the utmost extremity rather than abandon their enterprise.—As for the consul Junius, who had not lost his men when his ships were destroyed, he repaired with all expedition to the camp, full of anxious thoughts how to retrieve his honour by some remarkable service. Between Panormus and Drepanum, on the side of a mountain, the highest in all Sicily except Ætna, stood the city of Eryx; and on the top of the mountain was the temple of Venus Erycina[2], the fairest and richest temple in the whole island. Junius formed a design upon these, and being assisted by the treason of some of those who had been appointed to defend them, got possession of them by surprise. The city was difficult of access, the only way to it being steep and narrow; and the consul, the better to secure his conquest, built a fort at the entrance of the passage to it, where he placed a garrison of 800 men. He also posted another body of men on the top of the mountain, not doubting but by these precautions he should keep quiet possession both of the city and of the whole mountain.

Zon. B. 8.

Zonaras reports, that Junius, after this, was taken prisoner by Carthalo; but Cicero and

[2] It does not appear at what time the Carthaginians made themselves masters of these places; it was probably after the defeat of Claudius Pulcher, for, according to Polybius, they had nothing in the island but Drepanum and Lilybæum at the time when the latter was first besieged by the Romans.

Val. Maximus tell us that he killed himself to avoid an ignominious sentence at Rome, for his losing the fleet.

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Upon the death or disgrace of the two consuls, the dictator Calatinus passed into Sicily to command the army, the first instance of a Roman dictator appearing out of Italy. He performed no exploit.

Year of ROME DV. Bef. J. C. Two hundred forty-seven. 204th Consulship.

In the following year[3] nothing very memorable was done by either party. Zonaras relates, that Carthalo, to draw one of the consuls out of the island, made a descent on the Italian coast, but without success: for hearing that the prætor of Rome at the head of an army was advancing against him, he presently reimbarked and returned to Sicily. Here his troops, (whom he had not been able to satisfy with the plunder of the Roman territories) began to murmur for want of their pay. To put a stop to the mutiny, he punished the most clamorous with rigour; but this exasperating even those who were more peaceably inclined, a general sedition would probably have ensued, to the ruin of the Carthaginian cause, if he had not been seasonably recalled, and a captain of much greater credit and abilities appointed to succeed him. This was Amilcar Barcha, the father of the famous Hannibal.

[3] C. Aurelius Cotta. P. Servilius Geminus, } Consuls.

CHAP. X.

FROM THE EIGHTEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR TO THE END OF IT, IN THE TWENTY-THIRD OR TWENTY-FOURTH YEAR AFTER ITS COMMENCEMENT.

Amilcar Barcha, by his masterly conduct, hinders the Romans, during five years, from making any progress in the conquest of Sicily. They at length provide themselves once more with a naval force as the only means to accomplish their enterprise; and this new fleet, under the conduct of Lutatius Catulus, obtaining a complete victory over the fleet of Carthage, (commanded by Hanno) the Carthaginians are constrained to yield to their enemies the whole island, by a treaty of peace.

Year of ROME DVI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred forty-six. 205th Consulship. Pliny, B. 1. c. 56.

IT was in the eighteenth year of the war, that Amilcar Barcha became commander in chief of the Carthaginian forces by sea and land.—Having quieted the discontents of the army, he began his expeditions by sailing with the fleet to the coast of Italy; where, making a descent, he pillaged and laid waste the territories of the Locrians and Bruttians. After this he landed his troops in Sicily; and, because the Carthaginians were not masters there of any walled towns, so situated as he could from thence infest the Romans, he took possession of a commodious piece of ground near the sea coast, between Panormus and Eryx. It was a mountain environed on all sides with rocks and precipices, and on the top of it was a plain of at least twelve miles in compass, the ground yielding both good pasture and good corn. To this mountain the avenues were only three, one from the sea and two from the land; and being

Year of ROME DVI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred forty-six.

205th Consulship.

by nature straight and difficult, it required but little fortification to secure them.

Here then the brave Amilcar encamped his forces[1] to confront as well those of the enemy who were in Panormus, as those who were posted about Eryx, putting himself between the two armies with admirable resolution. And though he was thus in the midst of his enemies, and had no ally from whom he could hope for succour, he nevertheless gave the Romans great and frequent alarms, obliging them to a constant exercise of all their courage, vigilance, and severest discipline. For, as the place he was in had the command of a port[2], he made use of the opportunity with which this furnished him to scour all the coast of Italy with his fleet, as far as to the territory of Cuma: and when afterwards in Sicily the Romans had brought their camp within five furlongs of his army, on the side towards Panormus, he gave them battle so often, and had such variety of encounters with them, that (as

[1] Chevr. Folard understands the words of Polybius to mean that Amilcar posted himself in the avenue from the sea to the mountain.

[2] Frontinus (in lib. 3. Strat.) reports, that Amilcar, in order to supply Lilybæum with provisions, made use of a stratagem to draw the Roman fleet out of the harbour. But, according to Polybius, the Romans had no fleet at this time, or if any, none that was able to contend with Amilcar, and oblige him to have recourse to stratagem.

Polybius tells us that the Romans abstained from all naval preparations for five years. And, therefore, when Florus speaks of a battle gained at sea by the Romans during this time, it seems to be a tale without foundation.

Year of ROME DVI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred forty-six.

205th Consulship.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 57.

Polybius tells us) it would be scarce possible to relate all the particular actions. We must judge, says he, of this war, as we do of a combat between two strong and vigorous gladiators, who in close conflict have been incessantly giving and receiving wounds. Neither the spectators nor the combatants themselves would be able to recount every feint and every stroke, and to say how and why they were made: but we judge of the skill, strength, and resolution of the parties, by their perseverance in maintaining the fight, and by the event. So with regard to the war in question, a minute detail of the various stratagems, surprises, advances, attacks, which were daily practised on both sides, would be very difficult to an historian, and not very useful to the reader. A general relation of what was performed, with the success of the whole, will suffice to make us know the worth and abilities of the commanders.

In a word, then, no stratagem which could be learned from history, no new one which present circumstances and opportunity could suggest, none that required even the utmost hardiness and impetuosity to execute it, was neglected; and yet all this while nothing decisive was done. The strength on both sides being equal, the camps impregnable, and the space between them very small, it hence came to pass that there were every day skirmishes and encounters between parties, but a general action never. For in all the engagements, so soon as one party found themselves hard pressed by the other, the weaker instantly threw them-

selves behind their entrenchments, where they knew they had a secure shelter; and from whence they presently returned to the charge.

Year of ROME DIX. Bef. J. C. Two hundred forty-three.

208th Consulship.

In this manner was the war carried on for almost three years[3]; till at length (as our author speaks) fortune, who presided as an impartial umpire at this contention, transported the combatants to another theatre, where, shutting them up in yet closer lists, they were engaged in a more perilous conflict.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 58.

The Romans (as has been before observed) had placed garrisons on the top and at the bottom of Mount Eryx. Amilcar nevertheless

Y. of R. 506.	L. Cæcilius Metellus, second time. N. Fabius Buteo.
Y. of R. 507.	M. Otacilius Crassus, second time. M. Fabius Licinus.
Y. of R. 508.	N. Fabius Buteo. C. Atilius Balbus.

In this year 507 there happened at Rome* an accident, which serves to show how much it behoved even persons of the highest rank to avoid all petulancy of speech, and not by any indecent words to violate the dignity of Roman discipline. Claudia, the daughter of the famous Claudius the Blind, and sister to that Claudius Pulcher who lost the battle of Drepanum, wherein many thousand Romans perished, returning in her chariot from the public show, happened to be stopped in her way by the multitude that thronged the street. The lady, proud and impatient, cried out, "Gods, how this city is over-crowded! I wish my brother Claudius were alive again, and had the command of another fleet!" These words, even from a woman, were thought unpardonable. She was brought into judgment for them by the ædiles, before the tribes, and was there fined 25,000 asses of brass. [80*l.* 14*s.* 7*d.* Arbuthnot.]

* A Gell. B. 10. c. 6. Val. Max. B. 8. c. 1. Sueton. Life Tib. Liv. Epit. B. 19.

Year of ROME DIX. Bef. J. C. Two hundred forty-three.

208th Consulship.

found a way, lying towards the sea, by which he conveyed his men (before the enemy had the least notice of it) into the city of Eryx, that was about the middle of the ascent. By this means the Romans, who held the top of the mountain, were in a manner besieged; and it is wonderful with what resolution and constancy they sustained all the hardships to which their situation exposed them: but it is yet more wonderful, that the Carthaginians should be able to defend themselves, when hard pressed by the enemy both from above and from below, and when deprived of all means of subsistence, except by one avenue from the sea. And here again on this new stage of action were exerted, on both sides, all the art and vigour that can possibly be conceived, in an infinite variety of stratagems and assaults. Nor was an end put to this fierce struggle (as the historian Fabius falsely reported) by the failure of strength in the contending parties, exhausted by the sufferings they underwent; for they sustained famine, fatigue, and all the hardships incident to sieges, with so unwearied a fortitude, that they scarcely seemed to feel them: but a conclusion was given to the war after a different manner, and before either party in Sicily had gained any superiority over the other. Polybius compares the rival powers to two valiant birds, that, weakened by a long combat, and unable any more to make use of their wings in the fight, yet support themselves by their sole courage, and with joint consent coming close together, peck and maul

each other with their bills, thus mutually striving by these last efforts to obtain the victory.

Year of ROME DXI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred forty-one.

210th Consulship.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 59. Liv. Epit. B. 19.

Two[4] whole years were wasted by the Romans, in fruitless attempts to dislodge the invincible Amilcar from Eryx. And now the senate of Rome, who had hoped every thing from the bravery of their land forces, became perfectly convinced that they should never achieve the conquest of Sicily without the help of a naval strength. If, by means of a fleet, they could once get the mastery of the sea, it would then be impossible for the Carthaginian general to hold out much longer, because his supplies of provision would be totally obstructed. But where to find money at this time for a naval armament of sufficient strength was a difficulty that seemed not easy to be surmounted; for the expense would be great, and the public treasury was exhausted. On this pressing occasion the richest of the citizens showed a laudable zeal for their country's service. They built each of them a quinqueremis at his own cost; and this example had so good an effect, that those who were not able singly to do the like, yet concurring, two or three of them fitted out a galley at their joint expense. In short, a fleet of 200 quinqueremes[5] was thus put to sea by private citi-

4 Y. of R. 509. { A. Manlius Torquatus. C. Sempronius Blæsus, second time.

Y. of R. 510. { C. Fundanius. C. Sulpicius.

5 Three hundred, according to Eutropius, B. 2. c. 27.

Year of ROME DXI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred forty-one.

210th Consulship.

zens, who required no other condition, but to be reimbursed when the state of the public affairs would allow of it. And this armament was vastly better than any of the former, inasmuch as all the new galleys were built upon the model of that light vessel which had been taken from Hannibal the Rhodian.

The consuls chosen for the new year were C. Lutatius Catulus and A. Posthumius. The latter being at the same time high priest of Mars, the pontifex maximus declared it unlawful for him to abandon his priestly functions; nay, he absolutely forbad it, accompanying his prohibition with threats, and Posthumius was obliged to submit. But this religious scruple occasioned the creation of a new magistracy in the republic. The senate and people, not thinking it advisable to trust the command of their army to one general alone, nor yet to expose themselves to the inconveniences which might arise from the too long absence of the prætor of Rome, to whom it naturally fell to supply the place of Posthumius in the field, they created a second prætor for that purpose. This officer they styled prætor peregrinus; and he was not only to assist the general abroad, but to judge or appoint judges in all civil causes between Roman citizens and strangers. The former prætor took the title of prætor urbanus; and it was now regulated, that his residence should be at Rome, and his jurisdiction confined to the cognizance of causes between Roman citizens only. It was also decreed that the persons who were to

fill these offices should be chosen annually in the *comitia* by centuries; but their different provinces be determined by lot.

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210th Consulship.

Valerius Falto, the first prætor peregrinus, embarked with the consul Lutatius, on board the new fleet for Sicily. They began the campaign with the siege of Drepanum, and they very soon made a breach in the wall; nevertheless they did not carry the place; for as the consul at the head of his men was mounting to the assault, he received a dangerous wound in his thigh; whereupon the soldiers quitted the enterprise, to take care of their general, whom they carried back to the camp. After this the siege was discontinued; for Lutatius being persuaded that the Carthaginians would soon appear with a fleet upon the coast, and that a victory over them at sea would contribute much more than any other exploit towards the entire conquest of Sicily, turned all his thoughts to discipline his men, and prepare them for a naval engagement.

Oros. B. 4. c. 10.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 59.

The Carthaginians, greatly surprised at the news of a Roman navy at sea, had despatched away a fleet[6], with all expedition, under the conduct of an eminent commander, named Hanno; of whose character, because of the share he will have in several important events of this history, it may not be improper to give some features: an able pen, on the present occasion, has thus described him:

c. 60.

"—A man wise in picture, exceedingly for-

Sir W. R.

[6] Of 400 sail, according to Eutropius.

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210th Consulship.

mal, and skilful in the art of seeming reverend. How his reputation was first bred, I do not find, but it was upheld by a factious contradiction of things undertaken by men more worthy than himself. This quality procured to him (as it has done to many others) not only approbation among the ancient sort, whose cold temper is averse from new enterprises, but an opinion of great foresight, opinion confirmed by every loss received. More particularly he was gracious among the people, for that he was one of the most grievous oppressors of their subject provinces; whereby he procured unto the Carthaginians much wealth, but therewithal such hatred, as turned it all to their great loss. He had before this been employed against the Numidians, and wild Africans, who, in making war, were more like rovers than soldiers. Of those fugitive nations he learned to neglect more manly enemies to his own great dishonour, and to the great hurt of Carthage; which lost not more by his bad conduct than by his malicious counsel, when having showed himself an unworthy captain, he betook himself to the long robe. Yet is he much commended in Roman histories as a temperate man, and one that studied how to preserve the league between Rome and Carthage: in which regard how well he deserved of his own country, it will appear hereafter; how beneficial he was to Rome, it will appear hereafter, and in his present voyage wherein he reduced the Carthaginians to a miserable

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210th Consulship.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 60.

necessity of accepting, upon hard conditions, that PEACE which he thenceforth commended[7]."

Hanno had well furnished his navy with all necessary provisions for the soldiers at Eryx, (for dexterity in making such preparations was the best of his qualities) but he had neglected to man his galleys with able mariners, trained to the practice of sea-fights; he had taken the first that presented themselves; and his soldiers were raw men that knew nothing of service. He had been careless in these matters, through a foolish contempt of his enemies; not remembering that it was the resistless force of tempests, rather than any other strength of opposition, which had made them

[7] It is proper to inform the reader, that though Sir W. R. is here followed in supposing that the Hanno who now commanded the Carthaginian fleet was the same with that Hanno who afterwards headed the faction against Amilcar Barcha and his son Hannibal, there is some reason to doubt it. Polybius, indeed, says nothing from which we can infer that they were different persons; and the importance of the present expedition makes it probable, that the Carthaginians would not commit the charge of it but to a man in the highest reputation and esteem, as he, whom Sir W. R. characterises, was at this time. Yet by some words which Livy (as we shall see hereafter) puts into the mouth of that Hanno, who signalized himself by his opposition to Hannibal's measures, one would think that the speaker could not be the person who lost the battle at sea against Lutatius. For the historian makes the enemy of Hannibal, on two several occasions, remind the Carthaginians of that shameful and fatal overthrow, as an event which they ought never to forget.

And if we may believe Zonaras, the Hanno who suffered the defeat at the Ægates, was crucified at his return home for his misconduct.

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210th Consulship.

forsake the seas. Yet in one thing he judged right, or at least had been well instructed; for his intention was first of all to sail to Eryx, and there to discharge his ships of their loading, and when he had thus lightened them, to take on board the choice of the land forces together with Amilcar himself; and then to offer the enemy battle. This was an excellent course if it could have been performed. But the consul Lutatius, who, on the first notice of Hanno's being at sea, had sailed from Drepanum to the island of Ægusa, (one of the Ægates[8]) used all possible diligence to prevent the execution of the enemy's design; not that he was informed of their design, but that he knew it was, for them, the best which they could have, and because he feared no danger so greatly as an encounter with Amilcar. For these reasons, though he was not yet cured of his wound, and though the weather was very rough, and the seas went high, when the next morning he descried the Carthaginian fleet, coming with a flown sheet from the island of Hiera[9], (where they had put in) he chose rather to fight with the enemy, who had the wind of him, than upon unlikely hope of better opportunity, to suffer their convoy to pass to Eryx.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 91.

All that Hanno should have done, Lutatius had performed. He had carefully exercised his men in rowing; he had lightened his galleys of all unnecessary burdens, and he had

[8] Islands lying off Lilybæum and Drepanum.

[9] Another of the Ægates.

taken on board the best men of his land forces. The Carthaginians therefore, at the very first encounter, were utterly broken and defeated: fifty of their galleys were sunk and seventy taken, the rest by a sudden change of wind escaping to the island of Hiera. The consul, after the battle, stood away with the fleet for Lilybæum, there to dispose of his prizes and prisoners; of which latter the number amounted to near ten thousand.

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210th Consulship.

When at Carthage, they received the news of Hanno's defeat, so contrary to all expectation, they were greatly at a loss what measures to take. If, to have their revenge, nothing had been necessary but courage and emulation, they were never better provided than at this juncture, to prosecute the war. But what could they do? Amilcar, on whose valour and judgment the honour and safety of the commonwealth depended, was surrounded by his enemies, and could not be relieved. For, as the Romans were now masters of the sea, it was not possible for the Carthaginians to send either provisions or reinforcements to their armies in Sicily. In this extremity they could fix upon nothing better than to send by an express full powers to the general himself, to take what course he should think most proper; and this they did, leaving all conclusions to his election and sole counsel.

Amilcar, who had done every thing that could be expected from the most intrepid courage, and the most consummate wisdom, and whom no adversity, accompanied with the

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210th Consulship.

least hope or possibility of recovery, had ever vanquished, but who yet knew when to yield as well as when to resist, began now to turn his thoughts wholly to the preservation of the army under his conduct; for he plainly saw that Sicily was lost. He despatched therefore an ambassador to the consul, with an overture of peace. Lutatius having well considered it, gathered so many arguments from the present poverty of the Roman state, exhausted beyond expectation by the war, that he readily listened to the proposal. At first he demanded, that Amilcar and his soldiers should deliver up their arms; but this the Carthaginian absolutely refused, declaring that he would rather perish than undergo so great an infamy; and the consul acquiesced. In short, a treaty was concluded on terms to this effect:

Corn. Nep. in Amilc. c. 1.

"There shall be peace between Rome and Carthage (provided the Roman people approve of it) on the following conditions:

Polyb. B. I. c. 62.

"The Carthaginians shall evacuate all Sicily.

"They shall deliver up all the Roman prisoners ransom free.

"They shall pay to the Romans, within the space of twenty years next following, 2200 talents of silver[10], whereof one thousand shall be paid immediately.

"They shall not make war upon king Hiero, nor upon any of the allies of Rome; nor shall the Romans molest any of the allies of Carthage.

"Neither of the contracting powers shall

[10] 437,250*l.* Arbuthnot.

raise any fortress, or levy any soldiers in the dominions of the other.

"Nor shall either of them enter into confederacy with the allies of the other."

These articles being brought to Rome, and not being entirely approved there, ten commissioners were sent into Sicily to terminate the affair. These added 1000 talents to the former sum, and shortened the time for payment to ten years; and they also required, that the Carthaginians should not only leave Sicily, but withdraw their troops from all the islands between Sicily and Italy. Amilcar not thinking it advisable to break off the negotiation for the sake of these new demands, the treaty was ratified in form: but (probably) not in the consulate of Caius Lutatius, but of his successors Q. Lutatius and A. Manlius, in the year of Rome 512.

Such was the end of the first Punic war, after it had lasted 23 or 24 years[11]: a war (says Polybius) the longest, the least interrupted, and the greatest (that is, the most abounding with

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210th Consulship.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 63.

Livy, B. 30. c. 44.

Year of ROME DXII.

[11] Polybius makes this war to have lasted 24 years, and so do others: but Eutropius puts a conclusion to it in the 23d year; which reckoning agrees with the Capitoline Marbles, since, according to them, Appius Claudius Caudex, who began the war, was consul in the year 489, and C. Lutatius Catulus, who made the treaty with Amilcar, was consul in 511.

Livy, towards the close of his 30th book, says, the first Punic war ended when Q. Lutatius and A. Manlius were consuls. These were the successors of C. Lutatius; and perhaps their consulate was begun when the ten commissioners came into Sicily and the peace was ratified.

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211th Consulship.

great actions and events) of any to be met with in history. The Romans, in the course of it, lost 700 ships of war, and the Carthaginians about 500[12]; the greatness of which losses sufficiently prove the greatness of the two states, and of the war itself, wherein (according to the same author) the Romans in general showed themselves the braver nation, and Amilcar the ablest captain.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 64.

And now the great affair at Rome was to determine the fate of Sicily, the manner in which it should be governed, and the emoluments which the republic should draw from so fine a conquest.

Solinus.

The whole island, excepting the little kingdom of Syracuse, was declared a Roman province, that is to say, a province that should be ruled by Roman laws and Roman magistrates. A prætor was to be annually sent thither to be its governor; and a quæstor to take charge of the revenues. These revenues were either fixed or casual. The fixed were called tributes, and were a certain sum, which the province was obliged every year to pay into the public treasury. The casual were the tenths of the

[12] How came it to pass, that in Polybius's time, when the Romans were arrived at almost universal empire, they could not fit out such fleets, and make such naval preparations, as in the time of the first Punic war? This question is on the present occasion started by Polybius himself; who adds that a plain and satisfactory reason may be assigned for the change, but defers giving it, till he shall come to speak of the form of the Roman commonwealth. His discourse on this latter subject not being transmitted to us, we are at a loss to know how the difficulty may be resolved.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 4.

product of the lands, and the duties upon merchandise exported and imported. And these tenths and customs were generally farmed by the publicans[13].

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Caius Lutatius, the consul, and Q. Valerius, the prætor, had both of them the honour of the triumph at their return to Rome. The consul indeed disputed the pretensions of the latter to it, because Valerius had not acted in a post of equal authority with him; and upon a reference to the arbitration of Atilius Calatinus, the point was decided against the prætor; nevertheless, as his conduct in the war had been uncommonly meritorious, he obtained his suit by a decree of the people.

Val. Max. B. 2. c. 8.

But the public joy at Rome for the late important conquest was greatly damped by two misfortunes, which about this time followed close upon one another. The Tiber on a sudden overflowed with such violence, as to over-

[13] Among the advantages which Rome gained from her wars in Sicily, may be reckoned an improvement of her taste for letters, and juster notions of poesy. Sicily abounded with excellent poets. In the first year after her peaceable possession of this island, when C. Claudius and M. Sempronius were consuls, appeared L. Livius Andronicus, the reformer of the Latin theatre. He introduced upon the stage connected fables, after the Greek manner, instead of the buffooneries and rambling discourses with which the people were before entertained.

About this time was born at Rudes, a city of Calabria, Ennius, the famous poet and historian. He was the inventor of hexameter verses among the Latines; but his Life of Scipio Africanus, which was his masterpiece, he wrote in choraics. He is thought to have eclipsed the poet Nævius, his contemporary.

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211th Consulship.

turn a great number of houses in the lower grounds; where the water continuing a considerable time, it much damaged also the foundations of many others.

After this there happened a greater calamity by fire, which breaking out in the night, destroyed not only numberless houses, but an incredible multitude of people. It consumed all the buildings within the circumference of the Forum. Cæcilius Metellus, the pontifex maximus, signalized his pious zeal on this occasion: for when the fire had seized the temple of Vesta, and when the virgins in a fright had all deserted it, he ventured his life to save the palladium: making his way through the flames, he brought it safely out of the sanctuary. One of his arms was much hurt in the attempt, and he entirely lost his sight. To reward so heroic an action of piety, it was decreed by the people, that he should have the privilege of being carried to the senate-house in a charriot, as often as he went thither; a distinction which had never been granted to any man before.

Val. Max. B. 1. c. 4.

It is probable that the Roman tribes (by the addition of those called Velina and Quirina) were about this time augmented to 35, which number was never after increased.

Livy, Epit. B. 19.

CHAP. XI.

The Falisci in Hetruria rebel against the Romans, but are quelled in a few days. Carthage is reduced to great extremities in a war, which for more than three years is carried on against her by her foreign mercenaries, in conjunction with her African subjects. The conduct of the Romans on this occasion.

Year of ROME DXII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred forty.

211th Consulship. Polyb. B. 1. c. 65.

THE peace between Rome and Carthage was hardly ratified, when both these states found themselves on a sudden engaged in new and unexpected wars at home, by the rebellion of their own subjects.

The Falisci in Hetruria, through some unaccountable levity or madness, rose up in arms, and declared war against the Roman power. This intestine commotion caused a great alarm and terror throughout all Italy; and it occasioned no less wonder, by the speedy issue to which it was brought. The consuls Q. Lutatius and A. Manlius, at the head of the legions, are said to have quelled the rebels in six days. Two battles were fought. In the first the success was doubtful; but in the second, the Romans obtained a complete victory. The Falisci having lost 15,000 men in the action, humbly submitted themselves, and sued for peace. They were despoiled of their arms, horses, household-goods, slaves, and half their territory. Their city, strongly situated in a steep craggy place, was ordered to be demolished, and the inhabitants to build a new one for themselves in the flat open country. Nay, the people of Rome were meditating a more severe revenge against a nation that had so often rebelled; but

Eutrop. B. 2. Liv. Ep. B. 19. Zonaras.

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211th Consulship.

they restrained their wrath by the advice of a venerable Roman named Papirius, whom the consuls had employed to draw up in writing the form of the rebels' surrendry. He represented to the multitude, that the Falisci had yielded themselves, not to the power but the faith (or honour) of the Romans[1]; and this sacred name of public faith had such a prevalency on the minds of the people, that they readily acquiesed in what had been agreed upon.

Carthage, not so fortunate as Rome, had a much longer and more dangerous conflict to sustain at the very gates of the capital.

The avarice of a republic of merchants, who better understood the value of money than the merit of brave soldiers, was the source of this intestine mischief. They would needs persuade those foreign troops, who had fought so gallantly under Amilcar in Sicily, and had endured so steadily all the hardships of war, in the defence of a state to which they had no tie but their wages; they would needs, I say, persuade these strangers to remit, out of affection to that state, some part of what was due to them from it, by compact, for their services: whereas in truth they ought rather to have rewarded them with rich gratuities, beyond their stipulated pay. In the pursuit of this penurious project, they fell into strange imprudences. It could not be well imagined, that a proposal to foreign mercenaries to contribute out of their pay to

[1] "Faliscos non potestati, sed fidei se Romanorum commisisse." Val. Max. B. 6. c. 5.

the expenses of the war, would be very cheerfully received or easily digested. Nevertheless, that they might hear the grave oratory of Hanno on this head, the Carthaginians suffered these strangers, amounting to 20,000 men, to assemble all in one place, in the neighbourhood of the capital; and this at a time when Carthage had not, on foot, a sufficient body of her own people to resist such an army in case of a mutiny. And they committed a yet greater mistake, as Polybius observes, in constraining the soldiers to take with them, from the city to the place of rendezvous, their wives and children; because these, had they remained in Carthage, would have served as hostages for the good behaviour of the fathers and husbands.

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211th Consulship.

In a word, the rhetoric of Hanno had no effect but to kindle the highest resentment.—The mercenaries turned their arms with fury against their late masters; the African subjects of Carthage, easily drawn into rebellion, because greatly oppressed, took this opportunity to attempt the recovery of their freedom; and the Numidians, the old enemies of the republic and greedy of her destruction, joined their forces to the rebels.

In this war, which lasted three years and almost four months, it was not with the Carthaginians, as in former times, when they fought for glory, or to give a wider extent to their empire; it was no sportive enterprise of ambition; all was at stake; the very being of their government, their estates, their lives, were all

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211th Consulship.

in the utmost peril, from the desperate fury and close attacks of the most cruel and implacable enemies they had ever contended with. Amilcar saved his country. Superior by his skill and courage, not only to the impetuous force of multitudes, but to the cautious bravery of an army, which he himself had trained and disciplined, it was through his abilities that his republic remained victorious in the conclusion of this inexpiable war * ; a war that was never to be ended but by the total destruction of one of the contending parties.

THE AFRICAN WAR, OR WAR OF THE CARTHAGINIANS WITH THEIR MERCENARIES,

* This war, being a very curious part of history, and serving greatly to give us a more perfect knowledge of the character of that rival state, whose destruction alone could establish the Roman greatness, it may neither be unseasonable nor disagreeable to the reader, if the substance of Polybius's account of it be here inserted.

Polyb. B. 1. c. 66. et seq. and Sir W. R. B. 5. c. 2.

"When Amilcar had finished the treaty which put an end to the first Punic war, he led his troops from Eryx to Lilybæum, and there committed to Gisco (governor of the place) the care of transporting them into Africa. Gisco, as foreseeing what might happen, acted in this affair with great caution. For, instead of embarking the forces all at once, he shipped them off successively, and in small parties, allotting

so much time between the embarkations as might suffice for his prudent purpose; which was, that those who were first sent might be paid off and dismissed to their own countries, before the others should arrive. The Carthaginians, however, whose treasury was much exhausted, did not correspond to the intention of Gisco, but hoping they should be able to obtain from the whole army, when assembled, a remission of some part of what was due to them, detained at Carthage the several divisions as they came."

Polybius does not assign any reason, nor does any reason readily occur, why it should have seemed more easy to obtain this remission from the whole army together, than from the parts when disjoined. "One would think, (as a judicious historian observes*) that to persuade any small number of men, lodged in so great a city as Carthage, to have some consideration of the distress and poverty of the state, would have been no hard matter; and if the first comers had been thus persuaded, and had been friendly discharged, it would have left a good precedent to the second and third, whilst their disjunction had made them unable to recover their whole due by force." Perhaps the best conjecture towards accounting for the conduct of the Carthaginians in this particular is, that they had really no intention to disband these troops, and yet were unwilling, for good reasons, to let their design of keeping them on foot be known, before they were all safely arrived in Africa. And though avarice had de-

* Sir W. R.

termined the senate to try whether the soldiers could be persuaded to remit some part of what was due to them, there was no design to refuse them their full payment in case they insisted upon it. They never dreamed that the bare proposal of such a remission as they desired would have the sudden and fatal consequences which it had.

Polyb. L. 3. c. 9.

That the leading men at Carthage had resolved to continue these troops in the service, may, I think, be fairly collected from Polybius, who assures us that Amilcar left Sicily with firm resolution to renew the war against Rome without delay; and that he would have executed his purpose, if it had not been hindered by the revolt of the mercenaries. Now is it in the least probable, that the Carthaginian general, with this project of speedy revenge at his heart, would consent to break a veteran army, which he himself had disciplined, legions animated with the same spirit as himself?

Corn. Nep. Amilc. c. 1.

"Be this as it will, the Carthaginians did not follow the scheme of Gisco. They detained the first and second comers, telling them, that they would make a fair reckoning with all together. Thus every day the number increased, and many disorders (incident among soldiers) were committed, which much disquieted the city, not accustomed to the like. It was thought fit therefore to remove them all to some other place, where they might be less troublesome; and Sicca, a little town at no great distance, being pitched upon for this rendezvous, the officers were civilly requested to conduct all

their men thither, who, while they there waited the coming of their fellow-soldiers from Sicily, should receive, each of them, a piece of gold to bear his charges.

"This motion was accepted, and the soldiers began to dislodge; leaving behind them their wives, their children, and all their baggage, as intending very soon to fetch all away when they came back for their pay. But the Carthaginians, who wanted to rid the city entirely of these ungovernable guests, and who feared, that if the women and children remained there, it would be difficult to hinder some of the soldiers from staying behind, and others from returning, which would frustrate the intention of the measure now taken, they prevailed with them to march away with all that belonged to them, wives and children, bag and baggage.

"To Sicca then they all removed, and there lay waiting for news of their fellows' arrival, and their own pay. Business they had none to do, and therefore might easily be drawn to mutiny, the whole argument of their discourse inclining them to nothing else. Their daily talk was, how rich they should be when all their money came in; how much would fall to every single share, and for how long a time the city was behindhand with them in reckoning.—They were all grown arithmeticians; and he was thought a man of worth, who could find most reason to increase their demands to the very highest, even beyond their due. No part of their long service was forgotten; but the encouraging words and promises of their cap-

tains, leading them forth to any dangerous fight, were called to mind as so many obligations, not to be cancelled without satisfying their expectation by some extraordinary bounty.

"In this manner passed the time away, till at length, the whole army being arrived and united, Hanno (chief magistrate of Carthage) appeared at Sicca to clear the accompt. Now was the day come, when they were all to be made rich, especially if they could hold together, in maintaining resolutely the common cause. Full of these thoughts and expectations they assembled themselves to hear what good news this messenger had brought; with firm purpose to help his memory in case he should happen to forget any part of the many promises made to them, which were all to be considered in the reckoning.

"Hanno begins a very formal oration, wherein he bewails the poverty of Carthage; tells them how great a sum of money is to be paid to the Romans; reckons up the excessive charges the commonwealth had been at, in the late war, and in conclusion, desires them to be contented with part of their pay, and out of the love which they bore to the city, to remit the rest. Few of the hearers understood this orator's discourse: for the Carthaginian army was composed of sundry nations, as Greeks, Africans, Gauls, Ligurians, Spaniards, and others, all of different languages. But when such as conceived the whole tenor of his speech had informed the rest what message he brought, they all broke out into such a storm of rage,

that nothing would serve to appease them.—The insurrections and revolt were universal, each nation at first caballing apart, and then all the several nations joining together in a general sedition; of which the difference of languages greatly increased the tumult and confusion.

"Hanno would fain have assuaged their fury, but he knew not how: for he less understood their dissonant loud noises than they did his oration. An army, collected out of so many countries, that have no one language common to all, is neither easily stirred up to mutiny, nor easily pacified, when once it is broken into outrage. The best that Hanno could do, was to use the help of their own officers as his interpreters and messengers; but these interpreters mistook his meaning, some for want of skill, others on purpose; and such as delivered his errands in the worst sense, were the best believed. In short, nothing was to be seen, but fluctuation of mind, jealousies, distrusts, and caballing. Among the other causes of the soldiers' anger, was this also, that the Carthaginians, instead of sending to them some one of those officers, under whom they had served in Sicily, who knew their merits, and who so often had promised them rewards, had sent a man who had not been present in any of those actions where they had signalized their courage. In short, they considered themselves as not only wronged, but insulted. Full of indignation therefore, they hastily left Sicca, and, to the number of 20,000 men, advanced towards Car-

thage, as far as Tunes, where they took up their quarters, about 15 miles from the capital.—And now, when it was too late, the Carthaginians became convinced of their mistakes; for it was a mighty fault in them to permit such a body of strangers to assemble all in one place; and it was yet a greater error to turn out of their city the wives, children, and goods of these poor soldiers, which had they retained them in show of kindness, they might have used as hostages for their own safety, and as means to bring the army to their own terms: but now the terror they were in from the neighbourhood of these mutineers, carried them to yield to every demand, though never so unreasonable. They furnished a market at Tunes for the soldiers, whom they suffered to buy what they pleased, and at what price they pleased. Deputies, out of the body of the senate, were from time to time despatched to them, to assure them that all their demands, if possible to be performed, should be satisfied. The soldiers easily perceived the cause of this change; and taking advantage of the fright the city was in, they every day invented some new article to insist upon; and their insolence was the greater from the persuasion, that having served with honour against the Romans in Sicily, neither the Carthaginians, nor any other people, would have the courage to face them in the field.—No sooner therefore had they adjusted their demands of pay, but they proceeded further to exact satisfaction for the horses they had lost in the service. When that was agreed to, the

next demand was on account of short allowance of provisions for many years. They would be paid for the deficiency; and in this reckoning, the corn should be valued at the highest price it had at any time borne during the whole war.

"In short, as there were many factious and seditious spirits in the army, these incited the multitude to make new and exorbitant demands, such as it was impossible for the republic to comply with; nevertheless, as the Carthaginians promised to do every thing in their power to satisfy them, it was at length agreed, that the difference should be referred to some one of the generals who had been in Sicily, and that the soldiers should choose the arbitrator. Accordingly they pitched upon Gisco, partly out of affection to him, who had shown himself at all times a friendly man to them, and careful of their good, especially when they were to be transported into Africa; and partly out of a dislike they had conceived of Amilcar, because he had not visited them in all this busy time. [It is probable that Amilcar had no desire to be used as an instrument in defrauding his own soldiers of their wages; especially considering, that as he could best bear witness of their merits, so was he not ignorant that means to content them were not wanting, had the citizens been willing to do it.] Sir W. R.

"Gisco then embarks and comes among them, and to please them the better, brings money with him. He calls to him first of all the principal officers, and then the several na-

tions apart, rebuking them gently for what had passed, advising them calmly concerning the present, and exhorting them to continue their affection to a state, which had long entertained them in its pay, and would be always mindful of their good services. He then offered to give them their whole pay in hand, proposing to defer the consideration of other reckonings to a more convenient time. This might have been well accepted, and might have served to restore things to quiet, if two seditious ring-leaders of the multitude had not opposed it.

"Among the mutineers there happened to be one Spendius, a Campanian, who had been a slave to a Roman master. He was strong of body, and on all occasions of danger very forward; this fellow, fearing to fall into the hands of his master, (for by the custom of Rome his fault was punished with death) laboured both with words and actions, to trouble and perplex the treaty they were upon; and to hinder, by all means possible, their agreement with the Carthaginians. Another there was, whose name was Matho, an African, of free condition, and a soldier among them, who having been an active stirrer in this conspiracy, and fearing punishment, joined with Spendius to obstruct the accommodation, possessing the Africans with the belief, that as soon as the strangers should be paid, and despatched to their own countries, it would be their lot to pay for all; and that the Carthaginians would take such revenge on them for what they had done, that all Africa should tremble at it. The soldiers

grew hereupon enraged anew, and in regard they were not likely to receive of Gisco any other satisfaction than their arrears of pay, what was due for their horses and bread being respited to another time, they therefore took thence occasion of fresh disorders, and ran together in a mutinous manner. To Spendius and Matho they lent a willing ear, who railed both against Gisco and the Carthaginians, and if any one presumed to offer them temperate counsel, he was forthwith stoned to death, even before it could be understood what the purport of his discourse was, whether for or against Spendius; and now great slaughter was made both of officers and private soldiers, and nothing was heard during the tumult but 'Throw, throw, down with him;' and what greatly augmented the rage of those people, was the excess of wine they had drank, having newly risen from their repast. So that the word 'throw' was no sooner heard, but the person against whom it was designed was immediately slain. At length there appearing no one who presumed to open his mouth to divert their determinations, they chose Spendius and Matho for their leaders and commanders in chief.

"Gisco was not without a due sense of the danger he was in among these people, but he let that consideration give place to the duty he owed his country. He foresaw that if this mutiny once came to a head, the commonwealth would be driven to great straits; to prevent which, he was willing to be exposed to any hazard. He therefore, with great constancy of

mind, pursued his purpose of reducing them to their duty by all means possible: sometimes treating with the officers, sometimes with the sundry nations apart. It happened that the Africans coming rudely to Gisco, to demand the corn-money, which they pretended was due to them; he, to reprove their insolence, bid them in a contemptuous manner go ask their captain, Matho, for it. This answer put all into a flame. Without any hesitation, they tumultuously ran, and seized on the money, which had been brought in order to their payment.

"Matho and Spendius fomented with all their art and industry this audacious proceeding of the multitude, being persuaded that to do some outrageous act, in violation of the treaty they were upon, and contrary to the law of nations, would be the surest way to put things past accommodation, and to kindle the war they so much desired. Thus, therefore, not only the money and baggage of the Carthaginians were seized by the mutineers, but Gisco and all the Carthaginians who accompanied him, were arrested, put in irons, and thrown into prison; and these violences were immediately followed by an open declaration of war against Carthage.

"And now Matho despatched deputies to the cities round about, exhorting them to lend him succours, enter into confederacy with him, and bravely recover their liberty. It was not needful for the deputies to use much persuasion, the very fame of this rebellion sufficing to draw the

whole country into it. The merciless impositions of the Carthaginians upon their African subjects, were the cause of this universal proneness to a revolt. They had taken from the country people during the late war one half of their corn, and had doubled the tributes paid by the inhabitants of the cities, not exempting even the poorest from these exactions. When new magistrates were to be elected for the provinces, the choice never fell on those who were likely to govern the people with lenity and moderation, but on such whose rigour promised the electors the richest fruits of oppression.—Hanno, for example, was of this sort, and therefore a great favourite at Carthage.

"All these things considered, it is no wonder that the Africans were not backward to rebel. Not only such as could bear arms readily tendered their service in this commotion, but the very women (who had seen their husbands and fathers dragged to prison by the tax-gatherers) brought forth their jewels and other ornaments, offering all to sale for the maintenance of so just a quarrel. And by this great forwardness and liberal contribution, Matho and Spendius were supplied with a strong reinforcement of 70,000 Africans, and were moreover furnished with money, not only to give the soldiers the arrears of their pay, (which to engage them in the revolt they had promised) but sufficient to carry on the war begun, though it should be of long continuance.

"The mercenaries, using the advantage of their present strength, laid siege to Utica and

Hippo, two maritime cities of great importance, lying to the west of Carthage, and not far from it; nor did they abandon their camp at Tunes, which, on the other side, lay commodiously to hinder the Carthaginians from passing up into the country that way.

"Carthage was situate on a peninsula, which is bounded on one side by the sea, and on the other by a lake. The isthmus that joins this peninsula to the continent is about three miles broad. Utica stood on that side of Carthage which regards the sea, Tunes on the other side upon the lake: so that the enemy, from those two posts, marching sometimes by day and sometimes by night, to the very walls of the capital, filled the inhabitants with extreme terror. The Carthaginians, in this distress, appointed Hanno to be their general. He had gained some reputation in that capacity, when employed to conquer that part of Africa which lay towards Hecatompolis. Hanno did not fail to make with diligence all needful preparations (for that was his talent): he got together whatever was necessary, as well to relieve a town besieged, as to batter and assail any place defended against him. With these provisions, and with a hundred elephants, he came to Utica so suddenly, that the mercenaries, as men surprised, forsook their trenches, and retired to a rising piece of woody ground, where they might be safe against the violence of his huge beasts.

"Hanno, having been accustomed to make war with the Africans and Numidians, who

upon any defeat were wont to fly for two or three days together, imagined that the enemy he had only routed were utterly ruined, even beyond a possibility of recovery; neglecting therefore to keep guard, and leaving his men at liberty, he immediately entered the town, there to recreate and divert himself. But those old soldiers, with whom he was now at war, had learned of Amilcar to sustain such shocks as they had just suffered without being discouraged, and to retire and to fight again many times in one day, as occasion required. Wherefore, as soon as they perceived that Hanno knew not how to make use of a victory, they instantly rushed down from their retreat, assailed their own camp, and with great slaughter drove the Carthaginians out of it, forcing them to hide themselves within the walls of Utica; and they also got possession of all the stores that Hanno had brought for the relief of the town. Nor was this the only occasion wherein Hanno gave marks of his insufficiency: twice he might have defeated the enemy in pitched battle, and twice by surprise; yet he unaccountably neglected these opportunities, and even suffered the enemy to take possession of all the passes in the isthmus which joins the peninsula, whereon Carthage stood, to the firm land.

"The Carthaginians, dissatisfied with the conduct of Hanno, had now recourse to the undisputed abilities of Amilcar, whom they sent into the field with 10,000 men and 70 elephants. Amilcar was for some time at a loss how to meet with the enemy upon equal ground.

For, beside the other places of advantage which the mercenaries had seized, Hanno had suffered them to get possession of the only bridge by which the river Macar or Bagradas was passable to those who were to travel from Carthage into the continent. This river had not many fords, and the few it had were so well watched, that it was not easy for even a single man to get over without being seen. As for the bridge itself, the enemy guarded it with the utmost vigilance, and had built a town close by it, for the more commodious lodging of the troops that were appointed to that service. Amilcar, having in vain tried all means possible to force a passage, at length bethought himself of an expedient to gain one by stealth. He had observed that upon the blowing of certain winds, the mouth of the Macar used to be choked up with sand and gravel, which formed a kind of bar across it. Marching therefore to the mouth of the river, he there waited, without communicating his design to any body, the blowing of those favourable winds; which no sooner happened, but he passed the stream with his army by night unperceived, and the next morning appeared in the plain, to the great astonishment both of the Carthaginians and of the enemy.

"Spendius and his followers were extremely troubled as well as amazed at this news, as knowing that they had no longer to deal with the improvident gravity of Hanno, but with an able captain, even their own master in the art of war, whom they still admired though they

hated him. Amilcar marched directly towards those of the enemy who guarded the bridge.—Spendius advanced to meet him with 10,000 men, whom he drew out of the town that was near it. He had ordered 15,000 to come from before Utica and join him. Upon the arrival of this reinforcement, the fear with which the mercenaries had been struck was changed into presumption. They thought to surround Amilcar, and bear him down by numbers. Amilcar had disposed his elephants in the front, his cavalry and light armed infantry in the second line, and his heavy armed foot in the rear of all. He had* probably expected that the 15,000 men from Utica would have fallen upon his rear, instead of joining the forces with Spendius; and this expectation was the reason of his placing his main strength in the rear. But when he saw that the enemy, neglecting their advantage, had joined their two bodies of troops together, he immediately changed the order of his battle, making his horse wheel about and go to the rear, and his infantry advance. This sudden retreat of the Carthaginian cavalry was mistaken by the mercenaries for a real flight and a mark of fear. They advanced therefore briskly to the attack, without observing any order, and in full confidence of victory. But no sooner did they perceive that cavalry, which they had thought routed, appear again in good array, covering the whole body of the Carthaginian foot, (for, by the general's order, the horse wheeling from the rear to the right and left, had now placed themselves in the same

* Chev. Folard.

line with the infantry) than their astonishment at this movement quite took away their courage. They instantly turned their backs and fled, and being warmly pursued by the horse and elephants of Amilcar, suffered a very great slaughter. In this overthrow, 6000 of the mercenaries were slain, and 2000 taken prisoners; the rest escaped, some to the camp before Utica, others to the town by the bridge, whither Amilcar followed them so fast, that he easily possessed himself of that place, the enemy not having sufficiently recovered their spirits to make a defence, but flying thence to Tunes at his approach. After this, he speedily reduced several other towns, partly by force, partly by composition, and by this happy progress, gave the Carthaginians some better hopes of their affairs.

"As for Matho, he still continued the siege of Hippo, advising Spendius, and Autaritus, chief captain of the Gauls, to follow Amilcar so as never to lose sight of him, yet always to keep the higher grounds, or the foot of some hill, where they might be safe from the horse and elephants of the Carthaginians. He also sent into Numidia and Africa, admonishing the people to furnish those two commanders with supplies, and to exert themselves on this occasion for the recovery of their freedom. Spendius, with 6000 men chosen out of the several nations, encamped at Tunes, and with 2000 Gauls, that followed Autaritus, (these being all that remained of those who had served under this captain in Sicily, the rest having deserted

to the Romans at Eryx) pursuant to the counsel of Matho, continually coasted the Carthaginians, but always keeping the foot of the hills. One day, when Amilcar was encamped in a plain encompassed on all sides with hills, the succours which Spendius had waited for arrived, and the Carthaginian general was not a little embarrassed thereby; for he had now to deal with a body of Africans in front, and another of Numidians behind him, while the army of Spendius lay on his flank. In this difficulty, the fame of Amilcar's personal worth was of great benefit to his country. In the enemy's troops there happened to be a certain Numidian, named Naravasus, a man of distinction both for his birth and courage. He had inherited from his father an inclination to the Carthaginians, and it was much increased by what he had heard of Amilcar's merit. Thinking that he had now an opportunity of gaining the friendship of this people, he came to the camp, attended by about 100 Numidian horse. Having halted near the lines, without any show of fear, he there made a sign with his hand.—Amilcar, not a little wondering at the hardiness of the action, sent out to him a horseman; to whom Naravasus signified, that he desired a conference with the general. The latter not readily complying with the motion, the Numidian no sooner perceived his distrust, but dismounting, he gave his horse and arms to those who were with him; and with a noble confidence entered the camp alone. Every body wondered at the bravery of the man, but re-

ceived him amicably. Being conducted to Amilcar, he told him, he wanted not good inclinations for the Carthaginians in general; but that his principal motive of coming there was to engage in a friendship with him; which, if he approved, he should find him for the future a faithful friend, both in counsel and in action. This discourse, together with the manly assurance and ingenuous simplicity with which it was spoken, filled Amilcar with unspeakable joy; insomuch, that he not only consented to make him his companion in all his enterprises, but, to purchase his fidelity to the Carthaginians, promised him his daughter in marriage.

"After this conference and treaty, Naravasus brought to the camp 2000 Numidians that were under his command; with which reinforcement Amilcar offered the enemy battle. Spendius, on his part, being strengthened by the Africans, advanced boldly into the plain, where the battle was obstinately fought. Amilcar, in the end, had the day: the elephants did great service: and Naravasus signalized himself most eminently. Spendius and Autaritus escaped by flight, about 10,000 of their men being slain, and 4000 taken prisoners. Amilcar received kindly all those of the prisoners that were willing to take his pay, and serve under him, and he armed them with the spoils of the dead. As for those that were not willing to serve, he assembled them all, and then told them, that he freely pardoned their past fault, and gave them their liberty; but bid them

remember, that if ever they were taken again in arms against the Carthaginians, they were to expect no mercy.

"During these transactions, the mercenaries that were in garrison in Sardinia mutinied, after the example of Matho and Spendius; and having shut up Bostar, their chief commander, in the citadel, they at length murdered both him and all the Carthaginians with him. Hereupon the republic, in order to quell these mercenaries, despatched from Carthage into that island a body of troops, which, if we may judge from their proceedings, were also mercenaries (a strange policy of the magistrates). These soldiers no sooner arrived, but they entered into the views of the mutineers, and joined the revolt. The united forces seized on the leader of the new comers and crucified him; they likewise, in a most cruel manner, murdered all the Carthaginians they could meet with, possessed themselves of the towns, and remained masters of the whole island; until at length a quarrel happened between them and the natives, who, prevailing, constrained them to leave the country, and fly for refuge into Italy. But thus Sardinia became entirely lost to the Carthaginians.

"To return to the mercenaries in Africa.

"Matho, Spendius, and Autaritus, having advice of the clemency which Amilcar exercised towards the prisoners, and fearing the effect it might have upon the Africans, and their other troops, resolved to engage them in some new act of villany, such as should put them past all

hopes of indemnity. With this view they assembled the whole army. A messenger presently arrives with a pretended letter from those who had followed their steps in Sardinia. This letter admonishes them to be careful in guarding Gisco, and the rest of the prisoners, (whom they had seized at the treaty of Tunes) there being some persons in the army, who held secret intelligence with the Carthaginians for their release. Spendius took occasion, from this letter, to warn the soldiers not to rely on the specious humanity of Amilcar towards those who had fallen into his hands; whose real intention, he said, was not to spare them, but by a feigned clemency to draw the rest to submission; to the end, that having all at his mercy, he might at once take vengeance upon all. He likewise counselled them, to be especially watchful not to suffer Gisco to escape; who being a principal leader, and in great authority, would prove one of their most dangerous enemies. Spendius had hardly ended his discourse, when a second courier, pretending to come from Tunes, arrived with a letter, pressing the same matter that was contained in the other. Upon this, Autaritus, the Gaul, immediately stepped forth, and declared to the assembly, that their safety and success could only be found in renouncing all hopes of reconciliation with the Carthaginians; and that whoever should appear to have turned his thoughts that way, ought to be distrusted as a traitor to the common cause, and as being in secret correspondence with the enemy; and he advised them to be guided

wholly by those, who were for carrying things to the utmost extremity against the Carthaginians. After this, he gave it as his opinion, that they ought to put to death by torments, not only Gisco and all the Carthaginians then in their custody, but all those that should hereafter fall alive into their hands. Autaritus was always in these assemblies of the soldiers a leading man, having the advantage, by his knowledge of several languages, of being able to make himself understood by the greatest part of his hearers. His proposal was received with almost universal applause; nevertheless there were some of every nation, who joined in one common request, that in regard of the many benefits they had received from Gisco, he might at least have the favour to suffer only death, and not be put to torment. As they spoke in several languages, and all at once, it was not presently understood what they demanded; but no sooner was their intention known, and some one in the assembly had cried out, 'Down with them, knock them all on the head,' but these intercessors were stoned to death by the multitude. Then, by order of Spendius, was Gisco with the other Carthaginian prisoners, to the number of 700 persons, brought out to suffer the sentence pronounced against them. The executioners (beginning with Gisco, that same Gisco whom but a little before the whole army had owned for their benefactor, and whom they had made choice of to be arbitrator of their differences with the republic) cut off their hands, broke their legs, and then threw them

alive into a ditch, there to expire in misery.—The Carthaginians receiving intelligence of this cruelty, and being deeply affected with the sad fate of so many of their citizens, sent orders to Amilcar and Hanno, to use their utmost diligence to revenge it. They likewise dispatched heralds to the mercenaries, to demand the bodies of the dead; but the villains were so far from complying with this demand, that they threatened to treat whatever messengers should hereafter be sent to them in the same manner they had treated Gisco. And in fact it became an established law among them, that all Carthaginian prisoners they took should be tormented to death; and that those who were allies of the Carthaginians should have their hands cut off, and in that condition be sent back to them: and this law was afterwards rigorously executed.

"Amilcar, seeing no means left to put an end to the unbounded audaciousness of the enemy, but by utterly exterminating them, sent to Hanno to come and join him with the forces, which, without performing any thing worthy of notice, he had hitherto separately commanded. It was hoped, that with their united strength they might be able to give a happy issue to the war. And in the meantime it was resolved, that in return for the barbarity practised by the enemy, all those of them, who should fall alive into the hands of the Carthaginians, should be thrown to wild beasts to be devoured.

"But now, when affairs began to have a pro-

mising aspect, a dispute, that arose on a sudden between the two generals, was carried so far, that by it they lost many fair occasions of beating the enemy, and even gave them frequent advantages in the war. Upon the news of this division, the magistrates of Carthage came to a resolution, that one of the two should quit his command, and that the option should be left to the army.

"This quarrel, so unseasonable, and its consequences above mentioned, were not the only misfortunes that befel the Carthaginians at this time. A convoy from Emporium with provisions, and other stores, much wanted for the army, was lost by tempest at sea; and to fill the measure of their adversity, the towns of Utica and Hippo, that had hitherto stood firm to the Carthaginian party, not only in this war, but even in the time of Agathocles, and when the Romans made their descent on Africa, now abandoned them on a sudden, without any plausible motive; and not only entered into a league of fast friendship with the Africans, but conceived an implacable hatred against the Carthaginians; which they sufficiently testified by murdering all those they had of that nation in garrison, and throwing their bodies over the walls, without suffering them to be buried. These events encouraged Matho and Spendius to think of laying siege even to Carthage itself.

"The Carthaginian army having declared in favour of Amilcar, Hanno was constrained to relinquish his authority, and was succeeded by

Hannibal, whom the senate appointed to command in his stead. Assisted by this new colleague, and especially by Naravasus, who was eminently useful in all expeditions, Amilcar scoured the country, and endeavoured to cut off all means of subsistence from the enemy, who now invested Carthage.

"The city, blocked up on all sides by land, was forced to have recourse to her allies. Hiero king of Syracuse, who had all along had a watchful eye upon the events of this war, and had supplied the republic with every thing she had desired of him, was now, in her greatest distress, more than ever diligent to assist her; as being well aware, that to maintain his own authority in Sicily, and his alliance of friendship with the Romans, it was necessary that Carthage should be preserved in a condition to balance their power; otherwise he himself might soon be at their mercy, and instead of their friend become their subject.

L. 1. c. 83. "In this, says Polybius, he acted wisely, for it greatly behoves a prince not to neglect a mischief of this kind, in the beginning, nor to suffer the exorbitant growth of a neighbouring power, till he is no longer able to contest with it for his own indisputable right.

"Not only king Hiero, but the Romans also, (faithfully observing their treaty of peace) supplied the Carthaginians with such provisions and stores as they wanted; so that the city, being thus succoured, was in a condition to defend itself against the efforts of the besiegers.

"In the meantime, Amilcar was so active and diligent in preventing any supplies from going to the camp of Matho and Spendius, that he at length reduced them to great straits for provisions, and in the end constrained them to raise the siege. And now Spendius, assisted by one Zarxas an African leader, and by Autaritus the Gaul, issued into the field at the head of 50,000 chosen men, to try the fortune of war against Amilcar. (Matho was left at Tunes, to negotiate with their friends, and take a general care of the business.) The elephants of Carthage and the horse of Naravasus made Spendius afraid of descending into the plains, so that he betook himself to his former method of keeping the hills and rough grounds, or occupying the strait passages, wherein the desperate courage of his men might show itself with little disadvantage. But Amilcar, having more skill than he in the trade of war, artfully contrived to draw him to many skirmishes; in all which the success was such, as added courage to the Carthaginians, and abated the strength and spirit of their enemies. Thus he continued alarming and provoking them by night and by day; and, through his skill in laying ambushes, never failed to entrap some of them when they engaged in small parties, nor to cut off great numbers when the action was more general; and those that fell alive into his hands he gave to be devoured by wild beasts.

"At length he surprised them in a place that was very commodious for his own army,

and very disadvantageous to theirs. They presently saw their disadvantage, and therefore had not heart to fight. Amilcar prudently foreseeing that necessity might draw them to attempt the most desperate enterprises, took the opportunity of their present fear, and shut them close up with a trench and rampart. There they waited miserably and in vain for succour from Tunes; and having spent all their provisions were so pressed with hunger, that they fed upon the bodies of their prisoners. This they suffered patiently, as knowing they had not deserved any favour from Carthage; and hoping still that their friends at Tunes would not neglect them. But when at length they were driven to such extremity, as to be forced to devour their own companions, and yet saw no appearance of relief, then was their obstinacy quite broken, and they began to threaten their captains. Spendius, Zarxas, and Autaritus, having therefore consulted together, came to a resolution to yield themselves to Amilcar, if required, as the condition of peace. They sent a herald to demand a pass, which being granted them, they came in person to the Carthaginian general. What they could say to him is hard to conjecture; yet by the conditions that Amilcar granted, it would seem that they took the blame upon themselves, and begged pardon for the multitude. The conditions were, That the Carthaginians should choose out of the whole number of these enemies, any ten whom they pleased, to remain at their discretion; and that the rest

should all be dismissed, each in one single coat. When the treaty was thus concluded, Amilcar told Spendius, and those that were with him, that he chose them as part of the ten; and then immediately ordered them to be seized and secured. The army receiving intelligence that their leaders were detained, and not knowing that a treaty was concluded for them upon such gentle terms, presently imagined they were betrayed. In amazement therefore they all ran to arms. But now they wanted captains to order and conduct them; and the same astonishment that made them break the covenants of peace, of which they were ignorant, gave Amilcar both colour of justice in accomplishing revenge, and facility in doing the execution. They were all slain, being 40,000 or more in number.

"The news of this exploit, (as may well be supposed) gave new life and spirit to the people at Carthage, and was terrible to the revolted cities. Amilcar with Naravasus and Hannibal, carried the war from town to town, and found all places ready to yield except Utica, Hippo, and Tunes, the two first standing out through fear of deserved vengeance, and the last being held by Matho, with the remainder of the rebel army. It was thought fit to begin with Tunes, where lay the chief strength of the enemy. Coming before this town, they brought forth Spendius with his fellows, and, in view of the garrison, crucified them under the walls, to terrify those of his old companions, that were still in arms. With this rigour the

siege began, as if speedy victory had been assured. Hannibal quartered upon that side of Tunes which lay toward Carthage; Amilcar on the opposite side; too far asunder to help one another in sudden accidents. It behoved them therefore to be more circumspect. Nevertheless, Hannibal secure, as if all danger were past, neglected to keep good guard. Matho perceived it, and, using his advantage, sallied out with unexpected fury against that part of the Carthaginian army, and so successfully, that after a great slaughter of the enemy, he put the rest to flight, forced their camp, pillaged it, and took Hannibal himself prisoner. After the victory, having caused the dead body of Spendius to be taken down from the cross, he ordered Hannibal to be fixed alive in his place, and executed him with unspeakable torments. The rest also of the noblest of the Carthaginians, who had fallen into his hands, were by his command slain round the body of Spendius. Of all this Amilcar knew nothing, till it was too late; neither had he strength enough remaining, after this great loss, to continue the siege; but was obliged to break it up, and remove to the mouth of the river Bagradas, where he encamped.

"The terror in Carthage, upon the news of this disaster, was not less than had been the joy for the late important victory. All that could bear arms were sent into the field under Hanno; and the senate commissioned thirty principal men of their body to labour with all the force of persuasion, to bring Amilcar and

him to a reconciliation. This could not be effected presently. Amilcar was perhaps nearly touched in his honour, that the carelessness of Hannibal seemed to be imputed to him, by sending his enemy to share with him the conduct of affairs, and be a check upon his proceedings. Nevertheless, after many conferences, the authority of the senators prevailed; and the two generals passed their words to live in friendship, and act in concert for the public good. And thenceforward all affairs were successfully managed to the satisfaction of their fellow citizens.

"Matho, during these transactions, was come abroad into the field, wisely purposing to make advantage of the reputation of his late success, while it gave some life to his cause. But this African leader wanted the necessary skill to cope with Amilcar, who in all skirmishes and encounters between parties never failed to worst him, and thereby to diminish both his strength and his credit. Matho, sensible of this growing mischief to his affairs, resolved therefore to try the fortune of one battle, whereby either his ambition should be accomplished, or his cares at an end. The Carthaginians were no less disposed to a general action, having many advantages above their enemies, and especially (which was worth all the rest) such a commander as was not easily to be matched in that age. Both parties being thus agreed, the confederates and friends of both were called together, and the towns drained of their garrisons to augment the ar-

mies. At length with joint consent, in time and place, the battle was fought. The Carthaginians won the day. The greatest part of the African army was slain upon the spot; the rest fled to a town, that, not being defensible, quickly surrendered; Matho himself was there taken alive. Immediately upon this victory all the African cities which had been in the rebellion submitted to their old masters, Utica and Hippo only excepted; these, by their treacherous and outrageous proceedings, having cut off from themselves all hopes of pardon. However, these also were constrained to surrender at mercy. Matho and his companions, being led in triumph to Carthage, were put to death by all the torments that revenge could devise.

"Thus was a period given to this inexpiable war, which had lasted three years and near four months, and had abounded with more acts of wickedness and cruelty than any other to be met with in story."

ROME during all this time[1] took no advantage of her rival's distress to promote her ruin,

[1] Part of the Y. of R. 512. { Q. LUTATIUS, A. MANLIUS.
Y. of R. 513. { C. CLAUDIUS, M. SEMPRONIUS.
Y. of R. 514. { C. MAMILIUS, Q. VALERIUS.
Part of the Y. of R. 515. { TIB. SEMPRONIUS, P. VALERIUS.

but continued faithfully to observe the treaty of peace with her; and even assisted her as a friend in many instances. Once indeed there seemed to be some danger of a rupture. For as the Carthaginians, at the beginning of this war, made prize of all vessels that came on the coast of Africa, to supply the rebels with provisions, it happened that they had at one time in custody 500 Italians, whom they had taken carrying on this traffic for the profit of private merchants. The Romans, offended at the detaining of these traders in prison, began to turn their thoughts to revenge; but they were soon appeased by a respectful embassy from Carthage, who restored the prisoners in so frank a manner, that the Romans, not to be behind her in courtesy, enlarged, without ransom, all the Carthaginian captives, that yet remained of those who had been taken during the Sicilian war. They also permitted their merchants to supply Carthage with whatsoever she stood in need of, and prohibited all commerce with her enemies. Nay, more than this, when the people of Utica, having revolted from the Carthaginians, would have put that city into the hands of the Romans, the latter rejected the overture; as they also did an offer made them of the island of Sardinia by the mercenaries there, who, following the example of those in Africa, had turned their arms against the masters in whose pay they were, and had forcibly seized upon that island.

Year of ROME DXV. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-seven. 214th Consulship.

This behaviour towards a rival power (says a learned writer) might have served as a notable

Sir W. R.

Year of R. O. M. E DXV. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-seven.

214th Consulship.

example of Roman faith to all posterity, had not the issue proved that it proceeded wholly from the hope of greater profit thereby, than could reasonably be expected from an open violation of the treaty of peace. The whole estate of Carthage depended, at that time, upon the virtue of Amilcar, and had he been overthrown by the rebels in one main battle, that mighty city must either have fallen into the hands of merciless villains, or have humbled herself under the protection of the Romans, with whom she had lately contended for superiority. She was once during the war reduced by the rebels to so great extremity as not to be far from such a miserable choice. Wherefore it was not unwisely done of the Romans, to make such demonstration of kindness, and honourable dealing, as might invite a rich but sinking ship, to run herself aground upon their shore. But when all was well ended in Africa, and the Carthaginians began to prepare for the recovery of Sardinia, then did Ambition put off her goodly visor. Though the Romans had formerly refused this island, when offered them by the mercenaries, (who were afterwards driven thence by the natives) they now resolved to take possession of it by force of arms. One of the consuls passed thither with an army, and denounced war against Carthage, under the shameless pretence, that the preparations made (by that enfeebled and impoverished city) to reduce Sardinia, were indeed designed against Rome. The Carthaginians were in no condition at this time to en-

Polyb. B. 1. c. 88.

Sinnius Capito apud Pomp. Fest. in voce Sardi Venales

ter upon a new war with so potent an enemy: yielding therefore to necessity, they relinquished all pretensions to the island for ever; and not only so, but submitted to the exactions of the consul, who further demanded of them, as the price of a peace, the sum of 1200 talents*: detestable injustice and extortion! which, as Polybius assures us, were the chief cause of that bloody war, in which Hannibal afterwards, with hereditary hatred and an implacable spirit of revenge, pushed the Romans to the very brink of destruction.

Year of ROME DXV. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-seven.

214th Consulship.

* 232, 500l. Arbuthnot.

CHAP. XII.

Wars of the Romans with the Boian Gauls, Ligurians, Sardinians, and Corsicans.

DURING the three years and some months that the war of Carthage with her mercenaries had lasted, the Roman consuls had no affairs abroad, and seem to have chiefly employed their thoughts to establish good order in Italy, and to secure the frontiers against the Gauls and Ligurians, by planting colonies in their neighbourhood. The republic, however, would gladly have engaged in some quarrel, if she could have found a plausible pretence for it. Eutropius tells us, that after the conclusion of the war in Sicily, she sent ambassadors to Ptolemy Evergetes, king of Egypt, to offer him her assistance against Antiochus of Syria, surnamed the God: but the Egyptian having got rid of his

Eutrop. L. 3. c. 1.

Year of ROME DXV. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-seven.

214th Consulship.

enemy before the ambassadors arrived, his answer was only a compliment of thanks. And we have seen, that after the conclusion of the African war, in which Carthage was triumphant, the Romans would have renewed hostilities against that hated rival, on account of Sardinia, if they had not been prevented in this project, by an unwilling cession of that island to them.

But about the same time these ambitious and restless spirits found sufficient opportunity to keep their hardy legions in exercise. In the consulate of Tib. Sempronius and P. Valerius, those Italic Gauls who were called Boii, and who, after infinite losses and calamities sustained in their struggles with the Romans, had continued quiet 45 years, resolved at length, upon some very trivial pretences, to break the peace which had been so long maintained with the republic. The old men, all those who had felt the hardships and sufferings of the former wars, being extinct, the young men, their successors, who had experienced nothing of those miseries, and feared nothing from fortune, began, according to the nature of man, to grow turbulent and desirous of some change in their condition; and this was the true source of their rash enterprise.

See B. 3. c. 25. § 1, 2. Polyb. L. 2. c. 21.

Liv. Epit. 20.

The Ligurians[1] also (whom Rome had not yet begun to subdue) being in motion, and

[1] Liguria comprehended at this time the whole extent of country between the Arno, the Apennines, the country of the Ananes, the Po, the maritime Alps, and the Ligurian sea (now the sea of Genoa.)

seeming to threaten her with war, the consuls for the year were obliged to divide their forces.

Year of ROME DXV. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-seven.

214th Consulship.

Oros. B. 4. c. 12. Val. Max. B. 5. c. 6.

Valerius led a consular army against the Gauls, and was vanquished in his first battle with them, in which he lost 3500 men. Upon the news of this defeat, the Romans immediately despatched M. Genucius Cipus, one of the prætors, from the city, with a reinforcement for the consul. Valerius looking on this precaution as a personal affront, and believing that he was still strong enough to cope with the enemy, notwithstanding the blow he had received, hastened to attack them again, before Cipus could arrive. His soldiers were no less zealous than himself to recover their honour; and being animated by this motive behaved themselves so gallantly, that they slew 14,000 of the Gauls, and took 2000 prisoners. However, this victory did not obtain the consul a triumph, because he had been rash in the attempt, and had not paid sufficient deference to the sentiments of the senate and people.

In the meantime Sempronius, the other consul, gained a battle, (though not a decisive one) against the Ligurians.

Year of ROME DXVI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-six.

215th Consulship.

Zon. B. 8.

These wars were continued by the next year's consuls, L. Cornelius Lentulus and Q. Fulvius Flaccus. Fulvius acquired no honour by the campaign. It was with great difficulty that he preserved his camp from being forced by the Gauls, whose country on this side of the Po he had entered; he was obliged to keep within his intrenchments, and to act entirely on the defensive.

Year of ROME DXVI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-six.

215th Consulship.

Eutrop. B. 3. c. 1. Ken. Antiq. Part 2. B. 5. c. 7. Lib. 2. c. 4.

Miscel. c. 58.

Cornelius had better success against the Ligurians near Hetruria. He obtained a victory, for which he was rewarded with a triumph.

During these wars, preparations were made at Rome to celebrate the secular games[1]: Hiero

[1] *Ludi Sæculares*, the most remarkable games that we meet with in the Roman story. The common opinion makes them to have had a very odd original, of which we have a tedious relation in Valerius Maximus, of the ancients, and Angelus Politianus of the moderns. Monsieur Dacier, in his excellent remarks on the secular poem of Horace, passes by this old conceit as trivial and fabulous, and assures us, that we need go no further for the rise of the custom than to the Sybilline oracles, for which the Romans had so great an esteem and veneration.

In these sacred writings there was one famous prophecy to this effect; that if the Romans, at the beginning of every age, should hold solemn games in the Campus Martius to the honour of Pluto, Proserpine, Juno, Apollo, Diana, Ceres, and the Parcæ, or three fatal sisters, their city should ever flourish, and all nations be subjected to their dominion. They were very ready to obey the oracle, and, in all the ceremonies used on that occasion, conformed themselves to its directions. The whole manner of the solemnity was as follows: in the first place, the heralds received orders to make an invitation of the whole world to come to a feast which they had never seen already, and should never see again. Some few days before the beginning of the games, the quindecemviri, taking their seats in the capitol, and in the Palatine temple, distributed among the people purifying compositions, as flambeaux, brimstone, and sulphur. From hence the people passed on to Diana's temple on the Aventine mountain, carrying wheat, barley, and beans, as an offering; and after this they spent whole nights in devotion to the destinies. At length, when the time of the games was actually come, which continued three days and three nights, the people assembled in the Campus Martius, and sacrificed to Jupiter, Juno, Apollo, Latona, Diana, the Parcæ, Ceres, Pluto, and Proserpine. On the first night

king of Syracuse came to see the show, and brought with him 200,000 modii (measures of the feast, the emperor, accompanied by the quindecemviri, commanded three altars to be raised on the bank of the Tiber, which they sprinkled with the blood of three lambs, and then proceeded to burn the offerings and the victims. After this, they marked out a space which served for a theatre, being illuminated by an innumerable multitude of flambeaux and fires: here they sung some certain hymns composed on this occasion, and celebrated all kinds of sports. On the day after, when they had been at the capitol to offer the victims, they returned to the Campus Martius, and held sports to the honour of Apollo and Diana. These lasted till the next day, when the noble matrons, at the hour appointed by the oracle, went to the capitol to sing hymns to Jupiter. On the third day, which concluded the feast, twenty-seven young boys, and as many girls, sung, in the temple of Palatine Apollo, hymns and verses in Greek and Latin, to recommend the city to the protection of those deities whom they designed particularly to honour by their sacrifices.

Year of ROME DXVI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-six.

215th Consulship.

The famous secular poem of Horace was composed for this last day, in the secular game held by Augustus. Dacier has given his judgment on this poem, as the masterpiece of Horace; and believes that all antiquity cannot furnish us with any thing more happily complete.

There has been much controversy, whether these games were celebrated every hundred or every hundred and ten years. For the former opinion, Censorinus* alleges the testimony of Valerius Antias, Varro, and Livy; and this was certainly the space of time which the Romans called *sæculum*, or an age. For the latter he produceth the authority of the registers, or commentaries of the quindecemviri, and the edicts of Augustus, besides the plain evidence of Horace in his secular poem; 21.

Certus undenos decies per annos, &c.

This last space is expressly enjoined by the Sybilline oracle itself; the verses of which, relating to this purpose, are transcribed by Zosimus in the second book of his history.

* De Die Natali, cap. 17.

Year of ROME DXVI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-five.

containing a peck and a half) of wheat, that the vast concourse of people might not cause a scarcity of provisions.

216th Consulship.

The year of the secular games was not a year of tranquillity. The new consuls, P. Cor-

Ἀλλ' ὄπȣἂν μήκιςος ἵκη χρόνος ἀνθρωποισι
Ζωῆς, εἰς ἑτέ ων ἑκατὸν δέκα κύκλον ὁδεύων, &c.

Yet, according to the ancient accounts we have of their celebration in the several ages, neither of these periods are much regarded.

The first were held *A. U. C.* 245, or 298.
The second *A.* 330, or 408.
The third *A.* 518.
The fourth either *A.* 605, or 608, or 628.
The fifth by Augustus, *A.* 736.
The sixth by Claudius, *A.* 800.
The seventh by Domitian, *A.* 841.
The eighth by Severus, *A.* 957.
The ninth by Philip, *A.* 1000.
The tenth by Honorius, *A.* 1157.

The disorder, without question, was owing to the ambition of the emperors, who were extremely desirous to have the honour of celebrating these games in their reign; and therefore, upon the slightest pretence, many times made them return before their ordinary course. Thus Claudius pretended that Augustus had held the games before their due time, that he might have the least excuse to keep them within sixty-four years afterwards. On which account, Suetonius tells us, that the people scoffed at his cryers, when they went about proclaiming games that nobody had ever seen, nor would see again; whereas there were not only many persons alive who remembered the games of Augustus, but several players, who had acted in those games, were now again brought on the stage by Claudius. Sueton. Claud. 21.

Mr. Walker of Coins, p. 168.

What part of the year the secular games were celebrated in, is uncertain; probably, in the times of the commonwealth, on the days of the nativity of the city, *i. e.* the 9, 10, 11, Kal. Maii, but under the emperors, on the day when they came to their power.

nelius Lentulus and C. Licinius Varro, were obliged to take the field to oppose the Gauls. The confidence of their leaders being raised by the multitudes of men they had assembled, and by the expectation of a strong reinforcement of their countrymen from the other side the Alps, they demanded the restitution of Ariminum, formerly taken from them by the Romans. Lentulus and Varus, to gain time, (not having their troops complete) referred the matter to the determination of the senate, and in the interim agreed upon a truce with the enemy, whose commanders were very ready to consent to a cessation of arms till they should be joined by the forces they expected from Transalpine Gaul. When these forces arrived, their number proved so great as to give umbrage to those whom they came to assist. The Cisalpine Gauls, more afraid of the new comers than of the Romans, turned their arms against them, and put them to flight; but first slew their own two generals (or kings) Ates and Galatus, for having of their own head, and without consulting the nation, invited such dangerous allies to cross the Alps. The enemy being thus defeated by themselves, two consular armies were no longer necessary to repress them. Lentulus with his legions alone, not only reduced the Boii to yield a part of their country as the condition of a peace; but took a great number of forts from the Ligurians, partly by force, and partly by composition.

Year of ROME DXVII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-five.

216th Consulship.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 21.

In the meantime, Varus made preparations

Zon. B. 8.

Year of ROME DXVII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-five.

216th Consulship.

for going to the island of Corsica, which, by the secret intrigues of the Carthaginians, had been induced to throw off the Roman yoke. The consul, not finding a fleet ready to transport his whole army, sent away before him a small number of ships with a detachment under the command of that Claudius Glycias, who had formerly been named to the dictatorship in derision. Claudius had served, since that time, with good reputation, in several posts of a lower order, but had never commanded in chief. Seeing himself now at the head of a part of the consular army, his ambition was raised, and fancying it would be much for his honour to gain this island to the republic without bloodshed, he, without the consent of consul or senate, made a shameful peace with the Corsicans. The consul, at his arrival, annulled the treaty, renewed the war, and subdued the island by force of arms. As for Claudius, by a decree of the senate, he was delivered up to the resentment of the Corsicans, for having drawn them (as it was alleged) into a bloody war by a fallacious peace: in which sentence the republic, beside the punishing a breach of duty and order, had the further view of preventing the reproach that might have been cast upon the consul, for having made war on a people who depended on the faith of a treaty. However, the Corsicans disdained this reparation, and sent Claudius back to Rome. There he was put to death in prison, and then his body, being first carried to the top of the steps called Scalæ Gemoniæ, on

Zon. B. 8.

Dio apud Vales. p. 593. Val. Max. B. 6. c. 3. § 3.

which the bodies of the greatest malefactors used to be exposed, was thence dragged away with an iron crook, and thrown into the Tiber.

Year of ROME DXVII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-five.

216th Consulship.

This execution of Claudius did not satisfy the Corsicans, who had been amused by a treaty of peace, only to give their enemies the better opportunity to subdue them by a war. The near neighbourhood of Sardinia made it easy for them to communicate their discontent to the people of that island; and it is said, that Carthage underhand excited the Sardinians to revolt from the Romans; and that Rome, for this reason, made preparations for a new war with the African republic. Alarmed at this news, the Carthaginians sent ambassador after ambassador to negotiate an accommodation; but all in vain. At length they despatched to Rome, for the same end, ten of the principal members of their state, among whom was one Hanno, a young man of great spirit and vivacity. When these new deputies had for a while employed the lowest submissions and the humblest entreaties to procure a reconciliation, and all to no effect, Hanno, weary of so much cringing, and full of indignation at the rough and haughty answers of the senate, cried out with an air of confidence and dignity, "Well, then, if you are resolved to break the treaty, reinstate us in the condition we were in before it was concluded. Restore to us SICILY and SARDINIA. With these we bought of you, not a short truce, but a peace that was to be perpetual." The sena-

Zon. B. 8. Eutrop. B. 3. c. 2.

Oros. B. 4. c. 12.

Dio in excerp. xi. p. 922.

Year of ROME DXVIII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-four.

217th Consulship.

tors, ashamed, dismissed the deputies with a milder answer.

After this, the consuls for the new year, C. Attilius Balbus and T. Manlius Torquatus, drew lots for their provinces; the former continued in Italy, while the latter easily recovered Sardinia, and settled peace there, but without reducing it to a Roman province.

Eutrop. B. 3. c. 3. Vell. Pat. B. 2. c. 38. Oros. B. 4. c. 12. Livy, B. 1. c. 19.

And now the temple of Janus was shut up for the first time since the reign of Numa Pompilius. For near 450 years the Romans had been almost continually in arms: and so steady was their ambition, and so unwearied their constancy in pursuing its dictates, that in the succeeding parts of this history we shall see them, in spite of numberless misfortunes, still forming new enterprises upon the neighbouring nations, and never ceasing to push their conquests till they have attained to universal empire.

Year of ROME DXIX. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-three.

218th Consulship.

Zon. B. 8. Livy, Epit. 20. Tab. Triumph.

The present tranquillity lasted but a few months. In the following consulship of L. Posthumius Albinus and Sp. Carvilius, three armies were raised to act against the Sardinians, Corsicans, and Ligurians, who had (probably) engaged themselves, by secret treaties, mutually to assist one another. Posthumius succeeded against the Ligurians; but the prætor Cornelius, who commanded in Sardinia, was, with many of his soldiers, carried off by distemper. Carvilius (from Corsica) transported his legions thither, gained a victory over the Sardinians, and then returned to Rome in triumph.

Year of ROME DXIX. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-three.

218th Consulship.

In this consulship, the censors, observing the number of the citizens to be considerably lessened, and imputing it to men marrying only with a view to interest, deserting their own wives for fear of having many children to maintain, and carrying on unlawful intrigues with other women, they obliged all the citizens to swear, that they would not marry with any other view than that of increasing the subjects of the republic. This oath raised many scruples; and caused many ruptures between husbands and wives. Among the rest one Carvilius Ruga, a considerable man, thought himself bound by his oath to divorce his wife, whom he passionately loved, because she was barren, and accordingly he put her away, contrary to his inclination, and married another; the first instance of divorce at Rome in 519 years, notwithstanding that the laws had always allowed it. And it was on this occasion that marriage contracts were first introduced, to secure women's portions in case of divorces, which we shall see hereafter grow scandalously frequent, as a corruption of manners prevailed in the republic.

Gell. B. 4. c. 3. and B. 17. c. 21. in fine. Sulp de dotibus. D. Hal. p. 93.

Year of ROME DXX. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-two.

219th Consulship.

Plut. Life of Fab.

The fresh revolts of the Sardinians and Ligurians obliged the new consuls, M. Pomponius Matho and Q. Fabius Maximus, (the same Fabius who afterwards acquired so much glory in the wars of Hannibal) to divide the Roman forces. It now falling to Fabius's lot to make war with the Ligurians, he drove them out of the flat country, and forced them to take shelter under the Alps. In the mean-

Year of ROME DXX. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-two.

219th Consulship. Tab. Triumph. A. Gell. B. 16. c. 10.

time, his colleague Pomponius sailed for Sardinia, and gained some victories there, for which a triumph was granted him at his return home.

It is conjectured, that about this time the Æbutian law (so called from the two Æbutii, tribunes of the people, who proposed it and got it passed) was promulged. It retrenched many frivolous customs, ordained by the twelve tables to be observed in processes relating to civil affairs, and it also directed that three able and judicious men should be chosen out of each tribe to form a new tribunal, which, subordinate to the prætors, might assist them, and remedy the inconveniences often occasioned by their absence from Rome. These new judges were called, for brevity's sake, centumvirs[2], though they were 105 in number; and when they were afterwards augmented to 180 they still kept the same name.

Pompon. de Orig. Juris.

Year of ROME DXXI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-one.

220th Consulship.

Cic. in Bruto, c. 14. Polyb. B. 2. c. 21. Plin. Jun. B. 5. Epist. 1. Cicero de Orat. B. 1. c. 28.

The establishment of this new tribunal made no change as to the direction of state affairs, which continued wholly in the senate and *comitia*. Flaminius, one of the tribunes, made a motion to the commons, at this time, to distribute a fruitful country, lately taken from the Gauls, among the poor citizens of Rome. All

[2] They were divided into four courts or chambers. The causes, which fell under their cognizance, were such as related to prescriptions, guardianships, degrees of consanguinity or affinity, damages occasioned by inundations, contests about building or repairing middle walls, the windows a man might open upon his neighbour, with an infinite number of other matters, that often raised disputes between the inhabitants of the same city.

motions of this kind had ever been opposed by the senators, out of private interest; and now they had indeed a better reason to unite their strength, in order to hinder Flaminius's motion from passing into a law. They foresaw that the Gauls on both sides the Po, would impatiently bear the distribution proposed of those lands. Neither the threats of the present consuls, M. Æmilius Lepidus and M. Publicius Malleolus, nor the entreaties of the senate, nor yet the tears of his own father, whom the patricians had gained over to them, could prevail with Flaminius to desist. On the day appointed for proposing the law to the *comitia*, he mounted the rostra, and spoke to the people in favour of it; but in the midst of his harangue, his father appearing on a sudden, ascended the rostra, took him by the arm, and commanded him to follow him home; and then Flaminius immediately obeyed without reply; and what is most extraordinary, not the least noise nor murmur was heard in the assembly. Nevertheless, the affair was now only postponed; it was afterwards carried into execution; and what the senators had apprehended came to pass; a dangerous war from the angry Gauls.

Year of ROME DXXI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty-one.

220th Consulship.

Val. Max. B. 5. c. 4. § 5. Cic. de Inv. Rhet. B. 2. c. 17.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 21.

In the following year the new consuls, M. Pomponius Matho and C. Papirius Maso, entirely finished the conquest of the two islands of Sardinia and Corsica, which were then reduced to the state of a Roman province, upon the same foot as Sicily. It is probable, that after this regulation Pomponius continued in

Year of ROME DXXII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty.

221st Consulship. Zon. B. 8.

Year of ROME DXXII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred thirty.

221st Consulship. Fast. Cap.

the new province to govern it in quality of pro-consul or prætor, when the year of his consulate, which was not far from a conclusion, should expire; but Papirius returned to Rome. At his arrival, he found the grand elections over; a dictator had been created to hold the *comitia*, so that during the few remaining days of his magistracy, he had nothing to do, and he also quickly perceived, upon trial, that he had no more credit than business. The senate, dissatisfied with him for some reason unknown, refused him a triumph. This provoked him to take a method entirely new, to do himself honour. At the head of his army, he marched to the temple of Jupiter Latialis, on the hill of Alba, with all the pomp with which triumphant victors were wont to march to the capitol; he made no alteration in the ceremony, except that instead of a crown of laurel, he wore a crown of myrtle, on account of his having defeated the Corsicans, in a place where was a grove of myrtles. This example of Papirius was afterwards followed by many generals to whom the senate refused the honour of a triumph.

Val. Max. B. 3. c. 6. Pliny, B. 15. c. 29.

Festus in voce Myrtea.

CHAP. XIII.

The first Illyrian War.

THE next year M. Æmilius Barbula, and M. Junius Pera, being consuls, the republic engaged in a new war out of Italy. Illyricum,

Year of ROME DXXIII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-nine.

222d Consulship.

or rather that part of the country so called, which lies upon the Adriatic, and confines upon Macedon and Epirus, was at this time governed by a woman, named Teuta, the widow of king Agron, and guardian to her son Pinæus, under age. The success of her late husband's arms, who had vanquished the Ætolians, made her vain and presumptuous; and being governed by evil councils, she, instead of prudently managing the affairs of her ward in peace, commissioned her subjects to practise piracy on the sea-coast, and seize all the places they could; which was, in a manner, declaring herself a common enemy to all nations. Her pirates had taken many ships belonging to the Roman merchants, and she was now besieging the island of Issa, in the Adriatic; the inhabitants of which had put themselves under the protection of the republic. Upon the complaints of those merchants, and to protect the people of Issa, the senate despatched two ambassadors, Caius and Lucius Coruncanius, to the Illyrian queen, to require of her that she would restrain her subjects from infesting the seas with their piracies. To this demand the queen answered, that she would take care that no injury should be done to the Romans by the Illyrian NATION, but that she thought it was never the custom of princes to hinder private subjects from making what advantages they could from the sea. "But the Romans (replied the younger of the ambassadors) have an excellent custom, which is, to punish private injuries by a public revenge, and to relieve the

Polyb B. 2. c. 2. Appian in Illyr.

Zon. B. 8. Dio. in Excerpt. xii.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 8.

Year of ROME DXXIII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-nine.

222d Consulship.

Pliny, B. 34. c. 6.

Dio. in Excerpt. xii. Zon. B. 8.

oppressed. Teuta, by the help of the gods, we shall find means to make you speedily reform your royal institutions." The proud queen, angry to excess at these words, secretly contrived to have the ambassadors murdered on their return homeward. Upon the news of this cruel breach of the law of nations, the senate, having first done honour to the manes of the ambassadors, by erecting, as was usual in such cases, statues three feet high to their memory, equipped a fleet with all expedition to begin the war. Teuta, alarmed with these preparations, despatched an embassy to Rome, to disown her having had any share in the murder, yet when the Romans demanded that the murderers should be delivered up, she peremptorily refused it.

Year of ROME DXXIV. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-eight.

223d Consulship.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 11.

The consuls therefore for the new year, P. Posthumius Albinus and Cn. Fulvius Centumalus, both embarked for Illyricum. Fulvius had the command of the fleet, consisting of 200 galleys, and Posthumius of the land forces, which were 20,000 foot, and a small body of horse. The queen, in the beginning of the spring, had augmented her fleet, and sent it to plunder the coasts of Greece. One part sailed to Corcyra*, (a small island lying near Pharos in the Adriatic) the rest anchored before Epidamnum. These, who had thought to surprise the town, having failed of their hope, rejoined the squadron that lay before Corcyra: the people of which place had called in the Ætolians and Achæans to their assistance.—Nevertheless, the Illyrians, being assisted by the

* Now Curzola.

Year of ROME DXXIV. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twen-eight.

223d Consulship.

Acarnanians, had the victory in a brisk action by sea: so that Corcyra, being no longer in a condition to defend itself, capitulated, and received an Illyrian garrison, commanded by Demetrius of Pharos: after which, the conquerors sailed to Epidamnum, and renewed the siege of that place.

Fulvius sailed directly for Corcyra; and though he learned by the way that the city had surrendered, he pursued his course, having a secret intelligence with Demetrius; who, knowing that some ill offices had been done him with Teuta, and fearing her resentment, had promised the consul to deliver up the place to him; and this he did with the consent of the Corcyræans, who thought it the only means of getting a protection from the insults of the Illyrians.

By the advice and assistance of the same Demetrius, the Romans (after Posthumius had landed his forces) made themselves masters of Apollonia, (a great city, and one of the keys of Illyricum, on the side of Macedon) and of many other places, of which, to reward his services, they appointed him governor. Teuta was quickly constrained by Posthumius's army to retire for safety to the inner part of Illyricum, while Fulvius, with his naval forces, cleared the sea of her pirates.

Year of ROME DXXV. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-seven.

224th Consulship.

Upon the election of Sp. Carvilius and Q. Fabius Verrucosus to the consulate, Fulvius was recalled from Illyricum, with the greater part of the fleet, and of the land forces; and Posthumius received orders to stay there with the

Year of ROME DXXV. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-seven.

224th Consulship.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 12. in Illyr.

remainder, in quality of proconsul. Teuta, who perhaps had built some hopes on a change of the Roman magistrates, finding that Posthumius not only wintered in Illyricum, but was raising fresh troops to pursue the war, sent early in the spring from Rhizon, (whither she had retired) an embassy to Rome to divert the storm. The senate granted her a peace on these conditions: "That she should pay an annual tribute to the Romans; surrender to them all Illyricum, a few places excepted; (Appian mentions Corcyra, Pharos, Issa, Epidamnum, (or Dyrrachium), and the country of the Atintanes, as yielded to the Romans) and (which principally concerned the Greeks) that not more than two of her ships, and these unarmed, should be permitted to sail beyond Lissos," a seaport on the confines of Illyricum and Macedon. Thus ended the first Illyrian war, which had not lasted quite two years. As for Teuta, whether out of shame, or compelled to it by a secret article of the treaty, she abdicated the regency, and Demetrius took her place.

Posthumius, after this, sent ambassadors to the Ætolians and Achæans, to lay before them the reasons for which the Romans had undertaken the war, what had been the events of it, and upon what terms a peace had been concluded. The ambassadors having performed their commission, returned to Corcyra much pleased with the courteous reception they had met with from those states. In reality, the treaty was of great benefit to the Greeks, and

delivered them from vexations and perpetual fears: for all Greece had been plagued and infested with the Illyrian piracies.

Year of ROME DXXV. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-seven.

224th Consulship.

Polybius remarks, that this was the first time that any Roman troops crossed the sea into Illyricum; and the first time that there was any intercourse by ambassadors between the Greeks and the Romans. The latter, about the same time, sent ambassadors to Corinth and to Athens. They were honourably received. The Corinthians, by a public act, decreed that the Romans should be admitted to the celebration of the Isthmian games.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 12.

And Zonaras tells us, that the Athenians declared the Romans citizens of Athens, and decreed them the privilege of being admitted to the mysteries of Eleusis; that is, of the festival of Ceres, celebrated at Eleusis, a city of Attica.

Zon. B. 8.

CHAP. XIV.

The Romans vanquish the Gauls on both sides the Po.

BEFORE the Illyrian war was well ended, the Italic Gauls on both sides the Po began to be in motion. Nevertheless, it does not appear that P. Valerius Flaccus and M. Attilius Regulus, the consuls for the new year, took the field against them, or performed any military exploit[1].

Year of ROME DXXVI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-six.

225th Consulship.

[1] Some authors say, that the first establishment of two provincial prætors, one for the government of Sicily, and

Year of ROME DXXVI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty six.

225th Consulship.

The Romans had the extremest dread of those enemies who had formerly reduced their state to the very brink of total destruction. There was a prophecy at this time current at Rome, 'That the Gauls and Greeks should one day be in possession of it.' This prophecy is said to have been found in the Sybilline books. The completion of it seemed now to approach, when the states of the republic were bounded on one side by the Greeks, and on the other by the Gauls. The succeeding consuls, therefore, M. Valerius Messala, and L. Apustius Fullo, consulted with the pontifices, how to quiet the apprehensions of the people; and immediately an edict was published by the decemvirs, who had the care of the Sybilline books, commanding that two Greeks, a man and a woman, and two Gauls, a man and a woman, should be buried alive in the Ox Market; and by this they persuaded the people, that the prophecy was fulfilled, and that the Gauls and Greeks had taken possession of Rome.

Year of ROME DXXVII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-five.

226th Consulship.

Zon. B. 8. Oros. B. 4. c. 13.

The difficulties raised by superstition being thus surmounted, the Romans applied themselves to create divisions among the Gauls, and to levy a prodigious force; which (according

one for that of Sardinia and Corsica, was in this consulate, and not at the time before mentioned. Be that as it will, it was in this year that, at the motion of two tribunes, Villius and Titius, a law passed, empowering the Roman prætors to appoint, as well in the provinces belonging to the republic as at Rome, guardians to those women and children who had none. This law was called *Villia Titia.*—*Catrou.*

Pomp. de Orig. Juris. Justinian Instit. B. 1. Ulpian, c. 11. de tutelis.

to Polybius[2]) amounted to near 700,000 foot, and near 70,000 horse, so great was the terror

Year of ROME DXXVI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-five.

226th Consulship.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 24.

[2] The numbers found upon the muster, as recorded by Polybius, are as follow:

	Foot.	Horse.
With the consuls marched four legions of Romans, each legion consisting of 5,200 foot and 300 horse	20,800	2,200
They had also with them of the allies	30,000	2,000
Of the Sabines and Hetrurians were sent, under the command of a prætor, to the frontiers of Hetruria	50,000	4,000
Of the Umbrians and Sarcinates (from the Apennines) 20,000, and as many of the Veneti and Cenomani were appointed to invade the Boii, in order to oblige them to keep a part of their forces at home, for their own defence	40,000	
At Rome were kept ready to march, (on any exigence) of the citizens	20,000	1,500
These were strengthened by a body of the allies, amounting to	30,000	2,000
On the muster-rolls sent to the senate from the allies were,		
Of the Latins	80,000	5,000
Of the Samnites	70,000	7,000
Of the Iapyges and Messapyges	50,000	16,000
Of the people of Lucania	30,000	3,000
Of the Marsi, Marrucini, Ferentini, and Vestini	20,000	4,000
The Romans had also in Sicily and Tarentum, two legions, consisting each of 4,200 foot and 200 horse	8,400	400
Beside all these, of the common people in Rome and in Campania, were mustered as fit to bear arms	250,000	23,000
	699,200	69,100

Polybius, on occasion of this muster, expresses his admiration of the hardy enterprise of Hannibal, to attack an

Year of ROME DXXVII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-five.

226th Consulship. Polyb. B. 2. c. 23.

which the threatened invasion from these barbarians spread over all Italy. The Gauls, nevertheless, with only 50,000 foot and 20,000 horse, began the hostilities, entered Hetruria,

empire of such prodigious strength with an army of scarcely 20,000 men.

But Sir Walter Raleigh observes, that this muster seems to have been like to that which Lodowic Sforza made, when Lewis the XIIth invaded Milan; at which time, the better to encourage himself and his subjects, he took a roll of all persons able to bear arms within the duchy, though indeed he was never able to bring a tenth part of them into the field. Certain it is (adds our historian) that the battles of Trebia, Thrasymene, and Cannæ, did not consume any such proportion as was answerable to this large account. Yet were the Romans fain to arm their slaves, even for want of other soldiers, after their overthrow at Cannæ. Wherefore the marvel is not great, that the Carthaginians and others were little terrified with the report of such a multitude: for all heads are not fit for helmets; though the Roman citizens were in general as good fighting men as elsewhere might be found.

Another reason may be also assigned why Hannibal should not be much frightened at these muster-rolls, even supposing the far greater part of the men there registered, to be fit to bear arms. Polybius tells us, that the people of Italy, terrified at the approach of the Gauls, did not consider themselves now as being to fight only as allies of Rome, and for the preservation of her empire, but for their own proper safety, their families, their fortunes, all that was dear to them; and that it was for this reason they so readily executed the orders that were sent to them from the senate. The contest with the Gauls was looked upon as the common cause of all Italy.

But when Hannibal passed the Alps, the case was widely different; for we may well conclude from the neutrality and cold behaviour generally observed by the allies of Rome on that occasion, that they looked upon this war as regarding her only, and in which they themselves had little concern.

pillaging and laying waste the country, without opposition.

Year of ROME DXXVIII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty four.

227th Consulship.

The republic had promoted L. Æmilius Papus and C. Attilius Regulus to the consulship. The latter went into Sardinia, to quiet some commotion there; while Æmilius took upon him the conduct of the war with the Insubrian and Boian Gauls, joined by a numerous army, from the other side of the Alps, of the Gæsatæ[3], so called (says Polybius) because they served for pay, the word having that signification.— They were commanded by two kings, Concolitanus and Aneroestus.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 22.

Æmilius being uncertain what route the Gæsatæ would take after they had passed the Alps, had led his troops to Ariminum, to hinder the enemy from entering upon the Roman lands by the coasts of the Adriatic sea. At the same time a prætor, with a body of 50,000 foot and 4000 horse, had been ordered into Hetruria, to defend the frontiers of that country. But in his march, he missed of the enemy; who were advanced to the neighbourhood of Clusium, (within three days march of Rome) when they heard that a Roman army was behind them, and would soon be at their heels. They immediately turned back to meet the prætor, and give him battle. It being about the close

c. 26.

c. 25.

[3] According to the Jesuits, the Gæsatæ were not a particular people of Transalpine Gaul, but probably Germans dispersed through all the Gallic nation, whose profession was arms, and who hired themselves to whoever would employ them in war. They had their name from a weapon they bore, called gæsum.

Year of ROME DXXVIII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-four.

227th Consulship.

of day when the two armies came in sight of each other, they both encamped. But in the night, the leaders of the Gauls, having meditated a stratagem, marched away with their infantry, towards Fæsula[4], leaving only their cavalry to appear in the field, when day should return. In the morning, the prætor seeing nothing but horse to oppose him, sallied out of his entrenchments and attacked them. The Gallic cavalry, according to their instructions, instantly gave ground, and took the road to Fæsula. Their flight drew the Romans after them, never suspecting that they should find the enemy's infantry in their way. The latter on a sudden appeared, and fell vigorously upon the prætor's troops, already fatigued with the pursuit. 6000 of his men were killed upon the spot; the rest, in disorder, fled to a neighbouring hill, where they entrenched themselves.—The first thought of the Gallic generals was to force the enemy immediately in this post; but considering afterwards that their own troops were wearied with the former night's march, they thought it best to give them some repose, and defer the attack till the next day.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 26 to 31.

In this distress of the prætor's army, the consul Æmilius came seasonably to their relief. Being informed of the approach of the Gæsatæ towards Rome, he had instantly quitted his camp at Ariminum, and had marched with expedition to the defence of his country. He was now encamped within a small distance from the enemy; and the prætor's troops, see-

A city of Hetruria at the foot of the Apennines.

Year of ROME DXXVIII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-four.

227th Consulship.

ing the fires in his camp, and conjecturing the truth, took courage. The Gauls perceiving the same fires, were greatly alarmed at the consul's unexpected arrival; and being unwilling to hazard by a battle the loss of the rich booty they had got, they, by the advice of their king, Aneroestus, decamped in the night, purposing to march home through Insubria; and when they had secured their booty, to return to the war. In their march they kept along the shore of the Hetrurian sea. Æmilius, though his army was now strengthened by the remains of the prætor's troops, did not think it advisable to hazard a pitched battle; but chose rather to follow the enemy close, and watch his opportunity to harass them in their retreat, and, if possible, to recover some part of the spoils they were carrying off. It luckily happened, that his colleague, Attilius, having put a speedy end to the troubles in Sardinia, had, in his return home, landed with his army at Pisa, and was now marching along the coast of the Hetrurian sea towards Rome: he was overjoyed when, near Telamon, a little port of Hetruria, he learned, by his scouts, the situation of things. And, in order to intercept the Gauls, he immediately drew up his infantry, making as wide a front as he could; and then commanded them to advance slowly to meet the enemy. He himself hastened with his cavalry to the top of a hill, by the foot of which the enemy must necessarily pass. His ambition was to have the chief glory of the success; and he persuaded

Year of ROME DXXVIII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-four.

227th Consulship.

himself that by being the first to begin the battle, he should obtain that advantage.

The Gauls imagined at first, that this body of Roman horse was only a detachment from Æmilius's army, and therefore ordered their cavalry to advance and drive them from their post. As for Æmilius, as soon as he perceived fighting at a distance, he concluded it was his colleague Attilius attacking the enemy in front, for he had been informed of his landing at Pisa. He immediately detached all his horse to fetch a compass and join those of Attilius. Upon the arrival of so powerful a reinforcement the Romans renewed the attack with more briskness than ever. Attilius, fighting with the utmost intrepidity, was killed in the engagement. A Gaul cut off his head, and sticking it on the top of a lance, carried it through all the files of the Gallic troops. However, the death of this brave man proved no advantage to them. One of his lieutenants took his place, and the action was continued as before. The Romans in the end had the victory, and kept possession of their post.

During the conflict between the cavalry on both sides, the Gallic generals had time to form their infantry. Having two consular armies to deal with, one in their front, the other in their rear, they divided their battalions pretty equally, one half of them turning their backs to the other half; and to avoid being attacked in flank, they placed all their waggons and other carriages on the wings. Their plunder

they had carried to a neighbouring hill, where they left it under a good guard.

Year of ROME DXXVIII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-four.

227th Consulship.

The Gæsatæ, who made the first line of the troops that faced Æmilius, confiding in their gigantic stature and strength, and observing that the plain where they were drawn up was full of bushes and briars, to avoid being incommoded in the battle by the thorns catching in their clothes, stripped themselves naked, keeping only their arms. But this vain confidence proved their destruction. For having only small bucklers, which were not sufficient to ward their huge bodies from the darts that were unexpectedly showered upon them by the Romans at a distance, they presently fell into discouragement and perplexity. Some, transported with rage and despair, threw themselves madly upon the enemy, where they found certain death; others, pale, discomfited, and trembling, drew back in disorder, breaking the ranks that were behind them. And thus were quelled, at the very first attack, the pride and ferocity of the Gæsatæ.

And now the Roman dartmen, retiring within the intervals of the army, the cohorts advanced to encounter the Insubrians, Boians, and Tauriscans, who fought with great resolution; for though they were hard pressed, and covered with wounds, they sustained the shock and kept their post, and may be truly said to have been inferior to the Romans only in their arms. Their shields were not so large as those of the Romans, and their swords were made only for cutting. Nevertheless they maintained the

Year of ROME DXXVIII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-four.

227th Consulship.

Diod. Sic. B 25. in Eclog.

fight till the Roman cavalry, who had been victorious on the eminence, driving at once full speed upon them, put an end to the struggle. The defeat was general; 40,000 of the Gauls remained dead upon the field of battle, and 10,000 were made prisoners, together with Concolitanus, one of their kings. The rest escaped by flight; but Aneroestus, their other king, the bravest soldier and most experienced commander of all the Gauls, cut his throat afterwards in rage and despair. Æmilius after this victory marched his army into the country of the Boian Gauls, enriched his soldiers with booty, and then returned to Rome, where he had a magnificent triumph.

Year of ROME DXXIX. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-three.

228th Consulship.

Polyb. B 2. c. 31.

The fear of the Gallic war was over, but the desire of revenge remained; and the next year's consuls therefore, T. Manlius Torquatus and Q. Fulvius Flaccus, had Gaul assigned them for their provinces. But these great men did not succeed to the expectation of the Romans, nor pass the Po as it was hoped they would. Their marches were retarded by violent rains, and a plague infected their army, which latter calamity not suffering them to return to Rome at the usual time, the famous Cæcilius Metellus was created dictator, to hold the *comitia* in their absence for the new elections.

Fast. Cap.

Year of ROME DXXX. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-two.

229th Consulship.

C. Flaminius Nepos and P. Furius Philo, being chosen consuls, put the design of their predecessors in execution, and notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of the Gauls, passed the Po, and entered Insubria; but having suffered much, both in their passage and afterwards,

Year of ROME DXXX. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-two.

229th Consulship.

and finding they could perform nothing of moment, they made a truce with this people, and retired into the territory of their friends the Cænomani. There they continued awhile augmenting their army with auxiliaries; and then renewed their incursions on the Insubrian plains at the foot of the Alps. Hereupon the princes of this nation, perceiving the fixed determination of the Romans to subdue them, resolved to put all to the hazard of a battle; and having collected all their strength, which amounted to 50,000 men, marched against the enemy, and encamped within sight of them.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 32.

It happened a little before this, that the Romans were much frightened by various prodigies in the heavens, in the waters, and upon the earth. In Hetruria, extraordinary lights appeared in the air. At Ariminum three moons were seen at the same time. A river of Picenum rolled waters as red as blood. The Italians felt the violent earthquake that overturned the Colossus of Rhodes. At Rome, a vulture lighted in the middle of the Forum, and staid there a considerable time. The augurs being consulted upon these prodigies, declared that there must have been some defect in the ceremonial at the election of the consuls; upon which, a courier was immediately despatched from the senate, with letters commanding them to return to Rome. But when these letters arrived, the consuls being on the banks of the river Addua, were in sight of the powerful army of the Insubrians; and Flaminius, either guessing at the substance of the letters, or having been inform-

Zon. B. 8. Plut. Life of Marcel. and Oros. B. 4. c. 13.

Year of ROME DXXX. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-two.

229th Consulship. Polyb. B. 2. c. 32 33.

ed of it by his friends, prevailed with his colleague not to open the packet till after the battle.

The Romans, being sensible that the enemy exceeded them in numbers, had intended to use the aid of those Gauls with whom they had reinforced their army. But now, remembering the faithlessness of these people, who were to be employed against troops of the same nation, they could not resolve to trust them in the present important conjuncture. At the same time it was by no means proper to express a diffidence of them, in such a manner as should give them occasion of quarrel. Flaminius, to free himself from this perplexity, made his Gauls pass to the other side of the river on a bridge of boats; and then, by causing the boats to be hauled to his own side, put it out of the power of those suspected troops to do him any harm during the action. By this means also his own army was left without any hopes but in victory; for the river which they had at their backs was unfordable. Thus far the conduct of Flaminius appears commendable: but he was guilty of a great oversight in drawing up his army too near the brink of the river; for he left so little space between that and his rear, that had the Romans been ever so little pressed during the engagement, they had not whither to retire but into the water. However, this defect of the consul's management was supplied by the bravery and skill of his soldiers, instructed by their tribunes. These officers had observed in former conflicts, that the Gauls

were not formidable but in the ardour of their first attack, and that their swords were of such a fashion and temper as, after two or three good cuts, to stand bent in their hands, and so become useless to them if they had not time to straighten them on the ground with their foot. The tribunes therefore furnished the first line of the Roman troops with the arms of the triarii, or third line; that is to say, with long javelins, like our halberds, and ordered the soldiers, first to make use of these, and then to draw their swords. These precautions had the desired success. The swords of the Gauls by the first strokes on the Roman javelins became blunted, bent, and useless; and then the Romans closing in with them, stabbed them in the face and breast with their pointed swords, making a terrible slaughter. 9000 of the enemy were killed, and 17,000 taken prisoners.

Year of ROME DXXX. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-two.

229th Consulship.

Oros. B. 4. c. 13.

After the action the consuls opened the packet. Furius was for immediately obeying the order; Flaminius insisted on pursuing the war: 'The victory (he said) was a sufficient proof that there had been no defect in the auguries, and that the letters of revocation were wholly from the envy of the senate; that he would finish his enterprise, and would teach the people not to be deceived by THE OBSERVATION OF BIRDS, or any thing else.' Pursuant to this resolution, he attacked and took several castles, and one considerable town, with the spoils of which he enriched his soldiers, to prepare them for his defence in that quarrel which he knew would arise between him and the se-

Zon. B. 8.

Year of ROME DXXX. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-two.

229th Consulship.

nate. His colleague would not accompany him in these expeditions, but continued encamped, waiting to join him when he should return from his incursion.

When the two colleagues came back to Rome with their armies, the people as well as the senate at first shewed their resentment by a very cold reception; but the troops of Flaminius, whom he had enriched, found means to prevail with the former to grant both the consuls the honours of the triumph. The senate, however, obliged these magistrates afterwards to depose themselves; such a respect, says Plutarch, had the Romans for religion, making all their affairs depend on the sole will of the gods, and never suffering, even in their greatest prosperities, the least contempt or neglect of the ancient oracles, or of the usages of their country; being fully persuaded, that what most contributed to the welfare of their state, was not the success of their arms, but their steady submission to the gods.

Life of Marcellus.

Year of ROME DXXXI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-one.

230th Consulship.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 3. 4.

The *comitia* being held by an interrex, M. Claudius Marcellus (of a plebeian branch of the Claudian family) who became afterwards so famous, was raised to the consulate with Cn. Cornelius Scipio. They were scarce entered upon their office, when a deputation came to Rome from the Insubrians, to implore a peace; but the senate, at the instigation of the new consuls, who represented those Gauls as an untractable people, on whom there could be no dependence, dismissed their deputies with a refusal. Upon this they resolved to bring into

Year of ROME DXXXI. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty-one.

230th Consulship.

Italy a fresh inundation of Gæsatæ, who were always ready to fight for hire. 30,000 of these mercenaries crossed the Alps, under the command of their king, Viridomarus.

Early in the spring, the consuls passed the Po, and laid siege to Acerræ, a place near that river, and in the neighbourhood of Cremona. The Gauls were now 90,000 strong, yet they thought it more advisable to oblige the Romans to raise the siege of that frontier town, by making a useful diversion, than to hazard a battle. Viridomarus, therefore, with 10,000 men, passed the Po, entered the Roman territories, and advanced towards Clastidium in Liguria. Upon the news of this motion of the Gauls, Marcellus, followed by only two-thirds of the Roman cavalry, and about 600 of the light armed infantry, left his camp and came up with the enemy near the place before named. He drew up his little army all in one line, giving it as much extent as he could. The Gauls, seeing the infantry of the Romans so inconsiderable, and always despising their cavalry, had no doubt of the victory. But when the two armies were just ready to join battle, Viridomarus advancing before his troops, defied the Roman general to single combat. Marcellus joyfully accepted the challenge, (for single combat was his talent) rushed upon his enemy, killed him, and stripped him of his armour; and then the Gæsatæ were so disheartened that the victor, with his handful of Romans, put them entirely to flight.

Plut. Life of Marcellus.

During the absence of Marcellus, his col-

Polyb. B. 2. c. 34.

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230th Consulship.

Eutrop. B. 3. c. 6.

Zon. B. 8.

league had taken Acerræ, and laid siege to Milan (or Mediolanum) the chief city of Insubria, but was himself besieged by the Gauls, while he lay before the town. The return of the victorious consul changed the scene; the Gæsatæ quite discouraged broke up their camp, fled, and repassed the Alps; and Milan immediately surrendered at discretion. Como was reduced to the same necessity; and, in short, the whole nation of the Insubrians submitted to receive law from the republic. Insubria and Liguria were now made one province, and called Cisalpine Gaul; and thus did all Italy become subject to Rome, from the Alps to the Ionian sea.

Vide Pigh. ad Ann. 531.

Plut. Life of Marcellus.

The senate decreed Marcellus a triumph, and it was said in the decree to be, for having conquered the Insubrians and Germans, which makes it probable that the Gæsatæ were originally German. The consul, in his triumphal procession, carried on his shoulders a trophy of the spoils of Viridomarus; and this was the third and last triumph in which any *opima spolia* were seen at Rome. As for Cornelius, Marcellus's colleague, he was continued in the new province, as proconsul, to regulate the affairs of it; and the same *comitia* which allotted him that post, chose M. Minucius Rufus and P. Cornelius Scipio Asina to be the consuls for the new year. The conquest of Istria, on the borders of the Adriatic, was the only military exploit during their magistracy.

Fast. Cap.

See Vol. 1. B. 1. c. 2. § 12. et B. 2. c. 33. § 1.

Year of ROME DXXXII. Bef J. C. Two hundred twenty.

231st Consulship.

Eutrop. B. c. 7.

CHAP. XV.

The second Illyrian War.

ABOUT this time, Demetrius of Pharos, whom the Roman republic had placed in the government of Illyricum, and guardianship of the young king, Pinæus, seeing the Romans engaged in a troublesome war with the Gauls, and that Carthage wanted only a fair opportunity to break with them, had despised their orders, forced the Atintanes to renounce their alliance with the republic, and sent fifty ships of war beyond Lissos, to pillage the islands called Cyclades, in the Archipelago.

Year of ROME DXXXII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred twenty.

231st Consulship.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 16. App. Illyr. Dio. in Eclog. 9. ap. Vales.

The new consuls, L. Veturius Philo and C. Lutatius, would have sailed for Illyricum, if they had not been forced to depose themselves upon some defect found in the ceremony of their election. They were succeeded by M. Æmilius Lepidus and M. Valerius Lævinus; but the season was now too far advanced to begin the expedition, so that it was postponed to the next consulship. [By a census taken this year, the number of Roman citizens fit to bear arms appeared to be two hundred seventy thousand two hundred and thirteen. The census, as usual, was followed by a lustrum, the forty-third from its institution.]

Year of ROME DXXXIII. Bef. J. C. Two hundred nineteen.

232nd Consulship.

Vide Pighi. ad Ann. 533. Livy, Epit. B. 20.

BOTH the consuls of the new year, M. Livius Salinator and L. Æmilius Paulus, embarked for Illyricum. Demetrius had assisted Philip, king of Macedon, (while a minor under the tuition

Year of ROME DXXXIV.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 16, 18, 19.

Year of ROME DXXXIV. Bef. J. C. Two hundred eighteen.

233d Consulship.

of his uncle, Antigonus Doson) in his wars with the Lacedæmonians, and had thereby secured himself a retreat with that prince, in case of a disaster. He had also fortified Dimalum, a city of importance in Illyricum; and having assembled the choicest of his troops in the island of Pharos, his own country, held his court there. Early in the spring, Æmilius sat down before Dimalum, and by surprising efforts took it in seven days; upon which all the old allies of Rome, who had been compelled to submit to the tyrant, returned joyfully to their former engagements. The next attempt was upon Pharos, the last refuge of the traitor. As the enterprise was difficult, Æmilius thought it necessary to join artifice to valour. The Roman fleet had two consular armies on board it; one of them was ordered to land in the island in the night, and hide itself in forests and behind rocks. This done, a detachment of the fleet appeared off Pharos in open day, as it were with design to land some forces there. Demetrius drew his army out of the town to the sea shore, to hinder the descent; which when the legionaries that were already landed perceived, they left their ambush, and marching silently, seized an eminence between the city and the port. It was of the last consequence to Demetrius to drive the Romans from this post, and therefore, having encouraged his men, he led them straight to the attack.

This gave the consuls on board the fleet an opportunity to make their descent, and then the Illyrians, finding themselves invested on all

sides, presently took to flight. As for the regent, he made his escape to Macedon, in a bark kept ready for that purpose.

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The defeat of the Illyrian army was followed by the taking of Pharos, which the Romans first plundered, and then levelled with the ground. Thus Rome became a second time mistress of Illyricum. However, she did not reduce it to the state of a Roman province, having some compassion for the young king, who had been embarked in these affairs merely by the fault of his guardians.

233d Consulship.

Polyb. B. 4. c. 66. B. 3. c. 19.

App. in Illyr.

The consuls returned to Rome, and obtained a triumph for their victories. Their conduct, nevertheless, had not been in all respects pleasing to the people, as appeared after the expiration of their magistracy[1]. Livius and Æmilius were then accused before the tribes of having applied a great part of the spoils taken from the enemy to their own use, and of having distributed the rest of the booty partially among the soldiers. Æmilius upon his trial was acquitted, but Livius was condemned by all the tribes except the Mæcian; an affront which he resented to excess, as we shall see hereafter when he comes to be censor.

Auth. of the Lives of Illust. Men, c. 50.

Front. Strat. B. 4. c. 1. § 45. Livy, B. 29. c. 37.

In this consulship, the senate observing that

[1] It was at this time Archagathus of Peloponnesus introduced surgery into Rome. At first he met with great applause, and a shop was built for him at the public charge, in a part of the city where four streets met; but as his constant practice in the cure of wounds was to make large incisions, which are painful remedies, his art soon fell into disrepute.

Plin. B 29. c. 1.

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233d Consulship.

the great concourse of strangers from Egypt and the Levant had introduced into the city the worship of Isis and Osiris, to whom several sanctuaries were already built, ordered these to be all demolished, agreeably to one of the twelve tables, forbidding the worship of strange gods. No workman, however, would venture the guilt of sacrilege by doing it, such credit had their worship gained among the people.—The consul Æmilius, therefore, full of zeal for the religion and laws of his country, laid aside his consular robe, took a hatchet, and beat down those oratories to the ground.

Val. Max. B. 1. c. 3. § 3.

But the most important transaction of this year was the planting colonies at Placentia and Cremona in the Gallic territories; this being the chief motive which inclined the Boians and Insubrians to favour Hannibal in his attempt upon Italy, that memorable and surprising event which is next to engage the reader's attention.

Livy, Epit. B. 20. Livy, B. 21. c. 25.

CHAP. XVI.

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR, OR THE WAR OF HANNIBAL.

Its causes and commencement.

TWENTY-TWO years were now past, since Carthage, bending to the superior fortune of Rome, had with shame and reluctance, submitted to the hard conditions of that treaty, which put an end to the FIRST PUNIC WAR. To relinquish the fair island of Sicily to an imperious rival

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was a sore and grievous article; and perhaps the payment of those large sums, that were further exacted for the peace, was a yet more sensible mortification to a republic of avaricious merchants: but necessity compelled; nor could even the courage and abilities of the incomparable Amilcar furnish any remedy, in the then distressful situation of affairs. For after the defeat of Hanno at the Ægates, which made the Romans masters of the sea, neither the army of Amilcar at Eryx, nor the garrisons of Lilybæum and Drepanum, could receive any supply of provisions or military stores. Sicily therefore was unavoidably lost: the army might be preserved; but the only visible way to preserve it, was by a peace with the enemy. Amilcar's immediate object in the treaty was this preservation of the troops. Yet even this neither he nor they would consent to purchase at the expense of their honour as soldiers. They chose rather to perish than to give up their arms. As for the annual sums which the consul Lutatius demanded from Carthage, Amilcar, on the part of his republic, readily yielded to that imposition. Nor did he much hesitate in complying with the further demands of money, which the ten commissioners from Rome insisted upon, before they would ratify the peace. What rendered him so tractable on this head, was doubtless (beside the danger of his army) the resolution he had secretly formed, that no more of the stipulated tribute should be paid, than was required to be paid at the time of the ratification. For, as we learn from

See p. 124.

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Polybius, he was determined to renew the war against Rome as soon as it should be possible to do it. Whatever fears some of the citizens of Carthage might have of the war's being transferred from Sicily to their own gates, if a peace were not concluded, it is evident that Amilcar, with that army of hardy veterans he then commanded, feared no enemy but famine; and could he have found means to transport those troops safely into Africa without a peace, he would have entered into no treaty with the Romans.

Polyb. B. 5. c. 9.

B. 3. c. 9.

The indignation of Amilcar, when he was thus constrained to leave Eryx and abandon Sicily, is assigned by Polybius for the FIRST CAUSE of that memorable war which we are going to enter upon: for though this implacable enemy of the Romans did not live to attempt that vengeance, which to his last breath he was ever meditating, we shall presently see, that his spirit of revenge was not extinguished by his death.

The dreadful and destructive conflict at home, to which, on his return thither from Sicily, he was obliged to give all his attention during more than three years, unavoidably suspended the execution of his purpose against Rome.—And when that domestic disturbance was happily quelled, the treasury and strength of Carthage were too much exhausted to furnish what was necessary to support her in so arduous an enterprise. The Romans, sensible of her weakness, took advantage of it (as we have seen) to extort from her not only the cession of Sardi-

See p. 166.

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nia, but the sum of 1200 talents; a fine shamelessly demanded for the reparation of an injury they had not received. And this odious extortion is held to be the SECOND and the PRINCIPAL CAUSE of that war, which followed it at almost twenty years distance. For so barefaced an injustice, so insulting a procedure, as it furnished Carthage with a just ground to attack the Romans whenever she should be in a condition to do it, so it also brought all the Carthaginians in general to concur with their brave captain in his resentment and designs; it being now sufficiently manifest, that they must either resolve to become obedient subjects of Rome, or take some effectual measures to render themselves the more potent republic.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 10.

With this view, Amilcar, soon after the reestablishment of tranquillity at home, by the suppression of the mercenaries and rebels, had a new army committed to him, to be employed in extending the Carthaginian empire in Spain; a country that both abounded with riches, and was able to supply the republic with a sufficient number of brave troops, to make head against those multitudes of soldiers with which Italy furnished the Romans.

How deeply Amilcar's hatred to Rome had rooted itself in his heart, and that revenge was his chief aim in this expedition, we have a singular and incontestible proof, in what he did just before his departure from Africa. His son Hannibal, at that time about nine years old, was with him, when he performed a sacrifice to Jupiter for the success of his intended voyage.

c. 11.

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The rites being all ended, and Amilcar having ordered the rest of the assistants to withdraw, he called his son to him, and tenderly caressing the boy, asked him whether he were willing to accompany him into Spain? The boy not only most readily declared his consent, but with all the blandishments and eager vivacity peculiar to children, begged of his father, that he would permit him to go. Amilcar then taking him by the hand, led him to the altar, made him lay his hand upon it, touch the sacrifice, and swear, "That he would never be in friendship with the Romans."

Polyb. B. 2. c. 1.

The Carthaginian passed the Straits of Hercules, and landed with his army on the western coast of Spain. Nine years he conducted the war in this country with uninterrupted success[1], reducing many nations to the

[1] According to Zonaras, in the consulate of Q. Fabius and M. Pomponius, [in the 520th of Rome, when Amilcar had been about five years in Spain] the Romans believing that the wars they had to sustain against the Ligurians and Sardinians, were owing to the secret practices of the Carthaginians, sent to these some ambassadors, who demanded of them, in harsh terms, certain sums of money due by treaty, and that they should forbear touching at any of the islands in the Roman jurisdiction; and to gain the readier compliance to these demands, the ambassadors presented a caduceus and a javelin, the one a symbol of peace, the other of war, bidding the senate take their choice. The Carthaginians, nothing terrified at this menace, answered, that they would choose neither, but would readily accept whichsoever they should think fit to leave them.

If this story [which does not seem probable] be true, the boldness of the Carthaginians proceeded doubtless from the great success of Amilcar in Spain.

obedience of his republic: but at length in a battle which he fought with the Vetones, a people of Lusitania*, (defending himself a long time with admirable resolution) he was encompassed and slain; carrying with him to the grave the same great honour and reputation, which by many signal victories he had acquired, together with the name of a second Mars.

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* Portugal. Livy, B. 21. c. 10.

This happened about the time when the Romans made their first expedition against the Illyrians.

See p. 182.

Upon the death of Amilcar, the command of the army was given to his son-in-law Asdrubal, at that time admiral of the galleys. He was no bad soldier, and a very able statesman; by his wisdom and gentle manners attracting the good-will of many princes of that country, and gaining more subjects to Carthage by his wonderful address in negotiation, than his predecessor had done by the sword. He also built new Carthage, (the present Carthagena) a town commodiously situated to be a magazine of arms, and to receive succours from Africa.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 13.

Livy, B. 21. c. 2.

Rome began now to be alarmed. Her jealousy of Carthage had been asleep during Amilcar's remote conquests in Spain: but the formidable growth of her rival's power, under the management of Asdrubal, awakened it. She did not dare, however, to exact any thing of the Carthaginians very grievous, or to commence hostilities against them; being at this time in extreme dread of the Gauls, who threatened her with an invasion. Ambassadors were

See p. 185.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 13.

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therefore sent to Asdrubal[2], to draw him by fair words into a treaty, wherein he should covenant, "That the Carthaginians would confine their arms within the Iberus." No mention was made of any other part of Spain in this treaty.

As the Spanish affairs had no relation to the peace between the two states, this demand was unreasonable; and the Romans seem to have sought by it a pretext of quarrel, when by freeing themselves from the Gauls, they should be in a condition to begin a new war with Carthage. For should Asdrubal refuse to engage, or, engaging, not perform, they would in either case be furnished with such a pretext, though perhaps in neither would the pretext be just[3].

Asdrubal was full of the same spirit as Amilcar, and had the same designs ever at heart. However he made no difficulty to comply with the motion of the ambassadors, having much to do before he could pass that boundary which the Romans were for fixing to his conquests.

Sir W. R.

By this treaty Rome acquired some reputation in Spain. For when it was conceived by the Spaniards, that the African republic, which sought to be mistress over them, stood herself in fear of a more potent state, they began to

[2] According to Appian, the treaty was made at Carthage, but the sequel proves this to be false.

[3] This will be explained when we come to the proper place for it.

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turn their eyes hither for protection; and the Saguntines, whose city was on the south-side of the Iberus, entered into a confederacy with the Romans, and were gladly received.

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When Asdrubal had governed in Spain for the space of eight years, he was treacherously murdered by a certain Gaul[4], whom he had provoked by some injury. The Carthaginians, upon receipt of this news, suspended the nomination of a new commander, till they could learn the inclinations of the army; and they no sooner understood that the soldiers had unanimously made choice of Hannibal[5] for their

Polyb. B. 2. c. 36. B 3. c. 13.

Livy, B. 21. c 3.

[4] Livy and Appian say, that Asdrubal was killed in revenge by a slave, whose master he had put to death.

[5] It is surprising that the judicious Mr. Rollin (in his Hist. Anc. 380.) should follow Livy, in relating an idle story full of absurdity, and which he afterwards (following again the same author) manifestly contradicts.

The Latin historian reports, "that Asdrubal [about three years before his death] wrote to Carthage to have Hannibal, who was then hardly at the age of puberty, sent to him, that the young man might be trained up to war, so as one day to imitate his father's prowess. He adds, that Hanno and others opposed this motion in the senate, imputing to Asdrubal dishonest intentions with regard to the lad; but that it was carried by a majority.—That Hannibal arriving in Spain, drew all eyes upon him; and that the old soldiers observed in his person and manner a wonderful resemblance to his father, &c. That he served three years under Asdrubal, and was then declared general of the army." Now is there the least probability, either that Hannibal should arrive at such a masterly knowledge in the art of war in three years service; or that the Carthaginians should trust the conduct of their army and their empire in Spain to a young man of so short experience? That Livy was very careless in delivering this tra-

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Polyb. B. 3. c. 13.

leader, than they called an assembly, and with one voice ratified the election.

Hannibal, soon after his confirmation in the command of the troops, undertook the reduction of the Olcades. The success was answerable to his desires. Having amassed much treasure by the sale of the booty taken in several towns, he marched to New Carthage, which he made his winter-quarters; where liberally paying the soldiers who had served under him, and promising them further gratifications, he both gained their affections, and inspired them with extraordinary hopes.

c. 14. Early the next spring, he led his army against the Vaccæi, and made a fortunate expedition: but in his return home, being attacked by the Carpetani, whom great numbers of the fugitive Olcades and Vaccæi (driven out of their own countries) had joined, he was reduced to very great straits. Could the enemy have com-

dition, appears sufficiently from the age he gives to Hannibal, at the time of his being sent into Spain, at Asdrubal's request, HUNC VIX DUM PUBEREM, when he was scarce fourteen. By the historian's own account, Hannibal was nine when Amilcar went into Spain; Amilcar lived there nine years; and Asdrubal had commanded near five years before he sent for the young man.

Mr. Rollin, aware, I suppose, of this inconsistency, drops the *vix dum puberem*, and makes Hannibal to be twenty-two at the time of his going from Carthage to Asdrubal; and by this indeed he avoids the anachronism: but then he seems not to have been aware, that the whole story is overthrown by what Hannibal says in the senate of Carthage, at the end of the second Punic war, "That he had never before been at home since he was nine years old." See Livy, B. 30. and Mr. Rollin, Vol. I. p. 486.

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pelled him to a pitched battle, he had inevitably been undone; but he, with great skill, making a slow retreat, till he had got the river Tagus between him and them, so judiciously disposed his horse and elephants, as entirely to defeat their endeavours to cross the river after him, which they attempted to their prodigious loss, by several fords at one and the same time. After which, passing the river himself, and pursuing his advantage, he, with terrible slaughter, routed this army of 100,000 barbarians.

The Vaccæi being thus vanquished, there remained no nation on that side the Iberus who durst think of opposing the Carthaginians, except the Saguntines. Hannibal had hitherto carefully forbore all hostility against this people, being ever mindful of his father's advice, which was, to avoid giving occasion to the Romans to declare war against Carthage, until such time as by the enlargement of her dominion and strength she was in a condition to cope with them. This time was now at hand; and the great success of the Carthaginian arms in Spain, under the conduct of Amilcar, Asdrubal, and Hannibal, is therefore assigned by Polybius for the THIRD CAUSE of the SECOND PUNIC WAR. Polyb. B. 3. c. 10.

While Hannibal was meditating the first blow he intended to give, and was clearing the way for the attack, by the several enterprises above mentioned, the Saguntines despatched c. 15. frequent messengers to the Romans, partly out of apprehension of their own impending danger, and partly out of friendship to their

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allies, that they might be perfectly informed of the progress of the Carthaginians. Little attention was given at Rome to these advices for a long time; but at last it was judged proper to send some ambassadors into Spain, to examine into the truth of the facts.

Hannibal, having carried his conquests as far as he had proposed that year, returned to take up his winter quarters in New Carthage, which was then become the seat of the Carthaginian government in Spain. There he found the Roman ambassadors; and, giving them audience, was by them admonished, "upon no account to attempt any thing against the Saguntines, a people received into the protection of Rome; and also to be mindful of the treaty with Asdrubal, and to forbear passing the river Iberus."

Hannibal, young, full of martial fire, fortunate in his enterprises, and mortally hating the Romans, answered with a careless and haughty air (personating a friend to the Saguntines) "That a sedition having formerly happened among the citizens of Saguntum, the Romans, to whose arbitration they referred the dispute, had unjustly condemned to death some of the magistrates; and that he would not suffer this injustice to go unpunished; for it had ever been the custom of the Carthaginians to undertake the cause of those who were wrongfully persecuted."

Polyb. B. 3. c. 16.

The ambassadors departing with this answer, sailed to Carthage (pursuant to their instructions in case of such a reception from Hannibal) there to expostulate upon the matter with the

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senate; though they well saw that a war was unavoidable. Little indeed did they imagine that Italy would be the theatre of it; but concluded that Saguntum and its territory would be the scene of action.

Hannibal at the same time sent to Carthage for instructions how to proceed, with regard to the Saguntines, who, as he said, "encouraged by their confederacy with Rome, committed many outrages against those who were in alliance with Carthage." According to Livy, these allies of Carthage were the Turdetani, between whom and the Saguntines Hannibal had contrived to raise a quarrel, that he might have a pretence, in quality of friend to the former, to attack the latter.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 15.

Livy, B. 21. c. 6.

What answer the Roman ambassadors received from the Carthaginian senate is not recorded; but we may well gather from the sequel, that it was by no means satisfactory.—The senate of Rome, nevertheless, being in the same prepossession as their ambassadors, concerning the seat of the war, that it would be in a remote country; and considering also that the war, when once begun, would probably be carried to a great length, resolved, before they entered upon it, to give a period first to their affairs of Illyricum, and punish the perfidy of Demetrius; believing that they should be able to effect this, and yet have sufficient opportunity to defeat the designs of Hannibal.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 16.

But these proved vain deliberations; for Hannibal was too much in earnest. He marched with his army towards Saguntum, at the same

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Polyb. B. 3. c. 17.

time that the Roman consuls embarked for Illyricum; and before the consuls had finished their expedition Saguntum was taken.

The Carthaginian used the more diligence in attacking this strong and wealthy city, for many weighty considerations. The reduction of Saguntum would probably deprive the Romans of all hope of making war in Spain: the nations he had already conquered, terrified by this new success of his arms, would be held in better obedience, and those who were yet unconquered would stand in greater awe of his power. And, what was still of greater importance, he should be able to pursue his enterprises with more security when he had no enemy at his back. He further considered, that this town, should he take it, would yield him large supplies of treasure for carrying on the war; that his army would be more at his devotion, when he had enriched them with booty; and that he should be enabled to secure to himself friends at Carthage, by sending thither a part of the spoil.

Livy, B. 21. c. 6.

From all these motives he was indefatigable in pressing the siege; which nevertheless lasted many months. The Roman senate no sooner received advice of his having begun it, but they sent ambassadors into Spain with instructions to give him warning to desist, and, in case of his refusal, to sail to Carthage, and there demand of the senate the delivering up of their general to the Romans, by way of compensation for the breach of the league between the two states.

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HANNIBAL, hearing of the arrival of these ambassadors on the coast of Spain, despatched some messengers to meet them at the sea-side, and to signify to them, "That neither would it be safe for them to come to his quarters; nor had he leisure to give them audience." And, as he knew very well to what place they would direct their course, after receiving such a message, he, without delay, sent proper emissaries to Carthage, to prepare the chiefs of the Barchine faction for the occasion. Livy, B. 21. c. 9.

Livy reports that Hanno, the avowed enemy of Amilcar's family, and the head of the opposite faction, was the only man in the Carthaginian senate who was for complying with the demands of Rome; and that he spoke to this effect: c. 10.

"How often have I conjured you by those gods, who are the witnesses and arbiters of leagues and treaties, not to suffer any of Amilcar's race to command your armies! How often have I told you, that neither the manes nor the progeny of that man would ever be at rest, and that no friendship, no peace with the Romans could be preserved inviolate, so long as there remained one alive of the Barchine name and family! Hannibal is an aspiring youth, proudly ambitious of being a monarch; and who thinks nothing so conducive to his purpose, as to draw upon us war after war, that so he may live in arms and be always surrounded with legions: And you, by making him the general of your armies, have furnished fuel to his fire; you have fed the flame which now scorches you. Your

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forces at this time besiege Saguntum, contrary to the faith of treaties. What can you expect, but that Carthage be soon invested by the Roman legions, under the conduct of those very gods, who in the former war took vengeance on us for the like perfidiousness[6]? Are you yet to learn what kind of enemies they are whom you provoke? Are you still strangers to yourselves? Are you ignorant of the fortunes of the two republics?

"Your worthy general would not vouchsafe the ambassadors of your allies a hearing; he has violated the law of nations. The ambassadors of our friends, worse treated than the messengers from an enemy were ever known to be, have now recourse to you. They demand satisfaction for the unjust violation of a treaty. They would have you clear the body of the nation from the shame of so odious a breach of faith, by giving up into their hands the author of the crime. The more moderate they are at present, the more exasperated, I fear, and the more implacable will they be hereafter. Remember the Ægates, and the affair

See p. 124.

[6] Hanno refers here (as he afterwards explains himself) to some attempts of the Carthaginians upon Tarentum, (at the time, I suppose, when Pyrrhus's troops held that city.) In the Epit. of Livy, B. 14. it is said, that the Carthaginians came with a fleet to the succour of Tarentum, whereby they broke their league with the Romans. And this doubtless is the foundation whereon Zonaras builds his report, that the motive assigned by the Romans for their beginning the first Punic war, was the assistance which the Carthaginians had given the Tarentines against Rome. See p. 29 of this volume.

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of Eryx, with all the calamities you suffered for four-and-twenty years together. And yet we had not then this boy at the head of our armies, but his father, Amilcar himself, a second Mars, as some are pleased to style him. But we could not then forbear making attempts upon Tarentum in violation of treaties, as we do now upon Saguntum. The gods declared themselves against us in that war, and, in spite of all our pretences of right, made appear, by giving victory to our enemies, which of the two nations had unjustly broken the league.

"It is against Carthage that Hannibal now plants his mantelets and erects his towers; it is her wall that he now shakes with his battering rams. The ruins of Saguntum (I wish I may prove a false prophet!) will fall upon our heads; and the war begun with the Saguntines must be maintained against the Romans.

"But, say you, shall we then deliver up Hannibal into the hands of his enemies? I know that my opinion will have little weight with you, because of the old animosities between his father and me; yet I must declare, that as I rejoiced when Amilcar fell, because, had he lived, he would have engaged us before now in a war with the Romans, so I hate and detest this youth as a fury and the firebrand to kindle a Roman war. Yes, I think it fit, that Hannibal be delivered up to expiate the breach of the league; and, if nobody had demanded him, I should vote to have him transported to the

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remotest corner of the earth, whence his name might never reach our ears to disturb the repose of our state.

"My conclusion therefore is, that deputies be forthwith sent to Rome to pacify the senate; others into Spain, with orders to the army to raise the siege of Saguntum, and deliver up their general to the Romans; and a third deputation to the Saguntines to make reparation for the injuries they have sustained[7]."

Livy, B. 21. c. 11.

The senate, though they heard this orator with respectful attention, as a man of authority and reputation among them, paid no regard to his remonstrance, invective, or advice, on the present occasion. Nay, the senators in general exclaimed, that he had spoken more like an enemy than a subject of Carthage. As for the Roman ambassadors, they were dismissed with this answer, "That the war was begun by the Saguntines, and not by Hannibal; and that the Romans would act injuriously to Carthage, if to her ancient alliance with them, they preferred the later friendship of the Saguntines."

Polyb. B. 3. c. 17.

Hannibal was all this time pressing the siege of Saguntum with uninterrupted diligence. He animated his soldiers in person, working in the

[7] The reader, I am persuaded, will not easily believe that a speech of this tenor was really delivered either by Hanno or any other Carthaginian senator. The greater part of the matter of it, doubtless, belongs to Livy no less than the form. However, this much we may conclude from the party spirit of Hanno, that he disapproved the proceedings of Hannibal, and was against a rupture with Rome.

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trenches among them, and mingling with them in all hazards. The defence was brave even to obstinacy; and it is said to have lasted eight months. When the besieged could no longer hold out, many of the citizens, rather than listen to the hard terms of peace which Hannibal exacted, (as the giving up their arms, leaving their city to be demolished, and moving off with nothing more of all their substance than two suits of apparel) threw themselves into a great fire, where they had first cast all their most valuable effects. While this was doing, it happened that a tower, which had been much battered and shaken, fell down on a sudden. A body of Carthaginians immediately entered at the breach; and Hannibal, upon notice of this accident, seizing the opportunity, made a general assault, and carried the place without difficulty. He gave orders, that all who were found in arms should be put to the sword: an unnecessary order, for they themselves were firmly determined to die fighting: many of the inhabitants shut themselves up with their wives and children, and burned the houses over their heads. But notwithstanding all this destruction of men and effects, the place yielded to the conqueror great store of wealth and many slaves. The money he appropriated for carrying on the war against Rome; the slaves he divided among the soldiers; and all the rich household stuff he sent to Carthage.

Livy, B. 21. c. 14.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 17.

The Roman ambassadors who had been dispatched to the Carthaginian senate brought

Livy, B. 21. c. 16.

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the answer, they had there received, to Rome, about the same time that the news arrived of the destruction of Saguntum.

Livy tells us, that the compassion of the Romans for this unfortunate city, their shame for having failed to succour such a faithful ally, their indignation against the Carthaginians, and their apprehension of the main event of things, (as if the enemy were already at the gates of Rome;) all these various passions were so strong in their minds, that at first they only mourned and trembled, instead of consulting for the common safety.

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Livy, B. 21. c. 17.

But it being now no longer a question whether they should enter into a war, they quickly began to make the necessary preparations for action. The consuls P. Cornelius Scipio and Tib. Sempronius Longus drew lots for their provinces. Sicily and Africa fell to Sempronius, and Spain to Cornelius. Sempronius with two Roman legions, consisting each of 4000 foot and 300 horse, and with 16,000 foot and 1800 horse of the allies on board a fleet of 160 galleys, was to go first into Sicily, and thence into Africa, in case the other consul should prove strong enough to hinder the Carthaginians from coming into Italy. Cornelius for this purpose had two Roman legions, with 14,000 foot and 1600 horse of the allies committed to his conduct; and with a fleet of sixty quinqueremes, he was to sail to Spain, and endeavour to prevent Hannibal's leaving that country. The consul had no stronger a navy appointed him, because it was supposed

that the enemy would not come by sea, nor choose to fight in that kind of service. And his army was also the less numerous, because the prætor Manlius had two Roman legions with 10,000 foot and 1000 horse of the allies to guard the province of Gaul. The whole number of the forces raised by the republic on this occasion was 24,000 Roman foot and 1800 horse, 40,000 foot and 4400 horse of the allies; and their ships of war amounted to 220.

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These extraordinary preparations sufficiently show the terror the Romans were in at the approaching war. And indeed it will not appear to be ill grounded, if we consider, that the Carthaginians, ever since Amilcar's going into Spain, had been fighting and conquering, and that the Spaniards, by whom their army was strengthened, were men steady even to obstinacy. Besides, the Roman republic had now no general equal to Hannibal, a man of immense views; ever judicious in his enterprises; a wonderful genius for seizing the critical moment to execute his designs; the greatest master in the art of appearing not to act, when he was most busy; inexhaustible of expedients; as skilful in recovering himself out of danger, as in drawing an enemy into it. He had been bred up to arms from his infancy, and though now only in the flower of his age, had the experience of several years command of an army. For Asdrubal, being himself no great warrior, had committed to him the conduct of all dangerous and difficult enterprises. So that no general then living had had more exercise

Abb. Vert. B. 8.

Livy, B. 21. c. 4.

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Abb. Vert. Polyb. B. 3. c. 34. vid. inf. p. 229, 230.

than he; nor were any troops better disciplined than his. Hannibal's design of carrying the war from the remote parts of Spain into the very centre of Italy, is said by an ingenious writer, to be the boldest project that ever captain durst conceive, and what was justified only by the event. But this does not seem to have been the opinion of Polybius, who tells us, that Hannibal had taken all prudent measures for facilitating his march, and for securing the assistance of the Gauls about the Alps and about the Po, which it was the easier to do, because he and they had one common interest with respect to the Romans, the hated enemies of both.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 20. Livy, B. 21. c. 18.

Though the Romans made the preparations above mentioned for war, as a thing certain and unavoidable, yet that nothing might be wanting to the exact observance of forms, they despatched a third embassy to Carthage[8], to

[8] Polybius mentions only two embassies from Rome to the Carthaginians, on the affair of Saguntum, one before the siege, another after the town was taken. Livy also mentions only two; but, according to him, the first was during the siege, when (he tells us) Hannibal refused the ambassadors an audience; the second, after the reduction of the place. That we may not reject Polybius's authority, who relates an audience which Hannibal, before the siege of Saguntum, gave at Carthagena to some ambassadors from Rome; nor yet accuse Livy or his vouchers of inventing the story of Hannibal's refusing audience, and of all that followed thereupon at Carthage, we have supposed (what seems most probable) that there were three embassies from Rome in relation to Saguntum, the first before the siege, the second while it was carrying on, the third after the place was taken.

To the first ambassadors Hannibal gave audience and

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demand once more, what they did not expect would be yielded, that Hannibal and his council should be delivered up to them; and the ambassadors were also now instructed to declare war in case of refusal.

When they were come to Carthage, and admitted to audience, the senate heard the haughty demand they brought with a coldness approaching to contempt. Nevertheless, one of the senators best qualified, was directed to speak in maintenance of the Carthaginian cause. This orator, without taking the least

a haughty answer, of which they made complaint to the Carthaginian senate. Those who came next were refused audience by him, and they also carried their complaints to Carthage. The last embassy was sent only to Carthage.

Father Catrou, not liking, I suppose, that the Romans should appear in so disadvantageous a light as they do, upon this occasion, is angry with Livy, for making them send even twice to Carthage before they declare war; though if any thing may be depended upon in the Roman story, this fact has a title to credit.

It may indeed seem hard to be accounted for, that the Romans, contrary to their former methods of proceeding, should so shamefully neglect to succour their allies, the Saguntines, and, when the case required the most vigorous measures, should lose so much time in vain and fruitless embassies to a people they had formerly vanquished and rendered tributary. Chevalier Folard conjectures, that the Romans were really intimidated by Hannibal's superior genius and skill in war, being conscious of their having no general of equal ability with the Carthaginian. And may we not also reasonably suppose, that at the time when Hannibal began to threaten Saguntum, the Roman republic was not in a condition to send by sea into Spain an army of sufficient strength to make head against the numerous and victorious troops of Carthage?

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Polyb. L. 3. c. 21.

notice of the treaty made with Asdrubal, (as if no such treaty had been made, or, if made, was nothing to the purpose, because made without authority) dwelt wholly on that which was concluded at the end of the Sicilian war; in which, as he alleged, there was no mention of Spain. He allowed, indeed, that it was there covenanted, that neither of the contracting parties should make war on the allies of the other; but added, that the Saguntines were entirely out of the question, they not being at that time in alliance with Rome; and he caused the articles of the treaty to be read.

The Romans refused absolutely to enter into a verbal discussion of this point. They said, there might have been room for such a discussion, had Saguntum been then in the same state as formerly, but that this city having been sacked contrary to the faith of treaties, the Carthaginians must either clear themselves of perfidy, by delivering up the authors of the injustice, or confess themselves guilty by refusing the satisfaction required. And finding that the senate would give no answer to the question, whether Saguntum was besieged by private or public authority, but would confine the debate to the justice or injustice of the action, the eldest of the ambassadors, gathering up the skirt of his gown, and making a hollow in it, "Here," said he, "we bring you peace and war, take which you will." At which they all cried out with one voice, "Give us which you please."—"I give you war then," said the ambassador, letting his robe loose again. "We ac-

Livy, B. 21. c. 18. and Polyb. B. 3. c. 33.

cept it," they all answered; "and with the same spirit that we accept it, we will maintain it."

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A mutual denunciation of war being thus made, the ambassadors did not return directly homeward, but, pursuant to their instructions, passed into Spain, to solicit the states and princes of that country, who were on the north side of the Iberus, to enter into an alliance with Rome, or at least not to contract any friendship with the Carthaginians. They were courteously entertained by the Bargusians. But when they came to the Volscians, they received from this people an answer, which being reported all over the country, was a means to turn away all the other nations from siding with the Romans. "With what assurance," said they, "can you ask of us to prefer your friendship to that of the Carthaginians, after we have seen the Saguntines, who did so, more cruelly betrayed by you, their allies, than destroyed by their open enemies. Go seek for confederates among those who never heard of the ruin of Saguntum. The miserable fate of this city will be a warning to all the nations of Spain, never to repose confidence in Roman faith or amity." The same kind of reception they met with from all the Spanish states to which they afterwards addressed themselves. So that finding their negotiations in this country fruitless, they passed into Gaul, endeavouring to persuade the several nations there, not to suffer the Carthaginians to march through their territories into Italy. The first public assembly of Gauls, to whom they made this proposal,

Livy, B. 21. c. 19.

Livy, B. 21. c. 20.

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burst into so loud a laughter, mixed with a murmur of indignation, that the magistrates and seniors could hardly still the noise of the younger sort, so impudent and foolish did it seem, to request of them, that they would suffer their own lands to be ravaged and spoiled, to preserve those of other men who were utter strangers to them. But silence at length being made, the ambassadors were answered, that neither had the Romans deserved so well, nor the Carthaginians so ill at their hands, that they should take arms, either in behalf of Rome, or against Carthage. That on the contrary, they had heard, that some of their countrymen had been driven out of their possessions in Italy by the Romans, constrained to pay tribute, and made to undergo other indignities. The like answers to the like demands were made in the other public councils of Gaul. Nor did the ambassadors meet with any thing like friendship, or even peaceable disposition towards them, till they came to Marseilles, which was in alliance with Rome; and where, upon careful inquiry made by their allies, they learned that Hannibal had been beforehand with them, and by the force of gold, of which the Gauls were ever most greedy, had gained them over to side with him. And with this unpleasing news they returned to Rome.

Hannibal was all this time extremely busy in settling the affairs of Spain, and in taking all the proper measures his foresight could suggest, for the happy execution of his great designs. After the reduction of Saguntum, he

Polyb. B. 3. c. 33.

had retired into winter quarters at New Carthage. And the better to dispose his Spanish soldiers to his service, he had given them permission to retire to their respective homes till the beginning of the spring, when, he told them, he expected their appearance again. In the meanwhile, as one of his chief cares was to provide for the safety of Africa, he transported thither, of Spaniards, (raised among the Thersites, Mastii, and Olcades,) 13,850 foot, and 1200 horse, together with 800 slingers of the baleares. And while he thus furnished Africa with Spanish troops, he took order for the security of Spain[9], by sending for a supply of near 15,000 Africans, to be commanded by his brother Asdrubal, whom he intended to leave governor in his absence. He furnished him also with 50 quinqueremes, 4 quadriremes, and 5 triremes, that he might be in a condition to oppose any descents that should be attempted there by the Romans.

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Livy, B. 21. c. 21.

Livy and Polybius commend the prudence of the Carthaginian in this exchange of troops; because both the Africans and Spaniards would probably prove the better soldiers for being thus at a distance from their respective countries, and they would be a kind of pledges or

[9] Livy reports, that Hannibal selected 4000 young men out of the chief cities in Spain, and of the best families, and caused them to be brought to [New] Carthage, there to remain as hostages for the fidelity of the Spaniards. These were probably the same youths which are afterwards said to be left by him in Saguntum, as we shall see in its proper place.

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Polyb. B. 3. c. 34.

hostages for the mutual fidelity of the two nations.

Besides these precautions, Hannibal (as has been already hinted) had despatched ambassadors to the Gauls on both sides the Alps, to sound their dispositions, and to engage them to take part with him in his enterprise. For this end he was extremely liberal, not only of his promises, but of his gold, believing it would be a main step towards a happy issue of his undertaking, if by avoiding war in his way to Italy, he could lead his army entire against the Romans. The answers he received were favourable to his wishes; "that the Gauls most willingly agreed to his proposal, and expected him with impatience." They also sent him word, that though the passage of those mountains was difficult, it was not insuperable. Animated with new hope by these reports, he began early in the spring to march his troops out of their winter quarters; and having now the concurrence of the senate and people of Carthage to his purpose, he began openly to discourse of his intended war against Rome, exhorting the soldiers (whom he assembled for this purpose) cheerfully to engage in the expedition; and telling them, in order to raise their indignation against the Romans, that they had impudently demanded a surrendry of both him and all his chief officers into their hands. He also expatiated on the fertility of the country which he purposed to invade, the good-will of the Gauls, and the confederacies he had made with their princes; and when the

army had loudly declared their readiness to go whithersoever he was disposed to conduct them, and he had, with thanks, applauded their fidelity, and prefixed the day for their march, he dismissed the assembly.

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The Spaniards, whom Hannibal had permitted to visit their families during the winter, being returned to their service, and the day appointed[10] for the general rendezvous being come, the whole army took the field. It consisted of 90,000 foot and 12,000 horse, and with this mighty force the Carthaginian immediately began his march from New Carthage towards the river Iberus.

Polyb. B. 3 c. 35.

But now, before the reader accompanies Hannibal into Italy, he may perhaps be willing to make a pause, and inquire into the justice of the cause that leads him thither.

"If the destruction of Saguntum (says Polybius) be considered as the CAUSE of the SECOND PUNIC WAR, we must necessarily determine, that the Carthaginians engaged in it very unjustly: whether regard be had to the treaty of Lutatius, whereby each party became bound to offer no violence to the allies of the other: or regard be had to the treaty of Asdrubal, in which it was stipulated that the Carthaginians should not carry their arms beyond the Iberus.

B. 3. c. 30.

See p. 126.

See p. 210.

[10] According to Livy, Hannibal, before he began his expedition against the Romans, went from New Carthage to Gades, there to discharge some vows he had made to Hercules, and to bind himself by new ones, in order to obtain success in the war he was going to enter upon. Polybius says nothing of the matter.

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B. 3. c. 6.

"But if, for the CAUSE of the war made by Hannibal, we assign the seizure of Sardinia by the Romans, and the money which they extorted from Carthage at that time, we shall be obliged to confess, that the Carthaginians acted not unjustly in entering upon this war. For they did no more than lay hold of a favourable opportunity to revenge themselves on those, who had taken advantage of their distresses, to injure and oppress them."

Here then the question of right is decided by our author. For he had before declared, and enlarged upon it, that the siege of Saguntum and the passing the Iberus were only the beginnings of the war and not the causes; and that the affair of Sardinia, and the money extorted at that time, were the principal cause of it. And he now declares that this principal cause is sufficient to justify the Carthaginians.

Our author nevertheless, in another part of his history, observes, that though Hannibal had a just motive to begin the war, and though he did begin it from that just motive, yet because he did not publicly assign that motive, for beginning it, but made use of a false pretext, his enterprise seemed contrary to justice. After relating the haughty and evasive answer of Hannibal to the first ambassadors that were sent to him from Rome, he adds,

See p. 214.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 15.

"Thus Hannibal, transported by a violent hatred, acted in every thing without consulting his reason, and instead of declaring the true motives of his proceeding, had recourse to false pretexts, after the manner of those, who, pre-

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possessed by their passion, do what they have determined, without regard to equity or honour: otherwise, had it not been better to have demanded of the Romans the restitution of Sardinia, and the money, which, during the weakness and distress of the Carthaginian republic, they had extorted from her, and, in case of refusal, to declare war against them? But as he concealed the true cause, and made use of the false pretext of injuries done to the Saguntines, he seemed to enter into that war without reason, and contrary to justice."

The reader observes, that Polybius here takes it for granted, that Hannibal, in attacking Saguntum, made war upon the Romans. Now Hannibal and the Carthaginians denied that the treaty with Lutatius could be broke by the siege of Saguntum. They alleged, that, as the Saguntines were not allies of Rome at the time of making that treaty, they could not be comprehended in it. Polybius indeed thinks, that future allies as well as present ought to be understood to be comprehended in that treaty; and so said the Romans. But what then? It was surely a point that might well bear a debate. Yet the Roman ambassadors (as we have seen) would enter into no discussion of this matter with the Carthaginians, but, upon their refusal to give up Hannibal as having unjustly violated that treaty by the siege of Saguntum, declared war.

And this makes it difficult to conceive why Polybius, on the present occasion, mentions the treaty with Asdrubal; that treaty, accord-

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ing to him, relating only to the Carthaginians passing the Iberus, which river Hannibal did not attempt to pass till after the declaration of war by the Romans. Polybius never speaks of the Saguntines as concerned in that treaty, but says expressly, that, when it was concluded, no mention was made in it of any other part of Spain, *i. e.* of any part on the south of that river; consequently no mention of the Saguntines *.

Polyb. B. 2. c. 13. * B. 3. 19.

Livy, B. 21. c. 18.

Livy indeed tells us, that the Saguntines were included in the treaty with Asdrubal, and makes the Carthaginians confess it; which, if true, we must suppose that a new article in favour of the Saguntines was inserted into that treaty, after Rome had entered into an alliance with them.

Livy adds, that the Carthaginians, in their conference with the Roman ambassadors, would have evaded the obligation of the treaty with Asdrubal, by saying[11], that it was concluded

[11] Livy, in making the Carthaginians use this plea at the time of the conference in question, seems to found himself on Polybius; and perhaps Polybius ought to be so understood: but as the Greek historian tells us, that the Carthaginian orator passed over the treaty of Asdrubal in silence, as if no such treaty had ever been made, or, if made, was nothing to the purpose; I imagine, that the plea above mentioned was not employed at the time of the conference; but that afterwards, when they used to speak of the justice of their cause, they urged among other things the nullity of Asdrubal's treaty: for, as Polybius relates, the Roman ambassadors did not, at their audience in the Carthaginian senate, object that treaty, nor set forth their rights, or pretensions of right, till after the war was begun. B. 3. c. 29.

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by him without authority from Carthage, and that, in paying no regard to it, they did but follow the example of the Romans, who had refused to abide by the first treaty of Lutatius in Sicily, for the like reason. Doubtless, if the Carthaginians employed this subterfuge, it was weak and trifling, because (as the same author, from Polybius, observes) in the treaty of Lutatius this clause was added, that it should be firm and inviolable, if ratified by the people of Rome; but in Asdrubal's treaty there was no proviso of like import.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 29.

But it is possible that Asdrubal might make an absolute treaty, and yet have no authority for so doing. At least, it was a common practice with the Roman generals, to make such treaties; and it was as common with the Roman senate to break them, as having been concluded without sufficient authority.

To return to the main question, the justice of the war made by Hannibal:

It is plain, that if the treaty of Sicily could not be construed to extend to future allies as well as present; and if Asdrubal's treaty was made without sufficient authority from Carthage, (both which the Carthaginians pleaded) there can be no pretence to charge Hannibal with beginning a war against Rome, by his attacking Saguntum.

But let us suppose, with the Romans, that the Saguntines were unquestionably within the treaty of Sicily; and also, that Asdrubal, in his treaty, acted with ample authority. What will follow? Not, that the second Punic war

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is to be imputed to the injustice of Hannibal and the Carthaginians, or that they were the first violators of the treaty of peace between the two nations. No: the Romans had scandalously violated that treaty by their seizure of Sardinia, and extortion of the 1200 talents; and all conventions between Rome and Carthage following that first violence and breach of the peace, were no better than Roman injuries, as implying this menace, on the part of the Romans, "Do whatsoever we require; otherwise we will make war, without regard to our oath, which we have already broken." And as their engaging Asdrubal to covenant, that he would not pass the Iberus, was a new breach of the peace of Sicily, and a new insult upon Carthage; because Rome had as yet no foot in Spain, on the one side of that river, whereas Carthage, on the other side, held almost all the country: so the alliance which the Romans made with the Saguntines, was in reality a breach of their treaty with Asdrubal. For the Romans could have no sort of colour for requiring that Asdrubal should not pass the Iberus, but an implicit covenant that this river should be a boundary, over which they themselves would not pass in any discovery or conquest by them intended to be made upon Spain; and that the Carthaginians should be free to push their conquests as far northward as to this limit. And so Livy says expressly, that by Asdrubal's treaty, "the river Iberus was to be the boundary between the two empires." Only he adds (inconsistently with Polybius's

B. 21. c. 2.

account) that the Saguntines were included in that treaty.

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It would seem then that the Carthaginians were not obliged, by any treaties with Rome, or by any consideration of justice, to abstain from the war which Hannibal began. And as to that open declaration of his true motives, the want of which made his enterprise seem dishonourable, he could not have made that declaration without throwing a bar in the way to the execution of his main design, the marching into Italy. For by demanding the restitution of Sardinia, and of the 1200 talents, he would have discovered the extent of his meditated revenge, and would thereby have put the enemy on such preparations for war, as might have disappointed all his views of doing justice to his country. It was to avoid this inconvenience, that he would seem at first to have no design but against the Saguntines; and we find his policy had its effect: for the Romans (as has been observed) had not the least apprehension of his intending so soon to invade Italy, but imagined that the seat of the war, they should have with him, would be in Spain.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 16.

CHAP. XVII.

FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.

The march of Hannibal, from the Iberus in Spain, to the Po in Italy; and how the Roman arms were employed in the meantime.

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Polyb. B. 3. c. 35. & seq.

Livy, B. 21. c. 23. & seq.

HANNIBAL, having passed the Iberus, subdued in a short time all those parts of Spain which he had not before entered, and which lie between that river and the Pyrenees. His successes however cost him many hard conflicts, in which he lost abundance of men. Of this newly conquered country he appointed one Hanno to be governor, instructing him to have a particular watch over the Bargusians, of whom he had the greatest jealousy on account of the friendship they had contracted with the Romans. And for the support of his government, he left under his command 10,000 foot and 1000 horse; and he committed likewise to his keeping all the heavy baggage of the main army, who left it behind them, that they might march light and disencumbered.

Being arrived at the borders of Spain, 3000 of his Spanish soldiers, (not so much for fear of the war, as of the fatigue of so long a march, and of passing over the Alps) returned home without asking leave; which that others might not also do or attempt, he courteously dismissed above 7000 more, who seemed willing to be gone; a condescension that made the journey seem less tedious to those that did follow him, as not being enforced by compulsion. His

army consisted now of but 50,000 foot and 9000 horse; but they were good men, and had been long trained, and in continual action during the wars in Spain, under the ablest captains that Carthage could ever boast. With these he passed the Pyrenees and entered into Gaul. He found the Gauls that bordered upon Spain, ready in arms to forbid his entrance into their country. However, by gentle words and rich presents to the leaders, he gained them over to favour his expedition, which he assured them was not designed against them; and he continued his march without any dangerous molestation, till he arrived upon the banks of the Rhone.

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Here he bought up from the Gauls, (who on the west side of the river favoured his passage for money and to get rid of him) all the boats, large and small, he could meet with, whereof the inhabitants, practising commerce, had a great number; and he also amassed prodigious quantities of timber for making floats, of which the soldiers, labouring in that employment with great diligence, in two days time made abundant provision. Nevertheless the Carthaginian found that it would be impossible to compass his passage without some stratagem, because of the opposition of the Gauls on the east side the river, who, in great multitudes, had determined to defend their bank. Wherefore, after three days' deliberation, he in the night detached an officer named Hanno with a considerable part of the army, to go a good way up the river, then cross it,

Polyb. B. 3. c. 42.

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Polyb. B. 3. c. 43.

and endeavour to get behind the enemy. Hanno passed the stream about 25 miles from the Carthaginian camp, made silent marches towards the camp of the Gauls, and, in the morning after the fifth night, by smoke in several places, (the appointed signal) gave notice of his approach to Hannibal, who thereupon immediately began to attempt his passage. He put into the larger boats a part of his cavalry ready for action. The horses of the rest, which could not be embarked, swam in tow after the small boats, one man, on each side of a boat, holding three or four horses by the bridles. The horsemen and the infantry went in small vessels and on floats; and that their passage might be the easier, the largest vessels were so disposed, a little higher up the stream, as to break the force of the current. When the Gauls perceived the Carthaginians advancing on the river, they by dreadful howlings, (according to their custom) signified, that they waited the attack with resolution. But when they heard a great noise behind them, saw their tents on fire, and themselves assailed in rear as well as front, they made but a short resistance. Vanquished and broken, they fled every man to his own village.

See p. 222. Polyb. B. 3. c. 40.

It has been already observed, that the Romans, without waiting the return of their ambassadors from Carthage, had ordered the consul P. Cornelius Scipio into Spain, and Tib. Sempronius into Sicily, from whence he was to go into Africa.

Cornelius, though, before he set out, the

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news arrived that Hannibal had passed the Iberus, was still in hopes he should be able to hinder him from marching out of Spain. For this end having embarked his forces at Pisa, on board the fleet of sixty galleys, which had been assigned him, he steered along the coast of Liguria *, and in five days arrived at Marseilles. Learning here that Hannibal had already passed the Pyrenees, he proceeded no further in his voyage than to the nearest mouth of the Rhone, where he landed his men, with intention to wait for the enemy on the banks of that river, and there put a stop to their further progress. The difficulties of the way from the Pyrenees, and the divers nations through which Hannibal was to make his passage, induced the consul to conclude, that he was yet a great way off. The Carthaginian however was at this time actually employed in passing the Rhone, at the distance of about four days' march from the sea †. The consul heard a report of this; but it seemed so incredible, that he could not believe it. Nevertheless, thinking it advisable to endeavour after such intelligence as he might rely on, while the army lay to refresh themselves after the fatigue of their voyage, he commanded out 300 chosen horse to make discovery, giving them, for guides, some Gauls in the service of Marseilles.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 41, 42.

* Genoa.

† A little above Avignon.

This detachment met with a party of 500 Numidian horse, not far from the Carthaginian camp. For Hannibal, the next morning after his passage, and while his men were wafting

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Livy, B. 21. c. 29.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 45.

over the elephants, having received intelligence of the consul's arrival at the mouth of the Rhone, had sent this party out to bring him an account of the strength and situation of the enemy. The conflict between the Romans and Numidians was very bloody, an hundred and sixty of the former were left dead upon the spot, and more than two hundred of the latter. The Romans had the honour of the day, forcing the Numidians to quit the field, and pursuing them so near their entrenchments as to be eye-witnesses of what they were sent to learn. After which they returned with all diligence to carry the news to the consul.

c. 44.

Hannibal, while these things passed, was giving audience, in the presence of his whole army, to Magilus a Gallic prince, who was come to him from the countries about the Po. Magilus (with whom the Carthaginian had before had a private conference) assured him by an interpreter, that the Gauls impatiently expected his arrival, and were ready to join him; and that he himself would be the guide to conduct the army through places where they would find every thing necessary, and by a road which would bring them speedily and safely into Italy. When the prince was withdrawn, Hannibal in a speech to his troops reminded them of all their exploits to that time, and of the success they had met with in every occasion of danger, by following his counsels. He exhorted them to continue their confidence in him, and to fear nothing for the future; since, having passed the Rhone, and secured

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such good allies as they found the Gauls to be, the greatest obstacles to their enterprise were now surmounted. The soldiers applauded all he said, expressing great willingness, and even ardour, to follow him whithersoever he should lead the way. He commended their good dispositions, made vows to the gods for the preservation of all his troops, admonished them to refresh themselves well, and prepare to march next day, and then dismissed the assembly.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 45.

Just at this time, the Numidians, who had survived the skirmish, returned with an account of their adventure. Hannibal, as he had before resolved, broke up his camp the next morning as soon as it was day, and posting his horse as a body of reserve, a little down the river, ordered his infantry to march. He himself staid behind, waiting the arrival of the elephants that were not yet all wafted over the stream.

c. 46.

The method of doing it was this: from the bank of the river they threw a large float of timber, which being strongly held by great ropes twisted about some trees, they covered over with earth, that the elephants might be deceived by this appearance, and take it for firm ground. At the end of this first float was fastened a second, but so, as it might be easily loosened from it. The female elephants were brought upon the first float, the males followed them; and when they were all got upon the second float, this was loosened from the first, and by the help of small boats, towed to the

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opposite shore. It does not appear how many of these animals were transported at a time; but when the first were landed, the float was sent back to fetch others, and so on till the whole number was brought over. Some of them being unruly, fell into the water, but they at last got safe to shore; not a single elephant was drowned, though some of their conductors were.

And now Hannibal, making his horse and elephants the rear guard to his infantry, marched along the banks of the river northward *, (though that was not the shortest way to the Alps) being resolved to avoid an engagement with Scipio, that he might lead his troops as entire as possible into Italy.

* Polybius (c. 47.) says eastward, but this agrees not with the context. Livy, B. 21. c. 31. Polyb. B. 3. c. 49.

Scipio, upon the information brought him by his discoverers, having immediately ordered all the baggage on board his ships, was coming by long marches with his whole army to attack the Carthaginians; but he did not arrive at the place where Hannibal had passed the Rhone, till three days after he was gone from thence. Despairing therefore to overtake him, he made haste back to his fleet, embarked his army, dispatched his brother Cneius, with the greatest part of it, into Spain, to carry the war into that country, and set sail himself for Italy, in hopes by the way of Hetruria, to reach the foot of the Alps before Hannibal could arrive there.

The Carthaginian, after four days' march, arrived in a country, which from its situation was called the island, being washed on two sides

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by the Rhone, and another river[1] which runs into that. Its form is triangular, and resem-

[1] It has been much disputed whether this other river was the Arar, [now called the Saone,] or the Isara, [the Isere.]

"The text of Polybius," says Mr. Rollin, "as it has been transmitted to us, and that of Livy, place this island at the conflux of the Rhone and the Saone, that is, in the place where the city of Lyons now stands. But this is a manifest error. It was in the Greek, Σκωρας, instead of which ὁ Ἄραρος has been substituted. J. Gronovius says, that he had seen in a manuscript of Livy, Bisarat, which shows that we are to read *Isara, Rhodanusque amnes,* instead of *Arar, Rhodanusque*; and that the island in question is formed by the conflux of the Isara and the Rhone."

Chevalier Folard, who knows perfectly well the road from the place where Hannibal passed the Rhone, (which is agreed to be between Orange and Avignon) to Lyons; and who also knows perfectly well what an army like Hannibal's is capable of doing, maintains, that it was absolutely impossible for it to march to Lyons in four days, it being thirty-five leagues; and, though he does not omit the reasons brought by Mr. Rollin, he lays the main stress of his argument (in behalf of the Isere) on the length and badness of the way to the Saone, there being three rivers to pass, and almost the whole way being through defiles.

I know not whether some aid to this cause might not be drawn from the time employed in Scipio's march, who was so eager to come up with the Carthaginians and give them battle. It is said that he did not arrive at the place where Hannibal had passed the Rhone till three days after he was gone from thence. Now it is reasonable to suppose that he began his march the very same morning that Hannibal began his; the skirmish between the parties having happened the morning before, and there being time enough for Scipio to receive intelligence by his scouts where the enemy was: and though, to get to that place, he had not half the way to make that Hannibal had to reach Lyons, it cost him, with all his expedition, three days' march.

On the decision of this question, another is made very much to depend: Over what part of the Alps the Cartha-

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bles the Delta of Egypt, with this difference, that the country here spoken of, is bounded on

ginian army passed into Italy? whether over the Alpes Penninæ, that stand a good way to the north of Turin, or over the Alpes Cottiæ, that stand a little to the west of that city? Livy is for the latter, and wonders that this fact should ever be questioned, since it is agreed that the part of Italy which Hannibal first entered was the territory of the Taurini, [the people of Turin] into which country the other passage would not have brought him; nor does he believe that passage was then open. He tells us also that the army crossed the Durance in its way to the mountains, which agrees very well with the opinion of its going over the Alpes Cottiæ, as may be seen by the maps. But the rest of Livy's account does not well accord with these particulars, nor indeed with common sense.

Chevalier Folard, who is well acquainted with the Alps, and all the roads thither, is sure that Hannibal went the shortest road, from the country of Prince Brancus to Turin; not only because it was the shortest, but because it was the safest and the best. He will not allow that Hannibal went so far northward, along the banks of the Rhone, as even to the conflux of that river and the Isere. He says, there was no occasion to do it on account of any danger, either from Scipio or any allies of Rome. According to the chevalier, Hannibal, leaving Grenoble on his left, passed the Drac [which runs into the Isere] over against Vizille. Thence he successively marched to Bourg d'Oisons, Le Mont de Lens, Le Lautaret, Briançon, Le Mont Genevre, Sezanne, Le Mont Sestrieres, Suze, Col de la Fenestre, and Pignerol; at a small distance from which last he encamped in the plains.

The fathers Catrou and Rouillé differ from the chevalier on both these questions. According to them, Hannibal crossed the Rhone at its conflux with the Saone, and then turning eastward, marched along the Rhone on its north side; then crossed it again, marching on its south side to the Durance, (which they suppose to be Livy's Durance) and thence to the foot of the Alpes Penninæ, which they passed, by the Great St. Bernard.

As to the objection of the thirty-five leagues march in

its third side by high mountains, whereas the Delta, which the Nile washes on two sides, is bounded on the third by the sea.

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four days, they think it is sufficient to say, that Hannibal was in haste to get out of Scipio's way.

And as to Σκωρας [Scoras] the supposed ancient name of the Isere*) "It can only impose," say they, "on those who don't know that the Saone was anciently called Scona, and by corruption Saucona. Ammianus Marcellinus calls it so, and it had the name of Matiscona, because Macon is situated upon its banks. So that here is correction for correction. Is it not more natural and more probable that Scoras should be changed into Sconas, than that Scoras should be changed into Isaras?"

* Cluverius.

But the main strength of their argument is from Polybius †, who tells us, that Hannibal continued his march along the Rhone EASTWARD. "Now," say the reverend fathers, "it is evident by a cast of an eye on the map, that if the Carthaginian army marched up the Rhone from west to east, it must first have marched along it as far as to Lyons." The necessity of this consequence I do not see. However, much doubtless might be built on this passage of Polybius, if we did not meet with it at a time when it is impossible it should be true; but it is just when Hannibal is setting out to go NORTHWARD along the river, and even thirty-five leagues northward, if he went to the conflux of the Rhone and the Saone. Casaubon seems to have been shocked at this inconsistency; for in his translation he has neglected the words παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν (along the river).

† B. 3. c. 47.

As to the PASSAGE OF THE ALPS, "There are six reasons," say the Jesuits, "which incline us to believe that Hannibal crossed the Alps by the Great St. Bernard, [one of the Alpes Penninæ.]"

I shall mention only three of them.

1. "Livy and Polybius say, that this general, to encourage his troops, showed them from the top of the mountain the rich plains of Italy that lay near the Po. Now supposing he had marched by the Alpes Cottiæ, as Livy pretends, he could not possibly from thence discover those plains; other mountains would have intercepted his views."

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Polyb. B. 3. c. 49.

Livy, B. 21. c. 31.

Here he found two brothers disputing for the kingdom, and the nation engaged in a civil war. The two armies were just ready to give battle, when Hannibal arrived. At the request of the elder brother (named Brancus) he assisted him, and forced the younger to retire. Hannibal had foreseen that it would be very advantageous to him to have the friendship of a prince of this country; and he immediately reaped many benefits from it. The Gaul furnished his troops, not only with provisions and arms, but with clothes; for they were in a tattered condition, most of them barefoot, and very ill provided for a march over the snows and ice of the mountains. But the most essential service he did, was by putting his troops in the rear of Hannibal's army, (which could not without great dread, enter the territories of the Gauls called Allobroges) and escorting it to the place where it was to ascend the Alps.

2. "Polybius reckons 1400 stadia, or about 175 miles, from the place where Hannibal passed the Rhone to the foot of those Alps which he ascended to go into Italy. And if we say with Livy, that he passed any of the Alpes Cottiæ, it is impossible to make out that dist ance.'

3. "Polybius tells us that Hannibal passed the Alps near the place where the Rhone rises. Consequently he passed over the Alpes Penninæ."

These reasons seem decisive, as to the passage of the Alps, (whatever becomes of Scoras and the thirty-five leagues march) Polybius's authority being unquestionable, since, as he tells us, he made a journey on purpose to visit the places where Hannibal had passed, that he might be the better able to give an account of them.

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Polyb. B. 3. c. 50.

Hannibal, thus attended, marched 100 miles in ten days without molestation. So long as he was in the flat country, the petty princes of the Allobroges made no opposition to his progress, either fearing the Carthaginian cavalry, or being held in respect by the Gauls that were in the rear of the army. But when these had retired to go home, and the Carthaginians began to ascend the mountains, they perceived that the mountaineers had possessed themselves of the highest cliffs that commanded the strait through which the army was to pass, with a resolution to oppose its passage. Here Hannibal, therefore, was obliged to make a halt and encamp. Had the mountaineers, says Polybius, concealed their designs till the Carthaginian army was advanced a good way into the narrow passes, it had been inevitably destroyed. Hannibal having learned by the means of some of those Gauls who served him for guides, that the enemy quitted their posts every night, retiring to a town not far off, he took his opportunity, with a detachment of his best men, (leaving the greatest part of his forces with the baggage) to advance by night and seize those posts, before the return of the barbarians; who in the morning were extremely surprised to find themselves thus dispossessed. c. 51.
However, as they perceived the cavalry and beasts of burden moving forward in the straits at a great distance, they ran thither, and fell with fury upon the rear guard of the army. The Carthaginians suffered a great loss of men, horses, and beasts of burden upon this

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occasion; which destruction was owing more to the difficulty of the passage than the swords of the enemy. For the horses, when wounded by the mountaineers, or frighted by their howlings, rushed upon the beasts of burden, oversetting them and every thing else that stood in their way, and hurrying all down the precipices that bordered the road.

Hannibal being sensible that the loss of his baggage would alone be sufficient to destroy his army, hastened with his detachment to the succour of the troops that were thus embarrassed. Falling on the enemy from the higher ground, he slew most of them, and put the rest to flight, yet not without sustaining considerable loss of men himself. What remained of his horses and beasts of burden now passed the strait, but with much difficulty, because of the ruggedness of the way. After which, taking with him those of his men who were the least fatigued with the combat, he attacked the town, from whence the enemy had sallied upon him, and he easily made himself master of it, the inhabitants having been almost all drawn out of it by the hopes of plunder. This conquest proved of great advantage to him. For he recovered a good number of men, horses, and beasts of carriage which had fallen into the enemy's hands. He also found a sufficient quantity of corn and cattle to sustain his army for two or three days. And he gained this further benefit: that the mountaineers of these parts were now so struck with dread, that they thought no more of interrupting his march.

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Polyb. B. 3. c. 52.

Here he encamped, and staid a whole day to refresh his troops. He then pursued his march, which for some days was unmolested. On the fourth, the people inhabiting the places near the road, having contrived a stratagem to attack him by surprise, came to meet him with olive branches and garlands, the usual signals of peace among these nations. Hannibal, mistrusting them, was very inquisitive concerning the intention of their coming. They told him, that having been informed of what had happened to their neighbours, and being themselves unwilling either to do or to suffer any injury, they were come to assure him of their peaceable dispositions; of which, if he doubted, they would give him hostages for his security.

Hannibal was for a while in suspense what resolution to take: but considering that if he accepted their offer with condescension, they might possibly become more easy and tractable, and that if he rejected it, he should have them immediately for open enemies, he at length pretended a great willingness to be upon terms of friendship with them.

Upon which they brought him hostages, furnished him with cattle, and seemed to place entire confidence in the Carthaginians. Hannibal seeing this, and either having, or seeming to have, a better opinion of them, told them, they should be his guides to conduct him through the remaining part of his way over the mountains. Thus for two days they marched at the head of the army. But when

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Polyb. B.3. c. 53.

it was got into a hollow way, overlooked by steep and craggy rocks, these faithless friends, in concert with others of their countrymen who had lain concealed, fell suddenly upon the troops in front, flank, and rear. The greatest number attacked the rear. The army would have been utterly destroyed, says Polybius, if Hannibal, who all along retained some diffidence of these barbarians, had not taken his precautions to guard against them, by placing his baggage and his cavalry in the van, and his heavy armed infantry in the rear guard.—These sustained the shock of the enemy. Nevertheless he lost a great number of men, horses, and beasts of burden. For the Gauls having possessed themselves of the cliffs, and advancing thereon as the Carthaginians advanced in the hollow way, rolled down upon them huge stones, which occasioned an exceeding terror among them. Hannibal was obliged, with one half of his army, to remain all night in the open air, upon a rock, to defend the horses and beasts of carriage, as they filed along through the strait below; for which movement that night was hardly sufficient, the train was of such a length.

The next day, the enemy being retired, Hannibal rejoined his horse and baggage, and continued his march. The Gauls after this made no more attempts upon him, except in small parties, that, sallying out by surprise from their lurking places in the hollows of the rocks, sometimes upon his van, sometimes upon his rear, seldom failed to carry off a part of his baggage,

which was their chief purpose. The elephants were of great use to the Carthaginians on these occasions, for wherever they chanced to appear, they struck such a terror into the mountaineers, as made them instantly take to their heels.

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Hannibal at length, after nine days' march from the first ascent, gained the summit of the mountain. Here he staid two days, that those of his men, who with infinite toil had climbed to this height might take breath; and that his sick and wounded, who were still behind and moving slowly on, might have time to crawl up. And Polybius adds, that while the troops continued here, they had the agreeable surprise of seeing many of the horses and beasts of burden which had fallen in the way, or had by fear been driven out of it, and were thought lost, arrive safely at the camp, having followed the track of the army.

It was now about the end of autumn, and abundance of snow was newly fallen on the top of the mountain. Hannibal perceiving his soldiers to be extremely discouraged by the sufferings they had already undergone, and by the apprehension of those that were to come, called them together, that he might try to revive their hope. Having led them to a convenient spot for taking an extensive view of the plains below; "There!" said he, "cast your eyes over those large and fruitful countries. The Gauls who inhabit them are our friends They are waiting for us, ready and impatient to join us. You have scaled not only the rampart of Italy,

Polyb. B. 3. c. 54.

Livy, B. 21. c. 35.

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but the walls of Rome itself. What remains is all smoothness and descent. One battle gained, or two at most, and the capital of Italy will be ours."

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The next day he broke up his camp and began to descend. But now, though he had no enemies to encounter, except a few lurking robbers, he is said to have lost almost as many men and horses in going down the mountain as in coming up. The way was so steep and slippery in most places, that the soldiers could neither keep on their feet, nor recover themselves when they slipped; and the ground being covered with snow, it was difficult to hit the right path, and if they missed it, they fell down frightful precipices, or were swallowed up in depths of snow. Nevertheless, being inured to such dangers, they supported this with fortitude. But at length they came to a place much worse than any they had before met with, and which quite took away their courage. The path, for about a furlong and a half, naturally very steep and craggy, was rendered much more so by the late falling away of a great quantity of earth, so that neither elephants nor horses could pass. Here, therefore, they stopped short. Hannibal, wondering at this sudden halt, ran to the place, and having viewed it, plainly saw there was no advancing further that way. His first thought was to try another by fetching a compass.—But he quickly desisted from this attempt, it being found impracticable. For though the snow that had last fallen, being soft and of no

Polyb. B. 3. c. 55.

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great depth, yielded good footing enough for the soldiers and horses that marched foremost; yet when this had been so trampled upon by them, that the feet of those who followed came to the hard snow and ice under it, the latter could by no means advance, or even keep upon their feet. And when they endeavoured to sustain themselves on their hands and knees, they often slid down and were lost in pits and precipices. And as for the horses and beasts of burden, when they struck their feet into the ice to preserve themselves from falling, they could not draw them out again, but remained there as if they had been themselves frozen.—It was necessary therefore to seek some other expedient.

Hannibal having caused all the snow to be removed that lay upon the ground near the entrance of the first way, he there pitched his camp; and then gave orders to cut out a winding path in the rock itself[2]; and this work was

[2] Mr. Rollin seems very loth to part with Livy's VINEGAR, which was poured upon the rock to soften it, after this had been first made red-hot under flaming piles of huge trees. "Many," says Mr. Rollin, "reject this fact as fabulous. Pliny observes, that vinegar has the force to break stones and rocks. *Saxa rumpit infusum, quæ non ruperit ignis antecedens.* Lib. 23. For which reason he calls vinegar *Succus rerum domitor,* Lib. 33, c. 2. Dio, speaking of the siege of Eleutheræ, says that the walls of it were made to fall by the force of vinegar." L. 36, p. 8.

"It is likely," [*apparemment*] adds Mr. Rollin, "what makes people question the truth of Livy's account, is the difficulty that Hannibal would have to procure in those mountains a sufficient quantity of vinegar for the operation." Doubtless the unbelievers do imagine this to be

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carried on with so great diligence and vigour, that at the end of one day the beasts of burden and the horses were able to descend without much difficulty. He immediately sent them forward, and, removing his camp to a place that was free from snow, put them to pasture. It now remained to enlarge the way, that the elephants might pass. This task was assigned to the Numidians, and it took up so much time, that Hannibal did not arrive with his whole army in the plains below, on the confines of Insubria, till four days after he began to descend. He had been fifteen days in passing the Alps, and, these included, five months and a half in his march (of about 1000 miles) from New Carthage.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 56.

Of the 38,000 foot with which the Carthaginian general had crossed the Rhone, he had now but 12,000 Africans, and 8000 Spaniards; and his 8000 horse were reduced to about 6000. This enumeration is according to Hannibal's own register, which he afterwards caused to be engraved on a column near the promontory of Lacinium in Calabria.

c. 60.

His first care, after entering Italy and pitching his camp in the plain at the foot of the mountain, was to refresh his men, who stood

an insuperable objection to the story. But this is not all. For a better authority than Livy assures us, that Hannibal had no wood to make a fire with; that there was not a tree in the place where he then was, or near it. Polybius, B. 3, c. 55. Των γαρ Αλπεων τα μεν ακρα, καὶ πρὸς τας υπερβολας ανηκονία, τελεως ἀδενδρα και ψιλα παντ' εςι.

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in great need of it. Famine and fatigue had so disfigured them, that they looked like savages. But as soon as he saw that both men and horses had recovered their strength, and were fit for action, he marched against the Taurini*, who were at that time in war with the Insubrians, and who had rejected his repeated solicitations to enter into an alliance with him. He sat down before their chief city, and took it in three days, putting all who had opposed him to the sword. This expedition struck such a terror into the Gauls of this neighbourhood, that they came of their own accord and surrendered themselves at discretion. The remoter Gauls of the plains about the Po, would have also been glad to join him, as they had long intended to do. But as the Roman legions had passed beyond those plains, and had escaped the ambushes there laid for them, these Gauls thought it better now to keep quiet; nay, some of their nation were constrained to take arms for the Romans. Hannibal, therefore, judging that he had no time to lose, resolved to march into their country, and endeavour by some exploit to raise the courage of a people who were so well disposed to favour him.

* The people of Turin.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 61.

He was full of this design, when he received intelligence that Scipio had passed the Po with his army, and that he was not far off. The two generals are said to have conceived a high opinion of each other. Hannibal's name had been long renowned, even before the taking of Saguntum; and, that Scipio must be a captain

Livy, B. 21. c. 39.

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of eminent worth, the Carthaginian had well concluded, from the Romans having chosen him, preferably to all others, to be his opponent. But this mutual impression was now become much stronger by the hardy enterprise of the one to march over the Alps, with the happy execution of it; and the expeditious courage of the other, in coming from the banks of the Rhone to meet him at the foot of those mountains.

But nothing had ever so astonished the people of Rome, as the news of the Carthaginians being so near. They had scarce ordered one of their consuls into Africa to attack Carthage, and another into Spain to stop Hannibal, when they hear, that this same Hannibal is in Italy at the head of an army besieging towns. Such terror seized them, that they immediately despatched an express to the consul, Sempronius, then at Lilybæum, to postpone every other affair, and come with all expedition to the defence of his conntry.

Polyb. B 3. c. 41. Livy, B. 21. c. 49. et seq.

Sempronius, to whom a considerable army, and a fleet of 160 galleys, had been committed, and who had made mighty preparations at Lilybæum for a descent upon Africa, was so elated with ambitious hope, that he thought of nothing less than laying siege to Carthage itself, when he had first cleared the coasts of Italy and Sicily of the Carthaginian fleets.—Before he went into Sicily, the Roman prætor of that province had gained some considerable advantages by sea over the Carthaginians, and had disappointed a design formed by them to

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possess themselves of Lilybæum by surprise. When the consul arrived at Messina, he was there met by king Hiero, who, continuing his friendship to the Romans, not only clothed the legions and furnished them with corn at his own expense, but with his fleet accompanied theirs to Lilybæum. From this place Sempronius made a successful attempt upon the island of Malta; a conquest which served to cover Sicily on that side. After which, being returned to Lilybæum, and having learned there that a Carthaginian fleet was ravaging the coasts of Calabria, he made preparations to drive the enemy from thence; but while he was getting ready for this expedition, he received the order above mentioned to return into Italy to the assistance of his colleague.—Hereupon he gave one part of his fleet to his lieutenant Pomponius, to guard the coast of Italy, another to Æmilius, prætor of Sicily, and with the rest, having embarked his army, set sail for Ariminum in the Adriatic.

CHAP. XVIII.

The battle of the Ticin.

WHILE the forces of Sempronius from Sicily were in their voyage, Hannibal and the consul Publius Scipio were advancing to meet each other. Scipio (as was before observed*) had, from the mouth of the Rhone, sent almost all

* See p. 244.

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his own consular army, under the conduct of his brother Cneius, into Spain. The forces which he now commanded, were chiefly the remains of an army which had been assigned to the prætor Manlius*, to guard the province of Gaul, and which had since been defeated by the Boii.

* See p. 223.

For these Gauls had no sooner heard of Hannibal's passing the Iberus, in his way to Italy, but, regardless of the hostages they had given at the conclusion of the last war with Rome, they rose in arms against her, and drew the Insubrians into the revolt. What made the Boii so forward in this matter, was their extreme dissatisfaction with the republic, for planting two colonies in their neighbourhood, at Placentia and Cremona; an affair which, though long intended, was not quite finished when the Carthaginian began his march from Spain.—The Boii fell first upon those lands which had been destined for the new colonies, pursuing the Romans who fled before them, to Mutina*, another Roman colony. In this place, which they besieged, were three Romans of great distinction, (one of them having been consul, and the other two, prætors) who had been commissioned to make the partition of the lands. The Gauls, contrary to their faith given, seized upon the persons of these commissioners at a conference for an accommodation, hoping by this treachery to recover their hostages. The news of it roused the prætor Manlius. He hastened to the relief of Mutina: but the Gauls having got notice of his approach, fell upon him

Polyb. B. 3. c. 40.

* Modena.

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by surprise, in his passage through a forest, and cut off a great part of his army, he himself narrowly escaping with the remainder to Tanetum, a small town on the banks of the Po. To this place the enemy pursued him, and there held him invested, till the prætor Attilius, with a legion that had been raised for Spain, and 5000 men of the allies, was sent from Rome to his assistance. Upon the approach of these troops, the Gauls raised the sieges of both Mutina and Tanetum, and retiring thence dispersed themselves about the country.

Livy, B. 21. c. 26.

The forces of Manlius and Attilius, which had been thus employed, composed the army which Scipio (who had landed at Pisa, and gone thence to Placentia) led against Hannibal. Having passed the Po, he turned to the left and advanced to the Ticin[1], over which he caused a bridge to be laid. But before he marched further, he thought it proper to assemble his soldiers, and endeavour to animate their courage for the approaching occasion.—He spoke to them in words to this effect:

Polyb. B. 3. c. 56. Livy, B. 21. c. 39, 40.

"Were you, soldiers, the same army which I had with me in Gaul, I might well forbear saying any thing to you at this time. For what occasion could there be to use exhortation to a CAVALRY that had so signally vanquished the squadrons of the enemy upon the Rhone; or to LEGIONS, by whom that same enemy, flying before them to avoid a battle,

[1] A small river on the north side of the Po, and running into it.

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did, in effect, confess themselves conquered? But, as those troops, having been enrolled for Spain, are there with my brother Cneius, making war under my auspices, (as was the will of the senate and people of Rome) I, that you might have a consul for your captain, against Hannibal and the Carthaginians, have freely offered myself for this war. You then have a new general, and I a new army. In this circumstance a few words from me to you will be neither improper nor unseasonable.

"And that you may not be unapprised of what sort of enemies you are going to encounter, or of what is to be feared from them, they are the very same, whom in a former war you vanquished both by land and sea; the same from whom you took Sicily and Sardinia, and who have been for these twenty years your tributaries. You will not, I presume, march against these men with only that courage with which you are wont to face other enemies, but with a certain anger and indignation, such as you would feel if you saw your slaves on a sudden rise up in arms against you. Conquered and enslaved, it is not boldness but necessity that urges them to battle: unless you can believe that those who avoided fighting when their army was entire, have acquired better hope by the loss of two thirds of their horse and foot, in the passage of the Alps.

"But you have heard, perhaps, that though they be few in number, they are men of stout hearts and robust bodies, heroes of such strength and vigour as nothing is able to resist—mere

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effigies! nay, shadows of men! wretches emaciated with hunger, and benumbed with cold! bruised and battered to pieces among the rocks and craggy cliffs! their weapons broke, and their horses weak and foundered! Such are the cavalry, and such the infantry, with which you are going to contend; not enemies, but the fragments of enemies. There is nothing which I more apprehend, than that it will be thought Hannibal was vanquished by the Alps, before we had any conflict with him. But perhaps it was fitting that so it should be; and that with a people and a leader, who had violated leagues and covenants, the gods themselves, without man's help, should begin the war, and bring it near to a conclusion; and that we, who, next to the gods, have been injured and offended, should happily finish what they begun.

"I need not be in any fear that you should suspect me of saying these things merely to encourage you, while inwardly I have different sentiments. What hindered me from going into Spain? That was my province; where I should have had the less dreaded Asdrubal, not Hannibal, to deal with. But hearing, as I passed along the coast of Gaul, of this enemy's march, I landed my troops, sent the horse forward, and pitched my camp upon the Rhone. A part of my cavalry encountered and defeated that of the enemy; my infantry not being able to overtake theirs, which fled before us, I returned to my fleet, and with all the expedition I could use in so long a voyage, by sea and land,

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am come to meet them at the foot of the Alps. Was it then my inclination to avoid a contest with this tremendous Hannibal? And have I lit upon him only by accident and unawares? Or am I come on purpose to challenge him to the combat? I would gladly try, whether the earth within these twenty years has brought forth a new kind of Carthaginians; or whether they be the same sort of men who fought at the Ægates; and whom at Eryx you suffered to redeem themselves at 18 *denarii** per head: whether this Hannibal, for labours and journeys be, as he would be thought, the rival of Hercules; or whether he be what his father left him, a tributary, a vassal, a slave of the Roman people. Did not the consciousness of his wicked deed at Saguntum torment him and make him desperate, he would have some regard, if not to his conquered country, yet surely to his own family, to his father's memory, to the treaty written with Amilcar's own hand. We might have starved them in Eryx; we might have passed into Africa with our victorious fleet, and in a few days have destroyed Carthage. At their humble supplication we pardoned them; we released them when they were closely shut up without a possibility of escaping; we made peace with them when they were conquered. When they were distressed by the African war, we considered them, we treated them as a people under our protection. And what is the return they make us for all these favours? Under the conduct of a hair-brained young man, they come hither to

* 11s. 7½d. Arbuth.

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overturn our state and lay waste our country. —I could wish indeed, that it were not so; and that the war we are now engaged in, concerned only our glory and not our preservation. But the contest at present is not for the possession of Sicily or Sardinia, but of Italy itself. Nor is there, behind us, another army which, if we should not prove the conquerors, may make head against our victorious enemies. There are no more Alps for them to pass, which might give us leisure to raise new forces. No, soldiers, here you must make your stand, as if you were just now before the walls of Rome. Let every one reflect, that he is now to defend, not his own person alone, but his wife, his children, his helpless infants. Yet let not private considerations alone possess our minds; let us remember that the eyes of the senate and people of Rome are upon us, and that as our force and courage shall now prove, such will be the fortune of that city, and of the Roman empire."

This discourse, supported by the authority of the speaker, the certainty of some things he had said, and the probability of others, had the wished-for effect on the minds of the hearers.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 62. Livy, B. 21. c. 42. et seq.

On the other side, Hannibal made use of a new kind of rhetoric to inspire his soldiers with resolution. He had taken prisoners some young men of the mountaineers who opposed his march over the Alps; and to prepare them for his purpose, had caused them to be treated in the severest manner, loaded with irons, tormented with hunger, and macerated with

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stripes. In this miserable condition he had them brought into the presence of his whole army; where, showing them such weapons as the Gallic princes were accustomed to use in single combat, and placing also before their eyes horses and handsome suits of apparel, he demanded, who of them would be willing, with those weapons, to fight in duel one against another, to the death of one of the duellists, on the condition that the victor should have his liberty, and the prizes they beheld? There was not a single wretch of these prisoners who did not instantly and eagerly call out for the arms; for, at worst, they were sure of this advantage, to be by death delivered from all their miseries. Hannibal hereupon directed that they should draw lots for entering the lists. At the hearing of this order, all the young men lifted up their hands to heaven, each conjuring the gods that he might be of the number of the combatants; and all those, whose fortune it proved to be so, exceedingly rejoiced and exulted, while the rest were as much dejected.

When these duels were over, those of the prisoners who had been only spectators seemed to envy the conquered, no less than they did the conquerors.

The spectacle had made the like impression on the greater part of the Carthaginians, who comparing the fortune of the dead with that of the living, who had not fought, compassionated these, and thought the others happy.

Hannibal, having thus brought his soldiers

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to the temper and disposition he desired, advanced into the midst of them, and then spoke in the following manner.

"If, in the estimation of your own fortune, you will but bear the same mind which you just now did, in contemplating the fortune of others, the victory, soldiers, is ours. What you have seen, was not a mere show for amusement, but a representation of your own real condition. I know not whether you or your prisoners be encompassed by fortune with the stricter bonds and necessities. Two seas inclose you on the right and left;—not a ship to fly to, for escaping. Before you is the Po, a river broader and more rapid than the Rhone; behind you are the Alps, over which, even when your numbers were undiminished, you were hardly able to force a passage. Here, then, soldiers, you must either conquer or die, the very first hour you meet the enemy. But the same fortune which has thus laid you under the necessity of fighting, has set before your eyes those rewards of victory, than which no men are ever wont to wish for greater from the immortal gods. Should we by our valour recover only Sicily and Sardinia, which were ravished from our fathers, those would be no inconsiderable prizes. Yet, what are those? The wealth of Rome, whatever riches she has heaped together from the spoils of nations, all these, with the masters of them, will be yours. You have been long enough employed in driving the cattle upon the vast mountains of Lu-

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sitania and Celtiberia; you have hitherto met with no reward worthy of the labours and dangers you have undergone. The time is now come to reap the full recompense of your toilsome marches over so many mountains and rivers, and through so many nations, all of them in arms. This is the place, which fortune has appointed to be the limit of your labours; it is here that you will finish your glorious warfare, and receive an ample recompense of your completed service. For I would not have you imagine that victory will be as difficult as the name of a ROMAN WAR is great and sounding. It has often happened that a despised enemy has given a bloody battle, and the most renowned kings and nations have by a small force been overthrown. And if you but take away that glitter of the Roman name, what is there wherein they may stand in competition with you? For, (to say nothing of your service in war for twenty years together with so much valour and success) from the very pillars of Hercules, from the ocean, from the utmost bounds of the earth, through so many warlike nations of Spain and Gaul, are you not come hither victorious? And with whom are you now to fight? with raw soldiers, an undisciplined army, beaten, vanquished, besieged by the Gauls the very last summer, an army unknown to their leader, and unacquainted with him.

"Or, shall I, who, I might almost say, was born, but certainly brought up, in the tent of

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my father[2], that most excellent general, shall I, the conqueror of Spain and Gaul, and not only of the Alpine nations, but, which is greater yet, of the Alps themselves, shall I compare myself with this half-year captain? A captain before whom should one place the two armies, without their ensigns, I am persuaded he would not know to which of them he is consul? I esteem it no small advantage, soldiers, that there is not one among you, who has not often been an eye-witness of my exploits in war; not one, of whose valour, I myself have not been a spectator, so as to be able to name the times and places of his noble achievements; that with soldiers, whom I have a thousand times praised and rewarded, and whose pupil I was, before I became their general, I shall march against an army of men strangers to one another.

"On what side soever I turn my eyes, I behold all full of courage and strength; a veteran infantry, a most gallant cavalry[3]; you, my allies, most faithful and valiant; you, Carthaginians, whom not only your country's cause, but the justest anger impels to battle. The hope, the courage of assailants is always greater, than of those who act upon the defensive.

2 Here we have another proof from Livy himself, of his own inadvertency in delivering the idle story mentioned, p. 211.

3 Livy's expression is, *Generosissimarum gentium equites frænatos et infrænatos*, horsemen that ride with bridles, and those that ride without bridles; by the latter meaning the Numidians, who had no bridles nor saddles to their horses, and who in action resembled the modern hussars.

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With hostile banners displayed you are come down upon Italy; you bring the war. Grief, injuries, indignities fire your mind, and spur you forward to revenge.—First, they demand me, that I, your general, should be delivered up to them; next, all you, who had fought at the siege of Saguntum; and we were to be put to death by the extremest tortures. Proud and cruel nation! Every thing must be yours, and at your disposal? You are to prescribe to us, with whom we shall make war, with whom we shall make peace? You are to set us bounds, to shut us up within hills and rivers; but you, you are not to observe the limits which yourselves have fixed[4]? Pass not the IBERUS. What next? Touch not the SAGUNTINES; SAGUNTUM is upon the IBERUS[5]; move not a step towards that city. It is a small matter then, that you have deprived us of our ancient possessions, Sicily and Sardinia; you would have Spain too? Well, we shall yield Spain; and then—you will pass into Africa. Will pass did I say?—This very year they ordered one of their consuls into Africa, the other into Spain. No, soldiers, there is nothing left for us but what

[4] By the words which Livy here puts into the mouth of Hannibal, it is plain, that the Saguntines were not included at first in the treaty with Asdrubal; that this treaty only restrained the Carthaginians from passing the Iberus, as Polybius declares; and that the alliance of the Romans with the Saguntines was posterior to it, and a real infraction of it. See page 235, 236.

[5] Hannibal, the more to incense his hearers against the Romans, makes these assert an impudent falsehood, that Saguntum is upon the Iberus.

we can vindicate with our swords. Come on then. Be men. The Romans may with more safety be cowards; they have their own country behind them, have places of refuge to fly to, and are secure from danger in the roads thither; but for you there is no middle fortune between death and victory. Let this be but well fixed in your minds, and once again I say, you are CONQUERORS."

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Livy, B. 21. c. 45.

Livy reports, that Hannibal, further to animate his men, assured them, that they should have every one of them lands in property, either in Africa, Spain, or Italy, or else an equivalent in money, if they preferred money. And these assurances he ratified in form. Taking a flint in one hand, and holding a lamb with the other, he said, "Great JUPITER, and all ye gods, if I do not perform my promise, slay me as I do this lamb!" at which words he broke with the flint the skull of the lamb; a solemnity which much augmented the confidence of his troops.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 65.

The next day the two armies advanced towards each other along the Ticin, on that side of it which is next the Alps, the Romans having the river on their left, the Carthaginians the same river on their right. The day following each army, receiving intelligence by its foragers that the enemy was near, encamped in the place where it then was. The third, Scipio with his cavalry and light-armed foot marching forward to discover the strength and situation of the Carthaginians; and Hannibal, with his cavalry only, coming on with the like intention,

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they soon perceived each other's approach by the dust they raised in the plain, and thereupon immediately prepared for battle. The Roman general sent before him his Gallic horse, assisted by his dartmen, to begin the fight, he himself with the rest of his cavalry in one line following slowly in good order. The Gauls behaved themselves courageously; but the foot, that should have aided them, shrunk at the first onset, or rather fled cowardly through the intervals of the squadrons without casting a dart, fearing to be trodden down by the enemy's horse. Nevertheless the Gauls maintained the fight, as presuming they should be well sustained by the Roman horse behind them. Nor did the consul neglect his part, but hazarded his person so far, that he received a dangerous wound, and had been left upon the place, if his son[6], a mere youth, (afterwards the great Africanus) had not, by a surprising effort of courage, brought him off. Whilst the Romans were busied in assisting their consul, an unexpected storm came driving at their backs, and obliged them to look to their own preservation. For Hannibal had ordered his Numidians, who were in the wings, to wheel and give upon the Romans in flank and rear, while he with his Spanish and other horse sustained their charge in front. The Numidians performed their instructions, and having first cut in pieces the scattered foot that had run away

[6] So Livy is inclined to believe, with the greater number of authors; but adds, that Celius the historian gives the honour of the consul's rescue to a Ligurian slave.

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at the beginning of the action, fell instantly upon the backs of the Roman cavalry, who by this impression were entirely broken, and forced to betake themselves to their speed, leaving to their enemies the honour of the day.

Scipio, the night following, decamped secretly, and marched with expedition over the plains to the Po, which he now repassed, retiring to the neighbourhood of Placentia[7]. For he thought it not safe, wounded as he was, to stay in a flat open country, with an enemy so near, that was much superior to him in horse. Hannibal, who had expected to have an engagement with the enemy's infantry, no sooner learned that the Romans were retired, but he followed them as far as to their bridge upon the Ticin[8]. Here he surprised and made pri-

Polyb. B. 3. c. 66.

[7] Livy says, that Scipio retired to Placentia; which if true, Placentia must have had a different situation from what it has now, and must have been, not on the east but the west side of the Trebia *. For we find, that Scipio, after this first retreat, passed the Trebia to get further from Hannibal. Polybius's words import no more than that the Romans retired to the neighbourhood of Placentia, περὶ πόλιν Πλακεντίαν.

*See Polyb. B. 3. c. 74.

[8] Livy, who, in this part of his history, plainly borrows from Polybius, seems to have misunderstood him with regard to the bridge, at which Hannibal is said to have arrived in his pursuit of the Romans. The Latin historian makes it to be their bridge over the Po, as if they had no river to pass in their way to the Po; which, if true, we must say, that the battle was fought on the east side of the Ticin, the side towards Placentia: for Polybius expressly affirms, that Scipio, at the head of the battle, had the Ticin to his left, and Hannibal the same river to his right. Yet, that the battle was fought on the west side of the Ticin, we have Livy's own authority. He makes Scipio's march,

B. 21. c. 39.

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soners 600 men who had been left behind to destroy the bridge so soon as the army should

in order to meet Hannibal, to have been from Placentia to that river, over which he passed by a bridge, before he gave battle to the Carthaginian. *Ponte perfecto traductus Romanus exercitus in agrum Insubrium,* B. 21. c. 45. And in this he does not disagree with Polybius. Now, if the battle was fought on the west bank of the Ticin, and Scipio had this river to his left, it is evident that the Carthaginians were between him and the Po, and that he could not steal a march to the Po (in the way to Placentia) without first repassing the Ticin; which Hannibal must also have crossed in the pursuit of his enemy to the Po. But not one word is any where said of Hannibal's passing, or attempting to pass, the Ticin.

The bridge therefore to which Hannibal came, in pursuit of the Romans, must have been their bridge over the Ticin; at the entrance of which, according to Livy, Scipio had raised a fort and placed a guard. And it was this guard which Hannibal surprised.

The reason which Polybius assigns for Hannibal's turning back, when he came to the broken bridge, is the distance of the enemy: he heard that the Romans were got a great way off (too far to be overtaken.) This furnishes another proof, that the river in question was the Ticin and not the Po. For as he had determined to pass the Po with all expedition, how could he find a more convenient time to lay his bridge, than when he had no enemies to oppose him? But the distance of the enemy was a good reason why he should not lay a bridge over the Ticin; since this would be only loss of time and labour, and could not in the least further his intention of passing the Po, or coming up with the Romans. And what necessity could he be under of spending two days (as Livy says he did) in search of a convenient place to lay a bridge over the Po, if he was already at that very place where the Romans had laid their bridge over that river? Chevalier Folard's translator of Polybius, understands him as Livy does. Yet the Chevalier, in his comment, regardless of his text, speaks of the bridge in question, as the bridge over the Ticin, tom. 4. p. 129.

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be passed. The work was however effected; the boats which had composed the bridge being loosed from one another were floating down the stream; which Hannibal perceiving, and hearing also that the Romans were far advanced in their march, he immediately turned back, went down the Ticin, and then up along the banks of the Po, to find a convenient place where he might lay a bridge of boats over this river. After two days march, a proper place being found, and the bridge formed, he ordered Asdrubal to lead over the army, while he himself was employed in giving audience to ambassadors come to him from the Gauls of the neighbouring countries, who, after his success at the Ticin, retaining their first design, now offered to join their forces to his, and to furnish him with whatever he wanted.

When the army was all passed, the Carthaginian took his march down the river, and at the end of the second day came within view of the Romans. The third, he drew up his forces in battalia, in the face of the enemy: but finding his challenge not accepted, he retired and pitched his camp about six miles from them.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 67.

At this time certain Gauls, to the number of 2000 foot and 200 horse, who served in the consul's camp, observing the fortunate state of Hannibal's affairs, plotted together to desert to him. After supper they retired to their tents, and there kept quiet till towards daybreak; but then, having suddenly armed themselves, they fell upon the sleeping Romans, who lay nearest to them, slew a great number, and

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wounded many others; after which they fled out of the camp, carrying with them to Hannibal the heads of those they had slain. The Carthaginian received these traitors kindly, exhorted them to continue their zeal, and promised them rewards proportionable to their services; but distrusting perhaps their fidelity, he did not enrol them among his troops, but dismissed them to their respective towns and villages, that they might publish among their countrymen the success of his arms, and exhort them to enter into alliance with him. There was in truth little need, for that end, of the exhortations of these emissaries, whose recent treachery alone sufficed to put the rest of the Boii under a necessity of siding with the Carthaginian. A party of them, at this very juncture, brought to Hannibal's camp the three Roman commissioners, whom, contrary to faith given, they had seized at a conference, (as was before mentioned) and they put them into his hands. Hannibal, after many kind words and promises to these Gauls, made a treaty with them, and then restored to them the three captives, whom he advised them to keep under strict guard, and to make use of (as they had at first proposed) to recover their hostages from the Romans.

Scipio, alarmed at the bloody treason of his Gallic deserters, and not doubting but the Gauls in general would quickly declare themselves in favour of Hannibal, thought it advisable to retire into a country where the friendship of the inhabitants was more to be depended

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Polyb. B. 3. c. 68.

upon. He decamped therefore about three hours after midnight to pass the Trebia [9], and take post upon the eminences near that river, where he believed the enemy would not have the boldness to attack him. Hannibal, upon notice of this motion of the Romans, detached his Numidian cavalry after them, he himself soon following with the rest of the army. The Numidians, finding the Roman camp deserted, stopped to set fire to it, a delay very fortunate to the Romans, who, had they been overtaken in the plain, and before they had got their baggage over the river, would have been extremely embarrassed. But when the Numidians came up, the main body of the consul's army, together with the baggage, had already passed the stream. There remained on the other side some of his rear guard only, of which the enemy slew a part, and took the rest prisoners.

The consul, having fortified himself in his new camp, resolved to wait there the arrival of his colleague Sempronius with the troops from Sicily, and, in the meantime, to attend carefully to the cure of his wound, that he might be in a condition to act, when, after the junction of the two armies, a favourable opportunity should present. Hannibal advanced, and pitched his camp about five miles from that of the consul, the Trebia running between them.

[9] A small river running northward into the Po near Placentia.

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Great numbers of Gauls from the circumjacent country flocked to the Carthaginian, and supplied him abundantly with arms and provisions.

CHAP. XIX.

The battle of the Trebia.
Hannibal passes over the Apennines into Hetruria.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 68.

WHEN the news came to Rome of the action upon the Ticin, though the public expectation was much disappointed by the ill success, yet they endeavoured to account for it by reasons that would leave no discouragement upon their minds. Some imputed the misfortune to rashness in the consul, stimulated by too eager a desire of fighting: others to perfidy in the Gauls of his army, whom they supposed to have designedly suffered themselves to be vanquished; a conjecture founded on the subsequent treachery of some of their countrymen; and as the Roman infantry remained unbroken, no danger to the republic was yet apprehended, from a defeat which the horse alone had sustained. The arrival of Sempronius, from Sicily, at Ariminum, with his legions, confirmed this confidence. It was imagined, that when these had joined the forces of Scipio, the very appearance of so powerful an army would alone be sufficient to put the Carthaginians to flight.

Sempronius marched with all diligence from Ariminum to join his colleague. Having

pitched his camp near him, and refreshed his legions, which had been fatigued by their voyage[1], and march from Lilybæum to Ariminum, which took up forty days, he gave orders to get all things ready for battle. While these preparations were going forward, he made frequent visits to Scipio, inquiring of him all the circumstances of the late action upon the Ticin, and consulting with him upon future measures.

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In the meantime Hannibal found means to get possession of Clastidium, a small town on the confines of Liguria, where the Romans had formed a magazine of arms and provisions. To give an impression of his clemency, and engage more of his enemies to have recourse to it, he treated the garrison with all gentleness. And as the governor had betrayed the place to him, he most richly rewarded him, in hopes thereby to allure other officers intrusted by the Romans to the like treachery.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 69.

Soon after this, having notice that certain Gauls who inhabited between the Trebia and the Po, and who had made alliance with him, continued nevertheless (that they might have a refuge in all events) to hold a secret correspondence with the enemy, he detached 2000 foot and 1000 horse to pillage and lay waste their lands. His orders were punctually executed, and the booty proved considerable;

[1] Livy sends the troops of Sempronius, all the way from Lilybæum to Ariminum, by sea. Polybius represents them traversing the city of Rome, and marching from thence to Ariminum.

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the plundered Gauls flocking to the Roman entrenchments to ask succour.

Sempronius, who had impatiently waited an occasion of fighting, seized this pretext. He sent out the greater part of his cavalry with a thousand light-armed foot, who expeditiously passing the Trebia, attacked the pillagers that were carrying off the booty, put them to flight, and obliged them to retire within their entrenchments. But a vigorous sally being made from thence, the pursuers were repulsed, and obliged in their turn to fly to their camp. Hereupon Sempronius put all his cavalry and all his light-armed troops in motion, so that the enemy were once more forced to retire. Hannibal, who was not prepared for a general action, and who thought it not the part of a prudent commander to hazard one lightly, and without a premeditated design, contented himself with stopping the flight of his men, and making them face about. He forbad them by his officers, and by his trumpets, either to charge or pursue the enemy; who, after they had continued some time upon the place, retreated to their camp.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 70.

The loss of men had not been very considerable on either side; but as the Romans had lost fewer than the Carthaginians, Sempronius, much elated with this trivial advantage, could think of nothing now but a decisive action. Nevertheless, he continued to observe the decency of advising with his colleague. Scipio's opinion was, that in prudence they ought to

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avoid fighting, till the troops, having been trained and exercised during the winter, might more reasonably be depended upon than at present: he added that the Gauls were naturally too fickle and inconstant to keep long in friendship with the Carthaginian, and would infallibly turn against him, if they found him out of a condition to enterprise any thing of importance; and he therefore entreated Sempronius to lay aside, for some time, all thoughts of a general battle; an occasion in which (he modestly added) he himself, when his wound was healed, might perhaps be of some use. Sempronius could not but be sensible that this advice was judicious; but his passion to distinguish himself overpowering his reason, and begetting a confidence of success, he, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of his colleague, bent his whole mind to bring on a general action, as soon as possible; that so neither Scipio's cure, nor the election of new consuls (the time for which drew near) might prevent his acquiring the sole glory of finishing the war. And thus, says Polybius, as he considered not what was seasonable for the public, but for himself, it was impossible but he must take wrong measures.

Hannibal formed the same judgment as Scipio, upon the situation of things, and was therefore no less desirous than Sempronius of coming to a decisive battle without delay. He was well aware of his present advantages in the favourable disposition of the Gauls to him, the inexperience of the Roman troops, and the in-

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Polyb. B. 3. c. 71.

ability of Scipio to be in the action. But his strongest motive was, the necessity an invader is under of being almost incessantly active, and of performing repeated exploits, if he would preserve to himself the esteem, and keep alive the hopes, of his confederates.

The Carthaginian had viewed and fully examined the ground between the two armies. It was an open plain, through which ran a winding rivulet. The banks of this small stream being pretty high, and also thick set with bushes and brambles, Hannibal perceived that it was easy not only for foot, but even for horsemen, to be there concealed. Having imparted to his chief officers the design he had formed, and finding it universally approved, he after supper sent for his brother Mago, a young man of great spirit, and a good soldier, and directed him to choose out a hundred horse and a hundred foot of the bravest men in the army, and to bring them before night to his tent. This done, and the general having exhorted the two hundred to behave themselves gallantly in the post he should assign them, he bid each man go and choose out of the corps to which he belonged, nine others, such as he knew to be the stoutest soldiers in it, and then to repair to him at a certain place in the camp. The whole number came, a thousand horse, and a thousand foot. He furnished them with guides, and under the conduct of his brother, to whom he signified the time when they should fall upon the enemy, sent them to the place he had chosen for the ambush.

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The next morning, at daybreak, he assembled his Numidian cavalry, a hardy people, inured to fatigue; and when he had promised ample rewards to every one that should distinguish himself in the discharge of his duty, he ordered them instantly to pass the Trebia, brave the enemy in their camp, skirmish with them if they sallied out, and, in skirmishing, retire and repass the river.

Hannibal's view in making this movement so early in the morning, was to provoke the Romans to an engagement while they were yet fasting, thoughtless of fighting, and unprepared for it.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 72.

Sempronius no sooner saw the Numidians approach, but he sent out his cavalry to attack them. The cavalry were followed by 6000 dartmen; and the general himself not long after came out of his entrenchment with all the rest of his army. His numerous forces, and the light advantage he had gained the day before, made him vain enough to think, that there needed little more than his appearance in the field to secure the victory.

It was yet winter, it snowed, the weather was extremely cold, and the soldiers had begun their march before they had eaten any thing to sustain them. And therefore, though they moved forward briskly at first, and with an eager desire of fighting, yet when they came to ford the river, which being swelled by the rain of the night before was breast high, they began to shrink; and when they had waded through it (the day being then pretty far ad-

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vanced) they found themselves extremely pinched and weakened both with cold and hunger; whereas, on the other hand, the Carthaginians had, by Hannibal's order, taken a good repast in their tents, rubbed themselves with oil, and put on their arms before the fire.

When Hannibal perceived that the Romans had passed the Trebia, which was the favourable moment he had waited for, he instantly sent out to the succour of his Numidians, the slingers of the Baleares, and his other light-armed infantry to the number of 8000; after which he led forth his main army. His foot consisted of 20,000 men, Gauls, Spaniards, and Africans. His cavalry including the Gauls, his allies, amounted to above 10,000. He drew up the whole horse and foot, in one line, about a mile from his camp, posting the horse on the wings. His elephants he placed before the points of his body of infantry.

In the meantime, Sempronius, by a signal, called off his cavalry that were fatiguing themselves to little purpose against the Numidians. For it was the custom of these to attack briskly; then on a sudden break their ranks, turn their backs and fly; and presently after return to the charge in as good order and with as much boldness as at first: a manner of fighting, which being entirely new to the Roman cavalry, perplexed and disconcerted them.

The consul's infantry consisted of 16,000 Roman legionaries[2], and 20,000 foot of the

[2] Livy says, 18,000. He adds, that the consul's army was strengthened by a body of the Cenomani, the only

allies. He formed his battle after the usual manner of the Romans, the infantry in three lines, and the horse, amounting to 4000, upon the wings. In this order he advanced slowly towards the enemy. The light-armed troops on both sides began the action, much to the advantage of the Carthaginians; for the dart-men of the Romans having suffered cold and hunger ever since the morning, and having spent the most of their darts against the Numidians, were by no means a match for those of Hannibal, who had but just left their camp, well armed, fresh, and vigorous.

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Polyb. B. 3. c. 73.

When these skirmishing troops had retired through the intervals of the respective armies to which they belonged, a general charge ensued. The Roman cavalry being soon routed and driven from their ground by the superior numbers of the Carthaginians, left the wings of their infantry exposed to be attacked in flank. The Numidians, who had been employed to provoke the battle, and the light-armed troops who had begun it, were ready on the part of Hannibal for this service, having, after their retreat, posted themselves to the right and left behind the Carthaginian cavalry; falling furiously therefore on the two wings of the Roman infantry in flank, they put them into great disorder and disabled them from defending themselves against the elephants, that attacked them in front. These wings, utterly

nation of the Gauls that continued faithful to the Romans.

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Polyb. B. 3. c. 74.

broken and put to flight, were chased into the river.

At the same time, the 2000 men who had lain in ambush in the brook before mentioned, came out, and fell upon the rear of the Roman legions in the centre, which caused a terrible confusion there. The foremost ranks of this centre were the only troops of the consul's army that could keep their ground. They fought a long time with undaunted bravery, against the heavy-armed forces of the enemy, and at length, urged by necessity, broke their way through them with great slaughter. But seeing that their wings were defeated, and not thinking themselves able either to succour them, or to return to their camp, by reason of the enemy's numerous horse, and the river that were in the way, they formed themselves into a close compact body to the number of 10,000, and took the direct road to Placentia. Hither they retreated without the least danger or opposition; and they were followed by all those of the rout, horse and foot, that could escape out of the field without passing the river. Of the remainder of the Roman army, some had the good fortune to get safely over the stream to their camp; but the greater part perished on the banks of it, either trodden down by the elephants or slain by the horse. The Carthaginians pursued the enemy no further than to the river, which the rigour of the season restrained them from passing. They returned to their intrenchments. Their victory was complete, and their loss inconsiderable. A few only of the

Africans and Spaniards remained upon the field; the Gauls suffered most. Yet after this victory the Carthaginians, through the inclemency of the weather, lost a great number both of men and horses; and of the elephants all died but one[4].

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As for the consul Scipio, and those that were with him, they stole away from their camp, the very night after the battle, crossed the Trebia upon boats or upon rafts, and got safe to Placentia; the enemy either not perceiving their flight, or not being able to pursue them, for cold and weariness.

Livy, B. 21. c. 56.

Sempronius, to conceal the shame of his defeat, sent messengers to Rome, whose tidings imported only, that there had been a battle, and that the severity of the weather had snatched the victory out of his hands. This report passed currently at first, but the true situation of affairs was quickly known; that the Roman forces had been utterly vanquished; that the routed had fled to the neighbouring colonies for refuge; that Scipio after his flight to Placentia, not to ruin that place by keeping too great a number of soldiers there, had crossed the Po with his part of the army, and retired to Cre-

Polyb. B. 3. c. 75.

Livy, B. 21. c. 56.

[4] Livy, B. 21, c. 58, speaks of seven elephants that after this time perished of cold, in a fruitless attempt which Hannibal made to pass the Apennines, being forced back from the top of those hills by a hurricane. The same author relates a battle that presently followed Hannibal's return into the plains, and was terminated by the night's coming on, when there had been no great slaughter on either side. Polybius says nothing of all this, and there is nothing of probability in the story, but a good deal of poetry.

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mona; that the troops had no provisions but what were brought by sea and up the Po; and, lastly, that all the nations of the Gauls had declared for Hannibal.

The people of Rome were yet in their first fright and consternation at all this bad news, when Sempronius himself, after escaping many dangers from the enemy's cavalry that were dispersed in parties over the country, arrived in the city. His business was to hold the *comitia* by centuries, for electing new consuls.

Notwithstanding the late disasters and the present distress, party favour had a greater share in the elections, than a due regard to the exigencies of the state. For (with Cn. Servilius) was raised to the consulate C. Flaminius, a rash hot-headed man, who when in the same station six years before, had signalized himself by his disobedience to the senate, and his contempt of religion. His merit with the people, and what now procured him the fasces, was his having been the only man of the conscript fathers, that assisted in promoting a law, which enacted that no senator, nor father of a senator, should have a ship at sea carrying above eight ton or thereabouts. A vessel of that burden was thought sufficient for transporting to Rome the produce of any man's lands; and it was intended by this law to confine commerce to the plebeians.

See p. 197.

Livy, B. 21. c. 63.

Sempronius's year not being yet expired, he immediately after the elections returned to his winter quarters at Placentia.

The senate provided for the next campaign.

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They made new levies amongst the allies, ordered troops into Sicily and Sardinia, put garrisons into Tarentum, and other places where they were most wanted, and sent provisions to Ariminum and into Hetruria; through which country the army was to march against Hannibal. They also despatched ambassadors to ask assistance of king Hiero, who furnished them with 500 Cretan archers, and 1000 other light armed soldiers. And lest the Carthaginians should from Africa attempt to land troops in Italy, they equipped sixty quinqueremes to guard the coast. In a word, they omitted nothing that was necessary for carrying on the war with the utmost vigour, it being the peculiar character of the Romans, says Polybius, that they are then most to be feared when they are most afraid.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 75.

On the side of Spain all was safe; for in that country, during the late unfortunate campaign in Italy, the arms of the republic, under the conduct of Cn. Scipio, had prospered beyond expectation. He had entirely defeated Hanno*, the Carthaginian general, and reduced almost all the nations between the Iberus and the Pyrennees to the obedience of Rome.

c. 76.

* See p. 237. Livy, B 21. c. 57.

As for Hannibal, he did not remain inactive after his victory at the Trebia. Wounded and repulsed in an attack upon one town belonging to the Romans, he assaulted and took another called Victumviæ, in Insubria, and gave it up to be plundered by the soldiers.

The Carthaginian, during his winter quarters among the Gauls, with whose levity he was

Polyb. B. 3. c. 78.

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well acquainted, and who, he feared, might repent of their newly contracted alliance with him, is said to have put in practice some of his Punic arts, to preserve himself from their snares. He not only wore false hair, but at different times the habits of different ages, frequently changing his dress in order to disguise himself. And because the Gauls were extremely dissatisfied that their country continued to be the seat of the war, and were impatiently desirous (from a hatred, as they pretended, to the Romans, but in truth, from an eagerness to enrich themselves with plunder) of being led into the territories of the allies of Rome, he resolved to pass as soon as possible over the Apennines into Hetruria. Just before he entered upon this expedition, he assembled all his captives that were of the Roman allies, and when he had assured them that he was come into Italy, not as their enemy, but their friend, to restore them to liberty, and to the possession of the towns which the Romans had taken from them; and when he had exhorted them to join with him in the common cause, and to engage their countrymen to do the same, he dismissed them all without ransom.

c. 77.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 78.

After this, having made inquiry about the several roads into Hetruria, he learned that there was one much shorter than any of the rest, but very difficult to pass, as it led through marshy grounds; the other roads more easy, but known to the enemy, and in their possession. Hannibal, for these reasons, or perhaps because he had naturally a turn for those dan-

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Livy, B. 22. c. 2. Polyb. B. 3. c. 16.

gerous enterprises, which are apt to raise men's admiration of a general, and strike his enemies with terror, chose the difficult road, which was now rendered more so by the overflowing of the Arnus. Having passed the Apennines, he entered the marshes. His Africans and Spaniards, who were inured to this sort of fatigue, and who marched first, went into the water without hesitation, and kept their order. The Gauls had more difficulty (the way being made much worse by the multitudes of men and beasts of burden that had gone before them) and many of them were killed with the fatigue: for, to add to the distress, they were obliged to march thus in mire and water four days together, with but very little sleep, such as they could get lying upon their baggage, or upon the beasts which had carried it, and had perished in the mud. Hannibal himself was not without his share of the inconveniences of this march, for though he rode upon an elephant, (the only one remaining) his continual watchings, and the unwholesome damps, brought such a defluxion upon his eyes that he lost one of them. When he was come out of the marshes, he halted for some days, that he might refresh his army, and inquire into the situation of the country, the strength and designs of the enemy, and the character and disposition of their general.

c. 80.

CHAP. XX.

THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR.

The battle of the Lake Thrasymenus.—Fabius Maximus Cunctator is sent against Hannibal, who deceives him by a very singular stratagem.—Transactions in Spain.

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Livy, B. 21. c. 63.

FLAMINIUS, as was before observed, had obtained the consulship by the favour of the people, contrary to the inclinations of the senate.—Being apprehensive that the augurs, influenced by his enemies, would, to render his election invalid, pretend some defect in the auspices, he took a bold unprecedented step, left Rome without performing the usual ceremonies of religion, went straight to Ariminum, (where he had ordered the army to rendezvous) and was there invested in the consulate. The senate, highly offended at this proceeding, sent two of their body to recal him to Rome, that he might perform those ceremonies which he had despised. But the consul paid no regard to their orders. At the head of four legions (two of which he received from Sempronius, and the other two from the prætor Atilius) he crossed the Apennines, and encamped his army under the walls of Aretium in Hetruria; and there he still was when Hannibal came out of the marshes.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 80, 82.

The Carthaginian having learned that Flaminius's chief talent was haranguing the people, in whose assemblies he was a leading man,

but that he wanted the skill for conducting a war, was of a hasty disposition, easy to be inflamed, and confident of his own abilities, did not doubt but he should be able, by provoking his high spirit, to lead him whithersoever he pleased. With this view, having put his army in march, he laid waste, before the consul's eyes, the fertile fields of Hetruria, and, in seeming contempt of him, passed by his camp at Aretium, and advanced nearer to Rome, as if he intended to carry on his devastations to the walls of the capital. Flaminius beheld the lands of Cortona (one of the most considerable cities of Hetruria) in a flame behind him. Enraged at being thus insulted by Hannibal, he immediately called a council of war, but would not listen to his officers, who advised him to continue in his camp till he was joined by his colleague, and in the meantime content himself with sending out strong parties to hinder the enemy from ravaging the country. He rushed out from the council in great wrath, and gave orders for marching. And when word was brought him that one of the standards stuck so fast in the ground that they could not pull it out, he asked the messenger whether he had not likewise brought letters from the senate forbidding him to fight. He added, "Since fear has not left the soldiers strength enough in their hands to pull up the standard, bid them dig it up." He then began his march, with a full resolution to fight Hannibal as soon as he could overtake him. And though his officers were greatly dissatisfied, yet the common sol-

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Livy, B. 22. c. 4.

c. 3.

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diers applauded the confidence of their general, who to such an extravagant height had raised the hopes of the vulgar, that an immense number of them followed the camp in expectation of booty, and went loaded with chains for the multitude of enemies that were to be taken prisoners.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 82.

Hannibal was pursuing his march in the way towards Rome, having the lake Thrasymenus (now Lago di Perugia) close on his right, and the town of Cortona at some distance on his left, when he learned that the consul was following him. Upon this advice, he turned his thoughts to seek out a convenient spot of ground, where he might draw the enemy into an ambuscade. Nor was it long before he found a place fit for his purpose. He came to a valley, which extending lengthways from the lake to a hill very steep and difficult of access, was lined on the two sides by ridges of little hills. Upon the steep hill Hannibal posted himself, with his Africans and Spaniards in open view. Behind the ridge of hills, on the right of the valley, he placed in a long line the Baleares and other light armed infantry; and behind that, on the left, his cavalry and the Gauls, who formed a line, the extremity of which reached to a narrow pass, whereby he had entered the valley. These dispositions being made in the beginning of the night, he continued the remaining part of it in quiet and silence in his camp.

It was late before the consul arrived at the lake; he therefore encamped that night by the

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side of it. But next morning, by break of day, without examining the ground, he marched into the valley through the pass before mentioned. As soon as Hannibal was apprized that the Roman army was entered, and that their vanguard was not far from him, he gave orders for a general onset. So thick a fog from the lake at this time covered the valley, that the Romans found themselves attacked in front, flank, and rear, almost before they saw the enemy. Many of them were slain in the order of their march, not having had time to form themselves for battle: and so closely was the greater part hemmed in, that they could neither fight nor fly[1]. 15,000 were slaughtered in the valley, among whom was the consul Flaminius. Great numbers being pushed into the lake, perished there. A body of 6000 men forced their way through the enemy. Could those brave legionaries have seen (says Polybius) what passed, they might, by facing about, and falling upon the backs of the Carthaginians, have given a turn to the fortune of the day. But they expecting to encounter new enemies, continued advancing on till they arrived at the summit of a hill; from which, when the fog was dispersed, seeing the total defeat of the rest of the army, they retreated to a neighbouring village.

[1] Livy and Plutarch tell us that this battle was fought with so much eagerness and fury on both sides, that the combatants were not sensible of an earthquake, which happened during the engagement, and which ruined many cities in Italy, overturned mountains, and changed the course of rivers. Livy, B. 22, c. 5. Plut. Life of Fabius.

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Livy, B. 22. c. 6.

The Carthaginian general detached Maharbal after them with a large body of horse and foot, to whom they surrendered next day upon a promise of their lives, and, if we may credit Livy, their liberties: whence he takes occasion to reproach Hannibal with breach of faith, because when the next day he had assembled all his prisoners to the number of 15,000, and had separated the Romans from the other Italians, he delivered the former to his soldiers, to be kept in chains, and released only the latter.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 85.

Polybius tells us, that Hannibal declared he did not think himself bound by the promise which Maharbal had made, as being without authority from him; but then, according to the same historian, that promise was only of their lives, which, if true, Hannibal cannot on this occasion be charged with breach of faith, whether he was in reality bound by Maharbal's promise or not. The loss on the side of the Carthaginians amounted only to 1500 men, most of them Gauls.

The first report of the defeat of the Roman army spread an unspeakable consternation in Rome. The people flocked in crowds to the Forum, calling upon their magistrates to give them an account of the battle. It being impossible for these to conceal or disguise the truth for any long time, the prætor Pomponius, towards sun-set, mounted the *rostra*. All he said was, "We are vanquished in a great battle." And the people, little accustomed to misfortunes in war, much less to hear their magistrates plainly and publicly own that they

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were conquered, could not bear this so heavy a calamity with patience and moderation. In this universal dejection the senators alone preserved their steadiness. The prætors assembled them, and kept them sitting several days together from sun-rising to sun-set. Before they came to any fixed resolution in what manner to oppose the conqueror, they were alarmed with the news of a second defeat. The consul Servilius having heard at Ariminum that Flaminius was following Hannibal with an intention to give him battle, had detached C. Centenius with 4000 horse to strengthen the Roman army. But this reinforcement had come too late. And Hannibal, after the action, hearing of Centenius's approach, had sent Maharbal, with the light-armed foot, and part of the cavalry, to encounter him. Near 2000 Romans were killed in the engagement; the rest fled to a rising ground, but being invested by the enemy, were next day obliged to surrender.

It was thought by the senate that the present exigency required a magistrate with dictatorial authority. Yet because there was no precedent of the people's naming a dictator, and because their only consul, Servilius, to whom that nomination legally belonged, was absent, and all communication between him and Rome cut off by the enemy, it was agreed that the *comitia* should create a magistrate, whose authority should be superior to the consular, but somewhat inferior to the dictatorial; and that he should be styled pro-dictator. En-

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bius Maximus was the person pitched upon; and the only privilege he seems to have wanted of those belonging to a dictator, was that of naming his general of the horse. To this office the people appointed M. Minucius Rufus, a young man much in their favour. Fabius was a senator distinguished for the coolness of his temper, and the great caution with which he proceeded in all his actions. He was as wary and circumspect in his conduct as Sempronius and Flaminius had been rash and impetuous. The pro-dictator began the exercise of his office by acts of religion. The Sybilline books were consulted to know the causes of the present calamities; and the guardians of those oracles declared, that the misfortunes of the republic were owing to the undue performance of a vow to Mars; that it ought to be repeated, and four new vows made to several deities, besides a dedication to Jupiter, of all the pigs, lambs, kids, and calves which should be produced in one spring. This last required the authority of the people; the other was made by the proper magistrates. This done, Fabius and Minucius immediately applied themselves to repair the fortifications of the city. They also posted guards in proper places, caused the bridges over the rivers to be broken down, and sent orders to the people all over the country through which it was thought Hannibal would pass, to burn their houses, destroy the fruits of the ground, and retire into places of strength and safety.

Livy, B. 22. c. 8.

Before the pro-dictator took the field, he

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advised with the senate concerning the troops that should serve under him. They allotted him the army of Servilius, and decreed that he should make what new levies he pleased, either at Rome or amongst the allies. Fabius raised but two new legions, which having commanded to repair to Tibur upon the Anio, he set out for Ocriculum, a city of Umbria, there to meet the troops from Ariminum, under the consul Servilius. These forces he himself led to Tibur, where he was joined by the new recruits. And having been informed that a Carthaginian fleet had taken, near the coast of Hetruria, some Roman ships of burden which were carrying provisions to the army in Spain, he sent the consul Servilius to equip with all diligence what vessels were at Rome and Ostia, and with them to take upon him the guard of the coast of Italy. After these regulations, Fabius began his march towards Hannibal, in which he proceeded with great caution, carefully searching all the places through which the army was to pass.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 86.

The Carthaginian, immediately after the defeat of Centenius, had led his army through Umbria and Picenum to the territory of Adria, a considerable town on the Adriatic, destroying the country wherever he passed, and putting to the sword all the Romans he found in his way that were able to bear arms; such was his hatred to the Roman name. Here he halted for some time, because the country abounded with good provisions and store of old wines, which served to recruit the strength of his ex-

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hausted troops, who had contracted distempers from bad food, and the fatigues they had undergone. He armed his Africans after the Roman manner, out of the spoils he had taken from the enemy. And being now near the sea, for the first time since his coming into Italy, he laid hold of the opportunity, and sent to Carthage an account of his success. Then having ravaged the territories of Asculum and Adria, he proceeded to the countries of the Prætutiani, the Marsi, the Marucini, the Peligni, and Frentani. Last of all he entered Apulia, and was laying waste this country, when Fabius arrived, and pitched his camp upon the hills near Æce[2], within six miles of him. Hannibal instantly led his army to the Roman entrenchments, and offered battle to the enemy. But the pro-dictator remaining quiet in his camp, the Carthaginian, after waiting some time, drew off his men, openly reproaching the Romans, (says Livy) that at length their martial spirit was broken, that the war was at an end, and that they plainly owned themselves vanquished. Nevertheless he was inwardly grieved to find he had to do with a general very different from Sempronius and Flaminius, and was much more afraid of Fabius's prudence than his strength. He had not yet tried his constancy. To provoke him to battle, he made frequent incursions into the countries of the Roman allies, and destoyed them with fire and sword; employing likewise

Livy, B. 22. c. 12.

[2] A town on the borders of Apulia.

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all his arts by sudden marches and countermarches to ensnare him. All was to no purpose; he could neither surprise Fabius, nor make him leave his hills, where he kept himself continually on his guard against so active an enemy. He did not suffer his soldiers to stir out of their camp, except in large bodies; he followed the Carthaginians, but at a considerable distance, because he would on no account hazard a pitched battle; yet he had frequent skirmishes with the enemy, and intercepted such parties of them as ventured too far from their camp. And indeed this was the surest method to ruin Hannibal. The Romans were in no danger of wanting men or provisions in their own country; whereas the Carthaginian could only subsist by pillage, and when his men dropped off, had but small opportunities of recruiting. While the pro-dictator was thus baffling his enemy, he had the continual murmurs of his general of the horse, and of his soldiers, to contend with. Minucius being a favourite of the people, and ambitious of the chief command, openly accused Fabius of real cowardice concealed under the appearance of prudence. But neither the invectives of this seditious man, nor the fresh devastations of Hannibal, who passed over the Apennines into Samnium, could make him alter his wise measures.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 90.

The Carthaginian having ravaged Samnium, and taken the town of Telesia, resolved to penetrate into Campania, one of the finest countries in the world, and at the same time the most inaccessible. Except on one side, where

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it is bounded by the sea, it is encompassed by a chain of high mountains through which there are but three passes, and those very narrow and difficult. It was a bold step in Hannibal, to undertake this expedition in sight of a Roman army commanded by an expert general; but he had his reasons for it. He would thereby either force the enemy to a battle, or shew plainly to the neighbouring nations that he was master of all the open country; by which means he hoped to draw over some of the towns to his party, not one of which had hitherto fallen off from the republic. Add to this, that the cities of Campania were the richest of any in Italy, and their trade the most considerable. Hannibal entered Campania by a pass at the foot of Mount Callicula*, near the Vulturnus[3], and encamped on the banks of that river. Fabius was indeed surprised at the boldness of the Carthaginian, but Minucius and the rest of the army, transported with rage at the being thus insulted, impatiently demanded to be led to battle, insomuch that the pro-dictator was forced to pretend the same eagerness to fight,

* Polybius calls it Eribanus.

[3] Livy tells us (B. 22. c. 13.) that Hannibal designed to enter Campania by a pass near Casinum, a town of Latium, beyond the Liris, because by guarding that pass, he was told he might prevent the Romans from assisting their allies. But the Carthaginian not pronouncing the word Casinum well, his guides thought he had said Casilinum, and accordingly led him to that town, which was situated on the Vulturnus, at the foot of mount Callicula. Hannibal was so enraged at the mistake, that he immediately ordered the chief of his guides to be crucified, for a terror to the rest.

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and march with much greater expedition than usual. But when he came near the enemy, he returned to his former conduct, encamped upon Mount Massicus, and from thence quietly beheld the Carthaginian army gathering the fruits and rich harvests of the Falernian fields. This so provoked his soldiers, that they called him in derision the pedagogue of Hannibal. And Minucius joining in the insolent raillery, said, " their general had chosen for them a fine theatre, from whence they might conveniently behold the ravages of Italy." He then asked the friends of Fabius, whether the pro-dictator did not think the earth an unsafe place for him, and was therefore going to pitch his camp in heaven, and cover himself with the clouds.— When these things were told Fabius, he only replied, that he should indeed be more cowardly than they made him, if he changed his resolution through fear of idle railleries or reproaches. He added, " It is no inglorious thing, to fear for the safety of our country. That man is not fit to rule others who will be influenced by foolish calumnies, or subject himself and his government to the caprice of those whom he ought to command." Fabius continued the same conduct the whole summer, though he was not ignorant that his caution was blamed at Rome as well as in the army.

Plut. Life of Fabius.

Livy, B. 22. c. 16.

Hannibal despaired of bringing the Romans to a battle, and therefore having got an immense booty, he began now to look out for a place in which to secure it, and where he might likewise take up his winter quarters; for though

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Polyb. B. 3. c. 92.

Livy, B. 22. c. 15.

Campania abounded with fruits and wine, yet it yielded not corn sufficient to subsist a numerous army for any considerable time. For these reasons, Hannibal began to draw towards the pass by which he had entered this country. Fabius perceiving his design, detached 4000 men to seize the strait, which being commanded by Mount Callicula, he encamped the rest of his army towards the top of that hill. From thence he sent a garrison into Casilinum, a town on the Vulturnus, on the other side the pass, and ordered L. Hostilius Mancinus, with 400 horse, to observe the enemy. This young officer, rashly engaging with a party of Numidians, was himself slain, together with the greatest part of the detachment. The same day Minucius joined Fabius. He had been sent to guard a pass at Terracina, a city of Latium, to hinder Hannibal from penetrating that way into the territory of Rome[4].

Polyb. B. 3. c. 93.

The Carthaginian, not being able to dislodge Fabius, contrived the following stratagem to be executed in the night. Being encamped at the foot of Mount Callicula, he ordered Asdrubal to pick out 2000 of the strongest oxen, to cause faggots of dry wood to be tied to their horns, and then to keep the cattle with

[4] Hannibal, according to Livy, advanced towards Fabius, and sent his light horse to try once more to provoke him to battle. But though the pro-dictator had greatly the advantage of the ground, he would not hazard a general action, but contented himself with skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry, of whom he killed 800, with the loss of only 200 of his own men.

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the herdsmen ready without the camp. After supper, when all things were quiet, the oxen were brought to the foot of an eminence not far from the pass that was guarded by the 4000 Romans. Upon a signal given, the wood on the horns of those beasts was set on fire, and the herdsmen, who had been instructed to drive them if possible to the top of the eminence, immediately set out, being followed by the light armed infantry. These had orders to assist the herdsmen as long as the cattle kept together, but upon their dispersing, to seize the top of the hill, making as great a noise as they could, and be in readiness to defend themselves in case they were attacked by the enemy. In the meantime Hannibal led his army to the very entrance of the pass. The Africans marched first, next followed the cavalry, then the booty, and last of all, the Spaniards and Gauls. The Roman detachment seeing the fires approach the top of the eminence, thought Hannibal was endeavouring to escape that way; they therefore left the pass in all haste, and marched up in order to oppose him. But as they came nearer the cattle, which now were running up and down, firing the bushes wherever they went, they knew not what to think of these lights, their imaginations suggesting to them a thousand fears. In this perplexity they began to skirmish with the Carthaginians on the top of the hill, but the cattle running in among the combatants, separated them; after which both parties continued quiet waiting for day-light. Fabius was surprised

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at what he saw, but suspecting it to be some stratagem of the enemy, would not stir from his camp, lest he should be entrapped, or, contrary to his intention, be forced to hazard a general action. Hannibal finding the pass open, marched safely through it, with his army and baggage; but that his light armed foot might not be overpowered by the Romans on the eminence, he, as soon as it was day, sent his Spaniards to their assistance, who brought off the detachment, with the slaughter of 1000 of the enemy. The Carthaginian continued his march to the neighbourhood of Alifæ, a city on the confines of Samnium and Campania.

Livy, B. 22. c. 18.

Fabius, though rallied by his soldiers for being thus overreached, kept steady to his first resolution; he marched directly after Hannibal, but encamped on the eminences near him. The latter having again pillaged Samnium and the country of the Peligni, returned to Apulia, where he took Geronium, the houses of which he turned into granaries, and pitched his camp under the walls. From thence he sent out two thirds of his army to forage; part of the remainder he kept to guard the camp, and the rest he disposed in different stations to protect his foragers. As these were in great number, and the country was very fertile, vast quantities of provisions were brought in daily. The pro-dictator continuing to follow him, at length encamped in the territory of Larinum, in the country of the Frentani. From thence he was recalled to Rome to perform a solemn sacrifice

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which required his presence. Both the senate and people were at this time much discontented with him. For beside that his caution had not succeeded to their wishes, Hannibal, by sparing the lands of Fabius, in the general devastation, had rendered him suspected at Rome of holding a secret correspondence with the enemy. And as he had, without consulting the senate, agreed upon an exchange of prisoners with Hannibal, and to purchase the redemption of 247 captives, which the Carthaginian had more than he, the senate refused him the money.—Fabius, determined to keep his word and release his countrymen, directed his son to sell his lands, and paid the sum stipulated. And though most of the prisoners afterwards offered to reimburse him their respective ransoms, he would not consent to it.

Plut. Life of Fabius.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 94.

Fabius, upon his leaving the army, had advised, entreated, and, by his authority, commanded, his general of the horse not to fight during his absence. But Minucius, even while the dictator was making his exhortation, had his thoughts wholly intent upon a battle, which he was determined to hazard the very first opportunity. After Fabius's departure he indeed stayed some time on the hills, in hopes that Hannibal would give him an opportunity of coming to an engagement with him there. But in this being disappointed, he marched down into the plain, and drew nearer the enemy. The Carthaginian upon his approach, leaving one third of his army to be employed in foraging, advanced with the rest from Geronium to

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meet him. Between the two camps there was a rising ground, that would be very commodious to whichever party should possess it. A detachment of 2000 Carthaginian light armed troops seized it by night. Minucius the next day drove them from it, and there entrenched his forces. As Hannibal's principal affair at this time was to provide abundantly not only for his men but for his horses, that they might be in good condition for action the next summer; and as the Romans did not for several days stir from their camp, the Carthaginian detached great numbers of his soldiers to forage. Minucius laid hold of this advantage, and marched his legions to the very entrenchments of the enemy, at the same time sending out his horse and the light armed men, in parties, to attack their foragers, who being dispersed over the fields, and loaded with booty, could make no resistance. Nor had Hannibal sufficient strength within his camp to venture out against those that assailed it. He was reduced to keep upon the defensive, till Asdrubal, informed of the danger by those who had escaped the Roman horse, came from Geronium with 4000 men to the assistance of his general. Upon the arrival of this succour, he sallied out, and Minucius retired. The Carthaginian, fearing lest the Romans should attack his camp at Geronium, and make themselves masters of the plunder and provisions he had laid up in it, returned thither, and after this time became more cautious in sending out parties to forage.

When Minucius's success was known at

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Livy, B. 22. c. 25.

Rome, his friends took advantage of it to extol his bravery and abilities above those of Fabius. M. Metilius, a tribune of the commons, assembled the people, and made a speech to them full of injurious reflections upon Fabius's conduct, and concluded with a motion to give the general of the horse an equal authority with the prodictator. The latter thought it to no purpose to defend himself in the assemblies of the people, since he had not a favourable hearing even in the senate. There he endeavoured to convince the fathers that their losses had been owing to the rashness of their generals: and he did not scruple to say, that if the dictatorial power continued in him, he would call Minucius to an account, for disobeying his orders; that he hoped soon to make it evident to all the world, that fortune was of small moment to an able general, and that reason and good conduct sufficed; adding, that for his part, he thought it a greater glory for a general to preserve his army (if he did it without ignominy) than to destroy many thousands of enemies. Having assisted at the sacrifice to which he had been called, and presided at the election of a new consul, (M. Atilius Regulus, who was substituted in the room of Flaminius) he left the city the night before the *comitia* were to determine in his affair, that he might not be present at the affront which was going to be put upon him. Next day, when the people were assembled, though they were prejudiced against Fabius, and zealous for Minucius, yet scarce any one had courage enough to harangue them

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in favour of Metilius's proposal. C. Terentius Varro was the only man that seconded the tribune. Varro was the son of a butcher, had been a shopkeeper, then a pleader, undertaking poor men's causes right or wrong. By this practice, and by railing at the nobility, he had ingratiated himself with the multitude, and by their favour obtained successively the offices of quæstor, ædile, and prætor, and was now aiming at the consulship. The motion in short was carried, Minucius was put upon an equal foot with Fabius, and the senate confirmed the decree of the people.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 103.

Fabius being arrived at the camp, it was agreed between him and his late master of the horse, now his colleague, to divide the army equally between them. The former kept on the hills, and Minucius posted himself at the distance of 1500 paces below him. Between the entrenchments of Minucius and those of the Carthaginian at Geronium was an eminence from whence either camp might be annoyed. This post Hannibal resolved to seize, not doubting but Minucius would attempt to dispossess him; and he hoped to draw him into a snare. With this view he had over night chosen out 5000 foot and 500 horse, divided them into bodies of 200 and 300 men each, and hid them in several cavities at the foot of the hill. And lest his ambush should happen to be discovered, he, to fix the attention of the Romans another way, sent a detachment to take possession of the eminence as soon as it was light. When Minucius perceived the

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Carthaginians upon the top of the hill, to dislodge them, he sent first his light armed foot, then his cavalry, and last of all (seeing that Hannibal sustained his own men by successive detachments) he followed in person with the legions. When the battle became general, the ambush, upon a signal given, rose on all sides. Minucius's army was quickly routed, and would have been entirely destroyed, but that Fabius had too much zeal for his country to let himself be swayed by private resentment. "We must make haste," said he to those that were about him, "to rescue Minucius, who is a valiant man, and a lover of his country. And if he has been too forward to engage the enemy, we will tell him of it at another time." Instantly he gave orders to march to the relief of his colleague and his routed troops, who at his approach began to rally, and retire to him for protection. Hannibal, seeing a fresh army advancing against him in good order, was obliged to give over the pursuit, and sound a retreat. He is reported to have said to some of his friends while he was retiring, "Have not I often told you, that that cloud which hovered upon the mountains would one day break upon us in a storm?" The Carthaginian after the battle, having possession of the eminence, fortified it, and placed a guard on it to secure his camp on that side.

Plut. Life of Fabius.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 105.

Plut. Life of Fabius.

Minucius and Fabius returned each to his intrenchments. The latter did not drop a word which savoured of contempt for his col-

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league; and Minucius, now convinced of his error, did justice both to Fabius and himself. Having assembled his troops, he ingenuously owned to them that he had learned by experience, he was not fit to command, adding, that both he and they for the future ought to obey the orders of Fabius. Then marching them to the pro-dictator's camp, he presented himself before him, made his acknowledgments, and resigned the dignity last conferred on him by the people. Fabius received him with great kindness, the soldiers embraced one another, and there was an universal joy. The pro-dictatorship being almost expired, Fabius sent for the consuls Servilius and Attilius to take upon them the command of the army.

Livy, B. 22. c. 30.

c. 31.

Servilius, with a fleet of 120 ships, had made an expedition into Africa, where, as he was ravaging the coast, he fell into an ambuscade, and was forced to retire to his fleet with the loss of a thousand of his men. Weighing anchor in all haste he sailed to Lilybæum in Sicily, and from thence, after delivering up the fleet to the prætor Otacilius, was returned to Italy.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 106.

The consuls following the advice and example of Fabius, no action of moment happened between the two armies, though Hannibal still continued at Geronium, and the Romans held their camp so near him as to watch all his motions.

Livy, B. 22. c. 20. vid. infr. chap. 31.

THE SAME YEAR, while the war was thus carried on in Italy, Cn. Scipio had great success,

both by sea and land, against the Carthaginians in Spain[5]. Ambassadors came to him

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5 The Romans at first divided this country into Hither Spain and Further Spain. Augustus Cæsar afterwards divided further Spain into two provinces, Bætica and Lusitania, and gave the name of Tarraconia to Hither Spain.

Bætica, so called from the river Bætis*, which runs through the middle of it, was the most southern province, and comprehended the present kingdom of Granada, Andalusia, part of new Castile, and Estremadura. Cadiz, called by the ancients Gades and Gadira, is a town situated in a small island of the same name, on the western coast of Andalusia, about nine leagues from Gibraltar. It is said that Hercules having extended his conquests to the ocean, and imagining he was come to the extremity of the world, raised two pillars near Gades, as monuments of his victories. Geographers are not agreed about the place where these pillars were erected. Bætica was the most fruitful, the wealthiest, and the most populous part of Spain. It contained two hundred cities, the chief of which stood on the Bætis, Castulo towards the source of that river, Corduba (the native place of Lucan and the two Senecas) lower down, and Hispalis† nearest the sea. Its chief inhabitants were the Turdetani.

* Guadalquivir.

Strabo, l. 3. p. 171.

Strab. l. 3. p. 139. 142.

† Seville.

Lusitania was bounded on the west by the ocean, on the north by the river Durius, and on the south by the river Anas. Between these two rivers runs the Tagus. Lusitania included what is now called Portugal, together with part of old and new Castile.

Terraconia comprehended the rest of Spain, that is to say, the kingdoms of Murcia, and Valencia, Catalonia, Arragon, Navarre, Biscay, the Asturias, Gallicia, the kingdom of Leon, and the greatest part of the two Castiles. Terraco‡, a city on the sea-coast, not far from the Iberus, gave name to the province. Pretty near this town lay Barcino, which from its name is thought to have been built by Amilcar Barca, the father of the great Hannibal. The chief nations of Tarraconia were the Celtiberi, beyond the river Iberus; the Cantabri, where Biscay now lies; the Carpetani, whose capital was Toledo; and the Overtani, &c. Rollin. Hist. Anc. Tom. 1. p. 247.

‡ Tarragon.

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from all the nations between the Iberus and the Pyrenees, and a hundred and twenty cities surrendered to him. To add to this good fortune, his allies, the Celtiberians, defeated Asdrubal in two battles, killed 15,000 of his men, and took 4000 prisoners. This was the state of the Roman affairs in Spain, when P. Scipio, the brother of Cneius, arrived there with the character of pro-consul. The view of the senate in carrying on the war with vigour in this country, was to divide the forces of Carthage, who would be more jealous of her conquests in Spain than of those in Italy, and by sending powerful succours to Asdrubal, would be less in a condition to supply his brother Hannibal. P. Scipio brought with him thirty ships of war, 8000 Roman soldiers, and a great quantity of arms and provisions.

Livy, B. 22. c. 22.

Asdrubal being employed in the Celtiberian war, the two brothers with joint forces passed the Iberus, and advanced to Saguntum without seeing an enemy. This city Hannibal had rebuilt, placed a garrison in it, and assigned it for the residence of all the young noblemen, whom he had obliged their parents to put into his hands as pledges of their fidelity. There was then at Saguntum a Spaniard named Abelox, of a good family, and considerable interest in his country, and hitherto looked upon as firmly attached to the Carthaginians. This man seeing their affairs declining in Spain, while the Romans were daily gaining ground, began to think of going over to the prevailing party. But considering at the same time that a deserter, how well born soever, makes but an

Polyb. B. 3. c. 98.

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indifferent figure, unless he can gain himself credit by some important services to his new friends, formed a scheme to put the young hostages into the hands of the Romans. At this time Bostar commanded the Carthaginians in those parts, having been sent by Asdrubal to hinder the Scipios from passing the Iberus; but not daring to wait for them, he had retired to Saguntum, and encamped under its walls. Bostar was a good natured easy man, and placed great confidence in Abelox, which the latter abusing, insinuated to him that the Romans having now passed the Iberus, it would be no longer possible for the Carthaginians to keep Spain in obedience by fear; that Saguntum being threatened with a siege, he had an opportunity of attaching all the Spaniards to the interest of his republic, by restoring the hostages to their parents, who would think themselves under a perpetual obligation to him for so early providing for the safety of their children, and that if the Romans should by force or artifice get them into their hands, they would certainly act the part which he advised him to act, and by that means bring over many nations to their party. Abelox added, that if he was sent to conduct the hostages to their respective countries, he did not doubt but he should be able to represent the obligation in such a light to the Spaniards, as that they should continue firm to the interest of a republic, who had given so eminent an example of her regard for her allies. The easy Carthaginian, deceived by an appearance of

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friendship, gave his consent to the proposal. Abelox hereupon stole away in the night to the Roman camp, acquainted the pro-consul with what he had done; and it was agreed between them that a detachment of Romans should lie in ambush the night following, and intercept the youths with their leader. The project was executed with success; and Scipio, by sending back the hostages to their relations, gained to himself a considerable interest in the country.

Livy, B. 22. c. 33.

To return to Italy: the senate at Rome was attentive to every thing that concerned the interest of the republic. To maintain her dignity, and preserve to her the respect of foreign nations, they sent to Pineus the Illyrian king for the annual tribute he had engaged to pay, and to Philip of Macedon to demand the treacherous Demetrius, who had sheltered himself in his dominions, and was exciting him to take advantage of the misfortunes of Rome, and make a descent upon Italy; at the same time she refused to accept a present of forty vases of gold from the city of Naples, that the world might see her finances were not exhausted.

Polyb. B. 5. c. 101.
Livy, B. 22. c. 32.

CHAP. XXI.

THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR.

Battle of Cannæ.

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Livy, B. 22. c. 54.

THE time for a new election of consuls drawing on, and the present consuls, Servilius and Attilius, not thinking it safe to leave the army, one of them, at the desire of the senate, nominated a dictator to hold the *comitia*. L. Veturius Philo was the person pitched upon; but, as he seems to have been attached to the interests of the people, it was probably for this reason that the senators made the augurs find some defect with regard to religion, in his nomination. After fourteen days' exercise of his office he was forced to abdicate; and an interregnum ensued. P. Cornelius Asina, one of the interreges, convened the centuries; and then amongst the candidates for the consulship appeared C. Terentius Varro, who had scarce any thing to recommend him but his hatred of the nobility, and the zeal he had lately shown for advancing Minucius, the general of the horse, to an equal authority with the pro-dictator Fabius. The patricians, as the most effectual way to disappoint the hopes of Varro, set up against him competitors of such known merit, both out of their own body, and from among the plebeians, as must naturally prepossess the people in their favour. But Varro happened to have among the tribunes of the commons a relation named Q. Bebius Herennius. This man, in a speech to the people,

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inveighed bitterly against the nobility. He asserted that it was the patricians who had brought Hannibal into Italy; that an end might have been put to the war had not they fraudulently protracted it; and that the Carthaginian would never be conquered till a true plebeian, not such a one as was only plebeian by extraction, and being dignified and ranked among the nobility, had imbibed the patrician spirit, but a new man, not infected with their maxims, was at the head of the Roman armies.

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See p. 204.

The people, full of these impressions, declared Terentius Varro consul, and would name no other that day, that Varro might preside in the *comitia* for choosing his colleague. The nobility, vexed at their disappointment, prevailed with great difficulty upon L. Æmilius Paullus, an enemy to the plebeians, (on account of the affront they had put upon him after his victories in Illyricum) to offer himself as a candidate; and the other competitors yielding to him, he was chosen consul in the next assembly. The other offices were bestowed with great judgment. Servilius and Attilius were directed to remain in quality of pro-consuls, at the head of the same armies they at present commanded. P. Scipio was continued pro-consul in Spain, M. Cl. Marcellus was appointed prætor in Sicily, and L. Posthumius Albinus in Cisalpine Gaul. All these, except Terentius Varro, had borne the same offices before; so careful were the Romans to have men of experience to conduct their affairs at so critical a time.

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B. 3. c. 107.

The senate also in the present exigency augmented the army to eight legions (each consisting of 5000 foot and 300 horse) without reckoning the allies.

The usual practice (says Polybius) is to raise yearly but four legions, each of 4000 foot and 200 horse: and it is only in the most important conjunctures that these numbers are increased to 5000 and 300. The infantry furnished by the allies is only equal to that of the legions, but the cavalry[1] twice the number of the Roman horse. Generally speaking, each consul has two legions and one half of the auxiliary forces, and commands his army separately, against a different enemy. It rarely happens that the four legions, with proportionable number of auxiliaries, are employed in the same expedition. But in this the Romans employed not only four but eight legions, so great was their apprehension of the impending danger.

[1] We read thrice in Polybius, doubtless through a mistake of the copyist. Livy says twice, and this must be the truth, otherwise the cavalry of the Roman army at the battle of Cannæ (which is going to be related) would have amounted to 9600, and Polybius himself says they were little more than 6000. Here again there must be some mistake, it should be little more than 7000; for reckoning 300 horse to each of the eight legions, and supposing the allies to have furnished double the number that the Romans did, the whole amount will be 7200; and so Livy, who frequently copies Polybius, seems to have understood him in this place. Some historians, says he, write, that when the battle of Cannæ was fought the Romans were 87,200 strong (*i. e.* 80,000 foot and 7200 horse) B. 22. c. 36.

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Livy, B. 22 c. 37.

Though the republic would not receive any presents from her dependents in Italy, she readily accepted at this time a very rich one from king Hiero, a statue of Victory of massy gold, and of great weight, 75,000 bushels of wheat, 50,000 bushels of barley, and 1000 dartmen and slingers to oppose the Baleares and Numidians. The king's present was accompanied with an exhortation to the senate to employ a fleet and some land forces to make a descent upon Africa. The conscript fathers returned him a grateful answer, and in pursuit of his advice ordered a reinforcement of twenty-five quinqueremes to T. Otacilius the pro-prætor in Sicily, (for Marcellus was not yet arrived there) giving him permission to carry the war into Africa if he thought proper. Before the consuls took the field, the soldiers (which had never been done before) were required to take an oath to this effect, that they would assemble at the command of the consuls, and not depart afterwards without leave; and whereas they had been accustomed voluntarily to swear that they would not forsake their ensigns through fear, nor go out of their ranks unless to take up a weapon, or to smite an enemy, or to save the life of a citizen, this oath also was now enjoined them by authority.

Polyb. B. 3. c. 106.

While these preparations were making at Rome, the army under the pro-consuls Servilius and Attilius continued to observe the motions of Hannibal. As those generals had received orders from the senate not to venture a battle,

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but only to train and discipline their men, and harass the enemy by frequent skirmishes, all the spring passed, as the winter had done, without any considerable action on either side.

But the time of harvest being come, Hannibal decamped from Geronium, and, to drive the enemy to the necessity of fighting, seized upon the castle of Cannæ, where the Romans had lodged the ammunition and provisions they had brought from Canusium. The town of Cannæ had been destroyed the last year; the castle was left standing, and Hannibal, by possessing himself of it, threw the Roman army into great perplexity: for, beside being master of those provisions, he was now in a post which by its situation commanded all the adjacent country. The pro-consuls despatched messenger after messenger to ask instructions from the senate, concerning the measures they should take. In their letters they represented that the country all around was ruined; that it was impossible to advance near the enemy without being obliged to fight; and that all the allies, attentive to the uncertain state of things, were in suspense waiting the event. The senate judged it expedient to come to a decisive action with the enemy, but wrote to Servilius and Attilius to defer it, till the consuls (whom they now sent from Rome) were arrived in the camp. Great dependence had the fathers on the virtue and abilities of Æmilius; and indeed his known prudence, and the eminent services he had done his country some years before in the Illyrian war, justified the

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confidence they reposed in him. At his departure from Rome, when they had represented to him the great importance of the present occasion, they urged him to exert himself as a true citizen mindful of the majesty of the Roman name. Nor was Æmilius wanting either of a just sense of his country's danger, or of the warmest zeal for its preservation: so that when he was arrived at the camp, and had assembled the soldiers to impart to them the pleasure of the senate, he made use of all the arguments he could think of to restore their courage, much abated by so many preceding disasters. He told them, that several good reasons might be assigned for the defeat of the former armies; but that no excuse could be found if this should fail of victory. That the soldiers of those armies were new-raised men without discipline or experience, and entirely unacquainted with the sort of enemy they had to deal with: that those who fought at the Trebia were not recovered from the fatigue of their voyage from Sicily when they were led to battle: that at the lake Thrasymenus the Romans, so far from seeing the enemy before the battle, did not even see them during the conflict: that in none of the preceding engagements had there been two consuls with two consular armies; but that now all circumstances were changed: "By frequent skirmishes with the enemy you have learned their manner of fighting. You have not only both the consuls of the present year to conduct you, but both the consuls of the last year, who have

consented to continue with us and share the fortune of the day. With equal numbers you have seldom failed of beating the enemy in small engagements: it would be strange therefore, nay I think it impossible, that now when you are double their number you should be vanquished by them in a general action. But what need of further exhortation? The fate of Rome, the preservation of whatever is dear to you, depends at this time upon your courage and resolution."

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The next day[2] the consuls put their army in march towards the place where the Carthaginians were posted, and the day following pitched their camp within six miles of them. As it was a smooth plain, and the Carthaginian cavalry were far superior to the Roman, Æmilius judged it not proper to come to a battle in that situation. He was for drawing

Polyb. B. 3. c. 100.

[2] Livy differs from Polybius with regard to the particulars that happened before the battle of Cannæ. The Latin historian tells us, that Hannibal had not yet removed from Geronium when the consuls began their march from Rome; that he had then scarce ten days provisions in his camp; that the Spaniards were ready to desert him, and that he himself had thoughts of running away into Gaul with his cavalry, and leaving his infantry to shift for themselves. He adds several other circumstances as little worth relating as these. And indeed, the accounts that he, Appian, and the later writers, give of these affairs, are intermixed with so many things evidently fabulous, and often inconsistent with one another, that in the text Polybius has been chiefly followed, who wrote the nearest to the times he speaks of, was himself a soldier, and whose history is the most consistent and the most judicious.

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the enemy, if possible, to some ground where horse would have little opportunity to act. But the next day, it being Varro's turn to command, he, in spite of all that his colleague could say to dissuade him from it, decamped and drew nearer the enemy. Hannibal with his cavalry and light-armed foot advanced to meet him, fell furiously upon the Romans in their march, and put them into great disorder. Varro, when he had sustained this first shock by means of some of the heavy-armed foot, commanded his horse and dartmen to charge, and he had the prudence to mingle with these some of his legionaries; this gave him the advantage in the combat, to which the night at length put an end.

The day following, Æmilius, who was against fighting, and yet could not safely retreat, encamped two thirds of his army along the Aufidus[3], which lay to their left. The other third he led over the river, and made them intrench themselves at the distance of about 1300 paces eastward from his greater camp, and at somewhat more than that distance from the camp of the enemy, which lay to the south. By this disposition he could protect his own foragers, and distress those of the Carthaginian.

Hannibal, foreseeing that these movements of the Romans would infallibly bring on a general action, thought it advisable, before he

[3] The Aufidus runs through the Apennines into the Adriatic, and is the only river in Italy which takes that course.

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came to that hazard, to animate his soldiers for the occasion; lest their late repulse should have left some impression of fear upon their minds. Having called them together, he bid them cast their eyes over the country all around, and then tell him, "Whether, being superior as they were to the enemy in horse, they could possibly, had the gods consulted their wishes, have desired any thing more to their advantage than to come to a decisive battle on such a spot?" They all agreed that they could not have chosen better. He added, "thank the gods then who have brought your enemies hither, that you may triumph over them; and remember also your obligation to me for having reduced the Romans to the necessity of fighting; for, advantageous as the ground is to us, here fight they must, there is no avoiding it." He concluded with reminding them of their former exploits, and with assuring them that one victory more would give a period to all their labours, and put them in possession of all their hopes, the wealth of Rome, and the dominion of Italy.

The Carthaginian after this intrenched his forces on the west side of Aufidus, where lay the greater camp of the Romans, and the next day but one drew out his army and presented battle. Æmilius not liking the ground, and being persuaded that want of provisions would very soon oblige Hannibal to quit his post, declined the challenge, but took great care to have his two camps well fortified and guarded.

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Hannibal, after waiting awhile in the field, returned to his intrenchments, and detached some of his Numidians to pass the Aufidus, and fall upon certain parties that, from the Roman lesser camp, were coming to the river for water. The Numidians having easily put these to flight, advanced so far as to brave the Romans in their very camp; an insult so offensive to the soldiers in general, as well as to Varro, that had it not been Æmilius's turn to command, those of the greater camp would have instantly crossed the river to join their fellows, and offer battle to the enemy. "Their impatience to fight," says Polybius, "was extreme; for when men have once resolved upon a difficult and dangerous enterprise, no time seems so tedious as the space between the determination and the execution."

The same author tells us, that when the news came to Rome of the armies being near each other, and of their daily skirmishing and pickeering, the people, remembering their former defeats, were universally in the utmost anxiety and fear, well foreseeing the fatal consequences of a new overthrow; that they talked of nothing but oracles, extraordinary appearances, prodigies seen both in temples and in private houses; and that their whole time was spent in vows and supplications: he adds, "for in all public calamities and dangers the Romans are extremely careful to pacify the anger of the gods; nor of the many religious ceremonies prescribed for such occa-

sions, is there one, of which, how frivolous and impertinent soever it may appear, they think the practice unbecoming."

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The battle of Cannæ. Polyb. B. 3. c. 113.

At sun-rise in the morning, after the insult by the Numidians, Varro, having the command, led his troops of the greater camp over the Aufidus, and joining them to those of the lesser, drew them up in the plain after the accustomed manner *, excepting that, in all the three lines, the battalions stood closer, and those in the first line were deeper than usual. The Roman knights, commanded by Æmilius, formed the right wing close to the river; the cavalry of the allies, under Terentius Varro, made the left. The pro-consuls Servilius and Attilius led the main body, consisting of 70,000 foot; for Varro had left 10,000 men in the greater camp, with orders to attack that of Hannibal when the armies should be engaged.

* See vol. iii. p. 236.

The Carthaginian [4] no sooner perceived the

[4] Plutarch reports, that Varro's confidence and his numerous army alarmed the Carthaginians; that Hannibal with a small company went out to take a view of the Romans, and that one of his followers, called Gisco, saying to him, that the "number of the enemy was very astonishing;" Hannibal with a serious countenance answered, "There is something yet more astonishing which you take no notice of, that in all that multitude there is not one man whose name is Gisco." This jest made all the company laugh, who telling it to every one they met in their return, the laughter was continued till they reached the camp. The army seeing Hannibal and his attendants come back laughing, imagined that without doubt this mirth proceeded from the good posture of their affairs, and their contempt of the enemy; which did not a little raise the spirits of the soldiers.

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Romans in motion, but he sent over the Aufidus his slingers, and the other light-armed foot. The rest of the army followed, passing the river at two different places. He drew up his forces in one front. To face the Roman knights he posted his Spanish and Gallic cavalry in his left wing; next these were placed one half of his African infantry, then the Spanish and Gallic foot, then the other half of his Africans; and the Numidian horse made his right wing.

The Africans were armed after the Roman manner, out of the spoils taken from the enemy in former battles. The Gauls, naked from the waist upward, and the Spaniards, clothed in linen jackets trimmed with purple, were armed each after the manner of their country. They had shields alike, but the Gauls used long broad swords, fit only for cutting strokes, and at a certain distance; the Spaniards' short and well-pointed blades, proper both for striking and thrusting. The cohorts of these two nations being ranged alternately, this medley of troops of such different appearances, is said to have been terrible to behold. Strong of body and furious in charging were the Gauls, but accustomed to spend their violence at the first brunt; the Spaniards, less eager and more wary, were neither ashamed to give ground when overmatched, nor afraid to return and renew the fight whenever it was practicable. As the impetuosity of the one, and the patience of the other, served mutually to reduce each of them to a good and firm temper, so the place which they held in this battle added confidence to

them both: for they saw themselves well and strongly flanked by the Africans, whose name was grown terrible in Spain by their conquests, and in Gaul by this their present war. Asdrubal commanded the cavalry of the left wing, Hanno* the right; and Hannibal, with his brother Mago, took the conduct of the main body; this amounted to about 40,000 foot: the horse were 10,000. The armies were neither of them incommoded by the rising sun, the Romans facing to the south, their enemies to the north.

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* Livy says Maharbal.

The action began with the skirmishing of the velites or light-armed troops, with little advantage to either side. During this skirmish, the Roman knights came to an engagement with the Spanish and Gallic cavalry. Being shut in by the river on one side, and by their own infantry on the other, they could practise none of the evolutions and returns commonly used in fight by the horse in those days. There was no way but to bear forward in a right line; and both parties rushing violently on, the men came at length to grapple with one another, and many of them, their horses running from under them, fell to the ground, whence starting up again, they fought on foot. In conclusion, the Roman cavalry were overborne and forced to recoil. This the consul Æmilius could by no means remedy, for Asdrubal, with his boisterous Gauls and Spaniards, was not to be resisted by the Roman knights, unequal both in number and horsemanship. The greater part of them, after they had defended themselves with

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the utmost bravery, were slain upon the spot, and most of the remainder in their flight along the river; for Asdrubal gave no quarter.

Before this rout was quite finished, the heavy-armed infantry on both sides joined battle.—Hannibal, in advancing against the enemy, had caused his Gauls and Spaniards, who held the middle of his line, (and probably made nine-tenths of it[5]) to march, some faster, some slower, so as by degrees to form the figure of a crescent, the convex side towards the Romans and the extreme points touching the Africans to the right and left. The middle, or most prominent part of the curve being the thickest[6], (as its figure of a crescent implies) and the best strengthened against all impression, sustained the shock of the enemy for some time with great bravery and steadiness; till the Roman centre, reinforced by some battalions from the wings, compelled, by its very weight, the curve to yield: but by the artful management of Hannibal, this curve so yielded and bent inward, as at length to form a new curve, the concave side towards

[5] The reason for this opinion will be given hereafter.

[6] Polybius (B. 3. c. 115,) tells us that the Gauls were thinly ranged, and therefore easily broken. But if this be meant of the whole crescent, how will it accord with the stout fight which he himself says the Gauls maintained, or with the necessity which the Roman centre, already deep, was under of being strengthened by draughts from the wings, in order to break that crescent? I imagine, therefore, that Polybius speaks here of the sides only of the crescent, the parts towards the horns, and not of the middle part, which, though thick and strong, was already broken by the superior weight of the Roman centre.

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the enemy. The Roman legions following their supposed victory, and pressing still forward against the Gauls and Spaniards, who continued retiring before them, came insensibly between the two bodies of African infantry, which had not yet moved from their posts, and the depth of whose files[7] was perhaps at first concealed by the sides of the concave into which the Romans entered, and was but gradually discovered in proportion as the Gauls and Spaniards recoiled. The two bodies of Africans, as the conjuncture itself dictated, facing one to the right the other to the left, attacked the Romans in flank, so that these could fight no longer in the order of a phalanx[8] (which form

[7] Neither Livy nor Polybius say any thing of the proportion which the number of the Gauls and Spaniards bore to that of the Africans; nor whether the African battalions were longer in rank or in file. Nor do they give us any light concerning those wonderful movements, by which Hannibal could, without confusion, form his centre from a straight line into a crescent, the convex to the enemy; and afterwards, without confusion, invert its figure.

[8] Chevalier Folard (tom. 4. p. 377.) from this expression of Polybius, triumphantly concludes that the Romans were originally drawn up by Varro in a *phalange coupée*, that is, says the chevalier, in "columns with small intervals between them." The inference is not well deduced. For, supposing the Romans to have been ranged at first in three lines as usual, yet Polybius might well speak of them as in the order of a phalanx at this time. It was the constant practice for all the three lines to form themselves into one phalanx, whenever it happened that neither the first alone, nor the first and second united, could make any impression on the enemy. And that this was the present case with the centre of the Roman army, is plain from the necessity the generals were under of bringing some batta-

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they had taken during the conflict) but were obliged to divide themselves into platoons or small bodies, to make head against those unexpected enemies.

The consul Æmilius, after the defeat of his cavalry, seeing that all depended upon the foot, had by this time put himself among the legionaries, animating them both by words and example. Hannibal acted the like part among the Gauls and Spaniards, the conduct of whom he had taken upon himself from the beginning.

Hitherto there had nothing of moment happened between the Numidian horse[9] and the cavalry of the Roman allies, commanded by

lions from the wings to strengthen it. If the hastati, principes, and triarii, of the centre, united in one phalanx, had not failed in the attempt to break Hannibal's crescent, what occasion could there be of adding strength to them from the wings?

9 According to Livy, when the two armies were just ready to join battle, 500 of these Numidians came galloping away from their fellows, with their shields cast behind their backs, (as was the manner of those that yielded) and throwing down their arms, surrendered themselves. Varro had not leisure to examine them, but thinking them really disarmed, ordered them behind the lines. In the heat of the battle, these pretended deserters, having short swords under their jackets, flew upon the hindmost of the Romans, while all eyes and thoughts were bent another way, so that they did great mischief, and caused yet a greater terror. Polybius mentions nothing of this, which he would hardly have omitted, had there been any foundation for it. Nor does he say any thing of a certain wind called Vulturnus, which, according to the Latin historian, proved very pernicious to the Romans, by blowing dust in their eyes.

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Varro; for the former would neither give nor sustain any charge: yet by making frequent offers, they kept their enemies so employed as to hinder them from assisting the legions. But now the last and fatal blow, which completed the destruction of the Roman army, was given by the same hand that gave the first. For Asdrubal, having cut in pieces almost all the horse of the Roman right wing, hastened to the assistance of the Numidians. The cavalry of the Roman left wing, perceiving his approach, did not wait to be attacked; they immediately fled. Hereupon Asdrubal ordering the light Numidians, as fittest for that service, to pursue them, turned with his Spanish and Gallic horse upon the rear of the Roman main body, which by this means was entirely surrounded. Then was the slaughter dreadful, and then fell the consul Æmilius [10], quite covered with wounds,

[10] Livy tells us that Æmilius had been wounded in the action between the cavalry, yet being assisted by those of the Roman knights who had escaped from Asdrubal, he made head against Hannibal, and restored the fight in several places. At length, unable through weakness to manage his horse, he was obliged to dismount; his attendants did the like, and it being told Hannibal that the consul had ordered his cavalry to quit their horses, he is reported to have said, jestingly, "I had rather he had delivered them to me bound." Livy adds, what is hard to be conceived, that some of the Roman knights, when they saw the battle irrecoverably lost, remounted their horses and escaped. One of them, Cn. Lentulus, a legionary tribune, galloping along, found the consul covered with blood, and sitting upon a stone. Lentulus entreated him to rise and save himself, offering him his horse; but Æmilius refused it, exhorting the tribune to shift for himself, and not to lose time, adding, that it was not his purpose to be brought

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nobly discharging in this conclusion of his life, as in all the former parts of it, the duties of a good citizen. The Romans, encompassed on all sides, faced every way, and held out for some time: but the outermost ranks of their orb being still mowed down, they were gradually forced into a narrow compass, and becoming at length a mere throng, unable to wield their arms, were all put to the sword [11].

again into judgment by the people, be an accuser of his colleague, or be himself charged with that day's loss. He further desired Lentulus to give the senate notice to fortify Rome, and to tell Fabius that he had been mindful of his counsel to the last. The consul had no sooner uttered these words, but first a multitude of his own men in the rout, and then the enemy in the pursuit, came upon him: the latter, not knowing who he was, despatched him with their darts. Lentulus escaped by the swiftness of his horse.

[11] THE ACCOUNTS transmitted to us by Polybius and Livy of the battle of Cannæ, are not sufficiently full and clear to convey to those who read them, at this distance of time, distinct and satisfactory ideas of what passed in that memorable day; but have left much room for conjecture.

In the plans that are commonly given by the moderns of this battle, the infantry of the two armies are equal in front. Hannibal's centre, which he formed into a crescent, the convex side towards the enemy, makes but one-third of his line of foot. How then came it to pass, that this crescent, when it yielded and retreated, so as gradually to invert its figure, and present a concave to the enemy, drew after it, and within it, more of the Roman infantry than had stood opposite to it when the armies first faced each other? This may be answered from Polybius, who tells us, that during the conflict between the centres of the two armies, the Romans, by draughts from their wings, thickened or deepened their centre, which therefore broke, by its very weight, the Carthaginian centre or crescent, con-

During this slaughter of the Roman foot, the Numidians were pursuing Terentius and the

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sisting of the Gauls and Spaniards. He adds, that the Romans pressing unwarily after those Gauls and Spaniards, came at length between the two bodies of African infantry; which, by a conversion one to the right and the other to the left, instantly pressed the Romans on their flanks; and that Asdrubal soon after came thundering upon their backs with his victorious cavalry.

All this is conceivable and credible; and we here see how not only the cohorts that were originally in the Roman centre, but those which were drawn from the wings to deepen it, became totally encompassed by the enemy; by the Gauls and Spaniards in front, by the Africans in flank, and by Asdrubal in the rear.

But the great difficulty still remains: for it is generally agreed (and indeed Polybius's words seem to import) that the whole, or almost the whole, of the Roman infantry, in one deep phalanx, pressed after the retiring Gauls and Spaniards, and so became at length wedged between the two bodies of Africans. Now, how could this happen, if the space between those two bodies was but one third of Hannibal's line of foot? For is it credible, that the Roman generals could be so infatuated as, in the heat of the battle, to contract the front of their army to one third of its first extent, draw ALL the battalions of the wings to the centre, and leave no troops to oppose the two wings (two thirds) of Hannibal's line, that were standing before them in battle array? And if those generals, to deepen their centre, only thinned their wings (as Chevalier Folard supposes) what advantage could Hannibal hope from drawing the Roman centre within his two wings? Since these wings, while employed in attacking the flanks of that centre, would themselves be exposed to be attacked both in flank and rear by the remainder of the Roman wings; which, if we suppose them diminished by one half, were still equal in number of men to the Carthaginian wings.

It would seem therefore that the plans which represent Hannibal's crescent, as making but one third of his line, must be extremely faulty.

Chevalier Folard, though he speaks as if he were a per-

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horse of the left wing. Of all the Roman cavalry 70 only escaped with the consul to Ve-

fect master of the subject, is as unsatisfactory in his account of the battle as any writer before him. His plan of it (tom. 4. p. 391.) represents Hannibal's curve as but one third of his line of foot; but being aware of the small number of Africans in the Carthaginian army, much too small to make the other two thirds of the line, (as they do in the Jesuits' plan) he represents the curve as consisting of only a part of the Gauls and Spaniards; the remainder of which troops stand extended to the right and left from the horns of the crescent, and between it and the Africans, who make only the extremities of the line, or the outer parts of the wings.

The employment which the chevalier finds for these wings, is not to give upon the flanks of the Romans that were advanced within the hollow of the inverted curve, but to wheel, extend themselves, and attack both in flank and rear the Roman wings, which he supposes to be still subsisting, though much weakened by the imprudence of their leaders.

This account of the action has not the least foundation in Polybius, who does not say, that the Romans of the centre, by rashly pursuing the Gauls and Spaniards of Hannibal's crescent, came between other Gauls and Spaniards of his wings, (as they must do according to the chevalier's plan) but between the two bodies of Africans.—The Africans are the only troops the historian speaks of as coming upon the flanks of the Romans. Nor does he say any thing of the Africans wheeling and extending themselves to attack the Roman wings in flank and rear, but that turning or inclining (κλινανῖες) one part of them to the shield, the other to the spear. *i. e.* one facing or turning to the right, the other to the left, they pressed upon the flanks of those Romans that were pursuing the Gauls and Spaniards of Hannibal's crescent or centre.

The Roman wings, says the chevalier, still subsisted, though much weakened by the draughts made from them. I know not how much the chevalier would allow them to be weakened. But if we suppose them to be diminished the one half, they were still equal (as I said before) in num-

nusia, and about 300 more into other neighbouring towns, 2000 were taken prisoners, the rest were slain.

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ber of men to the Carthaginian wings; and it is hardly credible that the Roman wings, having at this time no enemies to contend with but the Carthaginian wings, should stand still while these were wheeling and extending themselves to come upon their flank and rear; or that the Carthaginians should find their account in such an attempt.

I shall observe by the way, that Polybius never speaks of any part of the Roman army being attacked in rear by the Carthaginian foot. This was left for Asdrubal and his horse, who could hardly have performed this part without riding over the Africans, had these enclosed the Romans behind.

What seems to have driven the chevalier into all these deviations from his author, is his fundamental error of forming Hannibal's crescent out of but one third of his line.

Sir Walter Raleigh has gone into the other extreme.—To account for the whole Roman army's being enclosed by the enemy, he supposes that Hannibal's crescent was of such extent, as to make his whole front; that the Romans saw nothing before them but that crescent; that the Africans (deep in file) were hid behind its two corners, and not discovered by the Romans till they were attacked by them. "For it is agreed," says he, "that the Romans were encompassed unawares, and that they behaved themselves as men who thought upon no other work than what was found them by the Gauls. Neither is it credible, that they would have been so mad, as to run headlong with the whole bulk of their army into the throat of slaughter, had they seen those weapons bent against them at the first, which when they did see, they had little hope to escape. Much might be imputed to their heat of fight, and rashness of inferior captains: but since the consul Paulus, a man so expert in war, being vanquished in horse, had put himself among the legions, it cannot be supposed that he and they did wilfully thus engage themselves."

That Hannibal's crescent of Gauls and Spaniards made the whole of his front, cannot be reconciled with Polybius

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Livy, B. 22. c. 49.

The whole of the infantry that had been in the battle was cut off, except about 3000, who

or Livy, who expressly relate, that the Carthaginian drew up all his infantry in one line, of which the Africans made the two points or wings; and Polybius more than once, in describing the action, calls the crescent τα μέσα, the middle or centre of Hannibal's battalia, and the Africans are spoken of, not as hid, but as appearing to the enemy armed after the Roman manner.

But it is not credible, says Sir Walter, that the Romans would have been so mad as to run with the whole bulk of their army between the Africans, had they seen them at first.

I will not pretend to remove this difficulty. All I can aim at is, in some measure, to lessen it.

Hannibal's infantry is said to have consisted of about 40,000 men, extended at first in one straight line. Of this line, the Gauls and Spaniards (who afterwards formed themselves into a crescent) made the middle or centre, and the Africans the wings. Now, if that middle part, instead of being but one third, was at least nine tenths of the line, as there is good reason to believe, it will much lessen our wonder, that the Romans, when they had forced that middle part to give ground, should imagine themselves secure of the victory, and unwarily engage themselves between the Africans, who made so narrow a front, as only a tenth of the Carthaginian line, that is to say, at each extremity a twentieth.

That the Africans made but a very narrow front, in respect of the rest of the line, may, I think, be fairly collected from the small number to which we are obliged to reduce them, and from the manner in which it is reasonable to believe they were drawn up.

It cannot be supposed that the Africans amounted to above 8000 men. Hannibal brought into Italy but 20,000 foot, of which number 12,000 only were Africans*, and the other 8000 Spaniards. At the battle of the Trebia, his heavy armed infantry, Spaniards, Africans, and Gauls, were but 20,000 in all. He lost some of his Africans in this battle, some at the lake Thrasymenus; and doubtless

* See p. 256.

fled most of them to Canusium[12]. Among the dead were, beside the consul Æmilius, the two

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the Africans suffered with the rest of the troops in their march through the fens of Hetruria, and in their other fatigues. Hannibal had now been three years in Italy, and had received no recruits from Africa; and from all these considerations we may well conclude, that his Africans were diminished by one third at least, before the battle of Cannæ.

Now supposing the Africans to be but 8000 of Hannibal's 40,000 foot, and supposing his battalia to be every where of equal depth, it is plain that the Africans could make no more than one fifth part of the Carthaginian front, or one tenth of it at each extremity of the line. But if we consider, that Hannibal's intention, from the beginning of the day, was to draw the bulk of the Roman army between his Africans, it is reasonable to believe that he so disposed those Africans as to hide their strength as much as possible; and that he gave them no more extent in front, than was necessary to be their depth when they should face, one part of them to the right, and the other to the left, to attack the flanks of the Romans pressing after the retiring Gauls and Spaniards; and if so, it is probable that the front which the Africans made, was not so much as a tenth part of the line, or, at each extremity a twentieth. And this being granted, it will not be so astonishing that the bulk of the Roman army should run precipitately between them. That the whole did, strictly speaking, engage themselves between the Africans, I do not conceive necessary to be supposed, in order to account for the event of the battle. For it seems from Polybius's relation, that none of those who did so engage themselves escaped destruction. Yet we find, according to the same author, that 3000 of the Roman foot escaped from the battle, and, according to Livy, a much greater number. These might be of the troops that were in the points of the Roman battalia, and who probably took to their heels as soon as they saw Asdrubal with his horse coming upon the rear of the legions.

[12] Dionysius of Halicarnassus agrees nearly with Polybius as to the number of men the Romans lost in this battle.

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Polyb. B. 3. c. 117.

pro-consuls, Servilius and Atilius, M. Minucius, late master of the horse to Fabius, two military quæstors, 29 legionary tribunes, with 80 persons who had either been senators, or had borne such offices as entitled them to be chosen into the senate. Those of the infantry who were taken prisoners had not been in the fight. Varro, by the advice of Æmilius, had left 10,000 foot in his greater camp, with orders to attack the camp of Hannibal during the battle. The consul's view in this was to oblige the Carthaginian either to abandon his baggage, or to leave a greater part of his forces to guard it

Of 6000 horse (says he, Antiquit. B. 2. p. 37.) there remained only 370, and of 80,000 foot there escaped somewhat more than 3000. But Livy differs from them, and is not very consistent with himself. According to the first account he gives, the sum total of those that were slain and taken prisoners, amounts to about 59,400, and of those that escaped to about 5670. In which reckonings (supposing, as he seems to do, that the whole Roman army at Cannæ consisted of 87,200 men) there are above 18,000 omitted. He afterwards tells us (B. 22. c. 45, 49.) that there were got together of the fugitives 10,000 at Canusium, and 4070 at Venusia. In this case the number of the prisoners and the slain would be 73,130. But (c. 56.) he makes Varro write to the senate from Canusium (after he had brought to that place those that had fled to Venusia) that the whole remains of the Roman army were only 10,000 men. And yet in the same book (c. 60.) M. Torquatus tells the senate, that if the captives who petitioned to be ransomed, and who (as one of themselves had said a little before) amounted to 8000 men, were added to the forces at Canusium, the republic would have there an army of 20,000 men. According to Appian, the whole Roman army at Cannæ consisted of 70,000 foot and 6000 horse, of which 50,000 were slain, a great number taken prisoners, and about 10,000 escaped to Canusium.

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than he could well spare from the general action. The design so far succeeded, that Hannibal was just upon the point of losing his camp, when (after his victory in the field) he came to the assistance of the few troops he had left to defend it. Upon his approach, the assailants fled to their own intrenchments; where being invested, they surrendered themselves prisoners, after they had lost 2000 of their number[13].

Hannibal's loss of men on this important

[13] Livy relates that 7000 Romans fled out of the battle to the lesser camp, 10,000 to the greater, and that 2000 took refuge in the village of Cannæ. These last were immediately surrounded by Carthalo, and taken prisoners. The soldiers in the greater camp, who were without leaders, and but half-armed, sent a messenger to those in the lesser, desiring they would come over to them in the night, that they might march together and take refuge in Canusium, a city not far distant. But the troops in the little camp could not be prevailed upon to hearken to this proposal, fearing to be intercepted by the enemy in their passage. Nevertheless 600 of them, encouraged by Sempronius Tuditanus, a legionary tribune who commanded them, drew themselves up in the form of a wedge, and casting their shields upon their right arms, to defend themselves from the darts of the Numidians, to which they were exposed upon that side, made their way through the enemy to the great camp, from whence, in conjunction with another large body, they escaped to Canusium. Next day Hannibal having invested the little camp, the Romans surrendered upon terms. They had leave to depart each with one garment, upon paying a certain ransom. In the meantime about 4000 foot and 200 horse escaped from the great camp in straggling parties to Canusium. The rest yielded upon the conditions granted to those of the little camp.

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day amounted to no more than 4000 Gauls and Spaniards, 1500 Africans, and 200 horse[14].

The consequence of this victory (says Polybius) was such as both parties had expected[15].

Polyb. B. 3. c. 118. Livy, B. 22. c. 52.

[14] According to the Latin historian the loss of the Carthaginians amounted to 8000 men.

c. 51.

[15] Livy thinks it might reasonably have been expected that Hannibal should have taken Rome immediately after the battle of Cannæ. When the Carthaginian officers (says that author) flocked round their general, congratulating him on his victory, and advising him to spend the rest of that day, and the following night, in refreshing himself and his wearied troops, Maharbal, on the contrary, pressed him not to lose a moment's time. "That you may know (said he) the importance of this victory, follow me, I will instantly march away with the cavalry, and be at Rome before they have notice of my coming. In five days we shall sup in the capitol." Hannibal commended his zeal, but told him that what he had proposed was of too great moment to be suddenly resolved upon, and that he would take time to consider of it. "Nay then (said Maharbal) I find that no one man is endued by the gods with all talents. Hannibal knows how to conquer, but he knows not how to make advantage of his victories." It is generally believed (adds Livy) that this day's delay was the preservation of the city and empire of Rome.

Several of the ancients have joined with Livy in blaming Hannibal for not laying siege to Rome without delay, but whether justly or not may very well be a question. If the advantages he had gained were, as Polybius says, chiefly owing to the superiority of his cavalry, those could be of little use in a siege, and the Roman infantry, not inferior to his, would be invincible behind walls. Rome was provided with every thing necessary to sustain a siege. After the battle of Thrasymen, its fortifications had been repaired, (Liv. B. 22. c. 8.) and Polybius takes notice of the care of the senate upon the present occasion to put the city in a posture of defence, (B. 3. c. 118.) Rome abounded with soldiers well trained to war. Livy speaks of four new legions and 1000 horse raised in the city by

Hannibal became master of almost all Great

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Junius Pera, who was made dictator immediately after the battle of Cannæ. (Liv. B. 22. c. 57.) And exclusive of these the same dictator led out an army of 25,000 men (id. B. 23. c. 14.) which he would not have done, had not he thought he had left troops enough in the town to defend it. Marcellus had also sent from Ostia 1500 men to strengthen the garrison of Rome (Liv. B. 22. c. 57.)

Now what forces had Hannibal to bring against so powerful a city? His army after the battle of Cannæ consisted of scarce 45,000 men, 9800 of which were cavalry. He was moreover entirely unprovided of implements for carrying on a siege. And had he marched directly to Rome, it is not probable any of the nations of Italy would have gone over to him. At most they would have waited the issue of the siege, in which, if he had not succeeded, they would have been the less disposed to venture themselves under his protection. Nor perhaps would it have been prudent in him, when not one city in Italy had declared for him, to neglect the other towns (that were beginning to waver in their fidelity to the Romans) to go and besiege the capital; especially since his hopes of success in this undertaking must have depended more on the terror of his name, than the force of his arms. And that both these would have been insufficient seems plain from the little effect they had upon Nola and Naples, which cities were twice in vain attempted by Hannibal soon after his victory at Cannæ. (Liv. B. 23. c. 1, 14, 16.) Nuceria also and Casilinum, two inconsiderable towns, gave him a great deal of trouble before he could reduce them. The latter held out more than a whole winter, though defended by only 960 men. (Liv. B. 23. c. 15, 17, 18, 19.)

Add to this, that had Hannibal laid siege to Rome, it is not likely that the Latin nations, and those other of the allies who always continued steady to her interest, would have quietly looked on till the city had been taken. And that these allies were not yet exhausted of soldiers, is plain from the great levies made among them in the course of this war. In the dictatorship of Junius Pera, just after the defeat at Cannæ, the Roman armies in Italy (reckoning the

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Greece[16]. Nay, the Carthaginians were not without hope, by some sudden stroke, to possess themselves of Rome. The Romans, on the other hand, despaired of being able to retain the dominion of Italy, and, every moment expecting to hear of Hannibal's approach, were in the utmost anxiety for themselves and for their country. The senators nevertheless preserved their fortitude and dignity; they all zealously applied themselves to put the city in a posture of defence, and did every thing that could be done for the common safety. And though the Romans were now undoubtedly vanquished, and yielded, for the present, in military glory to their enemies, yet by their courage, steadiness, and unwearied labours, the wisdom of their counsels, and the constitu-

remains of Cannæ at 10,000) amounted to above 84,000 men, as appears from Livy, B. 22. c. 57. and B. 23. c. 14. The year after, the republic had twelve legions on foot, and the year after that eighteen legions, (Liv. B. 24. c. 11.) The third year after the battle they had twenty-one legions, and the fourth, viz. in the consulship of Q. Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius Pulcher, twenty-three legions. (Liv. B. 25. c. 3.)

Upon the whole, Livy's censure of Hannibal's conduct seems not well founded, and the rather, as we do not find that Polybius has any where blamed him upon this article.

[16] The nations that revolted to the Carthaginians after the battle of Cannæ are thus reckoned up by Livy (B. 22. c. 61.) The Atellani, Calatini and Hirpini, part of Apulia, the Samnites except the Pentri, all the Bruttians, the Lucanians, the Surrentini, and almost all Great Greece, the Tarentines, Metapontines, Crotonienses, Locri, and all the Cisalpine Gauls.

tion of their government, they not only recovered the empire of Italy, but totally subdued the Carthaginians, and in a few years after became lords of the world.

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CHAP. XXII.

The extreme terror with which the Romans were struck by their defeat at Cannæ.—Their reception of Terentius Varro at Rome.—They refuse to redeem the prisoners.—Hannibal gets possession of Capua, and winters there.—He sends to Carthage an account of his victories.—The Romans create a dictator, for the sole affair of filling the many vacant places in their senate.

AMONG those Romans, who had fled from the late battle to Canusium, were four legionary tribunes. Of these the soldiers chose two to be their chief commanders, Appius Claudius Pulcher and P. Cornelius Scipio, the son of the pro-consul in Spain. Whilst Scipio (who was now about nineteen years of age) was deliberating with his colleague, and some others, what measures to take, notice was brought them, that certain young men of the best families of Rome, at the head of whom was L. Cecilius Metellus, giving all up for lost, had resolved to embark at the first port, and fly from Italy. So base a thought stirred up Scipio's indignation. Turning therefore to the company, he said, "Let those who value the preservation of Rome follow me." They all went immediately to the house where the

Livy, B. 22. c. 53.

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young patricians were assembled. Scipio, as he entered their chamber, "I swear," said he, drawing his sword, "that I will never abandon the republic, nor consent that any of her citizens forsake her; I call the great Jupiter to witness this my oath." And then, addressing himself to Metellus, he added, "Do you, Metellus, and all that are here present, take the same oath, or not a man of you shall escape this sword." His look, his action, his menaces so terrified them all, that they readily came into the engagements he required.

The consternation and despondency of the people at Rome almost equalled those of Metellus and his companions. For it was there currently reported that both the consuls were killed, and their armies so entirely destroyed, that not an officer, nor hardly a single soldier remained alive; and that Hannibal was master of Apulia, Samnium, and all Italy. The conscript fathers, the pilots of the state, did not, however, leave the helm because the storm blew high. For want of consuls the two prætors assembled them. As Fabius's cunctation, that lingering war he had counselled and practised against Hannibal, was discovered, by the present calamity, to have been the dictate of wisdom, he now was principally listened to. He advised, that some horsemen well mounted should be sent out upon the Appian and Latine roads, to learn, if possible, of such as they met, the true state of affairs; what was become of the consuls; to what place the remains of

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the army, if there were any, had retreated; where Hannibal was encamped; what he was doing, and what he designed to do; that the women should be forbid to appear in public, disturbing the city with their lamentations; that when any courier arrived, he should be brought privately and without noise to the prætors; and that no person should be suffered to go out of the city.

Not long after, a messenger arrived from Terentius; his letters imported that the Roman army had been defeated; that his colleague Æmilius was slain; that he himself was retired to Canusium, where he was assembling the remains of the troops; that about 10,000 men of different corps, and for the most part without officers, had joined him; and that Hannibal was still at Cannæ[1].

At the same time a bark arrived from Sicily with advice from the pro-prætor Otacilius, that one Carthaginian squadron was ravaging the coast of Syracuse, while another appeared off the Ægates ready to make a descent at Lilybæum; and that it was necessary to send a

[1] Livy says that Hannibal, after this famous battle, acted more like a man that had finished his conquests than one that had a war to carry on, and that he was sitting at Cannæ bargaining about his plunder and the captives, in a manner very unbecoming a great general (Liv. B. 22. c. 56. 58.) If this be not a calumny, at least the Carthaginian did not continue long thus employed; for the same author begins his 23d book by telling us, that Hannibal, after the battle of Cannæ, having taken and plundered the Roman camps, marched immediately (*confestim*) from Apulia into Samnium.

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fleet thither with all speed. The conscript fathers, not dejected at these additional cares, prepared for the defence both of Italy and Sicily. Marcellus, appointed prætor for the last named province, and now at Ostia aboard the fleet, was ordered to resign the conduct of it to P. Furius Philus, the prætor Peregrinus, and to go and take upon him the command of the army at Canusium. As for Terentius Varro, the senate recalled him to Rome; and nothing has been more wondered at, than the respect with which he was received at his arrival. Multitudes of people of all ranks went out to meet him, and the senate returned him thanks for that he had not despaired of the commonwealth. How different this conduct, says Livy, from that of the Carthaginians, who were wont to put their unsuccessful generals to the most cruel death[2]!

Livy, B. 22. c. 61.

[2] The reception Varro met with at Rome, and his being afterwards intrusted with the command of an army, seem to have been the effects of just policy in the Romans. This general had done nothing irregular, nothing contrary to orders. The senate and people had sent him to fight Hannibal, not to follow him at a distance like Fabius. Æmilius, it is true, was against fighting at that time; and he was an able general. But what then? Varro was not obliged to follow his advice. In a dispute they had had a little before about marching, Æmilius had no officer of his opinion, except the late consul Servilius, as we are informed by Livy. And there is reason to think that it was not only the general inclination of the soldiers, but agreeable to the judgment of most of the officers, that Varro should fight, when he did. No objection is made to the order of his battle. If a fatal error was committed during the action, through the rashness of the infantry imagining them-

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As the present situation of things required an absolute magistrate to govern the state, M. Junius Pera was, by the authority of the senate, named dictator, and Sempronius Gracchus to be his general of the horse. Junius made it his whole business to put the army in a condition to resist the enemy. Four legions and a thousand horse were raised among the citizens of Rome. The two Latiums, the municipia, and the colonies, furnished their contingents as usual; and to all these were added 8000 slaves, whom the republic bought of their masters, and who were called volones, from the word *volo* (I will) which every one returned in answer, when he was asked, whether he would serve in the troops. To recruit the treasury, which was greatly exhausted, and to put the public revenues under a good regulation, three men of eminent prudence and integrity were chosen for that trust. And then, the senators giving the example, and being

selves victorious, this was no more imputable to Varro than to Æmilius. In short, as Varro does not appear to be chargeable with any thing worse, than the having such a dependence on the number and valour of his troops, as to venture a battle contrary to the advice of his colleague, it ought not perhaps to be so surprising that the senate and people received him in the manner they did. They could not have treated him with rigour without discouraging their generals, which might have been of dangerous consequence at this juncture. Nor is it much to be wondered at that they employed him again. He was very humble after his defeat at Cannæ, and behaved himself to the general satisfaction of both senate and people. However, they never put him at the head of a great army; he seldom had the command of above one legion.

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followed by the knights, the whole people in general of the Roman tribes brought all their gold to the public treasury; the senators only reserving their rings, and the *bullæ* about their children's necks. The silver coin was now, for the first time, alloyed with copper.

Livy, B 23, c. 21. Florus, B. 2. c. 6. Livy, B. 22. c. 56, 58.

While they were thus employed at Rome, Hannibal, to get a supply of money, and with the further view of abating the obstinate resolution of the Romans in battle, by the hopes of being ransomed, in case they should be defeated and taken, gave leave to his Roman prisoners to redeem themselves[3]. These chose out ten of their body, to send to Rome, to nenotiate their redemption; and Hannibal exacted no other security for their return than an oath. They were accompanied by a noble Carthaginian, named Carthalo, who, in case he found the Romans inclined to peace, was empowered to declare upon what terms Hannibal would grant it. Upon the first report of Carthalo's arrival, the dictator sent a lictor to order him out of the Roman territory. The ten deputies were admitted to an audience of the senate. M. Junius, the chief of them, pleaded with great earnestness in behalf of the captives. He justified them from the charge of cowardice in having yielded themselves prisoners to the enemy. He alleged that they had been left in the camp to defend it, that they had done

[3] The ransom of each horseman he fixed at 500 *denarii* (16*l.* 2*s.* 11*d.*); that of each soldier at 300 (9*l.* 3*s.* 9*d.*); and that of each slave at 100 (3*l.* 4*s.* 7*d.*)*.

* c. 58.

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nothing cowardly or unworthy the Roman name, but by the adverse fortune of the day, the troops in the field being all cut off, they had been under a necessity of surrendering to the conqueror. He cited precedents of the regard had to prisoners in former times, and urged the advantage it would be to the republic, to have in her army 8000 Romans, redeemed at a less price[4] than the purchase of so many slaves would amount to. His discourse was seconded by the multitude, whose concern for their relations in captivity had brought them together; and they implored the clemency of the fathers in a suppliant manner.

The senate debated the matter for some

[4] This (says Sir W. Raleigh) is but a tale devised to countenance the Roman proceedings, as if they had been severe, when, as indeed they were, suitable to the present fortune, poor and somewhat beggarly. Hereof it is no little proof, that Hannibal valued those Roman slaves whom he had taken in the camp among their masters, at no more, than every one the third part of a common soldier's ransom: and likely it is, that he offered them at the price, whereat he thought them current. But if we should suppose that by trading with Hannibal, a better bargain for slaves might have been made, than was by the state at home, in dealing with private men; yet must we withal consider, that these private men did only lend these slaves for a while unto the commonwealth, and were afterwards contented to forbear the price of them, until the war should be ended. [Livy, B. 24, c. 18.] If Hannibal would have given such long day of payment, it is likely that the Romans would have been his chapmen; but seeing he dealt only for ready money, they chose rather to say, we will not give, than we cannot. Hist. of the World, Part I. B. 5. c. 3. sect. 9.

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time, being much divided in opinion; but at length they concluded absolutely against the redemption of the captives; for, having penetrated into Hannibal's views, they would convince their soldiers that they must either conquer or be at the mercy of their enemies.

Livy, B. 23. c. 1.

Hannibal, after his victory at Cannæ, marched without delay from Apulia into Samnium. Compsa, a city of Hirpini, almost at the head of the Aufidus, surrendered to him, and was the first which fell off from the Romans. Having here placed a garrison, together with all his plunder and baggage, he divided his army. One part of it he gave to his brother Mago, to reduce the towns and fortresses of this country and of all Bruttium; and with the other he himself marched towards Naples, to get possession, if practicable, of that maritime city, which would open to him an easy communication with Africa. But though he drew a part of the garrison into an ambuscade, and cut them off, yet the strength of the place deterred him from laying siege to it.

c. 2. et seq.

From thence he turned towards Capua. This city, which had been formerly governed by Roman laws and a Roman prefect, was now a municipium, and chose her own magistrates; and the Capuans had the uncommon privilege of intermarrying with the Romans. After the battle of the lake Thrasymenus, one Pacuvius Calavius, a man of the greatest interest among the people, and then governor of the town, had laid a design to assassinate the senate, who were odious both to himself and the people,

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and deliver up the place to Hannibal: but afterwards he thought that to assume a kind of sovereignty himself there, would be a better scheme than that of introducing a stranger to usurp it. The only difficulty he had, was to engage the senators, who were universally for adhering to the Romans, to favour the project of his ambition. To this end, he told them that the people had sworn to cut their throats, and to surrender up Capua to the Carthaginians; but that if they would leave themselves to his conduct, he would preserve them. The senators trusted him upon his oath, and suffered him to shut them up in the temple, where they were then assembled, and to set a guard at the door. He then called the people together, and acquainted them, that the senate were now entirely in his power, and that he would abandon those detestable slaves of Rome to their resentment, to be treated according to their demerits; but he insisted that (in order to preserve the old form of government, which ought not to be destroyed) as soon as any one of them had received sentence, and before he was executed, the people should name some man of probity to succeed him; by which stratagem, Pacuvius saved the lives of all the senators; for the multitude could not agree upon this man of probity. Some disqualification or other was still objected to whoever was named; so that in the end, the people finding that they could not rid themselves of their present senate without choosing a worse, desired that all the prisoners might be released; and from this time

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the senate courted the people by all manner of kindness and adulation; and (if we may credit Livy) Pacuvius acquired an absolute ascendancy over both.

After the defeat of the Romans at Cannæ, the Capuans were again disposed to side with the Carthaginians. Two reasons restrained them: the intermarriages before mentioned, and the consideration that the flower of their nobility were in the service of the Romans in Sicily, and were therefore as so many hostages for their fidelity. And the relations of these young men prevailed to have a deputation sent to the consul Terentius, then at Venusia, to offer him succours. These deputies found the consul so dejected and desponding, that, weighing the circumstances of things, they thought the time now come to shake off the Roman yoke, and recover their ancient liberty. But to do this with the more decency, they first sent ambassadors to Rome, with such proposals as they knew would not be received. They demanded, that for the future, Rome and Capua should be upon a perfect equality, and that every year one of the consuls should be chosen out of the Capuans.

The conscript fathers having haughtily rejected the demand, it was carried by a majority of voices, both of the senate and people of Capua, to send deputies to treat with Hannibal. They demanded entire liberty and independence, and that 300 Roman knights should be put into their hands, to be exchanged against the same number of Capuan youths in the ser-

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vice of Rome. Hannibal readily granted all that was asked; and then the people contrived to have all the Romans in the city shut up in the public baths, and there suffocated. One Decius Magius, a man of a Roman spirit, and a friend to the Romans, loudly declared against these proceedings of his countrymen, warning them not to receive a Carthaginian garrison, and putting them in mind of Pyrrhus's tyranny over the people of Tarentum; but this discourse was despised. When Hannibal was to make his entry, all the town crowded to meet him, except this Magius, and some few of the nobility, among whom was Perolla, the son of Pacuvius, who, though not governor of Capua at this time, had been the soul of all the late proceedings. Perolla was afterwards obliged by his father to go and pay his homage to Hannibal; nevertheless, having deeply imbibed the sentiments of Magius, he formed a resolution to stab the Carthaginian general, at a magnificent entertainment which Pacuvius and some other of the principal citizens were to give him: but the young man having communicated the design to his father, was by his tears and entreaties dissuaded from it. The next day the senate assembled, and Hannibal complaining to them of the disaffection of Magius, this brave man was delivered up to him, loaded with irons, and put on board a ship bound for Carthage. A tempest drove the vessel into the port of Cyrene, a city belonging to the kings of Egypt; there the prisoner finding means to get to a statue of Ptolemy Philopater,

Livy, B. 23. c. 10.

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and laying hold of it, the Carthaginians durst not drag him from that sanctuary. The Cyrenians conveyed him to Alexandria, where he chose to continue under the protection of Ptolemy.

About this time, Hannibal despatched his brother Mago to Carthage with an account of his success. Mago reported to the senate, "That their general had defeated six consular armies, slain above 200,000 Romans, and taken more than 50,000 prisoners; that Bruttium and Apulia, with a part of Samnium and a part of Lucania, had revolted to the Carthaginians; that Capua, the chief city, not of Campania only, but (in the present low estate of Rome) even of Italy, had surrendered to Hannibal:" and he concluded with saying, "That for so many and so great victories, it was meet to return solemn thanks to the immortal gods." To verify his report, he spread abroad in the senate-house, some say one, others three, bushels of gold rings taken from the Roman knights and senators. Having thus prepossessed the senate in favour of his brother, he proceeded to solicit for him supplies of men, corn, and money, that he might be enabled to carry on so successful a war. The request was universally applauded; and Himilco, a senator of the Barchine faction, turning towards Hanno, as it were to insult him, "Well, Hanno, are you still dissatisfied that we entered into a war against Rome? Are you still of opinion that we ought to deliver up Hannibal? Come, declare against our giving thanks to the gods for

Livy, B. 23. c. 12.

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Livy, B. 23. c. 13.

our success; speak, Hanno, let us hear the language of a Roman in a Carthaginian senate." Hanno rose up; "To-day, fathers, if I had not been compelled to speak, I should have held my peace, that, in this concert of your common gladness, no discordant word might drop from me. But to be silent when thus interrogated by a senator, would argue either pride or disaffection to the state, a disregard of other men's liberty or of my own. To Himilco, therefore, I answer, that I do still condemn the war, and that I never shall cease to blame our invincible general, till I see it ended by a peace upon some tolerable conditions. The exploits which Mago has boasted of, have caused much joy to Himilco and his friends. To me, too, they may prove matter of joy, if a proper use be made of them for bringing about an honourable peace. But what is the ground of all this exultation? to what does it amount? I have slain, says Hannibal, whole armies of enemies: send me soldiers. What else could he have asked, had he been vanquished? I have taken two camps, full, doubtless, of wealth and provisions; supply me with corn and money.—What other demand could he have made, had he lost his own camp, with every thing that was in it? And, that I alone may not wonder at all this, I would have Himilco (for, as I have answered him, I have now surely a right to interrogate); I say, I would have Himilco or Mago answer me some questions. The Roman empire, it seems, was overturned at the battle of Cannæ, and all Italy is revolting: is any

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one, I pray, of the Latine nations come over to us? Has any one man of the five and thirty tribes deserted to Hannibal?" When Mago had to both these answered in the negative: "There remain then (replied Hanno) a huge number of enemies still to be subdued. And this multitude, what heart, what hope have they?" Mago answered, "That he knew not." "And yet (returned Hanno) there is nothing easier to be known. Have the Romans sent any ambassadors to Hannibal to treat of peace? Has intelligence been brought you, that any mention of peace was made at Rome?" "No," said Mago. "Why then (replied the other) the progress made in this war, is exactly the same as when Hannibal first entered Italy.—The vicissitude of our fortune in the first Roman war, many of us here present can well remember. Our affairs were never in a more prosperous course, both by land and sea, than just before our defeat at the Ægates. Should the like turn of fortune (the gods avert the omen!) happen to us again, can we hope to obtain, when vanquished, that peace, which, when we are victorious, we disdain to think of? Were it now in debate to offer or to accept a peace, I know what I should say. If you ask my opinion concerning the supplies which Mago demands for the army, my answer is, That if they be truly conquerors, they little need them; and if they deceive us with vain hope, they less deserve them." Hanno's speech made no impression on the senate. It was carried by a great majority to send to Hannibal from

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Africa, 4000 Numidians, 40 elephants, and 1000 talents of silver*. And one of the magistrates was immediately commissioned to go with Mago into Spain, and there hire 20,000 foot and 4000 horse, for recruiting the armies in that country and in Italy. These preparations, however, went on slowly, as is usual in times of prosperity. On the other side, neither the character, nor the present circumstances of the Romans would permit them to be dilatory in their proceedings. The senate neglected nothing, deferred nothing, that was necessary for supporting the war. The consul Varro showed himself extremely diligent in whatever belonged to his office; and the dictator Junius Pera, after performing the usual ceremonies of religion, marched out of Rome at the head of 25,000 men. This army was composed of two legions, which had been raised in the beginning of the year for the defence of the city, of some cohorts from Picenum and the Gallic territory[5], of the 8000 volones before mentioned, and of 6000 prisoners for crimes and debt, whom Junius had released, upon the condition of their enlisting themselves in the troops, and whom he had armed out of the spoils Flaminius had formerly brought from Gaul.

* 193,750*l.*

Livy, B. 23 c. 14.

As for Hannibal, having settled his affairs at Capua, he made a second attempt upon Na-

[5] This was a tract of land between the Rubicon and the Esis, formerly taken from the Galli-Senones, and divided amongst some Roman citizens by virtue of a law lately enacted.

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ples, with as little success as in the first. From thence he marched to Nola, in hopes that the populace, who were inclined to his party, would deliver up the town to him. But their senate, alarmed at the danger, had sent for assistance from Marcellus, who commanded the Roman army at Canusium, and who came in all haste to the defence of the place. Hannibal, disappointed here, once more attempted Naples.—

Livy, B. 23. c. 15.

As this city had lately received a Roman garrison, under the command of M. Junius Silanus, the Carthaginian soon despaired of being able to reduce it by force; and he turned his arms against Nuceria, a town not far from the other. The inhabitants, for want of provisions, were obliged to capitulate: yet he could not prevail upon any of them to serve in his army. After he had plundered and burnt Nuceria, he again sat down before Nola. Marcellus sallied out upon him at three several gates, and killed 2300 of his men, with the loss only of 500 of

c. 17.

his own. The Carthaginian being thus repulsed, laid siege to Acerræ, a small town on the banks of the Clanis, near Nola, and took it. Here he learned that the dictator was approaching to Casilinum with his army. Whereupon being afraid lest the neighbourhood of the enemy might occasion some sinister accident at Capua, he drew near to this city, and at the same time sent a part of his forces to attack Casilinum. These not succeeding, he himself marched thither with his army, and besieged the town in form. It was not garrisoned by Campanians. A body of Prænestini, to the number of 500

men, happening to pass that way, had found the inhabitants wavering in their fidelity to Rome, and had therefore cut their throats in the night, and possessed themselves of the walls. The Prænestini were afterwards reinforced by about 400 Perusini from Hetruria, and some Romans and Latines. All these being men of bravery and resolution, made a vigorous resistance. Winter approaching, Hannibal discontinued the siege, intending to renew it in the spring. He left a small body of troops before the town, and retired to Capua with the rest of his army.

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Livy and some other historians tell us, that both Hannibal and his soldiers were extremely softened by the effeminate life they gave themselves up to, this winter, at Capua, and are very particular in their descriptions of the luxury of the Carthaginians, making Capua prove as fatal a place to them as Cannæ had been to the Romans. It does not however appear by their after-behaviour, that they had lost much of their martial ardour. The principal cause of the decline of Hannibal's affairs in Italy after the battle of Cannæ, seems to have been his not receiving supplies from his own country. He had not men enough to oppose so many armies as the Romans sent against him, and at the same time to garrison the towns and protect the countries, that had submitted to him. And that his residence at Capua had abated nothing of his wonted activity, seems plain from Livy himself, who informs us, that as soon as the rigour of the season began to soften, he renewed

Livy, B. 23. c. 18.

c. 19.

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the siege of Casilinum, and this in sight of an army, which, without reckoning the allies, amounted to 25,000 men. This army was now under the conduct of Sempronius, general of the horse, the dictator having been recalled to Rome on account of some religious affair. Sempronius continued quiet in his camp; for he had received orders not to fight. Marcellus (according to Livy) would have gone to the assistance of the besieged, if he had not been hindered by the swelling of the Vulturnus, and by the people of Nola, who feared that the Capuans would attack them if the Roman garrison should withdraw. In the meantime Casilinum was reduced to great extremities for want of provisions, insomuch that many of the soldiers threw themselves from the walls, or exposed themselves without defence to the darts of the enemy. Sempronius attempted to relieve them, first by throwing barrels of meal into the Vulturnus, that ran through the town, and afterwards by scattering in the stream great quantities of nuts, which the besieged stopped with hurdles. These convoys of provisions being discovered and cut off, the garrison were reduced to live upon rats, and what other vermin they could find; nay, they pulled off the leather that covered their shields, boiled it soft in water, and eat it. And when Hannibal, to hinder them from gathering any weeds or roots that grew close under the wall, had ploughed up the ground, they threw turnip-seed out upon the mould; which when the Carthaginian heard of, he cried out, "What! am I then to

sit here till their turnips are come to maturity?" And from this time he became more willing to grant them terms. They were at length allowed to march out of the town, provided each freeman among them paid seven ounces of gold. The condition was accepted; they remained prisoners till the money was paid, and the Carthaginian put a garrison of 700 men into the place.

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Livy, B. 23. c. 20.

The inhabitants of Petilia, in Bruttium, gave likewise a signal proof of their attachment to the republic, and showed how agreeable her government was to her subjects. They resolutely stood a siege, though refused assistance from Rome on account of the distress she was in; and Himilco, one of Hannibal's lieutenants, found almost as much difficulty in subduing them, as the general had met with in reducing the garrison of Casilinum.

c. 30.

About the same time couriers arrived from Sicily and Sardinia, with complaints from the prætors of those two provinces of the want both of provisions and pay for their armies and fleets. The answer was, that they must shift for themselves as well as they could; for that Rome was not in a condition to help them. King Hiero supplied the prætor of Sicily with what money he wanted, and six months' provisions; and the cities of Sardinia in alliance with the republic raised contributions among themselves for the prætor of that island.

c. 21.

And now the senate began to think of filling up the many vacant places in their assembly. When this matter was in debate, Sp. Carvilius

c. 22.

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proposed that the present opportunity might be taken to oblige the Latines, those ancient and faithful allies of Rome, by admitting two out of each nation of them to sit among the fathers; but the motion was rejected with indignation; and Fabius reproved Carvilius for his imprudence in exposing the senate to a shameful innovation, or to the danger of affronting the Latines, at so critical a conjuncture. He added, that it was of the utmost consequence to observe a strict silence upon this head, that so the allies might never know such a proposal had been made. The matter was kept secret; no mischief followed.

As there were no censors in being, to fill up the vacancies in question, and the dictator was now with the army, the consul Terentius, by order of the senate, nominated M. Fabius Buteo, the oldest of the former censors, to be a second dictator, whose office should be confined to this affair. And never did dictator discharge his trust with more modesty and prudence. The first upon his list were all those who, since the last censors, had obtained curule magistracies, but had not yet been ranked among the fathers; then all those, without exception, who had been tribunes of the people, plebeian ædiles or quæstors; and lastly such of the citizens as could show the spoils of enemies by them vanquished, or had been rewarded by their generals with a civic crown. By this impartial election the Romans had the happiness to see 177 new senators created without jealousy or contention. Fabius was highly ap-

Livy, B. 23. c. 23.

plauded for his conduct, and when he had finished his list, he immediately abdicated the dictatorship, though he had been named to it for six months.

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CHAP. XXIII.

THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

A Roman army destroyed by the Gauls. King Philip of Macedon enters into league with Hannibal against Rome. Favourable accounts from Sardinia, and from the Scipios in Spain. After the death of king Hiero, Syracuse takes part with the Carthaginians.

THE next affair, at Rome, was to appoint the great officers of the state for the new year. T. Sempronius Gracchus (general of the horse to the dictator Junius) and L. Posthumius Albinus, now at the head of an army in Cisalpine Gaul, were elected consuls. Then the several prætors were named, and Marcellus had the power and title given him of pro-consul; because of all the Roman generals in Italy, he was the only one who had gained any advantage over the enemy since the battle of Cannæ. The elections being over, Junius returned to his camp in Apulia, but Sempronius continued in the city, to consult with the senate about the operations of the approaching campaign. While they were deliberating on these things, news came to Rome that Posthumius Albinus (one of the consuls elect) with all his army,

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237th Consulship.

Livy, B. 23. c. 30.

Year of ROME DXXXVIII Bef J. C. Two hundred fourteen.

237th Consulship.

Livy, B. 23. c. 30, 24, 25.

was destroyed by the Gauls[1]. The fortitude of the Romans enabled them to surmount this last calamity of so unfortunate a year. Sempronius assembled the senate, and endeavoured to raise their dejected spirits. "The defeat of Cannæ ought to have hardened us against every adversity that can happen in war. Shall we be discouraged by moderate losses, after having supported the greatest calamities? The war with the Gauls may be deferred. Let us have no more armies in Gaul, but turn all our forces against Hannibal. When he is once driven out of Italy, the rebellious nations will soon be reduced again." This advice was followed, and all the Roman forces were ordered to the provinces near Hannibal.

In the new disposition of employments, Terentius Varro, notwithstanding his former ill success, was entrusted with the command of an army in Apulia, and had the character of proconsul. His behaviour since his misfortune had softened every body to him. He had let his hair and beard grow, and had never taken

Val. Max. B 4. c 5. sect. 2.

[1] According to Livy, (B. 23, c. 24.) the Gauls made use of a very extraordinary stratagem upon this occasion.—Posthumius being to pass through a wood, they, against his coming, had, on each side the road, sawed all the trees so far that a little force would serve to cast them down.—When, therefore, the whole army had entered this dangerous passage, the Gauls that lay about the wood began to throw down the trees, which falling one against another, those that were nearest the road came upon the heads of the Romans, so that scarce ten men of them escaped being crushed.

a meal lying on a bed, as was the manner of the Romans. Nay, it is said, he modestly declined the dictatorship, to which the people, still well affected to him, would have raised him.

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Frontin. Stratag. l. 4. c. 5. sect. 6. Livy, B. 23. c. 31.

It now remained to choose a new consul in the room of Posthumius Albinus; and Marcellus being sent upon a commission to the army, it was suspected and complained of in the senate, that he was kept out of the way on purpose that he might not be present at the *comitia*. Sempronius therefore deferred convening the centuries till the return of Marcellus, and then he was unanimously chosen consul. But as it had happened to thunder during the assembly, the augurs laid hold of this accident to declare the election disagreeable to the will of the gods. Their true reason for opposing it was his being a plebeian, for Sempronius also being of that order, should Marcellus's election be confirmed, Rome would have two plebeian consuls. Hereupon Marcellus abdicated, and Fabius Cunctator was chosen (the third time) in his stead.

c. 32.

And now the Romans began to be in motion. Fabius put himself at the head of those troops which the late dictator had commanded. Sempronius was general of the Volones, and of 25,000 auxiliaries. The troops that had escaped from Cannæ, and which after that battle had served under Marcellus, and all the weak soldiers in the army lately under the conduct of Junius Pera, had been sent into Sicily, there to serve as long as the war should last in Italy.

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In the room of these, Marcellus led to his camp near Suessula (a city nine miles from Nola) two legions that had been raised for the defence of Rome. The prætor Lævinus was ordered to cover Apulia with two legions, which arrived from Sicily, and to defend the coast from Brundusium to Tarentum, with a fleet of twenty-five ships. A like number of vessels was sent under Q. Fulvius Flaccus, the other prætor, to guard the coast near the capital. The legion under Varro being commanded into Sicily, he was ordered to make new levies in the country of Picenum, and to continue there to protect that and the neighbouring territories.

Livy, B. 23. c. 33.

While the prætor Lævinus lay encamped at Luceria in Apulia, a company of Macedonians were, to his great surprise, brought before him.

At the head of them was an Athenian named Xenophanes. These strangers had landed not far from the Lacinian promontory, and were making their way to Hannibal's camp near Capua, when Lævinus's scouts intercepted them. Being examined by the prætor, the Athenian answered that he was commissioned by king Philip of Macedon to treat of an alliance with the Roman republic. Lævinus, overjoyed at this, showed great respect to the ambassador, and furnished him with guides to conduct him to Rome. It is not known by what artifice he got to Hannibal's camp: but the league which, in his master's name, he made with the Carthaginian, is preserved to

this day[2]. Having finished his commission, he returned to his ship, and Mago, Bostar, and

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[2] The form of the league, as it is in Polybius, B. 7. c. 2. runs thus.

The treaty confirmed by oath, which Hannibal the general, Mago, Myrcan, Barmocar, and all the senators of Carthage that are with him [Hannibal], and all the Carthaginians that serve under him, have concluded with Xenophanes the Athenian, the son of Cleomachus, whom king Philip, the son of Demetrius, hath sent to us in his own name, and in the name of the Macedonians, and of his allies

In the presence of Jupiter and Juno, and Apollo; in the presence of the tutelary divinity of the Carthaginians, and of Hercules, and of Iolaus; in the presence of Mars, of Triton and Neptune; in the presence of the gods who accompany our expedition, and of the sun, the moon, and the earth; in the presence of the rivers, the fields, and the waters; in the presence of all the gods who rule over Carthage; in the presence of all the gods who rule over Macedon and the rest of Greece; in the presence of all the gods who preside over war, and at the making this treaty; Hannibal the general hath said, and all the senators of Carthage that are with him, and all the Carthaginians that are in his army.

If it seem good unto you and to us, this shall be a treaty of amity and good-will between you and us, as friends, allies, and brethren, upon condition that king Philip, and the Macedonians, and all the other Greeks that are his allies, shall preserve and defend the Carthaginian lords, and Hannibal the general, and those that are with him, and the governors of provinces dependent upon the Carthaginians, and those that use the same laws with them; and the inhabitants of Utica, and of all the cities and countries subject to the Carthaginians, and all the soldiers and allies, and all the cities and nations in confederacy with us in Italy, Gaul, and Liguria, and all those in this country who are in friendship and alliance with us. In like manner the Carthaginian armies, and the inhabitants of Utica, and all the cities and nations subject to Carthage, and the sol-

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Gisco, three ambassadors from Hannibal, embarked with him. They were scarce out at sea when the vessel was descried by P. Vale-

diers and allies, and all the nations and cities with which we have amity and alliance in Italy, in Gaul, in Liguria, and with which we may contract amity and alliance in this country, shall preserve and defend king Philip, and the Macedonians, and all their allies amongst the Greeks. We will not secretly devise evil against one another. We will not lay snares for one another. We [the Macedonians] with all affection and good-will, without guile or fraud [declare that we] will be enemies to the enemies of the Carthaginians, except to those kings, cities, and ports with which we are in friendship and alliance. In like manner, we [the Carthaginians] will be enemies to the enemies of king Philip, except to those kings, cities, and nations with whom we are in alliance and friendship. You [the Macedonians] shall engage in the war we have with the Romans till it please the gods to give success to our arms and yours. You shall assist us with what is necessary, according as shall be agreed upon between us. But if the gods shall not grant to you and us a happy issue of the war against the Romans and their allies, and if we be reduced to make peace with the Romans, we shall treat in such a manner as that you shall be included in the treaty; and on condition that they shall not be allowed to declare war against you; that the Romans shall not be masters of the Corcyræi, nor of the Apolliniates, nor of the Dyrrachini, nor of Pharus, nor of Dymallar, nor of the Parthini, nor of Antintania. They shall likewise restore to Demetrius Pharius all his friends and relations who are in the Roman dominions. If the Romans shall declare war against you or against us, we will assist each other as the occasion shall require. We will act in the same manner in case any other shall declare war against us, except the kings, cities, and nations with whom we are in alliance and friendship. If either of us shall judge proper to add any thing to this treaty, or retrench any thing from it, it shall not be done without the consent of both of us.

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rius Flaccus, whom Lævinus had appointed to command the fleet. She was soon obliged to strike to some ships sent after her. Xenophanes endeavoured to escape a second time, by the same story of his embassy from Philip to the senate; adding only, that not having been able to reach the capital, because the enemy infested the roads, he had negotiated his business with the prætor Lævinus. He would have imposed upon Flaccus, but for the habit and language of the three Carthaginians. The Roman having discovered the truth, detached five galleys, under the command of Valerius Antias, to transport the Athenian and his companions to Rome.

Livy, B. 23. c. 35.

To return to Hannibal. Campania was now the chief seat of the war; and the Campanians themselves, to assist him, raised an army of 14,000 men. These having, in vain, solicited Cumæ, a city in the neighbourhood, to join with them, endeavoured, with no better success, to surprise the Cumans by treachery. After which Hannibal, at the request of the Campanians, laid siege to the place. Fabius was then encamped at Cales, but durst not cross the Vulturnus, to go to the assistance of the besieged, because of unlucky omens and prodigies. Sempronius had a little before entered the place, and he defended it. He is said to have slain in a sally 1300 of the Carthaginians. Hannibal the next day presented battle, in hopes the consul, flushed with his success, would venture to fight: but the Romans keeping close within the walls, he at

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Polyb. B. 23. c. 37.

length drew off his men and returned to his camp, which was on Mount Tifata.

Whilst Sempronius Gracchus was thus defending Cumæ, the Roman armies prospered in two other places. Another Sempronius, surnamed Longus, gained a victory over Hanno in Lucania, and drove him from thence into Bruttium. And Lævinus retook three cities of the Hirpini, which had revolted to Hannibal.

c. 38. About the same time the intercepted ambassador from king Philip, and his letters, were brought to Rome. And the senate, finding that the treaty was actually concluded, came immediately to the wise and noble resolution of keeping the Macedonian out of Italy, by carrying the war into his country.

c. 39. And now Fabius, having made expiation for the prodigies, at length passed the Vulturnus, and both the consuls carried on the war in concert together. Fabius recovered some towns that had declared for Hannibal, and had received Carthaginian garrisons. At Nola, the people, still disaffected to Rome, were secretly plotting to destroy their senators, and betray the city to Hannibal. To prevent this, Fabius sent Marcellus with his army into Nola, and he himself removed to the pro-consul's camp

c. 40. near Suessula. There he continued quiet, while Marcellus made frequent incursions into the lands of the Hirpini and the Samnites about Caudium. Deputies from these two nations came to Hannibal to inform him of the devastation of their country, and to desire relief. They even added reproaches to their com-

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237th Consulship.

Polyb.B.23. c.42.

plaints. "We believed," said they, "that so long as you were safe and our friend, we might have banished all fear, not only of the Romans, but (were it lawful so to speak) even of the angry gods themselves. Yet certain it is, that whilst you are not only safe and victorious, but so near us too, that you can see the burning of our houses, and almost hear the cries of our wives and children, we have been miserably harassed this summer by Marcellus, as if he, and not you, had been conqueror at Cannæ. The Romans give out that you are like a bee that can sting but once[3]." Hannibal returned

[3] The Roman historians frequently reproach Hannibal with inaction after the winter he spent in Capua, and Livy upon this occasion has put very severe reflections upon him into the mouths of the Samnite deputies. The truth of the matter seems to be this: the Romans had now learned by their defeats that they were not a match for Hannibal in the open field. It was a long time before they would yield this point; but the battle of Cannæ seems to have convinced them. At first they sent one consul to oppose him with the usual army of two legions (consisting of about 4000 men each) with a proportionable number of auxiliaries. The misfortune of the Ticin, and what immediately followed it, obliged them to send the other consul with his army to join his colleague. These being defeated at the Trebia, the republic increased her armies the next year. Flaminius had alone the command of four legions, and his colleague of two. The former being vanquished at the lake Thrasymen, and Fabius's dilatory arts not having any sensible good effect, the Romans seemed resolved to exert their whole strength, and ruin Hannibal at a blow. They doubled their legions, increased the number of men in each, and sent both their consuls at the head of an army of near 90,000 men to fight a decisive battle. The victory over these at Cannæ was so complete, that the Romans saw plainly they could not hope to conquer the Carthaginian in a general battle, and

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Livy, B. 23. c. 43.

a civil answer to the deputies, and encouraged them to hope for a happy issue of the war. "Of the victories I have gained," said he, "the last has always been the greatest. That of the lake Thrasymenus was more considerable than that of the Trebia, and the victory of Cannæ surpassed them both. I shall soon gain a fourth victory superior to all the past." With this answer, and rich presents, he dismissed the deputies.

that they must change their manner of carrying on the war. Accordingly they divided their troops into many armies, never risked their whole strength in one action, but contented themselves with wasting Hannibal's forces in small engagements, harassing his allies, and protecting their own. This very year they besieged him, as it were, with armies. Fabius commanded one at Liternum, Sempronius had another at Cumæ, and Marcellus a third at Suessula, all in Campania where Hannibal was. Lævinus defended Apulia; and Terentius Varro, Picenum. Each of these generals had at least two legions under him, except T. Varro, who had but one. Beside these, Livy mentions a Sempronius Longus, who had an army in Lucania, sufficient to defeat a considerable part of the Carthaginian army under Hanno, of which 2000 were slain in the action. All these forces joined together would have made a greater army than the Romans had at Cannæ, but the republic had now altered her measures, nay so steady was she in pursuing this new method of carrying on the war, that though Hannibal was many years hemmed in among the Bruttians, in a corner of Italy, without supplies from his own country, and in great want of men and money, she never ventured to unite her forces in order to compel him to a general battle. Now considering the small number of his troops, his want of money, the many armies he had to deal with, the towns he had to garrison, and the several allies he had to protect, it is more to be wondered at that he kept footing so long in Italy, than that he made no progress in conquest.

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Hannibal being soon after joined by Hanno with some troops from Bruttium, invested Nola, which was defended by Marcellus, (who if we may credit the Latine historian) boldly marched his troops out of the town, and came to a pitched battle with the Carthaginian before the walls; victory declared for the Romans, and Hannibal lost 5000 men[4]. Livy, B. 23. c. 44.

About this time, 1272 of his Spanish and Numidian horse went over to the enemy. These deserters continued faithful to Rome, c. 46.

[4] Livy, Plutarch, and others, relate several victories gained by Marcellus over Hannibal. But Corn. Nepos (in vit. Hannib.) tells us, that the latter was always victorious in Italy, and thatafter the battle of Cannæ no one ever ventured to pitch a camp in the plain against him. *Quamdiu in Italia fuit, nemo ei in acie restitit, nemo adversus eum, post Cannensem pugnam, in campo castra posuit.* Polybius's history of the Roman affairs after the battle of Cannæ is not entire; but we have several considerable fragments of it remaining, none of which mention any victory over Hannibal in Italy. From a passage in B. 9. c. 3. it is plain that Hannibal was never defeated by any Roman general before the siege of Capua, and consequently not by Marcellus this year. "Who," says the historian, "can help admiring the Romans? That they who durst not draw out an army in battle against Hannibal, but used to lead their legions, and that with difficulty, along the hills, should venture to lay siege to a strong city, while they themselves were harassed by an enemy whom they dared not to think of encountering in the field. But the Carthaginians, who had been conquerors in every battle, suffered no less than the vanquished, &c." And in B. 15. c. 16. he expressly asserts, that Hannibal was never vanquished before the battle of Zama. And, in chap. 11, he represents Hannibal, just before that battle, reminding his soldiers, that they had been victorious in every battle they had fought in Italy.

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and did her important services, for which they were recompensed with lands in their own countries at the end of the war. The Carthaginian general raised the siege of Nola, sent Hanno again into Bruttium, with the forces he had brought from thence, marched himself into Apulia, and pitched his camp near Arpi, where he purposed to winter. As soon as he was gone, Fabius made two incursions, with the greatest part of his army, into the flat country of Campania, gathered in all the corn, and carried it to his camp at Suessula, which he put in a condition to serve him for winter quarters. He then ordered Marcellus to keep no more soldiers at Nola than were necessary to defend the town, and to send the rest to Rome, that they might neither be a burden to the allies nor an expense to the republic. The consul Sempronius marched his legions from Cumæ to Luceria in Apulia; from thence he despatched the prætor Lævinus with the army under his command to Brundusium, to guard the coast of Salentum, and provide what was necessary for the Macedonian war.

Livy, B. 23. c. 48.

While affairs in Italy were in the situation that has been described, good news came to Rome from Sardinia and Spain. The prætor, Manlius Torquatus, had defeated the rebel Sardinians, though assisted by an army sent from Carthage under the command of Asdrubal the Bald. Twelve thousand of the enemy were killed upon the spot. Asdrubal himself, with Hanno and Mago his chief officers, taken prisoners, and the island entirely reduced.

c. 34, 40, 41.

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Livy, B. 23. c. 48.

The Scipios had been equally fortunate in their wars in Spain. However they wrote to the senate, that the troops wanted their pay, clothes to cover them, and provisions to subsist them. As to the first indeed, they added, that if the public treasury was exhausted, they would find means to get money from the Spaniards; but that the other necessaries must be sent from Rome, otherwise they could neither keep the province in obedience, nor support the army. The senators were all sensible of the reasonableness of the request; but how to comply with it was the difficulty. They considered the numerous forces they already had to maintain both at land and sea, and what a large new fleet must presently be equipped, if a war with Macedon should be commenced: that as to Sicily and Sardinia, which before the war brought in considerable subsidies to the treasury, they were now scarce able to maintain the forces necessary for the defence of these provinces; and that to tax the citizens at home for the supply demanded, would quite oppress and ruin them. The result of all was, that Fulvius the prætor should assemble the people, and lay before them the necessities of the state, and earnestly press all those who were grown rich by farming the public revenues, to lend the public, for a while, a part of what they had gained by it, and furnish the army in Spain with necessaries, under a promise of being reimbursed the first of any of the public creditors, when the treasury should be in a condition to discharge debts. The prætor accordingly re-

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presented the matter to the people, and also appointed a day when he would bargain for clothes and corn, to be sent to the troops in Spain, and for other necessaries to equip the fleet.

When the day came, three companies, of nineteen persons each, presented themselves as undertakers; but they insisted on two demands, that, while thus employed, they should be exempted from serving in the war: and that, if what they shipped were taken by the enemy, or cast away by storm, the public should bear the loss; both which conditions being agreed to, they undertook this affair, so that now the Roman armies were subsisted by the purses of private subjects; nor was any thing wanting to carry on the war in Spain more than if the treasury had been full.

The Scipios, thus supplied, immediately took the field, and (according to Livy) performed strange things, as shall hereafter be related.

Livy, B. 24. c. 4. B. 23. 30.

The accounts from Sicily were not so satisfactory as those from Spain and Sardinia. King Hiero was dead, and had left his dominions, by will, to his grandson Hieronymus, (whose father Gelo had rebelled against the old king the year before his death, and had come to an untimely end) under the tuition of fifteen guardians; whom he had entreated, a little before his decease, to keep up a good understanding with the Romans, as he himself had done for fifty years past. Hieronymus, being suffered by his guardians to take the reins of government into his own hands at fifteen years of age,

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Polyb. de Virt. et Vit. Exc. lib. 7. Livy, B. 24. c. 5, 6.

ran into many excesses of vice and cruelty. He affected an extravagant pomp, was difficult of access, gave audience with an air of contempt, and often added insulting jests to refusals. Three lords of distinction engrossed his favour; Andranodorus, and Zoippus, (his two uncles in law) and Thraso, surnamed Charcarus. This last was a friend to the Romans; the other two favoured Carthage. Thraso being put to death upon a false accusation of treason, the uncles easily persuaded their nephew to enter into a negotiation with Hannibal. Claudius Pulcher, the Roman prætor in Sicily, sent a deputation to the king, to renew the alliance formerly made by his grandfather with the Romans. Hieronymus insulted the deputies, asking them, what fortune they had at the battle of Cannæ? "Because," said he, "Hannibal's ambassadors have given most incredible accounts of it; and I would fain know the truth, that I may take my measures accordingly." The Romans only answered, that when he had learned to give audience to ambassadors in a serious manner, they would come to him again; and then having rather admonished than requested him, not rashly to violate the ancient league, they departed and returned to the prætor. Hieronymus without delay sent ambassadors to Carthage, to ratify a treaty he had already made with Hannibal; the substance of which was, that he and the Carthaginians should divide Sicily between them, when they had jointly conquered the

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whole island. But being afterwards persuaded to think that he had himself a title of inheritance to all Sicily, by being descended from Nereis, the daughter of Pyrrhus, (who had been declared king of it) he sent a new embassy, with instructions to lay before the senate of Carthage his pretended rights, and to conclude only a treaty of mutual assistance with them. The Carthaginians were glad at any rate to draw off Syracuse from the Roman interest, and readily yielded to the proposals.

Livy, B. 24. c. 7.

Not long after, this foolish king being at Leontini, a town situate on the frontiers of his dominions, was there assassinated in the presence of his guards, by some conspirators among his own subjects; an event which promised no great benefit to the Romans: for though the Syracusians, fond of liberty, seemed much inclined to change the monarchy into a commonwealth, they seemed no less inclined to side with the Carthaginian republic.

CHAP. XXIV.

FIFTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

The wise and public spirited conduct of the Romans in several instances.—They gain some advantages over Hannibal in Italy, and over King Philip in Greece.

IN Italy, the campaign of this year being ended, Fabius took the road to Rome, to hold the *comitia* by centuries for the new elections. The prudent consul did not enter the city,

but appeared at the assembly in the Campus Martius, on the day appointed, in his military habit, and attended by his lictors with their axes as well as fasces. It fell by lot to the tribe of the Anio to vote first, and of this tribe to a century which consisted of the younger men; and the majority of this prerogative[1] century named to the consulship T. Otacilius (a relation of the president) and M. Æmilius Regulus, men, neither of them, of such abilities as the present exigency required. Fabius therefore thought fit to interrupt the election, and harangue the assembly. He first excused the irregularity of his proceeding, by the present dangers which threatened the state. He then represented to them the importance of choosing consuls qualified to enter the lists with Hannibal; that Otacilius had given no cause to think him equal to that enterprise, not having performed any one thing for which the command of the fleet had, this year, been entrusted to him; and that Æmilius, as high priest of Quirinus, could not be absent from Rome. "Romans," he added, "do you name such consuls as you would wish to be conducted by,

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Livy, B. 24. c. 8.

[1] After the thirty-five tribes were completed, the centuries, which formed the *comitia centuriata*, were divided among the tribes, and became parts of them; and then in these assemblies it was decided by lot which of the tribes should vote first, and the tribe upon which the lot fell was called the prerogative tribe. Then lots were again cast among the centuries of this prerogative tribe, to determine which of those should vote before the rest; and the century upon which the lot fell was called the prerogative century. Rosin. p. 466.

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if you were this moment to give Hannibal battle. I pronounce, that the prerogative century give their suffrages again. Heralds, proclaim my orders." Otacilius at first made some opposition to this; but the lictors with their axes surrounded him, and soon forced him to silence. Then the prerogative century returned to the voting place, and gave their suffrages for the president himself, Q. Fabius Verrucosus* (surnamed Cunctator, or the Lingerer) and Claudius Marcellus†, who was absent; and the other centuries unanimously followed the example of this. Rome had never seen two greater men together at the head of her affairs. And though Fabius, by an irregular proceeding, had procured his own continuance in the consular dignity, against law and custom, yet no one accused him of ambition or tyranny, or of being actuated by any motive but a zeal for his country. The Romans were convinced of the necessity of continuing the commanders of their armies more than one year in office; and they now therefore made little alteration in the disposition of military employments.

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Livy, B. 24. c. 9.

* 4th time.

† 3d time.

Livy, B. 34. c. 1.

As a law had been made the last year (at the motion of Oppius, a tribune of the people) to restrain the luxury of women, forbidding them to wear above half an ounce of gold in toys, and to ride in a chariot within a mile of Rome, except to a public sacrifice; so now the censors, M. Attilius Regulus and P. Furius Philus, made a strict inquiry into offences committed by the men, to the detriment of

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the public. Cæcilius Metellus and the other young nobles who with him would in despair have left Italy after the battle of Cannæ, those of the ten deputies from the prisoners taken at that battle, who had not returned to Hannibal according to their oath, and about 2000 young men of military age who had neglected, without just cause, to enrol themselves for the service, were all degraded. The senate also decreed, that all who were stigmatized by the censors should be sent into Sicily, and there be obliged to serve on foot, amongst the runaways from the battle of Cannæ, till the war should be at an end. The Romans never exerted their virtue and disinterested zeal for their country in a greater degree than in this second Punic war; private men voluntarily advanced money for the public works; the masters who had sold their slaves to the republic, would not accept of payment till the war was ended; scarce a centurion or trooper demanded his pay, and if any one had so little generosity as to receive it from the quæstor, he became the jest of his legion. Nay, the money of the widow and the orphan was freely brought into the treasury, so great was the confidence in the public faith.

Livy, B. 24. c. 18.

Such being the dispositions of the people, the new levies were soon completed. Six legions were added to the twelve already on foot. The Sicilian expedition seemed to require the most despatch: and Otacilius was therefore ordered to embark with all diligence for that island, with one legion. And in order to man

c. 11.

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and equip the fleet, the consuls, by authority from the senate, laid a tax upon the rich.—Each head of a family, who by the censor's register was found worth from 50,000 to 100,000 asses, was obliged to maintain a rower or a sailor, at his own expense, for six months; and the more wealthy, three, five, seven, in proportion to their riches. The senators were obliged each to maintain eight sailors for a whole year.

What remained now, was to march the land forces, and begin the campaign in Italy. Hannibal, who had spent the winter in Apulia, returned to his camp on the Tifata, at the request of the Capuans, who thought their city threatened. He had ordered Hanno, with an army of 17,000 foot and 1200 Numidian horse, to come from the country of the Bruttians and seize Beneventum; but Sempronius, with his army of volones, prevented him, and possessed himself of that defenceless city. From thence he marched to give Hanno battle; and to engage his volones to exert themselves, he promised every man his liberty, who should bring off the head of an enemy. The senate had given him power to enfranchise whom he pleased.—But this promise had like to have ruined his affairs. For though his troops fought bravely at first, they lost much time in cutting off the heads of the enemies they had slain, and the ardour of those who had performed the condition of obtaining their freedom was immediately abated: so that he was forced to publish a new declaration through all the ranks of his army,

Livy, B. 24. c. 12.

c. 14.

c. 15, 16.

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'That none should obtain their liberty, unless the Carthaginians were routed.' Hereupon the volones renewed the fight with impetuosity, and gained so complete a victory, that scarce 2000 of the enemy escaped[2]. We are told, however, that 4000 of those legionary slaves did not behave themselves in the battle so well as the rest, and were afraid to pursue the enemy to their camp; and that, apprehending punishment for their cowardice, they retired after the action to a hill. Sempronius had compassion for their weakness, and sent a tribune to invite them back. And then, to perform his promise, he pronounced all, without exception, free. Nevertheless, that some distinction might be made between the brave and the cowards, he forbade the latter to eat sitting or lying down, all the time of their service, unless they were sick.

Livy, B. 2. c. 17.

In the meanwhile Hannibal endeavoured to surprise Puteoli. Failing in this attempt, he went and pillaged the country about Naples. From thence he moved towards Nola, whither the populace (who were still in his interest, in opposition to their senate) had invited him.—Marcellus being joined by the army from Suessula (now under Q. Pomponius) attacked and killed 2000 of his men, with the loss only of 400; and would have entirely ruined him, had Claudius Nero, whom the consul had ordered with some squadrons out of Nola to make

[2] The reader has been already cautioned concernin Livy's tales of Roman victories in this war.

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a tour, and fall upon the Carthaginians in the rear during the action, come up in time.—Marcellus offered Hannibal battle again the next day; but the latter declined it, decamped the night following, and marched towards Tarentum.

He had entertained strong hopes that this city would open her gates to him, upon his first appearance before it. Some Tarentine prisoners, whom he had formerly released without ransom, had engaged a great number of the young men of that place in his interest, and these invited him thither. But M. Livius, who commanded in the place, took such effectual measures to prevent the designs of the factious, that Hannibal was again disappointed. He quitted the enterprise, and marched towards Salapia in Apulia, where he resolved to spend the winter. Thither he ordered corn to be brought from Lucania; and his foragers having found in Apulia about 4000 colts, Hannibal ordered them to be broke; and with them he remounted his African horsemen. These were all his exploits during the whole campaign.

Livy, B. 24. c. 20.

But whilst the Carthaginian was on his march to Tarentum, Fabius besieged Casilinum, and sent to Marcellus to come with some legions and cover the siege, apprehending an attack from the Capuans. The garrison in the place consisted of 2000 Campanians and 700 Carthaginians; and they made so vigorous a defence, that Fabius, by the daily slaughter of his men, was much discouraged. He would

c. 19.

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have raised the siege, if Marcellus had not represented to him, "That a wise general should well consider all the difficulties of an enterprise before he undertakes it; but that, when it is once undertaken, he ought to go through with it: and that to desist now from the siege, would much lessen the credit of the republic among her allies." Upon this, Fabius renewed his attacks with more ardour than ever; and the Campanians were so intimidated by it, that they sent to him an offer to quit the place if they might retire in safety to Capua. Fabius consented; but Marcellus taking his opportunity, before fifty of them were come out of the city, seized the gate, entered the place, and put all who opposed him to the sword, without distinction[3]. The prisoners he sent to Rome. After the taking of Casilinum, Marcellus returned to Nola, and Fabius marched into Samnium, laid waste the country, and took several towns.

Plut. Life of Fabius.

Hannibal still depended upon his alliance with the king of Macedon; and indeed Philip began to draw towards Italy. He first besieged Apollonia; but not succeeding in this enterprise, he turned his arms against Oricum, and took it. The inhabitants sent notice of their misfortune to Lævinus at Brundusium, who in two days after the news arrived before the place. The king had left a small garrison

Livy, B. 24. c. 40.

[3] This story ill agrees with the character given by the historians of Marcellus, but well with his after behaviour at the siege of Syracuse.

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in it, and was returned to the siege of Apollonia. Lævinus easily took Oricum, and, while he was there, deputies came to him from the people of Apollonia, begging assistance against the Macedonians. He sent thither 2000 foot, under the command of Q. Nævius Crista, who got into the town without being perceived by the enemy. Nævius soon after understanding that the Macedonian camp was very negligently guarded, broke into it in the night, and, if his soldiers had abstained from slaughter, might have taken Philip prisoner; but the groans of the dying waked others, who carried off the king half naked to his ships. He returned into Macedon, and the Roman fleet wintered at Oricum.

CHAP. XXV.

Transactions in Sicily.—The Carthaginian interest prevails in Syracuse. Marcellus besieges it, but soon turns the siege into a blockade.

HANNIBAL made himself some amends for his disappointment on the side of Macedon, by the troubles he found means to raise in Sicily.—Hippocrates and Epicydes, two brothers of Syracusian extraction, whom he had sent to conclude the treaty with Hieronymus, had worked themselves into that prince's favour, and, at the time of his death, commanded a body of 2000 Syracusians. Upon the news of the king's as-

Livy, B. 24. c. 23. et seq.

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sassination, these generals, being abandoned by their soldiers, repaired to Syracuse, as thinking this the safest place for them in the present conjuncture. At their arrival they found that the heads of the conspiracy, who were favoured by the people, had come to an accommodation with Andranodorus, the late king's uncle-in-law, and chief of the royalist party, and that he, Themistus, and those leaders, had been chosen prætors to govern the state with the assistance of a senate. The two Hannibalists, doubtless believing that this change of government had changed the dispositions of the Syracusians with respect to Hannibal, to prevent all suspicion of their designing to raise disturbances, applied themselves to the prætors, and by their means obtained an audience of the senate. They spoke to this effect: "We came hither on the part of Hannibal to treat with his friend Hieronymus. We have only obeyed the commands of our general, and desire now to return to him; but as our journey is not like to be with safety to our persons, the Roman forces so much infesting Sicily, we request that we may have a convoy as far as Locri in Italy." Their suit was easily obtained; for the assembly had no unwillingness to be rid of these generals of the late king, men extremely bold and enterprising, of great ability in war, and of narrow fortunes. The senate, however, were too dilatory in executing their own desires; and the brothers took advantage of the delay. Sometimes to the soldiers, with whom they were very intimate and familiar, sometimes to

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the deserters from the Roman fleet, and occasionally to the meanest of the populace, they whispered calumnies against the senators and other principal men of the city, accusing them, that under colour of renewing the league with Rome, they designed to betray Syracuse to her, in the view, that their own faction, having the sole merit of the pretended new alliance, might lord it over the rest.

These rumours being spread and believed, and drawing every day crowds of people to Syracuse, gave not only Hippocrates and Epicydes, but also Andranodorus, who at the pressing instances of his ambitious wife, Demarata, the daughter of Hiero, aimed at the royalty, good hopes of changing the government, and effecting their several designs. Andranodorus having concerted his scheme with Themistus, the husband of Harmonia, Hieronymus's sister, unadvisedly imparted the secret to Aristo, a tragedian, who discovered it to the prætors. Aristo's profession was not dishonourable among the Greeks: he was a man well descended, and of a good estate, and the prætors therefore had no reason to reject his testimony, and it being confirmed by several corroborating circumstances, they, in concert with some of the oldest senators, placed guards at the door of the senate-house, who slew Andranodorus and Themistus as soon as they entered. This extraordinary action, most of the senators being ignorant of the cause of it, raised a great commotion and terror in the assembly. Aristo put an end to their fears. Being introduced

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by the prætors, he informed the senate, "That a plot had been laid to cut off all the chiefs of the republic, and to seize Ortygia[1] in the name of Andranodorus, and that this was to have been executed by the help of the Spanish and African mercenaries, who had served under Hieronymus." He then entered into the particulars of the conspiracy, declaring the names of all the conspirators, and the several parts they were to have acted. His evidence obtained full belief, and the assembly passed a decree, pronouncing the death of Andranodorus and Themistus no less just than that of Hieronymus. In the meantime the people without doors had taken the alarm at this proceeding; and it was necessary to quiet them. The senate therefore deputed Sopater, one of the prætors, to harangue the multitude.

This orator began with invectives against Andranodorus and Themistus, as if he had been accusing them at the bar, charging them, as the tutors and counsellors of Hieronymus, with all the injustices, oppressions, and cruelties, committed by the order or authority of that king, and with many other atrocious crimes perpetrated since his death. In the conclusion of his speech, he intimated that they had been spirited up by their wives, the ambitious daughter and grand-daughter of Hiero, to aspire to royalty by the destruction of the people's liberty. At this the whole multitude cried out,

[1] A well-fortified island to the south of Syracuse, and joined to the town by a bridge.

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that neither of those women ought to live, nor any one of the royal race be suffered to remain on the earth. The prætors, taking advantage of the people's present fury, immediately put it to the vote, and it was no sooner proposed than carried, that all who were of the royal family should be destroyed. In pursuance of this decree, certain officers, commissioned by the prætors, quickly despatched Demarata and Harmonia. There was another daughter of Hiero, named Heraclea, the wife of Zoippus, who had been sent ambassador by Hieronymus to king Ptolemy, and had chosen to continue at the Egyptian court in a voluntary exile from his country, rather than be a spectator of its miseries. This lady, with her two daughters, the same executioners inhumanly murdered, and with so much expedition, that an express from the magistrates (who on second thoughts relented) came too late to save them. But now the people also began to repent of their own precipitation, and to pity the fate of the dead. Their pity soon turned into rage against the first authors of the cruelty. They furiously called out for an election of prætors in the room of Andranodorus and Themistus; an election that was not like to be to the satisfaction of those already in power.

Livy, B. 24. c. 27. et seq.

When, on the day appointed, the assembly was formed, it happened beyond all expectation that somebody from the further end of the crowd, named Epicydes, and another a little after, named Hippocrates, and straight almost the whole multitude, joined their suffrages for

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these two agents of Hannibal. The republic being very young, no method was yet settled for voting, all were indifferently admitted into the voting place, citizens, strangers, and Roman deserters. The magistrates in vain opposed the people's choice. Fearing a sedition, they gave way to numbers, and Hippocrates and Epicydes were declared prætors.

The two Hannibalists did not immediately discover their intentions. They were much dissatisfied, that deputies had been sent to Appius Claudius to renew the ancient alliance between Rome and Syracuse, yet they thought it best to conceal their dissatisfaction till a more favourable opportunity should present to embroil affairs. Appius was then at Murgantia, with a fleet of 100 ships, waiting to see what the revolutions among the Syracusians would produce.

At Rome it had been resolved, from the apprehension that a dangerous war might arise in Sicily, to send the consul Marcellus to take upon him the direction of affairs in that island. He was just arrived in his province; and Appius referred the Syracusian deputies to him for a final answer. The consul approving the conditions, despatched ambassadors to conclude the treaty with the prætors at Syracuse. But those ambassadors found the state of things there very different from what they had expected. A Carthaginian fleet had appeared off Cape Pachynum, and Hippocrates and Epicydes had laid hold of this advantage to attempt something in favour of Carthage, by infusing

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anew into the minds of the people, a jealousy of the partizans of Rome, a suspicion of their intending to betray Syracuse to the Romans. This jealousy was the more readily entertained, as Appius, to encourage the Roman party in the town, was come with his fleet to the mouth of the port. The populace ran tumultuously to hinder the Romans from landing, in case they should attempt it.

In the perplexity occasioned by these commotions, the magistrates thought it proper to call an assembly of the people. The multitude were for some time divided in opinion. At length Apollonides, one of the chief citizens, with great calmness, and as a man unbiassed by any private or party views, represented to them "the necessity of unanimously adhering to the one or the other of the rival republics. The choice," he said, "was of much less importance than unanimity in choosing: yet, in his opinion, they had more encouragement to follow the example of Hiero than of Hieronymus, and to prefer a treaty with Rome, whose friendship they had happily experienced for 50 years, to the uncertain advantages of an alliance with Carthage, who, in times past, had not proved very faithful to her engagements. Nor was it a consideration of small moment, that they must have immediate peace with the Romans, or immediate war with them; whereas should they reject the friendship of the Carthaginians, a war with them might yet be at a great distance." The more dispassionate Apollonides appeared, the greater weight his advice

had with the people; and as they were in no condition to support a war with Rome, it was in conclusion agreed that the treaty with that republic should be renewed, and a deputation sent to Marcellus for that purpose.

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A few days after, the Leontines having demanded of the Syracusians a body of troops to defend their frontiers, the government thought this a favourable opportunity to get rid of a multitude of soldiers and officers, who were very turbulent in the city; and it was determined that Hippocrates should march to the assistance of the Leontines at the head of 4000 men, most of them deserters or mercenaries. This prætor, glad of an opportunity to create disturbances, readily accepted the commission, and, soon after his arrival among the Leontines, began to make stolen incursions into the Roman province, laying waste the country. Appius, informed of these hostilities, sent a body of soldiers to protect his allies. Those troops Hippocrates openly attacked, and put most of them to the sword. Hereupon Marcellus ordered deputies to Syracuse to complain of the infraction of the treaty, and to remonstrate, that a firm and lasting peace between Rome and Syracuse was not to be hoped for so long as Hippocrates and Epicydes continued in Sicily. The latter, fearing to be accused in the absence of his brother, and desirous of having some share in exciting a war, repaired in all haste to Leontini. There, in conjunction with Hippocrates, he represented to the inhabitants, "That Syracuse, while she provided for her

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own liberty, had expressly covenanted with the Romans, that she should have dominion over all the cities formerly subject to Hieronymus: but that the Leontines had as good a right to liberty as Syracuse, and that they ought therefore to refuse acceding to her treaty with Rome, unless that covenant were taken out of it."—The multitude was easily persuaded; so that when deputies from Syracuse complained of the slaughter made of the Roman troops, and desired the Leontines would concur with the Syracusians to banish Hippocrates and Epicydes out of the island, the citizens haughtily answered, "That they had given no commission to the Syracusians to make a peace for them with Rome, nor were they bound by a treaty concluded without their participation." The Syracusians acquainted Marcellus with this answer, and at the same time declared, that they would not only adhere steadily to their engagements with the Romans, but would join with them in besieging Leontini, on condition that this city, after its reduction, were restored to the dominion of Syracuse. Marcellus agreed to the proposal, assembled all his forces, sent for the prætor Appius to come to his assistance, and prepared to attack Leontini.

Plut Life of Marcellus. Livy, B. 25. c. 5, 6, 7.

About this time, a great company of those Roman soldiers who had fled from the battle of Cannæ, and who had been condemned, by a decree of the senate, to serve in a separate corps in Sicily as long as the war should last in Italy, came, with the permission of their commander Lentulus, and earnestly begged of

the consul to be incorporated in his legions. Marcellus wrote to Rome in their favour: the conscript fathers returned answer, that it was their opinion the republic ought not to put any confidence in the courage of soldiers who had deserted their companions at the battle of Cannæ; yet if Marcellus thought otherwise, he might act in this matter as he pleased, provided none of them ever received any military rewards, or were suffered to return to Italy before the end of the war.

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Leontini was taken upon the first assault; but Hippocrates and Epicydes made their escape to Erbessus. A body of 8000 men from Syracuse, under the command of Sosis and Dinomenes, two of the prætors, marching to join Marcellus, were met at the river Mylas by a man, who told them that Leontini had been sacked, and all, without distinction, able to bear arms, put to the sword. This false story (occasioned by the execution of 2000 deserters, whom Marcellus had taken in the place) made such an impression on the soldiers, that their officers could not prevail with them to proceed to Leontini, but were forced to turn aside and lead them to Megara. From this place the prætors marched them soon after towards Erbessus, believing that the seditious spirit among them would be easily quelled, if Hippocrates and Epicydes, the true authors of all the late disturbances, were destroyed, or driven out of the country.

Livy, B. 24. c. 30. et seq. Plut. Life of Marcellus.

The brothers found themselves now reduced to extremities; yet having some hope in the

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good-will of the soldiers, with whom they were well acquainted, and this hope being favoured by the recent report of the massacre at Leontini, they left Erbessus, in the resolution to yield themselves up to the soldiers at discretion. It happened, luckily for them, that a body of Cretans, which had formerly served the Romans as auxiliaries, and, being taken prisoners at the battle of Thrasymen, had been set at liberty by Hannibal, and had since served under Hippocrates and Epicydes in the reign of Hieronymus, was marching in the van of the army. To these they addressed themselves in a suppliant manner, presenting them olive branches, and imploring their protection, "That they might not be left at the mercy of the Syracusians, who would quickly deliver them up to be slain by the Romans." The Cretans immediately cried out to them, to take courage, and promised to defend them: so that when Sosis and Dinomenes, informed of what passed, came in haste and ordered the Hannibalists to be seized, they found no obedience from their troops, but rather a disposition to revolt. In this perplexity they gave orders for returning to Megara, and sent an account to Syracuse of what had happened. During the march of the army, a letter, forged by Hippocrates, but pretended to be written by the prætors at Syracuse to Marcellus, and intercepted, was produced and read to the soldiers by the contriver of it. It was to this effect: "The prætors of Syracuse to the consul Marcellus, health.—You have done justly and prudently in sparing

none at Leontini. All the mercenaries deserve the same fate. Nor will Syracuse ever be in peace while any foreign soldiers remain either in the city or the army. Turn then your arms against those who are with our prætors at Megara, and by their destruction restore us to perfect liberty." This letter kindled such a flame among the soldiers, and their sudden loud clamours so terrified Sosis and Dinomenes, that they galloped away in all haste to Syracuse. Their flight did not quiet the commotion: the mercenaries fell upon the Syracusian soldiers that were in the army, and would have put them all to the sword, if the Hannibalists had not interposed in their defence, desiring to make use of them as hostages, and also hoping by their means to gain friends in Syracuse. Thither they instantly sent a soldier, who had been in Leontini when it was taken, to spread the false story of the massacre of its inhabitants. The artifice had the desired effect, even upon the senate and the chief men in the republic. They thought it necessary to shut the gates and guard the city against the Romans, as against an enemy whose avarice and cruelty would spare nothing. Scarce was this done, when Hippocrates and Epicydes appeared before the walls at the head of the mercenaries, and by the assistance of the multitude within (who would not be restrained by their magistrates) broke open one of the gates and entered the city. The prætors retired with the Syracusian soldiery into that quarter of the town which was called Achradina, hoping to

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defend themselves there; but the Hannibalists being joined by the mercenaries, the deserters, and all the soldiers of the late king, took it at the first assault. Those of the prætors who could not escape in the first confusion of the conflict, were massacred, together with many of the citizens; and the next day, liberty being granted to all, slaves and prisoners, the mixed multitude declared Hippocrates and Epicydes their prætors.

Marcellus, upon the news of this revolution, advanced with his army to Syracuse. Before he began hostilities, he sent deputies to the Syracusians, to assure them he did not come to make war upon them, but assist those of their fellow citizens who, having escaped the slaughter in Achradina, had taken refuge in his camp, and those who suffered yet greater wrongs in the city, from tyranny and oppression: that what he therefore insisted upon was, that the refugees under his protection should be restored to their possessions and privileges, the authors of the disturbances given up, and Syracuse put in a condition to enjoy peaceably her laws and liberty; and he threatened war against whoever should oppose these demands. The brothers, not thinking it safe to let the deputies enter the town, gave them audience without the walls; and when the latter had made their demands, Epicydes spoke to this effect: "If you had brought any message to us, we would have returned an answer. You may now go back; and when the government of Syracuse is in the hands of those to whom

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you have orders to address yourselves, you may come again. If Marcellus is for war, he will find the siege of Syracuse an enterprise somewhat different from the siege of Leontini."—The consul, upon the return of his deputies, invested the place by sea and land.

Syracuse stood on the south-east side of Sicily, and was properly five cities in one, Ortygia, Achradina, Tyche, Neapolis, and Epipolæ. Ortygia was a small island, very near the continent, and might be called the citadel of Syracuse; it was joined to Achradina by a bridge. All the attempts of Marcellus to carry the town by assault were frustrated by the surprising inventions of Archimedes. This great man is said to have once told king Hiero, that he could move the globe of the earth, provided he had another earth to stand upon. And he now contrived machines which cast stones of so prodigious a weight, as to break in pieces all the battering engines of the Romans. Nay, he invented a sort of iron crows fastened to chains, which being let fall upon the Roman galleys (that were brought close to the wall of the town) stuck fast in the prows of them, drew them up, by means of a counterpoise on that part of the machine which was within the rampart, and set them on one end, or overturned them: insomuch that the Romans were utterly discouraged, and Marcellus obliged to remove to a further distance. It was resolved, in a council of war, to attack the place no more, but shut up all the avenues of it, in order to reduce it by famine.

CHAP. XXVI.

SIXTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

The Roman arms prosper in Italy. Syphax, a Numidian king, is gained by the Scipios to make war upon the Carthaginians in Africa. The blockade of Syracuse is continued, while Marcellus reduces some other towns in Sicily.

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AT Rome, Q. Fabius Maximus, the son of Fabius Cunctator, and T. Sempronius Gracchus, were chosen consuls for the new year, and appointed, in concert with the prætorian armies in Italy, to conduct the war against Hannibal. Marcellus continued in Sicily, and had the government of the country formerly subject to Hiero. Lentulus, with the title of pro-prætor, commanded the Roman province in that island, and T. Otacilius Crassus guarded the coast with his fleet. The two Scipios, Lævinus, and Scævola, managed the affairs of Rome in the respective countries of Spain, Greece, and Sardinia. And the republic employed this year, in her several armies, 21 Roman legions, besides the troops of her allies.

All the regulations necessary for beginning the campaign being despatched, young Fabius set out from Rome, and took upon him the command of the army at Suessula. His father served under him.

Livy, B. 24. c. 45.

While the Fabii continued here, Dasius Altinius, one of the chief men of Arpi, who had engaged that city to revolt to Hannibal, came

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and offered, for a reward, to restore it into the hands of its former masters. The affair being brought before a council, some were for treating the villain as Camillus had treated the schoolmaster of Falerii; but old Fabius represented to them, that though such traitors ought never to be trusted as friends, yet in the present circumstances of the republic, no discouragement should be given to those of the rebels who were disposed to return to their former obedience; and he advised, that Altinius should only be kept in an easy confinement till the end of the war, when it would be time enough to judge whether he had made sufficient amends for his revolt. This advice was followed, and the traitor sent to Cales, where in the day-time he was suffered to walk abroad with a guard, but confined close prisoner at night. As soon as he was missed at Arpi, the inhabitants sent notice of it to Hannibal. The Carthaginian was in no manner of pain at the news; he had long considered Altinius as a man in whom he could place no confidence, and was glad of this pretext to seize his riches, which were very great. But that he might appear to act rather from the motive of revenge than avarice, he sent for the wife and children of Altinius, and having put them to the torture, partly to discover the traitor's designs, but chiefly to learn what money he had left behind him, he ordered them to be burnt alive.

The Fabii opened the campaign with an assault upon Arpi, in which was a garrison of 5000 men. The Romans in a dark rainy night

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surprised and entered the place on the strongest side, where it was least guarded. Nevertheless the garrison, assisted by 3000 of the townsmen, whom, through suspicion of them, they placed in the front, made a stout defence. At length the citizens, and after their example, 1000 Spaniards, went over to the Romans. The Spaniards, according to Livy, bargained that the rest of the garrison should have leave to depart in safety, which they accordingly did, and joined Hannibal in Salapia.

In the meantime 112 of the chief men of Capua, having, under the pretext of pillaging the enemy's lands, got permission to leave the town, went to the Roman camp above Suessula, and yielded themselves to the prætor Fulvius, upon a promise of being restored to their estates, when Capua should be reduced to the obedience of the republic.

Livy, B. 24. c. 47. B. 25. c. 1.

Nothing further of great moment happened in Italy this campaign. The prætor Sempronius Tuditanus took Aternum by assault, and in it 7000 prisoners, and a good deal of money. Sempronius, the consul, had several light skirmishes with the enemy in Lucania, and reduced a few towns, but none of any note. Two petty nations of Bruttium returned to their former obedience. Hanno, the Carthaginian, defeated a præfect of the Roman allies in that country, and cut off almost all his army, which consisted of raw undisciplined men. Hannibal marched from Salapia to Tarentum, in hopes of having that city betrayed to him. He spent the summer near it to very little purpose, only some

inconsiderable towns of the Salentini revolted to him.

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In Spain, the two Scipios not only made considerable progress there, but extended their views even to Africa. They engaged Syphax, king of Masæsylia, (the western part of Numidia) to take arms against Carthage: and Statorius, one of the three officers whom the Scipios had sent upon the negotiation, continued with the Numidian king, at his request, to discipline his troops. On the other hand, the Carthaginians, alarmed at the motions of the Masæsylian, prevailed with Gala, king of Masylia (the eastern part of Numidia, and the nearest to their territory), to join with them, to divert the threatened storm. Gala gave the command of his forces to his son Masinissa, a youth of about 17 years of age, who, in conjunction with the Carthaginian army, defeated Syphax in a great battle, and slew 30,000 of his men. The vanquished king retired into Mauritania, and made new levies there, intending to pass the Straits, and join the Scipios in Spain: but Masinissa following him close, kept him so employed in Africa, that he had no leisure to cross the seas.

239th Consulship. Livy, B. 24. c. 48.

In the meanwhile the blockade of Syracuse continued. Marcellus, not thinking all his forces necessary for that purpose, left two-thirds of the army before the place under the command of Appius Claudius, and marched with the remainder to reduce some towns of Sicily, which had gone over to the Carthaginians.— Pelorus and Erbessus surrendered to him, and

c. 35.

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Megara he took by force and plundered. About this time, Himilco arrived from Africa, with an army of 25,000 foot, 3000 horse, and 12 elephants, and soon made himself master of Heraclea and Agrigentum. Upon this news, Hippocrates left his brother Epicydes to command in Syracuse, and sallying out of the town with 10,000 foot and 500 horse, broke through the Roman lines in the night, and marched to join Himilco. This detachment Marcellus surprised, as they were pitching their camp near Acrillæ, and he cut in pieces the infantry: but Hippocrates escaped with the cavalry, and, joining Himilco, turned against the pro-consul, in hopes of overtaking him before he could reach his camp at Syracuse. Disappointed in this expectation, and not daring to attack Marcellus in his entrenchments, the Carthaginian generals employed their forces to reduce the Sicilian cities that were in the interest of Rome. Murgantia opened her gates to them, and betrayed the Roman garrison into their hands. L. Pinarius, the governor of Enna, dreading the like fate, massacred all the inhabitants of that town, and pillaged it. Marcellus approved the fact, and granted the plunder of Enna to the soldiers of the garrison. The news of this barbarity, committed in a city held in great veneration all over the island, and sacred to Proserpine, (whom Pluto was said to have carried off from that neighbourhood) alienated the minds of the Sicilians from Rome; and many of their towns embraced the party of the Carthaginians. Winter approaching, Marcel-

lus, having dismissed Appius Claudius, who had a mind to stand for the consulship, gave the command both of the fleet and the army before Syracuse to Quinctius Crispinus, and took up his own quarters about five miles from the town.

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Livy, B. 25. c. 1.

During these transactions in Sicily, all was peaceable at Rome; only religion suffered by the introduction of foreign gods and foreign rites, which the superstition of a multitude of people from the country, driven by poverty and fear to shelter themselves in Rome, had, in this uncertain state of things, made them prone to receive. Foreign priests and diviners had dispersed among them books, containing prophecies, forms of prayer, and particular methods of sacrificing. The ancient worship was almost forgot. It seemed, says Livy, as if a new set of gods were, on a sudden, come into being; or that a new species of men was risen. The evil became at length so general, that the conscript fathers were forced to interpose. The prætor having assembled the people, read to them a decree of the senate, and, in conformity thereto, his own edict; which commanded all persons who had books of divination or prayers, or containing instructions about the rites of sacrifices, to bring them to him before the first of April; and forbade all persons to offer sacrifice in public, or in any sacred place whatsoever, according to any new or foreign ceremonies. Thus were the innovations suppressed, and religion settled again upon the ancient footing.

CHAP. XXVII.

SEVENTH AND EIGHTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

The city of Tarentum betrayed to Hannibal. He besieges the citadel. Capua besieged by the Romans. Syracuse taken by Marcellus. Hannibal marches into the neighbourhood of Rome; retires thence; defeats a Roman army; and marches to Rhegium. Capua surrenders to the Romans. They gain some advantages over king Philip in Greece.

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240th Consulship.

THE time for the elections drawing on, and the present consuls being both engaged abroad in the war, one of them nominated C. Claudius Centho dictator, to hold the *comitia*. And there Q. Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius Pulcher were chosen consuls for the new year. It was thought fit to add two legions to the 21 already on foot; a surprising multitude of soldiers, to be all raised out of the citizens of Rome, and exclusive of the troops of the allies, which were at least as numerous as the Roman legionaries! But the making these new levies was interrupted, and the departure of the consuls delayed for some time, by an incident, which revived the hatred of the people to the publicans.

Livy, B. 25. c. 3.

It has been observed before, that the publicans undertook to supply the Roman armies in Spain with provisions; and the senate had agreed to indemnify them, in case of losses at sea. Posthumius, an avaricious wretch, took advantage of this condition to practise rogue-

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240th Consulship.

ries, and impose upon the public. He placed to their account many shipwrecks which had never happened; he also put small quantities of goods, of little value, on board old shattered vessels; which after he had brought off the seamen in boats ready for that purpose, he sunk; and then pretended the cargoes had been extremely rich. By this means he made his losses run very high, and demanded great sums in consideration of them. But his knavery was at length discovered, and two tribunes of the people threatened to have him fined 200,000 asses of brass*: in order to which they cited him to appear and take his trial before the *comitia* by tribes. Hereupon the friends of the accused applied themselves to Servilius Casca, a relation of Posthumius, and one of the tribunes; but Casca not daring, through shame and fear of the people, to protest against the proceedings of his colleagues, the publicans, who were all interested in the affair, had recourse to violence, and insulted both the people and their magistrates. And they were just ready to come to blows, when the consul Fulvius said to the tribunes of the commons, "You see how little respect is shown to your persons. If you do not dissolve the assembly, the affair will end in sedition;" the tribunes followed his advice; and, being afterwards authorized by the senate, changed the nature of the process, and made the affair capital. Posthumius, and the other publicans who assisted him in the riot, were cited to appear as criminals before the *comitia* by centuries. Some were

* 645*l.* 16*s.* 8*d.* Arbuthnot.

Livy, B. 25. c. 3.

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dragged to prison, for want of the sureties required of them; others went into a voluntary banishment; Posthumius left his bail and fled; and Rome was delivered from a gang of bold and avaricious villains.

In the end of the winter Hannibal had surprised Tarentum. The inhabitants of this place had long been disaffected to the republic, and lately provoked by the cruel execution of some hostages they had sent to Rome, and who had attempted to make their escape. Thirteen of the principal citizens entered into a plot to deliver up the city to the Carthaginian. Nico and Philomenus were at the head of them. They made hunting their pretence for night-excursions. The game they brought home, and with which they furnished the table of Livius, the commander of the Roman garrison, pleased him so much, that without the least suspicion he allowed them the liberty of going out and coming in at pleasure. By this means the conspirators had frequent conferences with Hannibal, and having engaged him to promise, that when he should become master of Tarentum, the inhabitants should enjoy their laws, liberties, and estates, without infringement; that they should not be subject to pay any tribute, or to receive a Carthaginian garrison, without their own consent; and that the effects of the Romans only should be given up as free booty to his troops, they undertock to bring him into the town. Hannibal was at the distance of three days' march from Tarentum, and feigned himself sick in

Polyb. B. 8. c. 19. Livy, B. 25. c. 8.

his camp, that his long stay there might not occasion suspicion. At length Philomenus gave him notice, that a favourable opportunity offered to put their project in execution. The Carthaginian came away with a detachment of 10,000 men, and concealed himself in a valley fifteen miles from the city. Hither Philomenus brought him word, that the next night the Roman governor was to be at an entertainment, and would probably drink to excess; and that when he was fast asleep it would be the proper time for the attempt.

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All preparations being made by the conspirators, both within and without the city, Hannibal, conducted by Philomenus, approached the walls about midnight. The Carthaginian, then giving a part of his forces to the Tarentine, silently drew near with the rest to the gate Temenides, and gave the appointed signal to Nico, who at the head of his party in the town, without much noise, made himself master of the gate, slew the guard, and admitted the Carthaginians. The general, for the greater security in case of accidents, left 2000 horse without the gate, and advancing with the rest of his troops into the forum, took possession of it. In the meantime, Philomenus had marched with 1000 Africans to another gate, at which he used to be admitted when he returned from hunting. He was followed by two young men carrying a wild boar of an enormous size, and when the wicket was opened, and the centinel upon guard stood examining the beast, Philomenus ran him

Polyb. B. 8. c. 24.

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through with a hunting spear. Then 30 Carthaginians entered in an instant, broke down the gate, and let in their companions, who, as had been agreed upon, joined Hannibal in the forum. After this, the general seized the principal posts in the town, sent parties of men into the different quarters, and with each of them several of the conspirators. His view in this was, that the inhabitants might be distinguished and preserved, while all the Romans were put to the sword. To draw these out the more effectually, some men, prepared on purpose, sounded a charge in the theatre with Roman trumpets, and after the Roman manner. The slaughter continued all that night and part of the next day: but Livius with his domestics, in the beginning of the tumult, escaped in a bark to the citadel, which was strongly fortified, and where all that remained of the garrison took refuge.

In order to secure the Tarentines against all attacks from the Romans, Hannibal proposed to cast up a rampart over against the wall of the citadel, and as he knew the enemy would endeavour to hinder the work, he prepared to receive them. The rampart was no sooner begun, than the Romans made a vigorous sally. Hannibal defended himself but faintly till he observed that the greatest part of the garrison was got over their ditch: then falling furiously upon them, he drove them with such slaughter within their walls that they did not think proper to attack him a second time: and he had leisure to carry on

his works. Besides the rampart above mentioned, he ordered a ditch to be drawn, and another rampart to be raised upon the brink of it, and within that a wall, so that the inhabitants might, without the assistance of the Carthaginians, easily defend their town against all attempts from the citadel. Having left a part of his troops to finish and guard the works, in conjunction with the Tarentines, he encamped with the rest of his army on the banks of the Eurotas (otherwise called Galesus) five miles from the city. When the fortifications were completed, he returned and besieged the citadel in form; but the garrison having received a reinforcement from Metapontus, a Roman city on the gulf of Tarentum, sallied out, burned his machines in the night, and made him lay aside the thoughts of reducing the place by assault.

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However, it was necessary to secure the Tarentines a free passage to the sea, which was at present cut off by the citadel, that stood at the entrance of the port. No vessel could safely go out, or come in; and this made the Tarentines apprehend a scarcity of provisions. Hannibal, who was not to be discouraged by difficulties, formed a scheme (which the ancients have much admired) to remedy this evil. There were a good number of ships in the haven of Tarentum; and he caused them to be transported to the sea by land, on carriages made for that purpose. These vessels anchored before the mouth of the haven; so that the citadel, which before commanded the sea, could

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now receive no provisions that way; and the city was supplied. After this, Hannibal returned to his winter quarters, leaving the citadel blocked up by sea and land.

The consuls Fulvius and Appius, when their affairs at Rome were despatched, took the field, and marched with joint forces into Samnium. As the Capuans expected to be besieged by them, and began already to feel the miseries of famine (for the Roman armies had not permitted them to sow their lands) they sent a deputation to Hannibal, then near Tarentum, to beg he would order them a supply of corn from the towns in their neighbourhood, while the roads were yet open. The Carthaginian sent Hanno with an army from Bruttium to their relief. Hanno, having pitched his camp near Beneventum, gave notice to the Capuans, to send their waggons to fetch the corn, which he had collected for them in vast quantities. So indolent and lazy were these effeminate wretches, that they sent but four hundred carts, and a few mules. The Carthaginian could not forbear expressing his indignation at such intolerable negligence, and fixed a day when a greater number of carriages should come to remove the rest of the corn. In the meantime the consuls had notice of what was doing from the people of Beneventum; and Fulvius with his troops marched thither with all expedition. He entered the town in the night, and the next morning appeared by break of day before the enemy's camp while Hanno was absent foraging with a part of his army. Two

Livy, B. 25. c. 13.

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thousand Capuan carts were arrived there, and the carters and peasants mixing with the soldiers caused a good deal of disorder. Nevertheless, as the camp was situated upon an ascent, it was very difficult to take it by assault; the Roman soldiers signalized their bravery on this occasion beyond the expectation of their general, who was for quitting the enterprise, or at least suspending it, till his colleague should come to his assistance. One Vibius, who commanded a cohort of the Peligni, and, after his example, Pedanius, a centurion of the third Roman legion, threw each a standard over the enemy's rampart, to excite the soldiers to recover them. The stratagem succeeded, the Carthaginian entrenchments were forced, and the slaughter was great. As for Hanno, having lost his camp, he was forced to return to Bruttium with the remainder of his army; and the Capuans sent a new deputation to Hannibal, to press him to come to their assistance, being now more than ever apprehensive of a siege. The Carthaginian answered, that he would take care of Capua; and for the present sent them 2000 horse to defend their territory from the enemy's incursions. He had still hopes of reducing the citadel of Tarentum by famine; but a convoy of provisions having forced its way through the Tarentine galleys, entered the place, and disappointed his expectations. His design upon Thurium succeeded better. Hanno and Mago defeated the prætor Atinius, who sallied out of the place; after which the inhabitants opened their gates to the

Livy, B. 25. c. 14.

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conquerors. The Metapontines also, when left by the Roman garrison, which went to the relief of the citadel of Tarentum, submitted to the Carthaginians.

During these things, the consuls entered the territory of Capua with a design to besiege the city in form; and believing undoubtedly, that Hannibal would come to its relief, they ordered Sempronius Gracchus to leave Lucania, and draw near to Capua with his horse and light armed infantry, that they might be the better able to withstand the enemy's cavalry. Sempronius having left his legions under the command of Cn. Cornelius, his quæstor, was preparing for his march, when one Flavius, a Lucanian, and hitherto zealous in the Roman interest, changed his inclinations on a sudden, and in order to recommend himself to the Carthaginians, betrayed the pro-consul to them. He pretended to Sempronius, that the heads of the Carthaginian faction in Lucania were disposed to a reconciliation with the republic, and only desired a private conference with him. The Roman, not suspecting any deceit, suffered himself, attended only by his lictors and a troop of horse, to be led by the traitor into an ambush, where Mago with a body of Carthaginians surrounded them; and then Flavius went over to the enemy. The pro-consul, seeing himself betrayed, dismounted, and wrapping his left arm in his paludamentum, for want of a buckler, rushed sword in hand to the place where he saw Flavius, in hopes to kill the traitor before he fell himself; but he

Livy, B. 25. c. 16.

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perished in the attempt, though the Carthaginians endeavoured to take him alive. The body of this brave pro-consul was carried to Hannibal's camp, who erected a funeral pile for him, and did honour to his memory.

c. 18.

While the consuls were pillaging the country about Capua, Mago with his cavalry and some of the Capuans fell upon the Romans, of whom he slew 1500. Upon this news Hannibal advanced towards the city and offered battle to the enemy. Appius and Fulvius accepted the challenge, and the engagement was begun, to the disadvantage of the Romans, when Cn. Cornelius appeared with the volones which had been commanded by Sempronius. Each side apprehending that assistance was coming to the other, immediately sounded a retreat. The consuls, to draw Hannibal from Capua, decamped in the night, divided their armies, and marched the one into Lucania and the other towards Cumæ. The Carthaginian next day set out for Lucania in pursuit of Appius, who had taken that road, but the latter fetching a compass, returned by another way to the neighbourhood of Capua. There happened to be at this time in Lucania one M. Centenius Pænula, who, by the credit of the prætor Cornelius Scylla, and by promising great things, had obtained of the senate the command of a body of 8000 men, which he had increased to near double that number. Hannibal, missing the consul Appius, turned his arms against Centenius, entirely defeated him, and cut off almost all his whole army.

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The Carthaginian then marched into Apulia, and attacked the prætor Fulvius, who commanded 18,000 men in that country. The victory was complete, 16,000 of the Romans being slain, and their camp taken. And to add to the misfortunes of the present campaign, the volones disbanded themselves. Notwithstanding these discouragements the consuls were busy at Casilinum, preparing all things necessary for the siege of Capua. They sent for the prætor Claudius Nero, with the forces he commanded at Suessula; and the three generals with their united armies besieged Capua in form.

Livy, B. 25. c. 23. et seq.

During this siege, Marcellus made himself master of Syracuse. He took the opportunity of a festival, when the soldiers and citizens had drunk plentifully, to make a detachment scale the walls of Tyche, in that part of it which was nearest to Epipolæ, and which was ill guarded[1]. He presently after possessed himself of Epipolæ; whereupon the inhabitants of Neapolis, as well as Tyche, sent deputies to him and submitted. Marcellus granted life and liberty to all of free condition, but gave up those quarters of the city to be plundered.

Notwithstanding this, there was a great deal yet to do. Achradina and Ortygia, which were strongly fortified, still held out; Hippocrates and Himilco arrived with their troops to

[1] Though this account be taken from Livy, yet he afterwards tells us, in two or three places, that Sosis, a brazier, let Marcellus into Syracuse by night. Liv. B. 26. c. 21, 30 and 31.

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the relief of the besieged; and the Romans were forced to exert all their bravery and skill to maintain the advantages they had gained.

But now a plague made terrible havoc in both armies. At the first breaking out of the pestilence, the Sicilians, who served under Hippocrates and Himilco, disbanded themselves, and returned to their respective homes; but all the Carthaginian soldiers perished, together with those two generals. The Romans suffered less by the infection, because, having been a long time before Syracuse, they were seasoned to the air and water of the country.

About this time Bomilcar arrived on the coast of Sicily from Carthage with a fleet of 130 galleys and 700 ships of burden, but was long hindered by contrary winds from doubling the cape of Pachynum. Epicydes, fearing the Carthaginian might sail back to Africa, left the command of Achradina to the generals of the mercenaries, and went to Bomilcar, in order to persuade him to fight the Roman fleet. The admiral would not engage, but sailed away to Tarentum with all his galleys, ordering his ships of burden to return to Africa. Epicydes, thus frustrated of his hopes, and knowing himself unable to defend a city already half taken, retired to Agrigentum; whereupon the Syracusians massacred the commanders appointed by him, chose new prætors to govern in the town, and sent deputies to Marcellus to treat of peace. In the meantime the deserters, fearing to be given up to the vengeance of the Romans, persuaded the mercenaries that they

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also would have the same fate. Instantly the soldiers ran to arms, put to death the new prætors, together with many of the Syracusians, and plundered part of the city. After this slaughter, they chose six generals, three to command in Achradina, and three in Ortygia. Upon the return of the deputies from Marcellus, the mercenaries, finding that their case was different from that of the deserters, and that there was no design against their lives, became perfectly satisfied, and the negotiation went on. During the course of the treaty, Marcellus found means to corrupt Mericus, a Spaniard, one of the six generals chosen by the soldiers, and engaged him to admit the Romans into that part of the city where he commanded. Mericus, the better to accomplish this design, feigned an extraordinary zeal for the preservation of the place; pretended not to like that deputies should have leave to go out and in at pleasure; and proposed, that for the greater security of the town, each general should have a distinct quarter assigned him, and be responsible for any neglect of duty in it. The motion was agreed to, and, upon the division, that district of Ortygia, which extended from the fountain of Arethusa to the mouth of the great port, fell to his care. Marcellus, informed of what was done, took his measures accordingly; he sent a body of troops to that side where Mericus commanded, and the Spaniard admitted them at the gate of Arethusa. At the same time the pro-consul ordered a false attack to be made on Achradina, which drawing al-

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most all the soldiers of the garrison thither, Ortygia was in a manner left defenceless. Foreseeing this, he had detached another party of soldiers to take advantage of it. These entered Ortygia almost without fighting; upon which the deserters made their escape, the Romans giving them way; and the Syracusians in Achradina, thus delivered from the fear of the deserters, immediately opened their gates to Marcellus, who thereby became master of the whole city.

And now the conqueror, who is said to have wept, during the siege, with compassion for the inhabitants, gave up both Ortygia and Achradina to be plundered by his army, after he had secured the late king's treasures for the use of his republic, and the statues, paintings, and principal ornaments of Syracuse, to illustrate his triumph. The soldiers had orders to spare the lives of the citizens; but they were cruel in their avarice, slew many of them, and, among the rest, the incomparable Archimedes. He was very intent on a demonstration in geometry, and calmly drawing his lines, when a soldier entered the room and clapped a sword to his throat. "Hold!" (said Archimedes) "one moment, and my demonstration will be finished." But the soldier, equally regardless of his prayer and his demonstration, killed him instantly. There are different accounts of the manner of his death; but all agree, that Marcellus regretted it extremely, and showed singular favour to his relations for his sake.

Plut. Life of Marcellus.

The consular year being ready to expire

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the senate ordered, that one of the consuls should come from Capua to hold the *comitia* for the great elections. App. Claudius repaired to Rome, and presided in the assembly, which transferred the fasces to P. Sulpicius Galba, and Cn. Fulvius Centumalus. Apulia was to be their province; while the late consuls were in quality of pro-consuls to continue the siege of Capua. But as these proposed to reduce the place rather by famine than force, they turned the siege into a blockade.

Livy, B. 26. c. 2.

At Rome, Cn. Fulvius, the late prætor, was called to account for the defeat he had suffered in Apulia. One of the tribunes of the people cited him to appear before the *comitia*, purposing only to get him fined for his cowardice and ill conduct. When the witnesses came to be examined, the charge appeared so heavy, that all the people cried out, the process ought to be made capital; and a day was appointed for the trial. Fulvius sent to his brother the pro-consul before Capua, urging him to come to Rome and employ all his credit to avert the impending storm. The pro-consul would willingly have complied; but the conscript fathers thinking it a case wherein the public interest was greatly concerned, absolutely refused him leave to come: so that the accused, having no hopes, went into exile without waiting for his sentence; and the *comitia*, after his departure, condemned him to banishment.

c. 4.

In the meantime the Capuans, greatly distressed for want of provisions, sent a messenger to acquaint Hannibal with their present si-

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tuation. A Numidian horseman had the address to pass undiscovered through the Romans in the night, and carried the message to the Carthaginian general. Upon this advice, leaving the greatest part of his baggage behind him, he marched away with all expedition, arrived before Capua, and pitched his camp near the Roman entrenchments. At first he endeavoured by skirmishes to provoke the enemy to a battle, but this not succeeding, he almost besieged them in their camp, frequently assaulting it with bodies of infantry, which relieved one another, while some troops of horse covered them, and threw darts upon the enemy. All his attempts to draw the Romans to a battle, or to break into the town, proved ineffectual: nor was it possible for him to stay long in the neighbourhood of Capua for want of forage; because the enemy, foreseeing his coming, had ruined the country all around. Add to this, that there being several armies in the field against him, he feared lest they should join and attack him, or cut off his provisions, and so reduce him to extremities. Convinced that it was impracticable to raise the siege by force, he formed a design much extolled by the ancient writers. He resolved to leave his camp silently, march with all expedition, and appear before the walls of Rome. By this means, he hoped the affright of the citizens might produce some accident in his favour, perhaps might give him an opportunity of surprising the town: if that should not happen, the pro-consuls, he thought, would either quit

Polyb. l. 9. c. 3. et seq.

Livy, B. 26. c. 7. et seq.

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the blockade of Capua, or at least divide their army, and send a part of it to the defence of the capital. In this last case he did not doubt but he should have an easy victory, both over those that staid before Capua, and those that marched away. Before he put this scheme in execution, he took care to acquaint the besieged with his intention, lest upon his departure they should in despair surrender the town. Every thing being ready for his expedition, he set out in the night, and to deceive the enemy, left fires burning in his camp. Having marched through Samnium, he crossed the Anio, and pitched his camp within five miles of Rome, designing to attack the city next day, if practicable. The Romans, terrified at his approach, for he had never been so near their walls before, at first imagined he had made his way thither by the slaughter of their army at Capua. Their fears, however, did not lessen their resolution; and it happened luckily for them that the consuls had already raised one legion, which was to rendezvous at Rome that very day, and had also called together the citizens in order to select from amongst them another legion: by which means there was very seasonably a great concourse of men in the town. Sulpicius and Fulvius, the consuls, marched out with an army, and encamped before the walls. Hannibal seeing the Romans prepared to make a stout defence, lost all hopes of being able to take the town[a], and therefore fell to

[a] Livy says, that when Hannibal was before the walls of Rome, the ground on which his camp stood was sold at the

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pillaging the country. The consuls boldly advanced, and encamped within ten furlongs of him. The Carthaginian, to secure his booty and execute the remaining part of his scheme, decamped in the night, and passed the Anio at a ford, the bridges being all broken down. In his passage he was attacked by the Romans, and though the Numidians, and the rest of his cavalry, covered his retreat, so that he suffered no great loss, yet the enemy regained a part of the spoil, and took about three hundred prisoners. Sulpicius and Fulvius, thinking that Hannibal fled before them, followed him, but kept to the hills, for fear of a surprise. He, on the other hand, marched at first in great haste, to intercept any forces that, on occasion of his march to Rome, might have been sent from Capua, or in their absence to attack the Roman entrenchments before that city. Finding that none of the besiegers had stirred, he turned against the consuls that were pursuing him, fell upon their camp in the night, and took it with great slaughter. Next morning he saw those that had escaped posted upon a hill, which was very difficult of access; and he would not lose time in attacking them, having formed a project of greater moment. Despairing to raise the siege of Capua, he hoped to surprise Rhegium. And though it was situated

full price; which so provoked the Carthaginian that he put up to sale the bankers shops that were round the Roman forum. The account which the Latin historian gives of this expedition differs in many particulars from that of Polybius, which is followed in the text.

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in the remotest corner of Italy, he marched with such rapidity through Apulia, Lucania, and Bruttium, and appeared so unexpectedly before the place, that he took prisoners many of the inhabitants who were walking securely without the walls; and was very near getting possession of the town.

Hannibal's departure left Capua without hope of relief. The pro-consuls signified to the inhabitants, that they would spare the lives of all those of them who would repair to the Roman camp; but not one Capuan accepted the offer. The commanders of the Carthaginian garrison wrote letters to Hannibal full of reproaches, and pressing him not to abandon them to the cruelty of the Romans. These letters were committed to the care of some Numidians, who pretended to desert, and then sought an opportunity to escape to Rhegium. One of them being followed to the Roman camp by his mistress, to whom he had disclosed the secret, she betrayed it; and above seventy of the Numidians were seized, whipped, had their hands cut off, and were driven back to Capua.

Livy, B. 26. c. 12.

The sight of these maimed wretches threw the city into the utmost consternation. The people forced the chief of the senators, who had for some time withdrawn themselves from public affairs, to assemble with the rest in the senate-house; where the greatest part were for sending a deputation to the pro-consuls to capitulate: but Vibius Virius, one of the authors of the revolt, opposed this motion, and made a speech, the whole strain of which was

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rage and despair. Having represented the implacable hatred of the Romans to Capua, and exposed the folly of hoping for any favour from them, he thus concluded: "Death is our only refuge. I have prepared an entertainment at my house. When we have finished our repast, a cup shall go round, that will end our days and our misfortunes together. Let all those who are weary of life, or despise it, or despair of preserving it, follow me. Funeral piles are already prepared to burn our bodies. A glorious death will gain us esteem from our enemies; and the perfidious Hannibal will lament the loss of allies, who did not deserve to be thus deserted and betrayed." Twenty-seven of the assembly followed Virius, accepted the entertainment to which they were invited, and closed all with a cup of poison.

As to the terms of the treaty, which the rest of the Capuans made with the Romans, we can only guess at them by what followed. As soon as the latter were in possession of the place, they seized the soldiers of the garrison and the Capuan senators. These they conveyed to their camp to be tried by the proconsul. They were first made to discover all their treasures, which amounted to seventy pounds weight of gold, and three thousand two hundred pounds weight of silver; and then fifty-three of them were sent in custody to two Roman cities in separate companies; and it was resolved to determine their fate before any thing was decreed concerning the rest of the inhabitants. Appius inclined to cle-

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mency, Fulvius to severity; and the dispute grew warm between them. The former, to put an end to it, wrote to the senate, and referred the matter to them; but his colleague, without waiting for the senate's decree, went with two thousand horse, first to Teanum, whither twenty-eight of the Capuan senators had been transported, and he caused them to be beaten with rods, and then beheaded by the lictors. Thence he hastened to Cales, and treated with the same rigour the twenty-five senators who had been conveyed thither, though he might well have spared them, having just before the execution received letters from Rome, with orders to suspend it; but he put the letters in his bosom, and would not read them till all was over. Nor did the republic ever blame him for this instance of severity, being doubtless pleased to have revenge, without incurring the odium of inhumanity among her allies. This charge fell only upon Fulvius.

Livy, B. 26. c. 15.

And the impression of this pro-consul's cruelty became yet stronger in the minds of the people by the following incident. One Jubellius Taurea, a man among his own party, reputed brave, had come from Capua, and had been present at the late massacre of the senators. Pierced with compassion, and full of indignation, he thus addressed himself to the pro-consul, just as he was going to dismiss the assembly: "Stay one moment, Fulvius, and command me to be murdered; and then thou mayest boast of having killed a braver man than thyself." Fulvius (who had published the

senate's decree) replied, "You come too late to be punished, and are mad with rage."—"What!" said Jubellius, "have I lived to see my country reduced to slavery! Have I stabbed my wife and children to preserve them from insults and dishonour; and when I am come hither, to have my blood mixed with that of my friends and countrymen, do my enemies, after all, deny me death? My own arm shall put an end to this hated life:" as he ended these words he stabbed himself with a dagger he had brought under his robe, and fell dead at the foot of the tribunal.

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In Greece, the pro-prætor Lævinus had, in order to keep Philip of Macedon employed at home, endeavoured (with the approbation of the senate) to draw some of the Greek states into the interest of Rome. He began with the Ætolians, who were much discontented, because Acarnania had been by Philip dismembered from the body of their state; and he assured them that he would reduce it again under its ancient government and jurisdiction. These promises of the Roman general were confirmed to the people by Scopas their chief magistrate, and by Dorimachus a noble Ætolian, who, with less modesty and stronger asseverations, magnified the grandeur, power, and majesty of the people of Rome. The main motive, however, with the Ætolians was the hope of recovering Acarnania. Articles were therefore drawn up and agreed to, expressing the conditions on which these Grecians entered into an alliance with the Romans; and a clause

Livy, B. 26. c. 24.

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was added, "That the Eleans, the Lacedæmonians, Attalus king of Pergamus in Asia Minor, Pleuratus, a king of Thrace, or perhaps of a part of Illyricum, Scerdilœdus, king of the east part of the last-mentioned country, should, if they pleased, be comprised and included in the treaty." Polybius tells us, that the Ætolians sent ambassadors to these several states and princes, to solicit them to join in a confederacy against Philip; and he has transmitted to us the speeches made in the senate of Lacedæmon, by Chlœneas an Ætolian, and Lyciscus an Acarnanian, two orators, the first an advocate for the Ætolians, the second for Philip. Chlœneas's harangue consisted chiefly of invectives, displaying the tyranny, oppression, and usurpations exercised in Greece by the kings of Macedon, from the time of Philip the father of Alexander, to the present king; and, in the close of his speech, he urged the safety the Lacedæmonians would find in joining themselves with so powerful a confederacy as that formed against Philip. Lyciscus, on the other hand, endeavoured to clear the Macedonian kings from the charge brought against them; mentioned several of their laudable actions; loaded the Ætolians with the guilt of many violences, outrages, and sacrilegious abominations; and, in conclusion, represents the danger of making alliances with Barbarians; that these defenders of the Ætolians would soon become their conquerors, and, in time, of all Greece. These apprehensions were not unreasonable; but the Lacedæmonians did not

Polyb. B. 9. c. 22.

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at this time look so far forward: it seemed safest for them, at present, to come into the alliance proposed by the Ætolians; and they declared for that side.

The articles of confederacy between the Ætolians and Romans ran thus: "The Ætolians shall forthwith enter into a war with king Philip by land, and the Romans shall assist them by sea, with a fleet of 20 quinqueremes at least. All the cities that shall be conquered between the confines of Ætolia and Corcyra shall, as to the walls, houses, and lands, belonging to them, be possessed by the Ætolians; but the Romans shall have the moveable goods and plunder. The Romans shall use their endeavours that the Ætolians may again possess Acarnania. If at any time the Ætolians make a peace with Philip, they shall insert a clause, that the same shall be of no force until such time as Philip shall have withdrawn his forces employed against the Romans, or any of their allies. And in the same manner, if the Romans treat with the Macedonian king, they shall make the like provision for the security of the Ætolians and their allies." Though these articles were not signed till two years after, the confederates immediately began hostilities against Philip. Lævinus took the island of Zacynthus, and also two cities of Acarnania, which he replaced under the dominion of the Ætolians; and having thus kindled a war in Greece against the king, and found him sufficient employment at home, to hinder his as-

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sisting the Carthaginians, he retired with his fleet to Corcyra, and there wintered.

The news, that the Ætolians were in motion, was brought to Philip as he lay in his winter quarters at Pella. Resolving to invade Greece in the spring, he first turned his arms against Illyricum, that by the desolation and destruction he should cause there, he might intimidate the rest of his neighbours from attacking Macedon in his absence. From thence he marched his troops into Thrace against the Mædi. In the meantime the Ætolian army entered Acarnania, where they found that the people of the country were come to the most desperate resolutions for their defence: for, sending away their wives and children, and all who were above sixty years old, into Epirus, the rest engaged themselves by a solemn oath, never to return from the field but with victory: and they laid the heaviest curses on those of their own nation, who should harbour or relieve any who were vanquished and fled. These desperate measures, together with the approach of Philip, whom the Acarnanians had earnestly pressed to come from Thrace to their assistance, so terrified the Ætolians, that they retired into their own territories, and there continued quiet, till Lævinus, coming in the spring with his fleet to Naupactus, put them again in motion. In conjunction with the pro-prætor, they besieged Anticyra, (a city of the Locrenses, in the neighbourhood of Ætolia) by sea and land, and reduced it. But Lævinus, after

this, by reason of a dangerous sickness, was obliged to continue there a great while unactive.

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Winter now approached, and Marcellus returned from Sicily to Rome, for the first time since the taking of Syracuse. He demanded a triumph at his arrival; but having, pursuant to orders, left his army in Sicily, and it not being the custom for generals to triumph when their army was not present to give testimony to their exploits, he was granted only an ovation by the senate. To do himself justice, therefore, in the best manner he could, he decreed himself a triumph on the hill of Alba, for which there were some precedents in such cases. Next day he had a very magnificent ovation. A plan of Syracuse, statues and paintings of an exquisite taste, costly vases, and immense quantities of gold, silver, and brass, were carried on biers before him. Eight elephants, and all sorts of military engines used in sieges, made a part of the show. It was at this time that Marcellus introduced among the Romans a refined taste for paintings and sculptures; which made some of the old Romans uneasy. They feared it would gradually destroy the people's love of husbandry and war, and would be a means to soften and enervate them.

Livy, B. 26. c. 21.

Plut. Life of Marcellus. Author of the Lives of Illustrious Men.

CHAP. XXVIII.

THE NINTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

Marcellus's conduct complained of before the senate by the Sicilians.—Fulvius accused of cruelty by the Capuans: the fate of their city is determined.—The fortune of the campaign in Italy various.—The reduction of Sicily completed.

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Livy, B. 26 c. 22.

THE time for electing new magistrates drawing on, Fulvius Centumalus was recalled to Rome, to preside in the *comitia*. The first century that voted, named T. Manlius Torquatus and T. Otacilius for consuls. It was not doubted but the rest of the centuries would join in the nomination; and a multitude of people flocked round Manlius, to congratulate him upon his election. But he approaching the consul's tribunal, begged that he would call back the century that had just given their votes, and allow him to speak a few words. While all were in expectation of what he would ask, he excused himself on account of a weakness in his eyes, from accepting the dignity offered him. "A man," said he, "must be very shameless to desire to be a pilot or a general, and to have the lives and fortunes of multitudes committed to his care, when he knows that in every thing he does, he must make use of other men's eyes." He therefore entreated the president of the assembly to order the prerogative century to give their votes anew, and desired

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of them, that in their choice they would have regard to the circumstances of the republic, remember that the war was still in Italy, and that Rome was scarce recovered from the terror caused by the late insult of the enemy at her gates. Notwithstanding this remonstrance, the century, with repeated cries, insisted upon the choice they had made. "No," said Manlius, "neither can I bear your manners, nor you my government. Return into the voting place, and consider that Carthage is making war in Italy, and that Hannibal is her general." The century finding these words applauded by all who stood round Manlius, and having a real respect for him, made no longer any difficulty to comply with his desire; and Marcellus, the fourth time, and Lævinus, the second time, were raised to the consular dignity.

Lævinus was still lying sick at Anticyra in Greece. Marcellus entered upon his office on the ides of March, and, according to custom, assembled the senate that day, but declared he would bring no matters relating to the republic before the fathers till the arrival of his colleague. He complained that there were numbers of Syracusians in Rome, who spread reports about the city to his disadvantage; that M. Cornelius Cethegus, the prætor of Sicily, had not only sent over many of these to accuse him, but had also asserted in his letters, that the war was far from being finished in the island, [no untruth, as will appear by-and-by] that he might have the greater glory in putting an end to it. The consul added, that he him-

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self would immediately give his enemies an opportunity of laying their accusations before the senate, were it not that he understood they affected to be afraid of accusing him in the absence of his colleague; and that, as soon as Lævinus should arrive, he would take care they should be heard.

As Lævinus passed through Campania, in his return to Rome, the inhabitants of that country crowded about him, and implored his protection against the tyranny and cruelty of the pro-consul Fulvius Flaccus. Lævinus ordered them to follow him to Rome; which when he drew near, the company of Sicilians, who were to accuse Marcellus, joined him likewise; and he suffered them to enter the city with him. However, before he procured them an audience from the senate, he gave the conscript fathers an account of his own conduct, and the state of affairs in Greece. And the next thing to be done, was to assign the consuls and the rest of the generals of the Roman armies, their respective provinces for the ensuing campaign. Italy fell by lot to Lævinus, and Sicily to Marcellus. This was no sooner declared, than the Sicilians, who were present at the ceremony, made a horrible outcry, and expressed as much terror and consternation as they had done at Syracuse when Marcellus surprised it. They dressed themselves in mourning, ran to the houses of the senators, and there declared, they would never return home, rather than be again subject to Marcellus. And that it would be better for Sicily to perish in the

Livy, B. 26. c. 27.

Fast. Cap. Livy, B. 26. c. 28.

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flames of Ætna, than to be given up as a prey to her implacable enemy. The affair was mentioned in the senate, and the consuls were asked to consult the fathers about an exchange of provinces. Marcellus answered, that had the Sicilians been already heard, perhaps he should not think that motion so equitable; but now, lest it should be said that fear restrained them from accusing a man who must shortly be their governor, he was very willing to exchange provinces with his colleague, provided he agreed to it; but begged the senate would not give him the mortification of interposing a judgment of theirs in the matter; for, said he, if it would have been unjust to give my colleague his option, without casting lots, how much more unjust, nay, what an indignity would it be to me, to transfer my lot to him? The senate did not interpose their authority, and the exchange was made by the consuls themselves. Then the Sicilians were admitted to bring their complaints against Marcellus. Their accusation turned upon his pretended cruelty at Leontini, his having sacked Syracuse, and his having stripped the citizens of every thing, though (as the accusers protested) it had been by compulsion that the Syracusians had sided with the Carthaginians; and they prayed, that what had been taken from them, and could be recovered, might be restored.

Livy, B. 26. c. 30. Plut. in Marcello.

When the Sicilians had done speaking, Marcellus left the curule chair, and went to the place where persons accused were wont to make their defence. He fairly laid before the

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house the matters of fact, (as they have been related) and then withdrew, to give the senators more freedom in their debates. A great many of the fathers, and among the rest, T. Manlius Torquatus, were of opinion, that the war ought to be considered as having been carried on against the tyrants Hippocrates and Epicydes, equally the enemies of the Romans and Syracusians. After a long debate, the majority voted the proceedings of Marcellus to have been regular; but added to their decree, that the senate would take care of the Syracusians, and recommended it to the consul, Lævinus, to consult their interest, as far as it was consistent with that of the republic.

When the Sicilians, being called in, had heard the decree read, they threw themselves at the feet of Marcellus, and begged he would forgive whatever, with a view to set forth their miseries and move compassion, they had said against him; and would receive them into his protection. The consul granted their request; and in gratitude to him, the people of Syracuse ordered, that whenever he or any of his family set foot in Sicily, the people should crown themselves with garlands, and celebrate the day with sacrifices; and Syracuse was, ever after, under the patronage of the Marcelli.

Livy, B. 26. c. 33.

The cause of the Campanians came on next. Their pleading consisted wholly of a pathetic representation of their miseries. When they had finished their complaint, they were ordered to withdraw. And then M. Attilius Regulus, who had served in the army at the taking of Capua, was examined as to the facts. This

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senator could say little to the advantage of the Capuans; but he moved that the senate might not determine the affair, till it had obtained the consent of the tribes: because the Capuans, being Roman citizens, could not legally be judged by the senate, without the approbation of the people. Accordingly, a tribune of the commons was desired to summon the *comitia* by tribes, and request them to empower the senate to pronounce sentence on the Capuans. He complied. The *comitia* answered in that authoritative style which showed their sovereignty: "What the majority of the senate now sitting, after being sworn, shall determine, that we will and command." The senate, thus authorized, pronounced judgment: and when the sentence came to be executed, Campania was stripped of all the monuments of its grandeur; Capua was no longer a city; it had neither senate, *comitia*, nor magistrates of its own; Rome sent a præfect thither annually, to preserve order in the place, and to hear causes. Its former slothful and effeminate inhabitants were transplanted elsewhere, and succeeded by Roman colonies of laborious and industrious husbandmen.

Livy, B. 26. c. 35.

And now the consuls applied themselves wholly to the preparations for the approaching campaign. As the navy wanted great repairs, and the public treasury was exhausted, they published an edict, ordering every man, according to his census, to furnish pay and provisions for thirty days to a certain number of sailors and rowers, agreeably to a precedent on the like occasion. This falling heavy on the

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Livy, B. 26. c. 36.

poorer citizens, already drained by taxes, since Hannibal's invasion, it had like to have caused an insurrection. The people threatened to do themselves justice, if the edict was not revoked in three days. In that time, the consuls, to make matters easy, proposed in the senate a method which gained them great applause.—They moved that all the dignified persons in the state, and the senators, should give a good example of zeal for the republic, by voluntarily carrying in to the treasury their superfluous gold, silver, and brass. All present approved the motion; and the knights and common citizens so readily followed the example of the consuls and senators, that there was an emulation who should first enter their names in the register of the contributors. Thus were the Roman fleets recruited; and Rome put into a condition to support the war on all sides.

c. 37.

When Marcellus and Lævinus set out for their provinces, there were in the town of Salapia, in Apulia, two men of great authority, Dasius and Blasius; the latter was in the Roman interest, and had entered into a negotiation with the consul to betray the town to him. As this could not be done without Dasius's consent, the traitor ventured to open his mind to him, and solicit his assistance, though he knew him to be a zealous Hannibalist. Dasius immediately informed the Carthaginian of the affair, who thereupon cited both to appear before him. But the accuser not being able to bring any proof to support his charge, Hannibal imagined the accusation to have proceed-

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ed entirely from jealousy and hatred; and would take no further cognizance of it. After this, Blasius gained over his colleague, and they took measures together for the surrendry of the place. Marcellus on a sudden appeared before it, and was admitted into the town; and then the Carthaginian garrison, which consisted of 500 brave Numidian horse, finding themselves betrayed, resolved to sell their lives dear. They quitted their horses, which were of no use to them, and fought on foot, till they were all killed except fifty, who yielded themselves prisoners. This, if we may credit Livy, was so great a loss to Hannibal, that in all the battles he afterwards fought in Italy, his cavalry never gained the superiority over the enemy, as in former engagements.

Livy, B. 26. c. 39.

The Carthaginian had still hopes of taking the citadel of Tarentum, which he kept blocked up. On the other hand, the Romans sent a squadron of ships to supply the garrison with provisions: but this fleet, before it could enter the port, being obliged to come to an engagement with the Tarentine fleet, was utterly defeated, and the admiral of it killed in the action.

Plut. Life of Marcellus. Livy, B. 27. c. 1.

Marcellus took two more cities in Samnium, and in them about 3000 Carthaginian prisoners, together with a great quantity of grain. Fulvius Centumalus, who commanded as proconsul in Apulia, being ambitious of imitating the consul, without his abilities, drew near to a city called Herdonea, in hopes to reduce it by force, or by treaty, but was surprised by Hannibal; and though the Romans behaved

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themselves bravely, they were totally defeated, their camp taken, and the general, with 11 legionary tribunes, slain in the engagement.

So complete a victory recovered the affairs and credit of Hannibal for some time, and greatly discouraged the people at Rome, whose only hopes were now in Marcellus. This consul, knowing how much the people were terrified, wrote to the senate in these terms: "I am the same man that I was after the battle of Cannæ. I am going to meet the same conqueror, and have reason to expect the same success. The joy that now swells the mind of the Carthaginian, will not be of long duration." He then marched towards Hannibal, and came up with him near Numistro, in Bruttium. The Carthaginian did not decline a battle. The engagement was bloody; and the night alone put an end to it. At sun-rising, Marcellus offered him battle again; but Hannibal would not accept the challenge. He decamped; and the consul followed him from place to place. So that these two great generals spent the rest of the campaign, the one in seeking for an opportunity to come to a general action, the other in endeavouring to avoid it, and to draw his enemy into an ambush.

c. 3. In the meantime, Fulvius Flaccus was busy in managing the affairs of the republic in Campania; and the senate ordered a great quantity of corn to be bought up in Hetruria, and carried to the citadel of Tarentum: 2000 men were likewise commanded to the relief of the garrison; and this convoy had a happier passage thither than the last.

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From the consul Lævinus the senate received news of the total reduction of Sicily.—Agrigentum had long held out for the Carthaginians. Hanno had commanded there a numerous garrison; but having through jealousy disobliged, and even broke, a brave Numidian officer, named Mutines, much esteemed among his countrymen, and who having been sent by Hannibal into Sicily, to supply the place of Hippocrates, had done the Carthaginians signal service in that island, the proud African could not brook the affront. To revenge himself, he entered into a correspondence with the consul; and having engaged a body of the Numidians in the conspiracy, they opened one of the gates to the Roman troops. Hanno, with Epicydes, and a few more officers, escaped in a small vessel; but the rest of the garrison were all cut in pieces. After this, 20 towns were betrayed into the hands of the Romans, six taken by force, and the rest, to the number of 40, surrendered voluntarily. Lævinus, having settled all affairs in the island, (which from this time became the granary of Rome) received an order from the senate, to return home, to hold the *comitia* by centuries: for though Marcellus was nearer, it was dangerous to interrupt his pursuit of Hannibal. However, Lævinus was hardly arrived, when he found himself obliged to go back again, to take care of his province, an express coming from Valerius Messala (who commanded a fleet in Sicily and had been ravaging the coast of Africa) with an account that the Carthaginians were preparing a naval armament to re-conquer Sicily.

Livy, B. 27. c. 4.

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The senate hastened the departure of Lævinus, and ordered him to name a dictator to hold the *comitia* for the new elections. The consul did not refuse to obey; but that he might continue the longer in the supreme dignity, insisted upon deferring the nomination till he should arrive in Sicily; and he promised that he would then name Messala: but it being contrary to ancient custom, for a dictator to be named elsewhere than in Italy, the conscript fathers passed a decree, requiring Lævinus before he left the city to petition the people to recommend a proper person for the dictatorship and enjoining the consul to name that person; and the decree provided also, that in case the consul refused to petition, as before mentioned, the prætor of Rome should do it; and if he likewise refused, the tribunes of the commons should bring the matter before the *comitia*. Lævinus was obstinate, and forbad the prætor to offer any petition to the people. Upon this, the tribunes assembled them; and it was determined that Q. Fulvius Flaccus, then at Capua, should be nominated dictator. But Lævinus, the night before the holding of the *comitia*, had set out for Sicily, so that the fathers were obliged to write to Marcellus to name the dictator the people had recommended. Q. Fulvius being thus raised to the dictatorship, named P. Licinus Crassus, the pontifex maximus, to be his general of horse.

END OF VOL. IV.

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